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BUTLER'S  WORKS 

GLADSTONE 


t    VOL.  I. 


HENRY  FROWDE,  M.A. 
PUBLISHER  TO  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  OXFORD 


THE  MACMII.LAN  COMPANY 


THE  WORKS 


OF 


JOSEPH  BUTLER,  D.C.L. 

SOMETIME  LORD  BISHOP  OF  DURHAM 


DIVIDED    INTO   SECTIONS;     WITH    SECTIONAL    HEADINGS 

AN    INDEX    TO    EACH   VOLUME  ;    AND    SOME   OCCASIONAL    NOTES 

ALSO    PREFATORY    MATTER 


EDITED  BY 

THE   RIGHT   HON.  W.   E.   GLADSTONE 


Cuius  sacra  fero  ingcnti  perculsus  amorc 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 

VOL.  I:  ANALOGY,  ETC. 


Ojforfc 

AT  THE  CLARENDON   PRESS 
1897 


019S2 


PRINTED   AT  THE  CLARENDON   PRESS 

BY   HORACE   HART,    M.A. 
PRINTER' TO  THE  UNIVERSITY 


THE 

ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION 

NATURAL  AND   REVEALED 

TO  THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE 

TO   WHICH   ARE  ADDED  TWO  BRIEF  DISSERTATIONS 

I.  OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY  J  II.  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE 

AND 

A    CORRESPONDENCE    WITH    DR.    SAMUEL    CLARKE 
BY 

JOSEPH    BUTLER,   D.C.L. 

SOMETIME   LORD  BISHOP  OF  DURHAM 


EDITED  BY 

THE    RIGHT   HON.  W.   E.   GLADSTONE 


AT  THE   CLARENDON   PRESS 
1897 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE 


H^HE  purpose  with  which  this  edition  of  Bishop 
Butler's  Works  is  published,  is  to  give  readier 
access  to  the  substance  and  meaning  of  those  works 
than  the  student  has  heretofore  enjoyed. 

The  reasons  why  such  access  should  be  afforded,  and 
that  in  the  largest  possible  degree,  are  too  wide  for 
statement  in  a  Preface,  and  will  perhaps  be  sufficiently 
understood  from  a  collection  of  Essays  which  is  meant 
promptly  to  follow  the  present  publication.  But  it 
will  be  well  to  set  forth  the  means  which  have  been 
adopted. 

These  are  in  brief  as  follows : — 

1.  The   Analogy,  and  the  other  works  with  slight 
exceptions,  have  been  broken  into  sections. 

2.  Every  section  has  been  supplied  with  a  heading, 
intended  to  assist  the  eye,  and,  as  far  as  may  be,  the 
mind  of  the  reader,  by  an  indication  of  its  contents. 

3.  Indexes  to  each  Volume  have  been  provided :  and 
they  are  framed  upon  a  separate  perusal  and  following 
of   the    Text,    as    close    as    the    present    Editor  could 
make  it. 

4.  He  has  ventured  to  add  a  limited  number  of  Notes, 
in  part  explanatory,  and  in  part  illustrative. 


Vin  EDITOR'S   PREFACE 

5.  An  Appendix  has  been  added  to  Vol.  II.     The 
several  pieces  which  it  contains  are  all  of  them  either 
by  Butler,  or  associated  with  his  name. 

6.  The  Text  of  the  Analogy  has  been  duly  considered 
under  the  supervision  of  the  authorities  of  the  University 
Press,  and  with  the  aid  furnished  by  Bishop  Fitzgerald's 
edition  of  the  Analogy  (Dublin,  1849),  in  which  many 
corrections  of  the  current  edition  of   1844  were  made, 
and   a   collation  with  the   original   text   of    1736   was 
embodied. 

And  now  a  few  words  with  respect  to  some  of  these 
particulars. 

First,  the  labour  of  the  Editor  has  in  the  aggregate 
been  considerable.  The  smallest  and  least  arduous  part 
of  it  has  also  been  that  where  he  feels  most  sanguine  as 
to  the  results.  To  provide  the  students  of  Butler  with 
this  facility  for  comparison  and  for  reference,  appeared 
to  him  nothing  less  than  a  glaring  necessity. 

The  embarrassment  heretofore  felt  has  been  twofold  : 
it  has  been  experienced  alike  in  perusing  Butler,  and  in 
testing  what  has  been  written  upon  him. 

Dr.  Whewell,  in  1848,  made  a  step  towards  it  by  pre- 
fixing to  his  edition  of  the  Three  Sermons  on  Human 
Nature  a  brief  syllabus  in  seventy-nine  heads.  In 
1849,  publishing  an  edition  of  six  more  of  the  Fifteen 
Sermons,  as  the  Six  Sermons  on  Moral  Subjects,  he 
made  a  more  daring  advance,  and  divided  each  of 
them  into  a  continuous  series  of  paragraphs  or  articles 
regularly  numbered,  while  he  prefixed  to  them  a  cor- 
responding list  in  160  sentences,  each  of  a  very  few 
words.  They  were  such  as  might  have  been  printed  as 
headings  on  the  margin. 

Another  editor,  Dr.  Angus,  who  has  laboured  on  Butler 
with  care  and  ability,  perceived  that  something  was 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE  ix 

wanted  in  order  to  afford  easier  access  to  the  Analogy, 
and  was  struck  by  the  example  of  Dr.  Whewell,  but 
concluded  that  'this  plan  seemed  a  liberty  which  he 
was  not  justified  in  taking  V  And  notwithstanding 
that  this  very  same  liberty  has  now  been  taken,  and 
that  on  the  largest  scale,  a  tribute  of  sympathy  may 
still  be  paid  to  the  temper  which  made  Dr.  Angus  feel 
that  the  mere  body  and  figure  of  works  such  as  those 
of  Butler  were  to  be  handled  with  scruple  and  with 
reverence.  It  would  have  been  well  if  the  modesty  of 
Butler  had  allowed  him  to  anticipate  that  his  leading 
productions  would  become  classics  in  the  philosophical 
theology  of  his  country,  and  if  he  had  accordingly 
furnished  them  with  all  facilities  for  perusal  in  the 
mode  and  form  which  he  was  of  all  men  by  far  the  best 
fitted  to  determine. 

But  the  dominant  consideration  with  the  present 
Editor  has  been  this,  that  for  want  of  an  easily  available 
power  of  reference  from  part  to  part  of  works  so  close  in 
tissue  and  so  profoundly  charged  with  vital  matter,  the 
difficulty  of  mastering  Butler  has  been  seriously  aggra- 
vated, if  not  multiplied  manifold.  Most  of  the  editions 
are  without  index;  but  an  index  is  an  imperfect  help, 
and  the  reference  to  a  particular  page,  good  for  the 
particular  edition,  is  valueless  for  every  other.  The 
consequence  is  that  it  is  often  necessary  to  spend  half 
an  hour  in  looking  for  a  passage.  And  the  further 
consequence  is  that,  as  a  high  tariff  engenders  smuggling, 
so  readers,  and  even  critics,  of  Butler  are  often  compelled 
or  induced  to  forgo  this  trouble,  and  let  remote  recollec- 
tion or  vague  impression  shift  for  itself.  It  is  indeed 
too  easy  to  show  how  disastrously  censors  of  Butler  in 


Preface  to  Angus' s  Butler, 


X  EDITOR'S   PREFACE 

some  instances  have  failed  to  represent  him  correctly, 
owing,  as  I  believe,  to  this  cause. 

Without  sectional  divisions,  would  not  our  mani- 
pulation of  the  ancient  philosophers  be  hopelessly  em- 
barrassed? And  yet  who  is  there  among  them,  unless 
perhaps  Aristotle,  the  tissue  of  whose  thought  is  closer 
than  that  of  Butler? 

Secondly,  with  the  plan  of  sectional  division  has  been 
combined  that  of  sectional  headings.  And  here  the 
Editor  must  admit  that,  while  the  task  of  framing  them 
is  one  of  a  difficulty  not  to  be  wholly  overcome  (as  far 
as  his  experience  enables  him  to  speak)  by  any  amount 
of  labour,  the  result  may  probably  remain  far  from 
satisfactory.  Still,  on  the  one  hand,  these  headings-  may 
often  be  useful  guides  to  the  eye  of  a  searcher ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  they  may  supply  in  a  form  more  direct 
and  easy,  if  less  complete,  the  same  description  of  help 
as  is  aimed  at  by  a  more  formal  analysis. 

Thirdly,  as  to  Indexes. 

The  Analogy,  to  which  is  subjoined  the  Clarke  corre- 
spondence as  well  as  the  Two  Dissertations,  has  so  close 
a  coherence  in  itself  between  every  chapter,  and  indeed 
every  sentence,  that,  although  at  numerous  points  it 
touches  the  same  subject-matter  as  the  Sermons,  there 
is  upon  the  whole  a  marked  distinction ;  and  it  appeared 
desirable  therefore  to  give  a  separate  Index  to  eacli 
Volume. 

While  perhaps  no  writer  requires  an  index  so  much 
as  Butler,  it  may  be  also  said  that  for  no  writer  is  it 
•more  difficult  to  frame  an  index  which  shall  answer 
its  proper  purpose.  A  number  of  indexes  have  been 
framed  for  the  Analogy.  I  do  not  remember  any  for 
the  Sermons,  which  however  also  require  this  auxiliary. 
But  what  is  the  proper  basis  of  an  index?  Not  to 


EDITOR'S   PREFACE  xi 

present  an  exhaustive  analysis,  but  rather  to  supply  an 
aid  to  the  memory  of  the  student.  The  student  ought 
to  find  in  the  several  items  of  an  index,  under  the  most 
natural  and  (so  to  speak)  salient  heads,  every  point  of 
his  author's  text  to  which  it  is  likely  that,  in  default 
of  exact  recollection,  he  may  desire  to  refer.  This  has 
been  the  conception  or  plan  on  which  these  Indexes 
have  been  constructed ;  but  the  task  is  difficult,  and, 
though  labour  has  not  been  spared,  the  execution  may 
be  far  from  perfect. 

Fourthly,  this  edition  is  also  provided  with  occasional 
Notes.  Their  purpose  is  limited,  and  their  number  not 
very  large. 

Dr.  Angus  indicates  in  his  brief  Preface  three,  indeed 
four,  purposes  of  his  notes,  which  may  here  be  repeated 
in  substance.  First,  to  give  the  history  of  opinions  with 
which  the  text  has  dealt.  Secondly,  to  trace  the  influ- 
ence of  Butler  himself  on  later  writers.  Thirdly,  to 
question  or  qualify  his  arguments,  or  to  explain  his 
expressions.  Fourthly,  to  make  good  deficiencies  in 
point  of  evangelical  tone. 

It  appears,  however,  highly  desirable  that  the  student 
of  Butler  should  not  be  burdened  with  unnecessary 
or  distracting  notes.  In  the  case  of  great  works  like 
these,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  a  mass  of 
notes  encumbers  and  obstructs  the  road  to  the  author's 
meaning,  which  may  be  accessible  enough  with  the  aid 
of  close  attention  and  free  reference.  The  student  ought 
not  to  find  extraneous  matter  too  largely  interposed 
between  it  and  his  mind.  The  last  of  the  heads  above 
given  is,  in  the  view  of  the  present  Editor,  illegitimate 
and  causeless.  The  second,  which  would  open  a  very 
wide  field,  does  not  seem  well  suited  to  fragmentary 
discussion.  The  first  is  useful  on  account  of  the  amount 


xii  EDITOR'S   PREFACE 

of  tacit  reference  to  prior  writers,  which  Butler,  in  his 
anxiety  to  avoid  controversy,  has  embodied  without 
names  in  his  text;  but  it  should  be  confined  to  indi- 
cating immediate  sources.  The  third,  while  requiring 
circumspection,  is  proper,  and  is  directly  auxiliary  to 
the  purposes  of  the  student. 

Only  in  a  very  few  cases  of  reference  to  the  greatest 
masters  have  citations  been  made  for  the  purpose  of 
corroborative  illustration.  But,  as  a  general  rule,  the 
safest  basis  of  annotation  upon  Butler  probably  is  to 
consider  not  what  the  text  admits,  but  what  it,  more 
or  less,  requires. 

With  regard  to  the  Editor's  task  at  large,  he  is 
impressed  with  two  convictions  in  particular.  The  first 
of  these  is,  that  it  was  work  requisite  on  broad  grounds 
to  be  done.  The  second  is,  that  it  might  have  been— 
perhaps  may  yet  be — better  done  by  others.  Nor  does 
he  use  the  word  '  others '  vaguely ;  for  he  has  in  view 
such  minds  (always  of  necessity  rare)  as  the  mind  which 
produced  the  masterly  Sermon l  by  Dean  Church  on  his 
illustrious  predecessor.  The  apology  for  the  present 
effort  is  comprised  in  few  words :  Better  thus,  than  not 
at  all. 

W.  E.  GLADSTONE. 

HAWARDEN  CASTLE  : 
December,  1895. 

1  See  the  recent  Volume,  Blaise  Pascal  and  other  Sermons  (Macmillan). 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL,  I 


PAGE 

PREFACE  BY  THE  EDITOR vii 

CHRONOLOGY  OF  BISHOP  BUTLER'S  LIFE          ,        ,        .        .        .    xvii 

EPITAPH  ASCRIBED  TO  DR.  FORSTER    •  •-•» — -, ^—     ,~      .        .  xviii 

ACCOUNT  BY   BISHOP    HALIFAX  OF   THE    MORAL  AND    RELIGIOUS 

SYSTEMS  OF  BISHOP  BUTLER  .  .  .  .  ,  .  xix 
DEDICATION  .  .  *  .  .  ,  ,  ,  .  .  xxxix 
ADVERTISEMENT  +'  +  *  •  «  .  .  .  .  .  i 
INTRODUCTION 3 


PART   I, 
OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  a  Future  Life  .........       I; 

CHAPTER  ^1. 
Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards    and   Punishments  ; 

and  particularly  of  the  latter  .....       40 

CHAPTER  III. 
Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God       ...... 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Of  a   State    of  Probation,  as   implying  Trial,    Difficulties,  and 
Danger  .        ......... 


CONTENTS    OF   VOL.    I> 

CHAFIER  V. 

Of  a    State  of   Probation,   as   intended    for   Moral    Discipline 

and  Improvement  •        •.«...  88 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influencing  Practice.     114 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Of    the    Government    of    God,    considered     as    a    Scheme    or 

Constitution,  imperfectly  comprehended       .        .        .         .132 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Conclusion    ....        .        .     ,  .        .  .        .        m  t 


PART   II. 
OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity 


CHAPTER  II. 

Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revelation,  considered 
as  miraculous  ...... 

CHAPTER  III. 

Of  our  Incapacity  of  judging,  what  were  to  1«o  expected  in  a 
Revelation  ;  and  the  Credibility,  from  Analogy,  that  it 
must  contain  Things  appearing  liable  to  Objections  .  182 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Of  Christianity,   considered  as  a  Scheme  or   Constitution  im- 

perfectly comprehended          .....         .        .199 

CHAFFER  V. 
Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity  ;  the  Appointment  of 

a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World  .by  Him    .     207 


CONTENTS    OF   VOL.    I  XV 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Of  the    Want    of   Universality    in    Revelation:     and    of    the 
supposed  deficiency  in  the  proof  of  it 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity       ".        .        •        .247 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against  arguing  from 

the  Analogy  of  Nature,  to  Religion      .'•...        .        .     289 

CHAPTER  IX. 

003 
Conclusion     . 


DISSERTATION  I. 
Of  Personal  Identity 

DISSERTATION  II. 
Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue       .    *   .        .        . 


CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  DR.  BUTLEB  AND  DR.  CLARKE      .        .    339 

•         •        •        •        •        •        '        '359 


CHRONOLOGY  OF  BUTLER'S  LIFE 


Joseph  Butler  born        .        .        *   '    .        .        .      May  18,  1692 

Entered  at  Oriel  College,  Oxford  .         .        .        .  March  17,  1714 

Preacher  at  the  Rolls .  1718 

B.C.L June  10,  1721 

Rector  of  Haughton        ...        .        *        .        .        .  1722 

Rector  of  Stanhope         .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .  1725 

Publication  of  the  Sermons    .        .        .  ,        .        .1 726 

D.C.L .        .        .    »   .        .  1733 

Clerk  of  the  Closet  to  Queen  Caroline    .        .        .        .        .  1736 

Publication  of  the  Analogy    .        . 1 736 

Bishop  of  Bristol    .        .        .        ,        .        .        ,       Dec.  3,  1 738 

Dean  of  St.  Paul's ".      May  23,  1740 

Clerk  of  the  Closet  to  King  George  II 1746 

Bishop  of  Durham .      Oct.  16,  1750 

Charge  to  his  Clergy .1751 

Death June  16,  1752 


VOL.  I. 


\ 


EPITAPH  ASCRIBED  TO  DR.  FORSTER 


The  following  Epitaph,  said  to  be  written  by  Dr.  Nathanael  Porster, 
is  inscribed  on  a  flat  marble  stone,  in  the  cathedral  church  of 
Bristol,  placed  over  the  spot  where  the  remains  of  Bishop  Butler 
are  deposited ;  and  which,  as  it  is  now  almost  obliterated,  it  may 
be  worth  while  here  to  preserve. 

H.  S. 

REVERENDUS   ADMODUM   IN   CHRISTO   PATER 

JOSEPHUS  BUTLER,  LL.D. 

HUJUSCE   PRIMO   DIOECESEOS 
DEINDE   DUNELMENSIS   EPISCOPUS. 

QUALIS   QUANTUSQUE   VIR   ERAT 

SUA    LIBENTISSIME   AGNOVIT   AETAS  : 

ET   SI   QUID   PRAESULI   AUT  SCRIPTORI    AD   FAMAM   VALENT 

MENS   ALTISSIMA, 

1NGENII   PERSPICACIS   ET   SUBACTI   VIS, 

ANIMUSQUE   PIUS,   SIMPLEX,   CANDIDUS,    LIBERALS, 

MORTUI   HAUD   FACILE   EVANESCET   MEMORIA. 

OBIIT    BATHONIAE    l6  KALEND.   JULII, 

A.D.     1752. 
ANNOS   NATUS  60. 


AN 
ACCOUNT  BY   BISHOP   HALIFAX 

OF 

THE   MORAL  AND   RELIGIOUS  SYSTEMS 
OF   BISHOP   BUTLER1 

~j  N  what  follows  I  propose  to  give  a  short  account  of  the  Bishop's 
moral  and  religions  systems,  as  these  are  collected  from  his 
Works. 

I.  His  way  of  treating  the  subject  of  morals  is  to  be  gathered 
from  the  volume  of  his  Sermons,  and  particularly  from  the  three 
first,  and  from  the  preface  to  that  volume. 

'  There  is/  as  our  author  with  singular  sagacity  has  observed, 
'a  much  more  exact  correspondence  between  the  natural  and 
moral  world,  than  we  are  apt  to  take  notice  of  ».'  The  inward 
frame* of  man  answers  to  his  outward  condition;  the  several  pro- 
pensities, -  passions,  and  affections,  implanted  in  our  hearts  by 
the  Author  of  nature,  are  in  a  peculiar  manner  adapted  to  the 
circumstances  of  life  in  which  he  hath  placed  us.  This  general 
observation,  properly  pursued,  leads  to  several  important  con- 
clusions. The  original  internal  constitution  of  man,  compared 
with  his  external  condition,  enables  us  to  discern  what  course 

a  Serin,  vi. 


This  portion  of  the  Preface  writ-  which  there  is  no  occasion  to  displace 
ten  by  Bishop  Halifax  has  been  re-  from  the  ground  it  has  long  and 
tamed  as  a  clear  and  able  summary,  usefully  occupied.— ED 

b2 


XX  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

of  action  and  behaviour  that  constitution  leads  to,  what  is  our 
duty  respecting  that  condition,  and  furnishes  us  besides  with  the 
most  powerful  arguments  to  the  practice  of  it. 

What  the  inward  frame  and  constitution  of  man  is,  is  a  question 
of  fact ;  to  be  determined,  as  other  facts  are,  from  experience, 
from  our  internal  feelings  and  external  senses,  and  from  the 
testimony  of  others.     Whether  human  nature,  and  the   circum- 
stances in  which  it  is   placed,  might   not  have   been    ordered 
otherwise,  is  foreign  to  our  inquiry,  and  none   of  our  concern  : 
our  province  is,  taking  both  of  these  as  they  are,  and  viewing 
the  connection  between  them,  from  that  connection  to  discover, 
if  we  can,  what  course  of  action  is  fitted  to  that  nature  and  those 
circumstances.    From  contemplating  the  bodily  senses,  and  the 
organs  or  instruments  adapted  to  them,  we  learn  that  the  eye  was 
given  to  see  with,  the  ear  to  hear  with.     In  like  manner,  from 
considering  our  inward  perceptions  and  the  final  causes  of  them, 
we  collect  that  the  feeling  of  shame,  for  instance,  was  given  to 
prevent  the    doing  of  things   shameful ;    compassion,   to   carry 
us  to  relieve  others  in  distress ;  anger,  to  resist  sudden  violence 
offered  to   ourselves.     If,  continuing  our  inquiries  in   this  way, 
it  should  at  length  appear,  that  the  nature,  the  whole  nature^ 
of  man  leads  him  to   and  is  fitted  for  that  particular  course 
of  behaviour  which  we  usually  distinguish  by  the  name  of  virtue, 
we  are  authorized  to  conclude,  that  virtue  is  the  law  we  are  born 
under,  that  it  was  so  intended  by  the  Author  of  our  being ;  and 
we  are  bound  by  the  most  intimate  .of  all  obligations,  a  regard 
to  our  own  highest  interest  and  happiness,  to  conform  to  it  in  all 
situations  and  events. 

Human  nature  is  not  simple  and  uniform,  but  made  up  of  several 
parts ;  and  we  can  have  no  just  idea  of  it  as  a  system  or  consti- 
tution, unless  we  take  into  our  view  the  respects  and  relations 
which  these  parts  have  to  each  other.  As  the  body  is  not  one 
member,  but  many ;  so  our  inward  structure  consists  of  various 
instincts,  appetites,  and  propensions.  Thus  far  there  is  'no  dif- 
ference between  human  creatures  and  brutes.  But  besides  these 
common  passions  and  affections,  there  is  another  principle,  peculiar 
to  mankind,  that  of  conscience,  moral  sense,  reflection,  call  it 


MORAL    AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  Xxi 

what  you  please,  by  which  they  are  enabled  to  review  their  whole 
conduct,  to  approve  of  some  actions  in  themselves,  and  to  dis- 
approve of  others.  That  this  principle  will  of  course  have  some 
influence  on  our  behaviour,  at  least  at  times,  will  hardly  be 
disputed  :  but  the  particular  influence  which  it  ought  to  have, 
the  precise  degree  of  power  in  the  regulating  of  our  internal  frame 
that  is  assigned  it  by  him  who  placed  it  there,  is  a  point  of  the 
utmost  consequence  in  itself,  and  on  the  determination  of  which 
the  very  hinge  of  our  author's  moral  system  turns.  If  the  faculty 
here  spoken  of  be,  indeed,  what  it  is  asserted  to  be,  in  nature  and 
kind  superior  to  every  other  passion  and  affection ;  if  it  be  given, 
not  merely  that  it  may  exert  its  force  occasionally,  or  as  our 
present  humour  or  fancy  may  dispose  us,  but  that  it  may  at  all 
times  exercise  an  uncontrollable  authority  and  government  over 
all  the  rest ;  it  will  then  follow,  that,  in  order  to  complete  the 
idea  of  human  nature,  as  a  system,  we  must  not  only  take  in  each 
particular  bias,  propension,  instinct,  which  are  seen  to  belong  to 
it,  but  we  must  add  besides  the  principle  of  conscience,  together 
with  the  subjection  that  is  due  to  it  from  all  the  other  appetites 
and  passions :  just  as  the  idea  of  a  civil  constitution  is  formed, 
not  barely  from  enumerating  the  several  members  and  ranks 
of  which  it  is  composed,  but  from  these  considered  as  acting 
in  various  degrees  of  subordination  to  each  other,  and  all  under 
the  direction  of  the  same  supreme  authority,  whether  that  au- 
thority be  vested  in  one  person  or  more. 

The  view  here  given  of  the  internal  constitution  of  man,  and 
of  the  supremacy  of  conscience,  agreeably  to  the  conceptions 
of  Bishop  Butler,  enables  us  to  comprehend  the  force  of  that 
expression,  common  to  him  and  the  ancient  moralists,  that  virtue 
consists  in  following  nature.  The  meaning  cannot  be,  that  it 
consists  in  acting  agreeably  to  that  propensity  of  our  nature  which 
happens  to  be  the  strongest ;  or  which  propels  us  towards  certain 
objects,  without  any  regard  to  the  methods  by  which  they  are  to 
be  obtained  :  but  the  meaning  must  be,  that  virtue  consists  in  the 
due  regulation  and  subjection  of  all  the  other  appetites  and  affec- 
tions to  the  superior  faculty  of  conscience  ;  from  a  conformity  to 
which  alone  our  actions  are  properly  natural,  or  correspondent 


XXH  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

to  the  nature,  to  the  whole  nature,  of  such  an  agent  as  man. 
Prom  hence  too  it  appears,  that  the  Author  of  our  frame  is  by  no 
means  indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice,  or  has  left  us  at  liberty  to 
act  at  random,  as  humour  or  appetite  may  prompt  us  ;  but  that 
every  man  has  the  rule  of  right  within  him  ;  a  rule  attended  in 
the  very  notion  of  it  with  authority,  and  such  as  has  the  force 
of  a  direction  and  a  command  from  him  who  made  us  what  we 
are,  what  course  of  behaviour  is  suited  to  our  nature,  and  which 
he  expects  that  we  should  follow.  This  moral  faculty  implies 
also  a  presentiment  and  apprehension,  that  the  judgment  which 
passes  on  our  actions,  considered  as  of  good  or  ill  desert,  will 
hereafter  be  confirmed  by  the  unerring  judgment  of  God  ;  when 
virtue  and  happiness,  vice  and  misery,  whose  ideas  are  now  so 
closely  connected,  shall  be  indissolubly  united,  and  the  divine 
government  be  found  to  correspond  in  the  most  exact  proportion 
to  the  nature  he  has  given  us.  Lastly,  this  just  prerogative  or 
supremacy  of  conscience  it  is,  which  Mr.  Pope  has  described  in  his 
Universal  Prayer,  though  perhaps  he  may  have  expressed  it  rather 
too  strongly J,  where  he  says, 

'  What  conscience  dictates  to  be  done, 

Or  warns  me  not  to  do, 
This  teach  me  more  th<in  hell  to  shun, 
That  more  than  heaven  pursue.' 

The  reader  will  observe,  that  this  way  of  treating  the  subject 
of  morals,  by  an  appeal  to  facts,  does  not  at  all  interfere  with  that 
other  way.  adopted  by  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke  and  others,  which 
begins  with  inquiring  into  the  relations  and  fitness  of  things, 
but  rather  illustrates  and  confirms  it.  That  there  are  essential 
differences  in  the  qualities  of  human  actions,  established  by 
nature,  and  that  this  natural  difference  of  things,  prior  to  and 
independent  of  all  will,  creates  a  natural  fitness  in  the  agent 
to  act  agreeably  to  it,  seems  as  little  to  be  denied,  as  that  there 
is  the  moral  difference  before  explained,  from  which  we  approve 
and  feel  a  pleasure  in  what  is  right,  and  conceive  a  distaste 
to  what  is  wrong.  Still,  however,  when  we  are  endeavouring 


1  Among  readers  of  the  present  day,  most,  I  hope,  will  in  this  matter  hold 
with  Pope. — ED. 


MORAL   AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  xxiii 

to  establish  either  this  moral  or  that  natural  difference,  it  ought 
never  to  be  forgotten,  or  rather  it  will  require  to  be  distinctly 
shown,  that  both  of  these,  when  traced  up  to  their  source,  suppose 
an  intelligent  Author  of  nature  and  moral  Ruler  of  the  world ; 
who  originally  appointed  these  differences,  and  by  such  an  ap- 
pointment has  signified  his  will  that  we  should  conform  to  them, 
as  the  only  effectual  method  of  securing  our  happiness  on  the 
whole  under  his  government.  -  And  of  this  consideration  our 
prelate  himself  was  not  unmindful ;  as  may  be  collected  from 
many  expressions  in  different  parts  of  his  writings,  and  par- 
ticularly from  the  following  passages  in  his  eleventh  Sermon. 
'  It  may  be  allowed,  without  any  prejudice  to  the  cause  of  virtue 
and  religion,  that  our  ideas  of  happiness  and  misery  are  of  all  our 
ideas  the  nearest  and  most  important  to  us  ;  that  they  will,  nay, 
if  you  please,  that  they  ought  to  prevail  over  those  of  order,  and 
beauty,  and  harmony,  and  proportion,  if  there  should  ever  be. 
as  it  is  impossible  there  ever  should  be,  any  inconsistence  between 
them.'  And  again, '  Though  virtue  or  moral  rectitude  does  indeed 
consist  in  affection  to  and  pursuit  of  what  is  right  and  good, 
as  such ;  yet,  when  we  sit  down  in  a  cool  hour,  we  can  neither 
justify  to  ourselves  this  or  any  other  pursuit,  till  we  are  con- 
vinced that  it  will  be  for  our  happiness,  or  at  least  not  contrary 
to  it."*.1 

Besides  the  general  system  of  morality  opened  above,  our 
author  in  his  volume  of  Sermons  has  stated  with  accuracy  the 
difference  between  self-love  and  benevolence— in  opposition  to 
those  who,  on  the  one  hand,  make  the  whole  of  virtue  to  consist 
in  benevolence  c,  and  to  those  who,  on  the  other,  assert  that  every 
particular  affection  and  action  is  resolvable  into  self-love.  In 
combating  these  opinions,  he  has  shown,  I  think  unanswerably, 
that  there  are  the  same  kind  of  indications  in  human  nature,  that 
we  were  made  to  promote  the  happiness  of  others,  as  that  we  were 
made  to  promote  our  own  :  that  it  is  no  just  objection  to  this,  that 
we  have  dispositions  to  do  evil  to  others  as  well  as  good ;  for  we 


b  Serm.  xi. 

c  See  the  second  Dissertation  '  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,'  at  the  end  of  the 
Analogy. 


xxiv  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

have  also  dispositions  to  do  evil  as  well  as  good  to  ourselves,  to  our 
own  most  important  interests  even  in  this  life,  for  the  sake  of 
gratifying  a  present  passion  :  that  the  thing  to  be  lamented 
is,  not  that  men  have  too  great  a  regard  to  their  own  real  good, 
but  that  they  have  not  enough  :  that  benevolence  is  not  more 
at  variance  with  or  unfriendly  to  self-love,  than  any  other 
particular  affection  is :  and  that  by  consulting  the  happiness 
of  others  a  man  is  so  far  from  lessening  his  own,  that  the  very 
endeavour  to  do  so,  though  he  should  fail  in  the  accomplishment, 
is  a  source  of  the  highest  satisfaction  and  peace  of  mind d.  He 
has  also,  in  passing,  animadverted  on  the  phijosopher  of  Malmes- 
bury,  who  in  his  book  Of  Human  Nature  has  advanced,  as  dis- 
coveries in  moral  science,  that  benevolence  is  only  the  love  of 
power,  and  compassion  the  fear  of  future  calamity  to  ourselves. 
And  this  our  author  has  done,  not  so  much  with  the  design  of 
exposing  the  false  reasoning  of  Mr.  Hobbes,  but  because  on  so 
perverse  an  account  of  human  nature  he  has  raised  a  system, 
subversive  of  all  justice  and  honesty  e. 

II.  The  religious  system  of  Bishop  Butler  is  chiefly  to  be 
collected  from  the  treatise,  entitled,  The  Analogy  of  Religion, 
Natural  and  Revealed,  to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature. 

*  All  things  are  double  one  against  another,  and  God  hath  made 
nothing  imperfect f.'  On  this  single  observation  of  the  Son 
of  Sirach,  the  whole  fabric  of  our  prelate's  defence  of  religion, 
in  his  Analogy,  is  raised.  Instead  of  indulging  to  idle  specula- 
tions, how  the  world  might  possibly  have  been  better  than  it  is  ; 
or,  forgetful  of  the  difference  between  hypothesis  and  fact, 
attempting  to  explain  the  divine  economy  with  respect  to 
intelligent  creatures,  from  preconceived*  notions  of  his  own ; 
he  first  inquires  what  the  constitution  of  nature,  as  made  known 
to  us  in  the  way  of  experiment,  actually  is  ;  and  from  this,  now 
seen  and  acknowledged,  he  endeavours  to  form  a  judgment  of 
that  larger  constitution,  which  religion  discovers  to  us.  If  the 
dispensation  of  Providence  we  are  now  under,  considered  as 


d  See  Serin,  i.  and  xi.  and  the  Preface  to  the  volume  of  Sermons. 
6  See  the  Notes  to  Serm.  i,  and  v.  f  Ecclus.  xlii.  24. 


MORAL   AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  XX V 

inhabitants  of  this  world,  and  having  a  temporal  interest  to 
secure  in  it,  be  found,  on  examination,  to  be  analogous  to,  and 
of  a  piece  with,  that  further  dispensation,  which  relates  to  us  as 
designed  for  another  world,  in  which  we  have  an  eternal  interest, 
depending  on  our  behaviour  here ;  if  both  may  be  traced  up  to 
the  same  general  laws,  and  appear  to  be  carried  on  according 
to  the  same  plan  of  administration :  the  fair  presumption  is,  that 
both  proceed  from  one  and  the'same  Author.  And  if  the  principal 
parts  objected  to  in  this  latter  dispensation  be  similar  to  and 
of  the  same  kind  with  what  we  certainly  experience  under  the 
former  ;  the  objections,  being  clearly  inconclusive  in  one  case, 
because  contradicted  by  plain  fact,  must,  in  all  reason,  be  allowed 
to  be  inconclusive  also  in  the  other. 

This  way  of  arguing  from  what  is  acknowledged  to  what  is 
disputed,  from  things  known  to  other  things  that  resemble  them, 
from  that  part  of  the  divine  establishment  which  is  exposed  to  our 
view  to  that  more  important  one  which  lies  beyond  it,  is  on  all 
hands  confessed  to  be  just.  By  this  method  Sir  Isaac  Newton  has 
unfolded  the  system  of  nature ;  by  the  same  method  Bishop 
Butler  has  explained  the  system  of  grace ;  and  thus,  to  use  the 
words  of  a  writer,  whom  I  quote  with  pleasure,  has  '  formed  and 
concluded  a  happy  alliance  between  faith  and  philosophy  R.1 

And  although  the  argument  from  analogy  be  allowed  to  be 
imperfect,  and  by  no  means  sufficient  to  solve  all  difficulties 
respecting  the  government  of  God,  and  the  designs  of  his  provi- 
dence with  regard  to  mankind  (a  degree  of  knowledge,  which  we 
are  not  furnished  with  faculties  for  attaining,  at  least  in  the 
present  state) ;  yet  surely  it  is  of  importance  to  learn  from  it, 
that  the  natural  and  moral  world  are  intimately  connected,  and 
parts  of  one  stupendous  whole  or  system ;  and  that  the  chief 
objections  which  are  brought  against  religion  may  be  urged  with 
equal  force  against  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  where 
they  are  certainly  false  in  fact.  And  this  information  we  may 
derive  from  the  work  before  us  ;  the  proper  design  of  which,  it 
may  be  of  use  to  observe,  is  not  to  prove  the  truth  of  religion, 


Mr.  Mainwaring's  Dissertation,  prefixed  to  his  volume  of  Sermons. 


xxvi  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

either  natural    or  revealed,   but  to  confirm  that  proof,  already 
known,  by  considerations  from  analogy. 

After  this  account  of  the  method  of  reasoning  employed  by  our 
author,  let  us  now  advert  to  his  manner  of  applying  it,  first  to  the 
subject  of  natural  religion,  and  secondly  to  that  of  revealed. 

i.  The  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears  is  a  future  life  ; 
and  with  this  the  Treatise  begins.  Neither  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  nor  the  analogy  of  nature,  according  to  Bishop  Butler, 
give  ground  for  imagining,  that  the  unknown  event,  death,  will 
be  our  destruction.  The  states  in  which  we  have  formerly  existed, 
in  the  womb  and  in  infancy,  are  not  more  different  from  each 
other  than  from  that  of  mature  age  in  which  we  now  exist : 
therefore,  that  we  shall  continue  to  exist  hereafter,  in  a  state  as 
different  from  the  present  as  the  present  is  from  those  through 
which  we  have  passed  already,  is  a  presumption  favoured  by  the 
analogy  of  nature.  All  that  we  know  from  reason  concerning 
death,  is  the  effects  it  has  upon  animal  bodies :  and  the  frequent 
instances  among  men  of  the  intellectual  powers  continuing  in 
high  health  and  vigour,  at  the  very  time  when  a  mortal  disease  is 
on  the  point  of  putting  an  end  to  all  the  powers  of  sensation, 
induce  us  to  hope  that  it  may  have  no  effect  at  all  on  the  human 
soul,  not  even  so  much  as  to  suspend  the  exercise  of  its  faculties  ; 
though,  if  it  have,  the  suspension  of  a  power  by  no  means  implies 
its  extinction,  as  sleep  or  a  swoon  may  convince  us  h. 

The  probability  of  a  future  state  once  granted,  an  important 
question  arises,  How  best  to  secure  our  interest  in  that  state.  We 
find  from  what  passes  daily  before  us,  that  the  constitution  of 
nature  admits  of  misery  as  well  as  happiness;  that  both  of  these 
are  the  consequences  of  oar  own  actions  ;  and  these  consequences 
we  are  enabled  to  foresee.  Therefore,  that  our  happiness  or 
misery  in  a  future  world  may  depend  on  our  own  actions  also,  and 
that  rewards  and  punishments  hereafter  may  follow  our  good  or 
ill  behaviour  here,  is  but  an  appointment  of  the  same  sort  with 
what  we  experience  under  the  divine  government,  according  to 
the  regular  course  of  nature  !. 


h  Part  I,  chap.  i.  i  Chap.  ii. 


MORAL  AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  xxvii 

This  supposition  is  confirmed  from  another  circumstance,  that 
the  natural  government  of  God,  under  which  we  now  live,  is  also 
moral ;  in  which  rewards  and  punishments  are  the  consequences 
of  actions,  considered  as  virtuous  and  vicious.  Not  that  every  man 
is  rewarded  or  punished  here  in  exact  proportion  to  his  desert ; 
for  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice,  to  produce  happiness 
and  the  contrary,  are  often  hindered  from  taking  effect  from 
accidental  causes.  However,  there  are  plainly  the  rudiments  and 
beginnings  of  a  righteous  administration  to  be  discerned  in  the 
constitution  of  nature :  from  whence  we  are  led  to  expect,  that 
these  accidental  hindrances  will  one  day  be  removed,  and  the  rule 
of  distributive  justice  obtain  completely  in  a  more  perfect  state  k. 

The  moral  government  of  God,  thus  established,  implies  in  the 
notion  of  it  some  sort  of  trial,  or  a  moral  possibility  of  acting 
wrong  as  well  as  right,  in  those  who  are  the  subjects  of  it.  And 
the  doctrine  of  religion,  that  the  present  life  is  in  fact  a  state  of 
probation  for  a  future  one,  is  rendered  credible,  from  its  being 
analogous  throughout  to  the  general  conduct  of  Providence  towards 
us  with  respect  to  this  world ;  in  which  prudence  is  necessary  to 
secure  our  temporal  interest,  just  as  we  are  taught  that  virtue  is 
necessary  to  secure  our  eternal  interest ;  and  both  are  trusted  to 
ourselves l. 

But  the  present  life  is  not  merely  a  state  of  probation,  implying 
in  it  difficulties  and  danger ;  it  is  also  a  state  of  discipline  and 
improvement ;  a/id  that  both  in  our  temporal  and  religious  capacity. 
Thus  childhood  is  a  state  of  discipline  for  youth  ;  youth  for  man- 
hood ;  and  that  for  old  age.  Strength  of  body,  and  maturity  of 
understanding,  are  acquired  by  degrees ;  and  neither  of  them 
without  continual  exercise  and  attention  on  our  part,  not  only  in 
the  beginning  of  life,  but  through  the  whole  course  of  it.  So 
again  with  respect  to  our  religious  concerns,  the  present  world  is 
fitted  to  be,  and  to  good  men  is  in  event,  a  state  of  discipline  and 
improvement  for  a  future  one.  The  several  passions  and  pro- 
pensions  implanted  in  our  hearts  incline  us,  in  a  multitude  of 
instances,  to  forbidden  pleasures  :  this  inward  infirmity  is  increased 


k  Chap.  iii.  '  Chap.  iv. 


xxviii  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

by  various  snares  and  temptations,  perpetually  occurring  from 
without :  hence  arises  the  necessity  of  recollection  and  self- 
government,  of  withstanding  the  calls  of  appetite,  and  forming 
our  minds  to  habits  of  piety  and  virtue  ;  habits,  of  which  we  are 
capable,  and  which,  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  moral  imperfection, 
and  fallen  from  their  original  integrity,  must  be  of  the  greatest 
use,  as  an  additional  security,  over  and  above  the  principle  of 
conscience,  from  the  dangers  to  which  we  are  exposed  m. 

Nor  is  the  credibility  here  given,  by  the  analogy  of  nature,  to 
the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  destroyed  or  weakened  by  any 
notions  concerning  necessity.  Of  itself  it  is  a  mere  word,  the  sign 
of  an  abstract  idea;  and  as  much  requires  an  agent,  that  is, 
a  necessary  agent,  in  order  to  effect  any  thing,  as  freedom  requires 
a  free  agent.  Admitting  it  to  be  speculatively  true,  if  considered 
as  influencing  practice,  it  is  the  same  as  false  :  for  it  is  matter  of 
experience,  that,  with  regard  to  our  present  interest,  and  as 
inhabitants  of  this  world,  we  are  treated  as  if  we  were  free ; 
and  therefore  the  analogy  of  nature  leads  us  to  conclude,  that, 
with  regard  to  our  future  interest,  and  as  designed  for  another 
world,  we  shall  be  treated  as  free  also.  Nor  does  the  opinion  of 
necessity,  supposing  it  possible,  at  all  affect  either  the  general 
proof  of  religion,  or  its  external  evidence  n. 

Still  objections  may  be  made  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness 
of  the  divine  government,  to  which  analogy,  which  can  only  show 
the  truth  or  credibility  of  facts,  affords  no  answer.  Yet  even 
here  analogy  is  of  use,  if  it  suggest  that  the  divine  government  is 
a  scheme  or  system,  and  not  a  number  of  unconnected  acts,  and 
that  this  system  is  also  above  our  comprehension.  Now  the 
government  of  the  natural  world  appears  to  be  a  system  of  this 
kind  ;  with  parts,  related  to  each  other,  and  together  composing 
a  whole  :  in  which  system,  ends  are  brought  about  by  the  use  of 
means,  many  of  which  means,  before  experience,  would  have  been 
suspected  to  have  had  a  quite  contrary  tendency  ;  which  is  carried 
on  by  general  laws,  similar  causes  uniformly  producing  similar 
effects  :  the  utility  of  which  general  laws,  and  the  inconveniences 


m  Part  I.  chap.  v.  n  Chap.  vi. 


MORAL   AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  xxix 

which  would  probably  arise  from  the  occasional  or  even  secret 
suspension  of  them,  we  are  in  some  sort  enabled  to  discern  °  ;  but 
of  the  whole  we  are  incompetent  judges,  because  of  the  small  part 
which  comes  within  our  view.  Reasoning  then  from  what  we 
know,  it  is  highly  credible,  that  the  government  of  the  moral 
world  is  a  system  also,  carried  on  by  general  laws,  and  in  which 
ends  are  accomplished  by  the  intervention  of  means ;  and  that 
both  constitutions,  the  natural  and  the  moral,  are  so  connected, 
as  to  form  together  but  one  scheme.  But  of  this  scheme,  as  of 
that  of  the  natural  world  taken  alone,  we  are  not  qualified  to 
judge,  on  account  of  the  mutual  respect  of  the  several  parts  to 
each  other  and  to  the  whole,  and  our  own  incapacity  to  survey 
the  whole,  or,  with  accuracy,  any  single  part.  All  objections 
therefore  to  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  divine  government 
may  be  founded  merely  on  our  ignorance  ;  and  to  such  objections 
our  ignorance  is  the  proper,  and  a  satisfactory  answer  P. 

2.  The  chief  difficulties  concerning  natural  religion  being  now 
removed,  our  author  proceeds,  in  the  next  place,  to  that  which  is 
revealed  ;  and  as  an  introduction  to  an  inquiry  into  the  credibility 
of  Christianity,  begins  with  the  consideration  of  its  importance. 

The  importance  of  Christianity  appears  in  two  respects.  First, 
in  its  being  a  republication  of  natural  religion,  in  its  native 
simplicity,  with  authority,  and  with  circumstances  of  advantage  ; 
ascertaining,  in  many  instances  of  moment,  what  before  was 
only  probable,  and  particularly  confirming  the  doctrine  of  a  future 
state  of  rewards  and  punishments.  Secondly,  as  revealing  a  new 
dispensation  of  Providence,  originating  from  the  pure  love  and 
mercy  of  God,  and  conducted  by  the  mediation  of  his  Son,  and 
the  guidance  of  his  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  salvation  of  man- 
kind, represented  in  a  state  of  apostasy  and  ruin.  This  account 
of  Christianity  being  admitted  to  be  just,  and  the  distinct  offices 
of  these  three  divine  persons  being  once  discovered  to  us,  we  are 
as  much  obliged  in  point  of  duty  to  acknowledge  the  relations  we 
stand  in  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  as  our  Mediator  and  Sanctifier, 


0  See  a  Treatise  on  Divine  Benevolence,  by  Dr.  Thomas  Balgny,  part  ii. 
P  Part  I.  chap,  vii, 


xxx  BJSHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

as  we  are  obliged  in  point  of  duty  to  acknowledge  the  relation 
we  stand  in  to  G  od  the  Father ;  although  the  two  former  of  these 
relations  be  learnt  from  revelation  only,  and  in  the  last  we  are 
instructed  by  the  light  of  nature  ;  the  obligation  in  either  case 
arising  from  the  offices  themselves,  and  not  at  all  depending  on 
the  manner  in  which  they  are  made  known  to  us  <J. 

The  presumptions  against  revelation  in  general  are,  that  it  is 
not  discoverable  by  reason,  that  it  is  unlike  to  what  is  so  dis- 
covered, and  that  it  was  introduced  and  supported  by  miracles. 
But  in  a  scheme  so  large  as  that  of  the  universe,  unbounded  in 
extent  and  everlasting  in  duration,  there  must  of  necessity  be 
numberless  circumstances  which  are  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
faculties  to  discern,  and  which  can  only  be  known  by  divine 
illumination.  And  both  in  the  natural  and  moral  government 
of  the  world,  under  which  we  live,  we  find  many  things  unlike 
one  to  another,  and  therefore  ought  not  to  wonder  if  the  same 
unlikeness  obtain  between  things  visible  and  invisible  ;  although 
it  be  far  from  true,  that  revealed  religion  is  entirely  unlike  the 
constitution  of  nature,  as  analogy  may  teach  us.  Nor  is  there 
any  thing  incredible  in  revelation,  considered  as  miraculous  ; 
whether  miracles  be  supposed  to  have  been  performed  at  the 
beginning  of  the  world,  or  after  a  course  of  nature  has  been 
established1.  Not  at  the  beginning  of  the  world;  for  then  there 
was  either  no  course  of  nature  at  all,  or  a  power  must  have  been 
exerted  totally  different  from  what  that  course  is  at  present : 
all  men  and  animals  cannot  have  been  born,  as  they  are  now  ; 
but  a  pair  of  each  sort  must  have  been  produced  at  first,  in  a  way 
altogether  unlike  to  that  in  which  they  have  been  since  produced ; 
unless  we  affirm,  that  men  and  animals  have  existed  from  eternity 
in  an  endless  succession :  one  miracle  therefore  at  least  there 
must  have  been  at  the  beginning  of  the  world,  or  at  the  time 


Part  II.  chap.  i. 


1  The  argument  in  this  sentence,  tains  matter  which  appears  to  be  in 
purporting  to  be  Butler's,  seems  to  the  nature  of  expansion  and  inter- 
be  founded  on  Part  II.  ch.  ii.  §§  7-9  polation  into  the  original  text. — Eu. 
(II.'  in  the  older  editions) ;  but  con- 


MORAL    AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  xxxi 

of  man's  creation.  Not  after  the  settlement  of  a  course  of  nature, 
on  account  of  miracles  being  contrary  to  that  course,  or,  in  other 
words,  contrary  to  experience  ;  for,  in  order  to  know  whether 
miracles,  worked  in  attestation  of  a  divine  religion,  be  contrary 
to  experience  or  not,  we  ought  to  be  acquainted  with  other  cases, 
similar  or  parallel  to  those,  in  which  miracles  are  alleged  to  have 
been  wrought.  But  where  shall  we  find  such  similar  or  parallel 
cases'?  The  world  which  we  inhabit  affords  none:  we  know  of 
no  extraordinary  revelations  from  God  to  man,  but  those  recorded 
in  the  Old  and  New  Testament ;  all  of  which  were  established 
by  miracles  :  it  cannot  therefore  be  said,  that  miracles  are  in- 
credible, because  contrary  to  experience,  when  all  the  experience 
we  have  is  in  favour  of  miracles,  and  on  the  side  of  religion. 
Besides,  in  reasoning  concerning  miracles,  they  ought  not  to  be 
compared  with  common  natural  events,  but  with  uncommon 
appearances,  such  as  comets,  magnetism,  electricity  ;  which,  to 
one  acquainted  only  with  the  usual  phenomena  of  nature,  and 
the  common  powers  of  matter,  must,  before  proof  of  their  actual 
existence,  be  thought  incredible  r. 

The  presumptions  against  revelation  in  general  being  dispatched, 
objections  against  the  Christian  revelation  in  particular,  against 
the  scheme  of  it,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its 
evidence,  are  considered  next.  Now,  supposing  a  revelation  to 
be  really  given,  it  is  highly  probable  beforehand,  that  it  must 
contain  many  things  appearing  to  us  liable  to  objections.  The 
acknowledged  dispensation  of  nature  is  very  different  from  what 
we  should  have  expected:  reasoning  then  from  analogy,  the  re- 
vealed dispensation,  it  is  credible,  would  be  also  different.  Nor 
are  we  in  any  sort  judges  at  what  time,  or  in  what  degree,  or 
manner,  it  is  fit  or  expedient  for  God  to  instruct  us,  in  things 
confessedly  of  the  greatest  use,  either  by  natural  reason,  or  by 
supernatural  information.  Thus,  arguing  on  speculation  only, 
and  without  experience,  it  would  seem  very  unlikely  that  so  im- 
portant a  remedy  as  that  provided  by  Christianity,  for  the  recovery 
of  mankind  from  a  state  of  ruin,  should  have  been  for  so  many 

J  Chap.  ii. 


xxxii  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

ages  withheld  ;  and,  when  at  last  vouchsafed,  should  be  imparted 
to  so  few;  and,  after  it  has  been  imparted,  should  be  attended 
with  obscurity  and  doubt.  And  just  so  we  might  have  argued, 
before  experience,  concerning  the  remedies  provided  in  nature 
for  bodily  diseases,  to  which  by  nature  we  are  exposed  :  for  many 
of  these  were  unknown  to  mankind  for  a  number  of  ages  ;  are 
known  but  to  few  now ;  some  important  ones  probably  not 
discovered  yet;  and  those  which  are,  neither  certain  in  their 
application,  nor  universal  in  their  use :  and  the  same  mode  of 
reasoning  that  would  lead  us  to  expect  they  should  have  been  so, 
would  lead  us  to  expect  that  the  necessity  of  them  should  have  been 
superseded,  by  there  being  no  diseases ;  as  the  necessity  of  the 
Christian  scheme,  it  may  be  thought,  might  also  have  been 
superseded,  by  preventing  the  fall  of  man,  so  that  he  should  not 
have  stood  in  need  of  a  Redeemer  at  all 8. 

As  to  objections  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  Chris- 
tianity, the  same  answer  may  be  applied  to  them  as  was  to  the 
like  objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature.  For  here  also, 
Christianity  is  a  scheme  or  economy,  composed  of  various  parts, 
forming  a  whole ;  in  which  scheme  means  are  used  for  the 
accomplishing  of  ends ;  and  which  is  conducted  by  general  laws, 
of  all  of  which  we  know  as  little  as  we  do  of  the  constitution  of 
nature.  And  the  seeming  want  of  wisdom  or  goodness  in  this 
system  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  same  cause,  as  the  like  appearances 
of  defects  in  the  natural  system;  our  inability  to  discern  the 
whole  scheme,  and  our  ignorance  of  the  relation  of  those  parts 
which  are  discernible  to  others  beyond  our  view. 

The  objections  against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and 
against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  having  been  obviated 
together,  the  chief  of  them  are  now  to  be  considered  distinctly. 
One  of  these,  which  is  levelled  against  the  entire  system  itself,  is 
of  this  sort :  the  restoration  of  mankind,  represented  in  scripture 
as  the  great  design  of  the  gospel,  is  described  as  requiring  a  long 
series  of  means,  and  persons,  and  dispensations,  before  it  can 
be  brought  to  its  completion;  whereas  the  whole  ought  to  have 


Chap,  iii, 


MORAL   AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  xxxm 

been  effected  at  once.  Now  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course 
of  nature  shows  the  folly  of  this  objection.  For  in  the  natural 
course  of  Providence,  ends  are  brought  about  by  means,  not 
operating  immediately  and  at  once,  but  deliberately  and  in 
a  way  of  progression ;  one  thing  being  subservient  to  another, 
this  to  somewhat  further.  The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening 
of  fruits,  the  growth  of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  are  instances 
of  this.  And  therefore,  that  the  same  progressive  method  should 
be  followed  in  the  dispensation  of  Christianity,  as  is  observed  in 
the  common  dispensation  of  Providence,  is  a  reasonable  expect- 
ation, justified  by  the  analogy  of  nature*. 

Another  circumstance  objected  to  in  the  Christian  scheme  is 
the  appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the  saving  of  the  world 
through  him.  But  the  visible  government  of  God  being  actually 
administered  in  this  way,  or  by  the  mediation  and  instrument- 
ality of  others,  there  can  be  no  general  presumption  against 
an  appointment  of  this  kind,  against  his  invisible  government 
being  exercised  in  the  same  manner.  We  have  seen  already, 
that  with  regard  to  ourselves  this  visible  government  is  carried 
on  by  rewards  and  punishments ;  for  happiness  and  misery  are 
the  consequences  of  our  own  actions,  considered  as  virtuous  and 
vicious ;  and  these  consequences  we  are  enabled  to  foresee.  It 
might  have  been  imagined,  before  consulting  experience,  that 
after  we  had  rendered  ourselves  liable  to  misery  by  our  own  ill 
conduct,  sorrow  for  what  was  jast,  and  behaving  well  for  the 
future,  would,  alone  and  of  themselves,  have  exempted  us  from 
deserved  punishment,  and  restored  us  to  the  divine  favour.  But 
the  fact  is  otherwise ;  and  real  reformation  is  often  found  to  be 
of  no  avail,  so  as  to  secure  the  criminal  from  poverty,  sickness, 
infamy,  and  death,  the  never-failing  attendants  on  vice  and 
extravagance,  exceeding  a  certain  degree.  By  the  course  of 
nature  then  it  appears,  God  does  not  always  pardon  a  sinner  on 
his  repentance.  Yet  there  is  provision  made,  even  in  nature, 
that  the  miseries,  which  men  bring  on  themselves  by  unlawful 
indulgences,  may  in  many  cases  be  mitigated,  and  in  some  re- 


*  Chap.  iv. 

VOL.  I.  <e 


xxxiv  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

moved ;  partly  by  extraordinary  exertions  of  the  offender  himself, 
but  more  especially  and  frequently  by  the  intervention  of  others, 
who  voluntarily,  and  from  motives  of  compassion,  submit  to 
labour  and  sorrow,  such  as  produce  long  and  lasting  incon- 
veniences to  themselves,  as  the  means  of  rescuing  another 
from  the  wretched  effects  of  former  imprudences.  Vicarious 
punishment,  therefore,  or  one  person's  sufferings  contributing 
to  the  relief  of  another,  is  a  providential  disposition  in  the 
economy  of  nature :  and  it  ought  not  to  be  matter  of  surprise, 
if  by  a  method  analogous  to  this  we  be  redeemed  from  sin  and 
misery,  in  the  economy  of  grace.  That  mankind  at  present 
are  in  a  state  of  degradation,  different  from  that  in  which  they 
were  originally  created,  is  the  very  ground  of  the  Christian  reve- 
lation, as  contained  in  the  scriptures.  Whether  we  acquiesce 
in  the  account,  that  our  being  placed  in  such  a  state  is  owing 
to  the  crime  of  our  first  parents,  or  choose  to  ascribe  it  to  any 
other  cause,  it  makes  no  difference  as  to  our  condition  :  the  vice 
and  unhappiness  of  the  world  are  still  there,  notwithstanding 
all  our  suppositions;  nor  is  it  Christianity  that  hath  put  us 
into  this  state.  We  learn  also  from  the  same  scriptures,  what 
experience  and  the  use  of  expiatory  sacrifices  from  the  most 
early  times  might  have  taught  us,  that  repentance  alone  is  not 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  fatal  consequences  of  past  transgressions: 
but  that  still  there  is  room  for  mercy,  and  that  repentance 
shall  be  available,  though  not  of  itself,  yet  through  the  medi- 
ation of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah  ;  who,  from  the  sublimest 
principles  of  compassion,  when  we  were  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins  n, 
suffered  and  died,  the  innocent  for  the  guilty,  the  just  for  the 
unjust  *,  that  we  might  have  redemption  through  his  blood,  even  the 
forgiveness  of  sinsf.  In  what  way  the  death  of  Christ  was  of 
that  efficacy  it  is  said  to  be,  in  procuring  the  reconciliation  of 
sinners,  the  scriptures  have  not  explained :  it  is  enough  that  the 
doctrine  is  revealed ;  that  it  is  not  contrary  to  any  truths  which 
reason  and  experience  teach  us ;  and  that  it  accords  in  perfect 


Ephes.  ii.  i.  «  i  Pet.  iii.  18.  T  Coloss.  i.  14. 


MORAL   AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  xxxv 

harmony  with  the  usual  method  of  the  divine  conduct  in  the 
government  of  the  world  *. 

Again  it  hath  been  said,  that  if  the  Christian  revelation  were 
true,  it  must  have  been  universal,  and  could  not  have  been  left 
upon  doubtful  evidence.  But  God,  in  his  natural  providence, 
dispenses  his  gifts  in  great  variety,  not  only  among  creatures 
of  the  same  species,  but  to  the  same  individuals  also  at  different 
times.  Had  the  Christian  revelation  been  universal  at  first, 
yet,  from  the  diversity  of  men's  abilities,  both  of  mind  and 
body,  their  various  means  of  improvement,  and  other  external 
advantages,  some  persons  must  soon  have  been  in  a  situation, 
with  respect  to  religious  knowledge,  much  superior  to  that  of 
others,  as  much  perhaps  as  they  are  at  present :  and  all  men 
will  be  equitably  dealt  with  at  last ;  and  to  whom  little  is  given,  of 
him  little  will  be  required.  Then  as  to  the  evidence  for  religion 
being  left  doubtful,  difficulties  of  this  sort,  like  difficulties  in 
practice,  afford  scope  and  opportunity  for  a  virtuous  exercise  of 
the  understanding,  and  dispose  the  mind  to  acquiesce  and  rest 
satisfied  with  any  evidence  that  is  real.  In  the  daily  commerce 
of  life,  men  are  obliged  to  act  upon  great  uncertainties,  with 
regard  to  success  in  their  temporal  pursuits ;  and  the  case  with 
regard  to  religion  is  parallel.  However,  though  religion  be 
not  intuitively  true,  the  proofs  of  it  which  we  have  are  amply 
sufficient  in  reason  to  induce  us  to  embrace  it ;  and  dissatis- 
faction with  those  proofs  may  possibly  be  men's  own  fault a. 

Nothing  remains  but  to  attend  to  the  positive  evidence  there  is 
for  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Now,  besides  its  direct  and  funda- 
mental proofs,  which  are  miracles  and  prophecies,  there  are  many 
collateral  circumstances,  which  may  be  united  into  one  view,  and 
all  together  may  be  considered  as  making  up  one  argument.  In 
this  way  of  treating  the  subject,  the  revelation,  whether  real  or 
otherwise,  may  be  supposed  to  be  wholly  historical :  the  general 
design  of  which  appears  to  be,  to  give  an  account  of  the  condition 
of  religion,  and  its  professors,  with  a  concise  narration  of  the 
political  state  of  things,  as  far  as  religion  is  affected  by  it,  during 


Chap.  v.  a  Chap.  vi. 

C  2 


xxxvi  BISHOP  HALIFAX   ON  BUTLER'S 

a  great  length  of  time,  near  six  thousand  years  of  which  are 
already  past.  More  particularly  it  comprehends  an  account  of 
God's  entering  into  covenant  with  one  nation,  the  Jews,  that  he 
would  be  their  God,  and  that  they  should  be  his  people  ;  of  his 
often  interposing  in  their  affairs ;  giving  them  the  promise,  and 
afterwards  the  possession,  of  a  flourishing  country;  assuring  them 
of  the  greatest  national  prosperity,  in  case  of  their  obedience,  and 
threatening  the  severest  national  punishment,  in  case  they  forsook 
him,  and  joined  in  the  idolatry  of  their  pagan  neighbours.  It 
contains  also  a  prediction  of  a  particular  person  to  appear  in  the 
fulness  of  time,  in  whom  all  the  promises  of  God  to  the  Jews  were 
to  be  fulfilled :  and  it  relates,  that,  at  the  time  expected,  a  person 
did  actually  appear,  assuming  to  be  the  Saviour  foretold  ;  that  he 
worked  various  miracles  among  them,  in  confirmation  of  his  divine 
authority  ;  and,  as  was  foretold  also,  was  rejected  and  put  to  death 
by  the  very  people  who  had  long  desired  and  waited  for  his  coming ; 
but  that  his  religion,  in  spite  of  all  opposition,  was  established  in 
the  world  by  his  disciples,  invested  with  supernatural  powers  for 
that  purpose ;  of  the  fate  and  fortunes  of  which  religion  there 
is  a  prophetical  description,  carried  down  to  the  end  of  time.  Let 
any  one  now,  after  reading  the  above  history,  and  not  knowing 
whether  the  whole  were  not  a  fiction,  be  supposed  to  ask,  Whether 
all  that  is  here  related  be  true  ?  and  instead  of  a  direct  answer, 
let  him  be  informed  of  the  several  acknowledged  facts,  which  are 
found  to  correspond  to  it  in  real  life  ;  and  then  let  him  compare 
the  history  and  facts  together,  and  observe  the  astonishing  coinci- 
dence of  both :  such  a  joint  review  must  appear  to  him  of  very 
great  weight,  and  to  amount  to  evidence  somewhat  more  than 
human.  And  unless  the  whole  series,  and  every  particular  circum- 
stance contained  in  it,  can  be  thought  to  have  arisen  from  accident, 
the  truth  of  Christianity  is  proved  b. 


b  Chap.  vii.  To  the  Analogy  are  subjoined  two  Dissertations,  both 
originally  inserted  in  the  body  of  the  work.  One  on  '  Personal  Identity,'  in 
which  are  contained  some  strictures  on  Mr.  Locke,  who  asserts  that  con- 
sciousness makes  or  constitutes  personal  identity ;  whereas,  as  our  author 
observes,  consciousness  makes  only  personality,  or  is  necessary  to  the  idea 
of  a  person,  ie.  a  thinking  intelligent  being,  but  presupposes,  and  therefore 


MORAL    AND   RELIGIOUS   SYSTEMS  xxxvii 

The  view  here  given  of  the  moral  and  religious  systems  of  Bishop 
Butler,  it  will  immediately  be  perceived,  is  chiefly  intended  for 
younger  students,  especially  for  students  in  Divinity ;  to  whom  it 
is  hoped  it  may  be  of  use,  so  as  to  encourage  them  to  peruse,  with 
proper  diligence,  the  original  works  of  the  author  himself.  For 
it  may  be  necessary  to  observe,  that  neither  of  the  volumes  of  this 
excellent  prelate  are  addressed  to  those  who  read  for  amusement, 
or  curiosity,  or  to  get  rid  of  time.  All  subjects  are  not  to  be 
comprehended  with  the  same  ease  ;  and  morality  and  religion, 
when  treated  as  sciences,  each  accompanied  with  difficulties  of  its 
own,  can  neither  of  them  be  understood  as  they  ought,  without 
a  very  peculiar  attention.  But  morality  and  religion  are  not 
merely  to  be  studied  as  sciences,  or  as  being  speculatively  true ; 
they  are  to  be  regarded  in  another  and  higher  light,  as  a  rule  of 
life  and  manners,  as  containing  authoritative  directions  by  which 
to  regulate  our  faith  and  practice.  And  in  this  view,  the  infinite 
importance  of  them  considered,  it  can  never  be  an  indifferent 
matter  whether  they  be  received  or  rejected.  For  both  claim  to  be 
the  voice  of  God  ;  and  whether  they  be  so  or  not,  cannot  be  known, 
till  their  claims  be  impartially  examined.  If  they  indeed  come 
from  him,  we  are  bound  to  conform  to  them  at  our  peril :  nor  is  it 
left  to  our  choice,  whether  we  will  submit  to  the  obligations  they 
impose  upon  us  or  not;  for  submit  to  them  we  must,  in  such 
a  sense,  as  to  incur  the  punishments  denounced  by  both  against 
wilful  disobedience  to  their  injunctions. 


cannot  constitute,  personal  identity ;  just  as  knowledge  presupposes  truth, 
but  does  not  constitute  it.  Consciousness  of  past  actions  does  indeed  show 
us  the  identity  of  ourselves,  or  gives  us  a  certain  assurance  that  we  are  the 
same  persons  or  living  agents  now,  which  we  were  at  the  time  to  which  our 
remembrance  can  look  back  :  but  still  we  should  be  the  same  persons  as  we 
were,  though  this  consciousness  of  what  is  past  were  wanting,  though  all 
that  had  been  done  by  us  formerly  were  forgotten ;  unless  it  be  true,  that  no 
person  has  existed  a  single  moment  beyond  what  he  can  remember.  The 
other  Dissertation  is  '  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,'  which  properly  belongs  to  the 
moral  system  of  our  author,  already  explained. 


TO   THE 
RIGHT    HONOURABLE 

CHARLES,  LORD  TALBOT 

BARON  OF  HENSOL 
LORD  HIGH  CHANCELLOR  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

THE  FOLLOWING  TREATISE 

IS,    WITH    ALL    RESPECT,    INSCRIBED 

IN    ACKNOWLEDGMENT    OF    THE    HIGHEST    OBLIGATIONS 

TO 

THE  LATE  LORD  BISHOP  OF  DURHAM 

AND  TO  HIMSELF 
BY  HIS  LORDSHIP'S  MOST  DUTIFUL 

MOST  DEVOTED 
AND  MOST  HUMBLE  SERVANT 

JOSEPH  BUTLER 


ADVEETISEMENT 


§  i.    TJiis  Treatise  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  ivliole.     Its 
subject  gives  tveigJit  to  its  matter. 

IF  the  reader  should  meet  here  with  any  thing  which  he 
had  not  before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in  the  observa- 
tions upon  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  these  being 
all  obvious  ;  but  in  the  application  of  them  :  in  which,  though 
there  is  nothing  but  what  appears  to  me  of  some  real  weight, 
and  therefore  of  great  importance  ;  yet  he  will  observe  several 
things,  which  will  appear  to  him  of  very  little,  if  he  can 
think  things  to  be  of  little  importance,  which  are  of  any  real 
weight  at  all,  upon  such  a  subject  as  religion.  However, 
the  proper  force  of  the  following  Treatise  lies  in  the  whole 
general  analogy  considered  together. 

§  2.   Case  against  Christianity  is  largely  assumed  to 
be  clear;   but  untruly. 

\It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for  granted,  by 
many  persons,  that  Christianity  is  not  so  much  &  a  subject 
of  inquiry ;  but  that  it  is,  now  at  length,  discovered  to 
be  fictitious1.  And  accordingly  they  treat  it,  as  if,  in  the 


1  This  complaint,  uttered  in  every  one.'  Besides  the  decline 

1736,  Butler  repeats  in  1751.  He  of  religious  influences,  the  number 

opens  the  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  those  who  profess  themselves 

of  Durham  by  lamenting  '  the  unbelievers,  he  says,  '  increases, 

general  decay  of  religion  in  this  and  with  their  numbers  their 

nation,  which  is  now  observed  by  zeal'  (Char.  §  i). 

VOL.  I.  B 


2  ADVERTISEMENT 

present  age,  this  were  an  agreed  point  among  all  people 
of  discernment ;  and  nothing  remained,  but  to  set  it  up  as 
a  principal  subject  of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as  it  were  by  way 
of  reprisals,  for  its  having  so  long  interrupted  the  pleasures 
of  the  worlcL/ On  the  contrary,  thus  much,  at  least,  will 
be  here  found,  not  taken  for  granted,  but  proved,  that  any 
reasonable  man,  who  will  thoroughly  consider  the  matter, 
may  be  as  much  assured,  as  he  is  of  his  own  being,  that  it 
is  not,  however,  so  clear  a  case,  that  there  is  nothing  in  it. 
There  is,  I  think,  strong  evidence  of  its  truth  ;  but  it  is 
certain  no  one  can,  upon  principles  of  reason,  be  satisfied 
of  the  contrary.  And  the  practical  consequence  to  be  drawn 
from  this  is  not  attended  to  by  every  one  who  is  concerned 
in  it. 


INTRODUCTION 


§  i.   Probable  evidence,  from  lowest  to  highest,  is 
matter  of  degree. 

"OKOBABLE  evidence  is  essentially  distinguished  from 
£  demonstrative  by  this,  that  it  admits  of  degrees  ;  and  of 
all  variety  of  them,  from  the  highest  moral  certainty,  to  the 
very  lowest  presumption.  We  cannot  indeed  say  a  thing 
is  probably  true  upon  one  very  slight  presumption  for  it ; 
because,  as  there  may  be  probabilities  on  both  sides  of  a 
question,  there  may  be  some  against  it :  and  though  there 
be  not,  yet  a  slight  presumption  does  not  beget  that  degree 
of  conviction,  which  is  implied  in  saying  a  thing  is  probably 
true. 


§  2.   Presumption  is  admissible ;  may  be  small,  or  may 
rise  to  moral  certainty. 

But  that  the  slightest  possible  presumption  is  of  the 
nature  of  a  probability,  appears  from  hence ;  that  such  low 
presumption,  often  repeated,  will  amount  even  to  moral 
certainty.  Thus  a  man's  having  observed  the  ebb  and  flow 
of  the  tide  to-day,  affords  some  sort  of  presumption,  though 
the  lowest  imaginable,  that  it  may  happen  again  to-morrow  : 
but  the  observation  of  this  event  for  so  many  days,  and 
months,  and  ages  together,  as  it  has  been  observed  by  man- 
kind, gives  us  a  full  assurance  that  it  will. 

B  2 


4  INTRODUCTION  [§  3 

§  3.   Probability  means  some  likeness  to  observed 
truth  or  fact. 

That  which  chiefly  constitutes  probability  is  expressed  in 
the  word  likely,  i.  e.  like  some  truth  a,  or  true  event ;  like 
it,  in  itself,  in  its  evidence,  in  some  more  or  fewer  of  its 
circumstances.  For  when  we  determine  a  thing  to  be  pro- 
bably true,  suppose  that  an  event  has  or  will  come  to  pass, 
it  is  from  the  mind's  remarking  in  it  a  likeness  to  some 
other  event,  which  we  have  observed  has  come  to  pass. 
And  this  observation  forms,  in  numberless  daily  instances, 
a  presumption,  opinion,  or  full  conviction,  that  such  event 
has  or  will  come  to  pass ;  according  as  the  observation  is, 
that  the  like  event  has  sometimes,  most  commonly,  or 
always  so  far  as  our  observation  reaches,  come  to  pass  at 
like  distances  of  time,  or  place,  or  upon  like  occasions. 
Hence  arises  the  belief,  that  a  child,  if  it  lives  twenty  years, 
will  grow  up  to  the  stature  and  strength  of  a  man  ;  that 
food  will  contribute  to  the  preservation  of  its  life,  and  the 
want  of  it  for  such  a  number  of  days,  be  its  certain  destruc- 
tion. So  likewise  the  rule  and  measure  of  our  hopes  and 
fears  concerning  the  success  of  our  pursuits  ;  our  expectations 
that  others  will  act  so  and  so  in  such  circumstances ;  and 
our  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed  from  such  prin- 
ciples ;  all  these  rely  upon  our  having  observed  the  like  to 
what  we  hope,  fear,  expect,  judge  ;  I  say  upon  our  having 
observed  the  like,  either  with  respect  to  others  or  ourselves. 
And  thus,  whereas  the  prince b  who  had  always  lived  in 
a  warm  climate,  naturally  concluded  in  the  way  of  analogy, 
that  there  was  no  such  thing  as  water's  becoming  hard, 
because  he  had  always  observed  it  to  be  fluid  and  yielding : 
we,  on  the  contrary,  from  analogy  conclude,  that  there  is  no 
presumption  at  all  against  this  :  that  it  is  supposable  there 
may  be  frost  in  England  any  given  day  in  January  next ; 
probable  that  there  will  on  some  day  of  the  month  ;  and 


tt  Verisimile. 

b  The  story  is  told  by  Mr.  Locke  in  the  chapter  of  Probability. 
[Locke,  On  the  Understanding,  Bk.  iv.  c.  15,  §  5.] 


§§  4,  5]  INTRODUCTION  5 

that  there  is  a  moral  certainty,  i.  e.  ground  for  an  expecta- 
tion without  any  doubt  of  it,  in  some  part  or  other  of  the 
winter. 

§  4.    Is  imperfect ;   and  deals  ivith  limited  beings ; 
yet  is  for  us  the  guide  of  life. 

Probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but  an 
imperfect  kind  of  information  ;  and  is  to  be  considered 
as  relative  only  to  beings  of  limited  capacities.  For  nothing 
which  is  the  possible  object  of  knowledge,  whether  past, 
present,  or  future,  can  be  probable  to  an  infinite  Intelli- 
gence ;  since  it  cannot  but  be  discerned  absolutely  as  it 
is  in  itself,  certainly  true,  or  certainly  false.  But  to  us, 
probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life1. 

§  5.    Even  on  low  probabilities,  prudence  binds  to  action. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  that  in  questions  of  diffi- 
culty, or  such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more  satisfactory 


1   Butler's    doctrine   of  Proba-  tency  between  the  two  ?    The  con- 

bility  may  by  some  be  considered  science,    in    order    that    it    may 

commonplace.      But   Toland  had  legitimately   command,    requires 

shortly  before  taught  that  in  the  the  state  of  facts  on  which  it  has 

absence  of  demonstration  we  ought  to  judge  to  be  ascertained:   and 

to  hold  our  judgments  in  suspense.  this  is  ascertained  for  it  by  the 

See  Leslie  Stephen,  English  Thought  reason.    But  Butler's  fundamental 

in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  c.   iii.    14.  contention    is,    that     probability 

In  his  Place  of  Christ  in  Modern  Theo-  involves  moral   obligation  ;    and 

logy,  Dr.  Fairbairn  observes  (p.  n)  the   two    powers   deal   with    the 

that  Butler's  Analogy  drew  more  same    process,     but    at    diiferent 

attention   than   his   Sermons   on  stages. 

Human  Nature,  and  that  <  the  This  able  author  falls,  I  think, 
fundamental  inconsistency 'of the  into  a  casual  mistake,  when  he 
supremacy  of  conscience  with  the  holds  that  Butler  borrowed  his 
doctrine  of  probability  was  never  doctrine  of  probability  from  Locke, 
perceived.  In  proof  of  the  asser-  But  is  it  not  the  fact  that  Locke, 
tion  thus  hazarded,  Dr.  Fairbairn  in  his  Essay  on  the  Understanding, 
has  supplied  the  statement  that  deals  with  probability  (very  ra- 
the reason  deals  with  probabilities  tionally)  as  it  stands  apart  from 
which  it  analyses,  whereas  the  moral  obligation  ;  while  Butler, 
conscience  commands;  the  first  borrowing  nothing  from  him,  sim- 
being  an  operation  of  the  mental  ply  takes  up  the  question  at  the 
faculty,  while  the  second  is  in  the  point  where  he  had  laid  it  down? 
domain  of  religion  (pp.  25,  26).  (Locke,  On  the  Understanding,  Bk, 
Is  there  any  shadow  of  inconsis-  iv.  cc.  15,  16.) 


6  INTRODUCTION  [§  6 

evidence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  seen  ;  if  the  result  of 
examination  be,  that  there  appears  upon  the  whole,  any 
the  lowest  presumption  on  one  side,  and  none  on  the 
other,  or  a  greater  presumption  on  one  side,  though  in 
the  lowest  degree  greater  ;  this  determines  the  question, 
even  in  matters  of  speculation ;  and  in  matters  of  practice, 
will  lay  us  under  an  absolute  and  formal  obligation,  in 
point  of  prudence  and  of  interest1,  to  act  upon  that  pre- 
sumption or  low  probability,  though  it  be  so  low  as  to 
leave  the  mind  in  very  great  doubt  which  is  the  truth. 
For  surely  a  man  is  as  really  bound  in  prudence  to  do 
what  upon  the  whole  appears,  according  to  the  best  of 
his  judgment,  to  be  for  his  happiness,  as  what  he  certainly 
knows  to  be  so. 


§  6.    Sometimes,  thouyli  the  chances  be  less  than  even, 

Nay  further,  in  questions  of  great  consequence,  a  reason- 
able man  will  think  it  concerns  him  to  remark  lower 
probabilities  and  presumptions  than  these  ;  such  as  amount 
to  no  more  than  showing  one  side  of  a  question  to  be  as 
supposable  and  credible  as  the  other  :  nay,  such  as  but  amount 
to  much  less  even  than  this.  For  numberless  instances 
might  be  mentioned  respecting  the  common  pursuits  of 
life,  where  a  man  would  be  thought,  in  a  literal  sense, 
distracted,  who  would  not  act,  and  with  great  application 
too,  not  only  upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon  much  less2, 


1  Butler  has  explained  himself  place  of  our  destination  is  infested 
elsewhere  upon  the  nature  of  pru-  by  robbers,  that  a  party  had  been 
dence.     See  II.  viii.  19,  and  espe-  stopped  in  the  precedingweek,  and 
cially  Dissertation  II.  §  8  ;  where,  that  the  criminals  had  not  been 
after    explaining    the    nature    of  discovered.      But    another    road, 
prudence,  he  goes  on,  'it  should  nearly,  though  not  quite,  as  coii- 
seem  that  this  is  virtue,  and  the  venient,  was  perfectly  safe.     The 
contrary    behaviour    faulty    and  odds  against  our  being  molested 
blamable.'  in  the  first  case  might  be  slight,  or 

2  It  is  easy  to  provide  illustra-  might  be  (say)  three  or  five  to  one  ; 
tions  of  what  may  at   first  view  but  every  prudent  person  would 
seem  a   paradox.      Suppose  that  in  such  a  case  take  the  safe  road, 
with  a  journey  in  prospect  we  hear  (Jomp.  II.  vi.  24. 

that    the   ordinary   road    to    the 


§  7]  INTRODUCTION  7 

and  where  the  probability  or  chance  was  greatly  against 
his  succeeding f%. 

§  7.   Analogy  lias  weight  in  determining  judgment, 

and  practice. 

It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the  nature, 
the  foundation,  and  measure  of  probability;  or  whence 
it  proceeds  that  likeness  should  beget  that  presumption, 
opinion,  and  full  conviction,  which  the  human  mind  is 
formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which  it  does  necessarily 
produce  in  every  one  ;  or  to  guard  against  the  errors,  to 
which  reasoning  from  analogy  is  liable.  This  belongs 
to  the  subject  of  Logic;  and  is  a  part  of  that  subject 
which  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  considered.  Indeed 
I  shall  not  take  upon  me  to  say,  how  far  the  extent, 
compass,  and  force,  of  analogical  reasoning,  can  be  reduced 
to  general  heads  and  rules;  and  the  whole  be  formed 
into  a  system.  But  though  so  little  in  this  way  has  been 
attempted  by  those  who  have  treated  of  our  intellectual 
powers,  and  the  exercise  of  them l ;  this  does  not  hinder 
but  that  we  may  be,  as  we  unquestionably  are,  assured, 
that  analogy  is  of  weight,  in  various  degrees,  towards 
determining  our  judgment  and  our  practice*.  Nor  does 

e  See  Part  II.  c.  vi. 

1  This  may  seem  to  glance  at  perfect  sort,  which  do  not  amount 
Locke's  discussion  of  probability,  to  strict  inductions.  But,  accord- 
referred  to  above,  as  inadequate.  ing  to  his  view,  they  differ  from 

a  Butler  passes  from  probability  induction  not  so  much  in  kind  as 

to  analogy  without  describing  the  in  degree.'     We  may  perhaps  say  : 

resemblance  between  them.  to  establish  a  sound  analogy,  the 

Fitzgerald  (Butler's  Analogy,  by  resemblance  of  relations  need  not 

William  Fitzgerald,  Dublin,  1849)  be  entire,   but  ought  to  be  very 

says  (p.  i),   '  Analogy  is  properly  substantive  and  marked, 
the  resemblance  of  relations';  and  '  in  Analogy  then  (i)  is  not  demon- 

the  common  use  of  modern  meta-  strative,  but  probable  ;  (2)  is  not 

physical  writers,  is  uted  to  express  to  be  predicated  of  mere  quantity, 

such  arguments  from  resemblance  It  would  mislead  were  we  to  say 

as  fall  short  of  full  proof.'     And  there  was  an  analogy  between  the 

he  cites  Mill  (Logic,  ii.  97,  98),  do-  relation  of  one  foot  to  two  feet,  and 

scribing  Butler  :  '  The  analogies,  that  of  one  pound  to  two  pounds, 

with  which  his  argument  deals,  For    the    relation    is    absolutely 

arc,  indeed,  in  general,  of  that  im-  identical.    We  may  perhaps  adopt 


8  INTRODUCTION  [§  8 

it  in  any  wise  cease  to  be  of  weight  in  those  cases,  because 
persons,  either  given  to  dispute,  or  who  require  things 
to  be  stated  with  greater  exactness  than  our  faculties 
appear  to  admit  of  in  practical  matters,  may  find  other 
cases  in  which  it  is  not  easy  to  say,  whether  it  be,  or  be 
not,  of  any  weight ;  or  instances  of  seeming  analogies, 
which  are  really  of  none.  It  is  enough  to  the  present 
purpose  to  observe,  that  this  general  way  of  arguing  is 
evidently  natural,  just,  and  conclusive.  For  there  is  no 
man  can  make  a  question,  but  that  the  sun  will  rise 
to-morrow,  and  be  seen,  where  it  is  seen  at  all,  in  the 
figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a  square. 

§  8.    From  difficulties  in  nature,  Origen  infers  a  likelihood 
of  similar  difficulties  in  scripture. 

Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reasoning,  Origen d  has 
with  singular  sagacity  observed,  that  he  who  believes  the 
scripture  to  have  proceeded  from  him  who  is  the  Author  of 
nature,  may  ivell  expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  difficulties 
in  it,  as  are  found  in  the  constitution  of  nature  \  And  in 


d  Xprj  (j.€V  TOI  7€  TUV  ct7ra£  irapa5(£afi(vov  rov  KTIOO.VTOS  T^V  Koafnov  dvat 
Tairray  TOS  ypa<pa.s  irfirfiffOai,  on  oaa  irepl  TTJS  Kriafus  dnavra  rots  farovai 
TOV  irtpl  avrrjs  \6yov,  ravra  /cat  ircpl  TUV  ypcupwv.  Philocal.  p.  23,  cd.  Cant. 


Fitzgerald's  definition  thus  modi-  But,  if  Berkeley  contains  the 

fied  :   analogy  is  the  resemblance  of  germ  of  Butler,  the  passage  from 

qualitative  relations.  Fitzgerald  refers  Origen,  which  Butler  himself  so 

us  to  Coplestone's  Four  Discourses,  prominently  alleges,  contains  the 

and  to  Whately's  Rhetoric,  I.  iii.  7.  main   substance   of   the   striking 

1  Fitzgerald  (Life  of  Butter,  pp.  passage  from  Berkeley.  Origen 
xxxviii,  xlii)  quotes  the  following  supplied  in  all  likelihood  the  mi- 
passage  from  Berkeley's  Minute  nute  *seed,  from  which  grew  the 
Philosopher,  with  the  observation  tree  of  the  Analogy.  But  there 
that  it  clearly  contains  the  germ  of  can  be  little  doubt  that  though 
the  whole  argument  of  the  A nalogy.  the  Minute  Philosopher  (1732)  ap- 

'  It  will  be   sufficient,   if  such  peared    four    years     before     the 

analogy  appears  between  the  dis-  Analogy  (1736),  the  mind  of  Butler 

p,ensations  of  grace  and   nature,  had  been  occupied,  arid  his  subject 

as  may  make  it  probable  (although  in  hand,  for  a  much  longer  period  ; 

much  should  be  unaccountable  in  probably  from  the  date  (1726^,  or 

both)    to  suppose  them    derived  soon  after  the  date,  of  the  publica- 

from  the  same  Author,   and  the  tion  of  the  Sermons, 

workmanship  of  one  and  the  same  (Origen's   observation.)      'This 

hand.'  sagacious  remark  is  strangely  mis- 


§  9]  INTRODUCTION  9 

a  like  way  of  reflection  it  may  be  added,  that  lie  who  denies 
the  scripture  to  have  been  from  God  upon  account  of  these 
difficulties,  may,  for  the  very  same  reason,  deny  the  world 
to  have  been  formed  by  him.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there 
be  an  analogy  or  likeness  between  that  system  of  things  and 
dispensation  of  Providence,  which  revelation  informs  us  of, 
and  that  system  of  things  and  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  experience  together  with  reason  informs  us  of,  i.  e. 
the  known  course  of  nature ;  this  is  a  presumption,  that 
they  have  both  the  same  author  and  cause  ;  at  least  so  far 
as  to  answer  objections  against  the  former's  being  from  God, 
drawn  from  any  thing  which  is  analogical  or  similar  to  what 
is  in  the  latter,  which  is  acknowledged  to  be  from  him  ;  for 
an  Author  of  nature  is  here  supposed. 

§  9.    Facts,  ivith  reasons,  give  the  only  just  basis  for 
inference  from  the  known  to  the  less  knotvn. 

Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  world  upon  reasoning,  without  foundation  for 
the  principles  which  we  assume,  whether  from  the  attri- 
butes of  God,  or  any  thing  else,  is  building  a  world  upon 
hypothesis,  like  Descartes1.  Forming  our  notions  upon 

applied  by  Origen   to  the  estab-  bus,  quaedam  quidem  absolvamus 

lishmeiit  of  one  of  his  favourite  secundum  gratiam  Dei,  quaedam 

theories,  that  there  is  a  mystical  autem  commendemus  Deo,  et  non 

meaning  in  every  word  and  even  solum   in   hoc  seculo,   sed  et   in 

letter  of  scripture.     As  a  ground  future'  (Adv.  Haer.  ii.  47,  p.  203). 

for  his  analogy,  he  assumes  that  Fitzgerald. 

the  words  of  scripture  are  the  work  1  He,  says  Mr.  L.  Stephen,  deter- 

of  God,    in    the    same    sense  as  mined  the  starting-point  of  much 

nature  ;    or  that  scripture  is,  in  English  speculation.    It  was  theo- 

his  own  phrase,  Ofoni/fvcrros  ^XPL  logical.     Questioning  all  which  he 

TOV    TVX^VTOS    7/>a/tytaros.'        Fitz-  thought  could  be  doubted,  he  as- 

gerald.  sumed  the  certainty  of  what  he 

St.  Irenaeus,  after  adducing  in-  thought  could  not.     Self- attesting 

stances  of  strange  and  unaccount-  innate  ideas  were  discoverable  in 

able  things  in  the  economy  of  the  the  mind   (English  Thought,  i.  9). 

world,  proceeds  :    '  Si  ergo  et  in  The  movements  of  the  world  and 

rebus  creaturae  quaedam  quidem  the  heavens  he  considered  to  be 

adjacent  Deo,  quaedam  autem  et  due  to  tourbillons  or  vortices,  the 

in  nostram  venerunt   scientiam,  spring  of  which  were  to  be  found 

quid  mali  est,  si  et  eorum,  quae  in  in  the  earth  as  the  centre  of  the 

Scripturis  requirantur,   universis  solarsystem,  and  in  the  fixed  stars. 

Scripturis  spiritualibus  exisstenti-  This  scheme  it  is  which  Butler 


10  INTRODUCTION  [§  10 

reasoning  from  principles  which  are  certain,  but  applied 
to  cases  to  which  we  have  no  ground  to  apply  them,  (like 
those  who  explain  the  structure  of  the  human  body,  and  the 
nature  of  diseases  and  medicines  from  mere  mathematics 
without  sufficient  data,)  is  an  error  much  akin  to  the  former: 
since  what  is  assumed  in  order  to  make  the  reasoning  appli- 
cable, is  hypothesis.  But  it  must  be  allowed  just,  to  join 
abstract  reasonings  with  the  observation  of  facts,  and  argue 
from  such  facts  as  are  known,  to  others  that  are  like  them  ; 
from  that  part  of  the  divine  government  over  intelligent 
creatures  which  comes  under  our  view,  to  that  larger  and 
more  general  government  over  them  which  is  beyond  it ; 
and  from  what  is  present,  to  collect  what  is  likely,  credible, 
or  not  incredible,  will  be  hereafter. 

§  10.   Postulating  a  natural  Governor  of  the  world,  lie 
ivill  argue  thence  for  religion. 

This  method  *  then  of  concluding  and  determining  being 
practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  act  at  all,  we  cannot  but  act 
upon  in  the  common  pursuits  of  life  ;  being  evidently  con- 
clusive, in  various  degrees,  proportionable  to  the  degree  and 
exactness  of  the  whole  analogy  or  likeness  ;  and  having  so 
great  authority2  for  its  introduction  into  the  subject  of 
religion,  even  revealed  religion ;  my  design  is  to  apply  it 
to  that  subject  in  general,  both  natural  and  revealed :  taking 
for  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  and 
natural  Governor  of  the  world.  For  as  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption against  this  prior  to  the  proof  of  it :  so  it  has 
been  often  proved  with  accumulated  evidence  ;  from  this 
argument  of  analogy  and  final  causes  ;  from  abstract  reason- 
ings ;  from  the  most  ancient  tradition  and  testimony  ;  and 
from  the  general  consent  of  mankind.  Nor  does  it  appear, 
so  far  as  I  can  find,  to  be  denied  by  the  generality  of  those 

seems    to    have    in    view   (Biogr.  general  government 'contemplated 

Universelle,  vi.  150).  by  natural  and  revealed  religion. 

1  Viz.    of  proceeding  in   argu-  a  For  example,  John  iii.  12:  'If 

ment  from  facts  known,  that  is  to  I  have  told  you  earthly  things, 

say,  the  constitution  and  course  and  ye  believe  not,  how  shall  ye 

of    nature,    to    those    unknown,  believe,  if  I  tell  you  of  heavenly 

namely    '  the    larger    and    more  things.? ' 


§  „]  INTRODUCTION  " 

who  profess  themselves  dissatisfied  with  the  evidence  of 
religion. 

§  ii.  Some  build  up  world-systems  of  imagined  optimism. 
As  there  are  some,  who,  instead  of  thus  attending  to  what 
is  in  fact  the  constitution  of  nature,  form  their  notions  of 
God's  government  upon  hypothesis  :  so  there  are  others, 
who  indulge  themselves  in  vain  and  idle  speculations,  how 
the  world  might  possibly  have  been  framed  otherwise  than 
it  is  •  and  upon  supposition  that  things  might,  in  imagining 
that  they  should,  have  been  disposed  and  carried  on  after 
a  better  model,  than  what  appears  in  the  present  disposition 
and  conduct  of  them1.  Suppose  now  a  person  of  such 
a  turn  of  mind,  to  go  on  with  his  reveries,  till  he  had  at 
length  fixed  upon  some  particular  plan  of  nature,  as  appearing 

to  him  the  best, One  shall  scarce  be  thought  guilty  of 

detraction  against  human  understanding,  if  one  should  say, 
even  beforehand,  that  the  plan  which  this  speculative  person 
would  fix  upon,  though  he  were  the  wisest  of  the  sons  of  men, 
probably  would  not  be  the  very  best,  even  according  to  his 
own  notions  of  lest ;  whether  he  thought  that  to  be  so,  which 
afforded  occasions  and  motives  for  the  exercise  of  the  great- 
est  virtue,  or  which  was  productive  of  the  greatest  happiness, 
or  that  these  two  were  necessarily  connected,  and  run  up 
into  one  and  the  same  plan.    However,  it  may  not  be  amiss 
once  for  all  to  see,  what  would  be  the  amount  of  these 
emendations  and  imaginary  improvements  upon  the  system  of 
nature,  or  how  far  they  would  mislead  us.    And  it  seems  there 
could  be  no  stopping,  till  we  came  to  some  such  conclusions 
-  as  these  :  that  all  creatures  should  at  first  be  made  as  perfect 
and  as  happy  as  they  were  capable  of  ever  being :  that  nothing, 
to  be  sure,  of  hazard  or  danger  should  be  put  upon  them  to 
do  ;  some  indolent  persons  would  perhaps  think  nothing  at 
all :  or  certainly,  that  effectual  care  should  be  taken,  that 
they  should,  whether  necessarily  or  not,  yet  eventually  and 
in  fact,  always  do  what  was  right  and  most  conducive  to 

i  '  I   suppose  that   Butler  had       ehaeus,  Origen,  Paulicians),  Fitz- 
Baylc  particularly  in  his  eye  in       gerald. 
this  passage  '  (jsee  Crit.  Diet.,  Mani- 


12  INTRODUCTION  [§  12 

happiness,  which  would  be  thought  easy  for  infinite  power 
to  effect ;  either  by  not  giving  them  any  principles  which 
would  endanger  their  going  wrong ;  or  by  laying  the  right 
motive  of  action  in  eveiy  instance  before  their  minds  con- 
tinually in  so  strong  a  manner,  as  would  never  fail  of 
inducing  them  to  act  conformably  to  it  :  and  that  the  whole 
method  of  government  by  punishments  should  be  rejected 
as  absurd  ;  as  an  awkward  roundabout  method  of  carrying 
things  on ;  nay,  as  contrary  to  a  principal  purpose,  for 
which  it  would  be  supposed  creatures  were  made,  namely, 
happiness. 

§  12.    But,  even  if  agreed  as  to  ends,  we  are  incompetent 
judges  of  means. 

Now,  without  considering  what  is  to  be  said  in  particular 
to  the  several  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and  extravagance  ; 
what  has  been  above  intimated,  is  a  full  direct  general  answer 
to  it,  namely,  that  we  may  see  beforehand  that  we  have  not 
faculties  for  this  kind  of  speculation.  For  though  it  be 
admitted,  that,  from  the  first  principles  of  our  nature,  we 
unavoidably  judge  or  determine  some  ends  to  be  absolutely 
in  themselves  preferable  to  others,  and  that  the  ends  now 
mentioned,  or  if  they  run  up  into  one,  that  this  one  is  abso- 
lutely the  best ;  and  consequently  that  we  must  conclude 
the  ultimate  end  designed,  in  the  constitution  of  nature  and 
conduct  of  Providence,  is  the  most  virtue  and  happiness 
possible  :  yet  we  are  far  from  being  able  to  judge  what  parti- 
cular disposition  of  things  would  be  most  friendly  and 
assistant  to  virtue ;  or  what  means  might  be  absolutely 
necessaiy  to  produce  the  most  happiness  in  a  system  of 
such  extent  as  our  own  world  may  be,  taking  in  all  that 
is  past  and  to  come,  though  we  should  suppose  it  detached 
from  the  whole  of  things1.  Indeed  we  are  so  far  from 
being  able  to  judge  of  this,  that  we  are  not  judges  what 


1  This  is  possibly  a  first  glimpse  exceeding  in  an  unknown  degree 

given    us   of  an   idea   rooted   in  the  breadth  of  the  stage  on  which 

Butler's     philosophical     specula-  they  are  visibly  carried  on.     See 

tions,  that  the  operations  of  this  inf.  c.  iii.  26,  28. 
world   are   of  an  eventual  scope 


§§  i3,  14]  INTRODUCTION  13 

may  be  the  necessary  means  of  raising  and  conducting  one 
person  to  the  highest  perfection  and  happiness  of  his  nature. 
Nay,  even  in  the  little  affairs  of  the  present  life,  we  find  men 
of  different  educations  and  ranks  are  not  competent  judges  of 
the  conduct  of  each  other. 

§  13.    E.  g.,  as  an  end,  that  virtue  must  be  happiness, 
and  vice  misery,  for  us  all, 

Our  whole  nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection 
to  God,  and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  him.  And  this  will 
for  ever  be  a  practical  proof  of  his  moral  character,  to  such 
as  will  consider  what  a  practical  proof  is  ;  because  it  is  the 
voice  of  God  speaking  in  us.  And  from  hence  we  conclude, 
that  virtue  must  be  the  happiness,  and  vice  the  misery,  of 
every  creature ;  and  that  regularity  and  order  and  right 
cannot  but  prevail  finally  in  a  universe  under  his  govern- 
ment '.  But  we  are  in  no  sort  judges,  what  are  the 
necessary  means  of  accomplishing  this  end. 

§  14.    Will  build  on  the  experienced  conduct  of  nature 
to  intelligent  creatures. 

Let  us  then,  instead  of  that  idle  and  not  very  innocent 
employment  of  forming  imaginary  models  of  a  world,  and 
schemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our  thoughts  to  what  we 
experience  to  be  the  conduct  of  nature  with  respect  to 
intelligent  creatures ;  which  may  be  resolved  into  general 
laws  or  rules  of  administration,  in  the  same  way  as  many  of 
the  laws  of  nature  respecting  inanimate  matter  may  be 
collected  from  experiments.  And  let  us  compare  the  known 
constitution  and  course  of  things  with  what  is  said  to  be  the 
moral  system  of  nature  ;  the  acknowledged  dispensations  of 
Providence,  or  that  government  which  we  find  ourselves 
under,  with  what  religion  teaches  us  to  believe  and  expect ; 
and  see  whether  they  are  not  analogous  and  of  a  piece. 


1  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  able  supposition,  sustained  by  our 

this  final  triumph  dispenses  with  experience,  that  the  inequalities 

all  rendering  of  account  for  the  of  that  period  will  be  subservient 

period    which   precedes    it.     We  to  the  purposes  of  discipline  in 

have  here  to  introduce  the  reason-  the  improvement  of  characters. 


14  INTRODUCTION  [§§  15,  16 

And  upon  such  a  comparison  it  will,  I  think,  be  found,  that 
they  are  very  much  so  :  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the 
same  general  laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same  principles  of 
divine  conduct. 

§  15.   And  so  vindicate  both  religion  and  its  evidences. 

The  analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered  is  of  pretty 
large  extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts,  in  some,  more,  in 
others,  less,  exact.  In  some  few  instances  perhaps  it  may 
amount  to  a  real  practical  proof ;  in  others  not  so.  Yet  in 
these  it  is  a  confirmation  of  what  is  proved  other  ways.  It 
will  undeniably  show,  what  too  many  want  to  have  shown 
them,  that  the  system  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed, 
considered  only  as  a  system,  and  prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  is 
not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unless  that  of  nature  be  so  too.  And 
it  will  afford  an  answer  to  almost  all  objections  against  the 
system  both  of  natural  and  revealed  religion  ;  though  not 
perhaps  an  answer  in  so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very  con- 
siderable degree  an  answer  to  the  objections  against  the 
evidence  of  it :  for  objections  against  a  proof,  and  objections 
against  what  is  said  to  be  proved,  the  reader  will  observe  are 
different  things. 

§  1 6.    Chapter  of  summaries :  Religion,     (a)  Natural, 
in  five  heads;  (b)  Revealed,  in  six*lieads^. 

Now  the  divine  government  of  the  world,  implied  in  the 
notion  of  religion  in  general  and  of  Christianity,  contains  in 


1  See  note  on  I.  ii.  4.     Here  we  have  a  summary  : — 

Natural  Religion.  Revealed  Religion. 

1.  A  future  life,  I.  i.  i.  Sin,  ruin,  and  a  blinded  sense, 

2.  Of   reward    and    punishment,  required  a  further  plan,  II.  i. 

I.  ii.  2.  Proved  by  miracles,  II.  ii. 

3.  For    good    and    evil    conduct,  3.   Contents  partly    strange   and 

I.  iii.  unexpected,  II.  iii. 

4.  This  life  a  probation,  I.  iv.  4.  Constituting     a     scheme      or 

5.  And  discipline,  I.  v.  system,  II.  iv., 

5.  Worked   by  the    Messiah    for 

[Objection  of  Necessity,  I.  vi.  our  recovery,  II.  v. 

Scheme  known  only  in  part,  I.  6.  Partially    revealed   and    with 

vii.]  partial  evidence,  II.  vi,  vii. 


§  i7]  INTRODUCTION  15 

it ;  that  mankind  is  appointed  to  live  in  a  future  state e  ; 
that  there  every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished f;  re- 
warded or  punished  respectively  for  all  that  behaviour  here, 
which  we  comprehend  under  the  words,  virtuous  or  vicious, 
morally  good  or  evil  s :  that  our  present  life  is  a  probation, 
a  state  of  trial h,  and  of  discipline  *,  for  that  future  one  ; 
notwithstanding  the  objections,  which  men  may  fancy  they 
have,  from  notions  of  necessity,  against  there  being  any  such 
moral  plan  as  this  at  all k ;  and  whatever  objections  may 
appear  to  lie  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  as  it 
stands  so  imperfectly  made  known  to  us  at  present1 :  that 
this  wrorld  being  in  a  state  of  apostasy  and  wickedness,  and 
consequently  of  ruin,  and  the  sense  both  of  their  condition 
and  duty  being  greatly  corrupted  amongst  men,  this  gave 
occasion  for  an  additional  dispensation  of  Providence  ;  of 
the  utmost  importance m  ;  proved  by  miracles n ;  but  con- 
taining in  it  many  things  appearing  to  us  strange  and  not 
to  have  been  expected  ° ;  a  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  is  a  scheme  or  system  of  things  P  ;  carried  on  by  the 
mediation  of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah,  in  order  to  the 
recovery  of  the  world  fi ;  yet  not  revealed  to  all  men,  nor 
proved  with  the  strongest  possible  evidence  to  all  those  to 
whom  it  is  revealed  ;  but  only  to  such  a  part  of  mankind, 
and  with  such  particular  evidence  as  the  wrisdom  of  God 
thought  fif. 

§  17.    Will  show  that  both  rest  on  analogies  from  the 
constitution  and  course  of  nature. 

The  design  then  of  the  following  Treatise  will  be  to 
show,  that  the  several  parts  principally  objected  against 
in  this  moral  and  Christian  dispensation,  including  its 
scheme,  its  publication,  and  the  proof  which  God  has 
afforded  us  of  its  truth ;  that  the  particular  parts  prin- 
cipally objected  against  in  this  whole  dispensation,  are 

11  Ch.  iv. 
P  Ch.  iv. 


*  Part  I.  Ch.  i. 

f  Ch.  ii. 

*  Ch.  iii. 

1  Ch.  v. 

k  Ch.  vi. 

1  Ch.  vii. 

m  Part  II.  Ch.  i. 

"  Ch.  ii. 

0  Ch.  iii. 

i  Ch.  v. 

r  Ch.  vi,  vii. 

1 6  INTRODUCTION 

analogous  to  what  is  experienced  in  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature,  or  Providence ;  that  the  chief  objections 
themselves  which  are  alleged  against  the  former,  are  no 
other  than  what  may  be  alleged  with  like  justness  against 
the  latter,  where  they  are  found  in  fact  to  be  inconclusive  * ; 
and  that  this  argument  from  analogy  is  in  general  unanswer- 
able, and  undoubtedly  of  weight  on  the  side  of  religion s, 
notwithstanding  the  objections  which  may  seem  to  lie  against 
it,  and  the  real  ground  which  there  may  be  for  difference  of 
opinion,  as  to  the  particular  degree  of  weight  which  is  to 
be  laid  upon  it.  This  is  a  general  account  of  what  may 
be  looked  for  in  the  following  Treatise.  And  I  shall 
begin  it  with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  our 
hopes  and  of  all  our  fears ;  all  our  hopes  and  fears,  which 
are  of  any  consideration  ;  I  mean  a  future  life. 


•  Part  II.  Ch.  viii. 


1  It  is  charged  by  some  against  it  will  be  observed  that,  on  the 

Butler,  that  he  leaves  '  the  course  contrary,  even  in  this  contracted 

of  nature,  or  Providence,' to  meet  summary  he  inserts  the  express 

unprotected  the  storm  of  objec-  proviso  on  its  behalf,  conveyed  in 

tioiis  carried  over  to  it  from  Reli-  the  words  '  where  they  are  found 

gion,  which  he  has  in  a  manner  in  fact  to  be  inconclusive.'    Comp. 

exonerated  by  the  transfer.     But  I.  vii.  3. 


THK 

ANALOGY  OF   RELIGION      ; 

TO   THE 

CONSTITUTION    AND    COURSE    OF    NATURE 

PART    I 

OF   NATURAL    RELIGION 
CHAPTER  I1. 

OF     A     FUTUKE     LIFE. 

§  i.   Let  experience  test  for  us  the  probable  effect 
of  death. 

STRANGE    difficulties   have   been   raised   by  some   con- 
cerning  personal   identity,   or  the  sameness   of  living 
agents,   implied    in  the   notion    of  our  existing  now  and 
hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  moments  ;  which  whoever 


1  If  we  set  out  from  the  sentence  principal  hopes  and  fears,  so  that 

in  which  Origen  has  supplied  the  without  it  men  will  not  cross  the 

basis  of  the  Analogy,  the  natural  threshold  of  this  inquiry, 

order  of  the  subject  would  pro-  2.    That  it  had  been  darkened 

bably   suggest   dealing  with   the  and,  so  to  speak,  intercepted,  by 

phenomena  and  experience  of  life  speculations   then    fresh    in    the 

before  considering  those  of  death.  public  mind  respecting  personal 

But   the   author   seems   to   have  identity,   a   subject  lying  at  the 

given  precedence  to  this  subject  root  of  the  doctrine.     (See  Locke, 

on  the  special'and  double  grounds:  On  the  Understanding,  II.  xxvii.  10.) 

i.  That  the  doctrine  of  a  future  He   however    hereby    exposed 

life  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  himself  to  these  inconveniences  : 

VOL.  I.  C 


i8 


OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE 


[I.I. 


thinks  it  worth  while,  may  see  considered  in  the  first 
Dissertation  at  the  end  of  this  Treatise.  But  without 
regard  to  any  of  them  here,  let  us  consider  what  the 
analogy  of  nature,  and  the  several  changes  which  we  have 
undergone,  and  those  which  we  know  we  may  undergo 
without  being  destroyed,  suggest,  as  to  the  effect  which 
death  may,  or  may  not,  have  upon  us  ;  and  whether  it 


(i)  That  death  rather  hides  than 
exhibits  the  course  of  nature  with 
respect  to  our  condition,  by  shut- 
ting off  all  the  evidence  of  what 
follows,  so  that  his  argument 
works  at  a  disadvantage  from 
scantiness  of  material  in  a  nar- 
rowed field.  (2)  That  a  chapter 
purporting  to  treat  '  of  a  future 
life '  seemed  to  promise  a  full 
discussion  of  the  subject ;  whereas 
hero  the  author  is  confined  to  a 
very  partial  treatment,  and  does 
not,  indeed  cannot,  present  at 
all  the  great  moral  argument  in 
favour  of  our  survival,  while  the 
general  doctrine  of  the  natural 
immortality  of  the  soul  (on  which 
he  reserves  his  opinion)  seems  to 
have  no  natural  place  in  the  dis- 
cussion, as  it  is  not  derived  from 
the  '  constitution  and  course  of 
nature.' 

Hence  there  may  arise  with 
some  a  sense  of  disappointment 
with  the  contents  of  the  chapter, 
which  may  perhaps  be  removed 
or  mitigated  if  we  bear  steadily 
in  mind  that  the  author  was  con- 
fined by  the  conditions  of  his 
work  to  a  closely  limited  and 
partial  investigation.  He  has  to 
leave  aside  all  moral  arguments 
whatever :  and  the  sum  of  what 
he  can  do  is  to  rebut  adverse 
presumptions  drawn  from  the  ex- 
tinction of  our  sensuous  life  ;  to 
marshal  such  favourable  pre- 
sumptions as  he  can  gather  from 
certain  observed  facts,  while  not 
venturing  to  lay  great  stress 
upon  them ;  and  to  give  as  the 


main  considerations  in  his  favour, 
the  incapacity  of  death  to  destroy 
perhaps  the  corporeal  but  certainly 
the  mental  life,  and  the  argument 
from  continuance.  Now  that  last 
argument  in  favour  of  survival 
assumes  a  great  strength  when 
we  can  take  our  stand  upon  the 
moral  incompleteness  of  our 
present  existence.  But  this  is 
for  the  present  a  forbidden  topic  ; 
and,  in  connection  with  merely 
physical  considerations,  the  con- 
tention seems  hardly  corroborated 
enough  to  bear  our  laying  any 
very  great  stress  upon  it. 

On  the  whole  it  may  seem  that 
the  best  mode  of  conceiving  But- 
ler's attitude  is  to  treat  the  two 
heads  of  argument  as  one ;  and 
to  put  it  thus.  Considering  the 
disproof  which  has  been  given 
of  any  power  possessed  by  death 
to  destroy  mental  (and,  it  might 
have  been  added,  still  more  to 
destroy  moral)  qualities,  and  find- 
ing these  indestructible  qualities 
now  actually  embodied  in  a  living 
subject,  it  is  strictly  rational,  on 
grounds  quite  apart  from  religion, 
to  suggest  the  survival  of  that 
subject  after  the  change  brought 
about  by  death,  as  at  least  a  mat- 
ter of  high  probability. 

Angus  (p.  19),  citing  Chalmers 
in  aid,  observes  that  while  this 
chapter  cannot  be  taken  as  sup- 
plying an  affirmative  proof  of  the 
future  life,  it  is  triumphant  in  the 
confutation  of  objections.  Observe 
Butler's  own  claim  in  §  32. 


§§  2,  3]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  19 

be  not  from  thence  probable,   that  we  may  survive  this 
change,  and  exist  in  a  future  state  of  life  and  perception. 

§  2.    In  us  and  in  other  creatures  identity  survives 

great  changes. 

[I.]  From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world  in 
the  helpless  imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  having  arrived 
from  thence  to  mature  age,  :we  find  it  to  be  a  general 
law  of  nature  in  our  own  species,  that  the  same  creatures, 
the  same  individuals,  should  exist  in  degrees  of  life  and 
perception,  with  capacities  of  action,  of  enjoyment  and 
suffering,  in  one  period  of  their  being,  greatly  different 
from  those  appointed  them  in  another  period  of  it.  And 
in  other  creatures  the  same  law  holds.  For  the  difference 
of  their  capacities  and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go 
no  higher)  and  in  maturity ;  the  change  of  worms  into 
flies,  and  the  vast  enlargement  of  their  locomotive  powers 
by  such  change :  and  birds  and  insects  bursting  the  shell 
of  their  habitation,  and  by  this  means  entering  into  a  new 
world,  furnished  with  new  accommodations  for  them,  and 
finding  a  new  sphere  of  action  assigned  them  ;  these  are 
instances  of  this  general  law  of  nature.  Thus  all  the 
various  and  wonderful  transformations  of  animals  are  to 
be  taken  into  consideration  here l. 

§  3.    Death  may  be  no  greater. 

But  the  states  of  life  in  which  we  ourselves  existed 
formerly  in  the  womb  and  in  our  infancy,  ara  almost 

1  Fitzgerald  observes  that  in  his  may  be  l  almost,'  if  not  altogether, 

comparison  of  states  Butler  does  as  great. 

not  allow  for  the  fact  that  death  Butler  is  not  here  dealing  with 

differs  from  the  others  in  seeming  any    objection   to   a    future    life 

to  deprive  us.  wholly  of  bodily  or-  which  may  be  grounded  on  the 

ganisation.     On  the  other  hand,  phenomenon  of  death,   but  only 

in  the  womb  we  are  entirely  de-  dealing  with  the  novelty  of  that 

prived  of  any  medium  in  which  state  to  which  it  may  be  intro- 

to  act  ;    and  Butler's  comparison  ducingus.    Death  seems  to  suggest 

is  one  not  rigid,  but  only  general.  that,  if  there  be  a  future  state,  it 

It  is  conceivable  that  the  death-  must  be  very  foreign  to  the  present 

state  may  be  found  to  differ  from  state.    It  seems  legitimate  to  reply 

known   life-states,    only  in  such  by  showing  that  even  within  the 

a   way   that   the   differences   be-  known  limits  of  existence  it  ad- 

tween  one  life-state  and  another  mits  of  enormous  diversities. 

C  2 


20  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [l.  I. 

as  different  from  our  present  in  mature  age,  as  it  is 
possible  to  conceive  any  two  states  or  degrees  of  life  can 
be.  Therefore,  that  we  are  to  exist  hereafter  in  a  state 
as  different  (suppose)  from  our  present,  as  this  is  from 
our  former,  is  but  according  to  the  analogy  of  nature  ; 
according  to  a  natural  order  or  appointment  of  the  very 
same  kind,  with  what  we  have  already  experienced. 

§  4.    Unless  it  lias  a  power  to  destroy,  continuance 
after  it  is  to  be  presumed. 

[II.]  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  action, 
of  happiness  and  misery :  for  we  are  conscious  of  acting, 
of  enjoying  pleasure  and  suffering  pain.  Now  that  we 
have  these  powers  and  capacities  before  death,  is  a  pre- 
sumption that  we  shall  retain  them  through  and  after 
death  ;  indeed  a  probability  of  it  abundantly  sufficient  to 
act  upon,  'unless  there  be  some  positive  reason  to  think 
that  death  is  the  destruction  of  those  living  powers 1  : 
because  there  is  in  every  case  a  probability,  that  all  things 
will  continue  as  we  experience  they  are,  in  all  respects, 
except  those  in  which  we  have  some  reason  to  think  they 
will  be  altered.  This  is  that  kind0-  of  presumption  or 

ft  I  say  kind  of  presumption  or  probability  ;  for  I  do  not  mean  to 
attirm  that  there  is  the  same  degree  of  conviction,  that  our  living  powers 
will  continue  after  death,  as  there  is,  that  our  substances  will. 


1  Dr.  Eagar,   one  of  the  most  the  living  powers  and  the  bodily 

recent  writers  on  the  Analogy,  and  organs.     But  in   §  23  he  points 

in  general  a  supporter  of  itsargu-  out  that  the  living  powers  do  not 

nieiits,  holds  that  this  chapter  is  depend  upon   the   body    '  in   the 

( out  of  tune  with  present  know-  manner' in  which  perception  by 

ledge '  :    which   he    explains    by  our  organs  of  sense   does.     And 

saying  that   no  one  would  now  Dr.  Eagar  goes  on  to  show  (p.  105) 

suggest  that  our  reflective  powers  that  the  physical  changes  in  the 

'  might  be   independent '  of  our  brain  which  accompany  the  act 

physical   organs    (Butler's  Analogy  of  perception    'are  yet   different 

and  Modern  Thought,  c.  iv.  p.  102).  from  it,'   and    to  adopt    Butler's 

The  assertion  is  one  which  Butler  own  language,  'we  see  with  our 

has  nowhere  made.    The  word  is  eyes  as  with  glasses.'     The  verbal 

indeed,    on    account    of   its  am-  surrender   of  Butler's  argument 

biguity,  altogether  unsuitable.  He  appears    to   be    a    pure   mistake, 

continually  recognises  in  various  See  further  on  §§  10  and  14. 
forms  the  near  relation  between 


§  4]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  21 

probability  from  analogy,  expressed  in  the  very  word  con- 
tinuancc,  which  seems  our  only  natural  reason  for  believing 
the  course  of  the  world  will  continue  to-morrow,  as  it  has 
done  so  far  as  our  experience  or  knowledge  of  history  can 
carry  us  back  l.  Nay,  it  seems  our  only  reason  for  believing, 
that  any  one  substance  now  existing  will  continue  to  exist 
a  moment  longer  ;  the  self-existent  substance  only  excepted. 
Thus  if  men  were  assured  that  the  unknown  event,  death, 
was  not  the  destruction  of  our  faculties  of  perception  and 
of  action,  there  would  be  no  apprehension,  that  any  other 
power  or  event  unconnected  with  this  of  death,  would 
destroy  these  faculties  just  at  the  instant  of  each  creature's 
death  ;  and  therefore  no  doubt  but  that  they  would  remain 
after  it :  which  shows  the  high  probability  that  our  living- 
powers  will  continue  after  death,  unless  there  be  some 
ground  to  think  that  death  is  their  destruction b.  For, 
if  it  would  be  in  a  manner  certain  that  we  should  sur- 
vive death,  provided  it  were  certain  that  death  would  not 
be  our  destruction,  it  must  be  highly  probable  we  shall 
survive  it,  if  there  be  no  ground  to  think  death  will  be 
our  destruction. 


b  Destruction  of  living  powers  is  a  manner  of  expression  unavoidably 
ambiguous  ;  and  may  signify  either  the  destruction  of 
a  living  being,  so  as  that  the  same  living  being  shall  be     ^istina^sh  destruc- 
tion absolute  from 

uncapable  of  ever  perceiving  or  achng  again  at  all :  or  the       destruction  of  pre- 
destruction  of  those  means  and  instruments  ly  which  it  is      scnf  con(Hfions 
capable  of  its  present  life,  of  its  present  state  of  perception 
and  of  action.    It  is  here  used  in  the  former  sense.     When  it  is  used  in 
the  latter,  the  epithet  present  is  added.     The  loss  of  a  man's  eye  is  a 
destruction  of  living  powers  in  the  latter  sense.    But  we  have  no  reason 
to  think  the  destruction  of  living  powers,  in  the  former  sense,  to  be 
possible.     We  have  no  more  reason  to  think  a  being  endued  with 
living  powers,  ever  loses  them  during  its  whole  existence,   than  to 
believe  that  a  stone  ever  acquires  them. 


1  Continuance,  however,  only  plished  in  full,  the  continuance 
raises  this  presumption  in  connec-  of  its  existence  until  the  full 
tion  with  purpose  ;  and  while  the  accomplishment  may  be  reason- 
purpose  for  which  the  substance  ably  presumed.  See  note  on 
exists  remains  not  yet  accom-  §  i. 


22  OF  A    FUTURE    LIFE  [I.  I. 

§  5.    Mere  apprehension  to  the  contrary  is  of 
no  ivcight. 

Now  though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that 
prior  to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future  life 
commonly  insisted  upon,  there  would  arise  a  general  con- 
fused suspicion,  that  in  the  great  shock  and  alteration 
which  we  shall  undergo  by  death,  we,  i.  e.  our  living 
powers,  might  be  wholly  destroyed ;  yet  even  prior  to 
those  proofs,  there  is  really  no  particular  distinct  ground 
or  reason  for  this  apprehension  at  all,  so  far  as  I  can  find. 
If  there  be,  it  must  arise  either  from  the  reason  of  the  thine/, 
or  from  the  analogy  of  nature. 

§  6.  (a)  In  the  reason  of  the  thine/ ;  for  death  docs  not 
suggest  the  destruction  of  the  living  agent. 

But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that 
death  is  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  because  we  know 
not  at  all  what  death  is  in  itself ;  but  only  some  of  its  effects, 
such  as  the  dissolution  of  flesh,  skin,  and  bones.  And 
these  effects  do  in  no  wise  appear  to  imply  the  destruction 
of  a  living  agent.  And  besides,  as  we  are  greatly  in  the 
dark,  upon  what  the  exercise  of  our  living  powers  depends, 
so  we  are  wholly  ignorant  what  the  powers  themselves 
depend  upon  ;  the  powers  themselves  as  distinguished, 
not  only  from  their  actual  exercise,  but  also  from  the 
present  capacity  of  exercising  them  ;  and  as  opposed  to 
their  destruction  :  for  sleep,  or  however  a  swoon,  shows 
us,  not  only  that  these  powers  exist  when  they  are  not 
exercised,  as  the  passive  power  of  motion  does  in  inanimate 
matter ;  but  shows  also  that  they  exist,  when  there  is  no 
present  capacity  of  exercising  them  :  or  that  the  capacities 
of  exercising  them  for  the  present,  as  well  as  the  actual 
exercise  of  them,  may  be  suspended,  and  yet  the  powers 
themselves  remain  undestroyed.  Since  then  we  know  not 
at  all  upon  what  the  existence  of  our  living  powers  depends, 
this  shows  further,  there  can  110  probability  be  collected 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that  death  will  be  their 
destruction  :  because  their  existence  may  depend  upon 


§§  5-8]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  23 

somewhat  in  no  degree  affected  by  death ;  upon  somewhat 
quite  out  of  the  reach  of  this  king  of  terrors  '.  So  that 
there  is  nothing  more  certain,  than  that  the  reason  of  the  tiling 
shows  us  no  connection  between  death,  and  the  destruction 
of  living  agents. 


§  7.  Or  (b)  in  the  analogy  of  nature.     It  destroys 
only  the  sensible  proof  of  living  powers. 

Nor  can  we  find  any  thing  throughout  the  whole  analogy 
of  nature,  to  afford  us  even  the  slightest  presumption,  that 
animals  ever  lose  their  living  powers  ;  much  less,  if  it  were 
possible,  that  they  lose  them  by  death  :  for  we  have  no 
faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  beyond  or  through  it,  so 
as  to  see  what  becomes  of  them.  This  event  removes  them 
from  our  view.  It  destroys  the  sensible  proof,  which  we 
had  before  their  death,  of  their  being  possessed  of  living 
powers,  but  does  not  appear  to  afford  the  least  reason  to 
believe  that  they  are,  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived 
of  them. 

§  8.  Eepeats  arguments  of  §§  3  and  4. 

And  our  knowing,  that  they  were  possessed  of  these 
powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have  faculties 
capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itself  a  probability  of  their 
retaining  them,  beyond  it.  And  this  is  confirmed,  and 
a  sensible  credibility  is  given  to  it,  by  observing  the  very 
great  and  astonishing  changes  which  we  have  experienced  ; 
so  great,  that  our  existence  in  another  state  of  life,  of  per- 
ception and  of  action,  will  be  but  according  to  a  method 
of  providential  conduct,  the  like  to  which  has  been  already 
exercised  even  with  regard  to  ourselves  ;  according  to 
a  course  of  nature,  the  like  to  which  we  have  already 
gone  through. 


1  We  have   also  probable   evi-       we  know  to  be  affected  by  death, 
dence  that  their  existence  does       Inf.  §§  14,  16,  29. 
not  depend  upon  any  thing  that 


24  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [I.  I. 

§  9.   Warning  anainst  trespasses  of  flic  imagination  \ 

However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible,  how 
difficult  it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to  make  the 
voice  of  reason  even  distinctly  heard  in  this  case  ;  as  we 
are  accustomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to  indulge  that  forward 
delusive  faculty,  ever  obtruding  beyond  its  sphere  ;  of  some 
assistance  indeed  to  apprehension,  but  the  author  of  all 
error  :  as  we  plainly  lose  ourselves  in  gross  and  crude  con- 
ceptions of  things,  taking  for  granted  that  we  are  acquainted 
with,  what  indeed  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of :  it  may  be 
proper  to  consider  the  imaginary  presumptions,  that  death 
will  be  our  destruction,  arising  from  these  kinds  of  early 
and  lasting  prejudices  ;  and  to  show  how  little  they  can 
really  amount  to,  even  though  we  cannot  wholly  divest 
ourselves  of  them.  And, 

§  10.    Such  apprehension  (c)  is  futile,  iinless  the  liviny 
ac/ent  be  disccrptibk  :   which  it  seems  not  to  le. 

[I.]  All  presumption  of  death's  being  the  destruction  of 
living  beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that  they  are  com- 
pounded ;  and  so,  discerptible 2.  But  since  consciousness  is 


1  Butler  appears  here  to  charge  physiological   theory,    which   np- 
upon  the  imagination  all  the  er-  pears  to  go  far  in  supporting  the 
ratic   whims  and  fancies  of  the  ideas   propounded    here    and    in 
brain.     These  no  doubt  are  regard-  §  14.     *  In  the  highly  organised 
less  of  evidence,  and  apt,  too,  to  multicellular  being,  most  of  the.se 
palm  themselves   upon   us  as   if  cells  are  what  are  called  somatic 
they  were  fact.     But  imagination  cells,  i.e.  cells  that  are  continually 
proper   is   totally   different,    and  beingchangedandreplacedduring 
knows  itself  to  be  a  denixen  of  life,  whose  persistence  is  not  ne- 
a  world  different  from  the  world  c-essary  to  the  life  of  the  being, 
of  fact,  and  unsuited  to  masquer-  But   the  cell,  that   has   brought 
ad  ing  in  any  character  other  than  life,  is  of  a  different  kind.     It  is 
its  own.     It  seems  necessary  to  never  replaced,   and   never  loses 
make   these   allowances   in    con-  itslife.    Thecellof  the  unicellular 
sidering  the  passage.     In  imagin-  animal  is  of  this  kind,  a  genn-ceJI. 
ation  proper  it  would  appear  that  From  the  nature  of  the  case  it 
Butler  was  by  no  means  wanting,  can  have  no  somatic  cells'  (Eagar, 
if  we  may  judge  from  the  mode  p.  in).     I  need  hardly  add  that 
in  which  he  treats  the  subject  of  these  words  are  quoted  by  way  of 
beauty,  referring  it  as  he  does  to  illustration  only. 

fixed  principles.     See  Serm.xi.ai.  As  regards  the  text,  we  must 

2  Dr.  Eagar  refers  us  to  a  modern  closely   observe  its  terms.     This 


§§9-n]  OF  A    FUTURE    LIFE  25 

a  single  and  indivisible  power,  it  should  seem  that  the 
subject  in  which  it  resides  must  be  so  too.  For  were  the 
motion  of  any  particle  of  matter  absolutely  one  and  in- 
divisible, so  as  that  it  should  imply  a  contradiction  to  suppose 
part  of  this  motion  to  exist,  and  part  not  to  exist,  i.  e.  part 
of  this  matter  to  move,  and  part  to  be  at  rest  ;  then  its 
power  of  motion  would  be  indivisible  ;  and  so  also  would 
the  subject  in  which  the  power  inheres,  namely,  the  particle 
of  matter  :  for  if  this  could  be  divided  into  two,  one  part 
might  be  moved  and  the  other  at  rest,  which  is  contrary  to 
the  supposition.  In  like  manner  it  has  been  argued  c,  and, 
for  any  thing  appearing  to  the  contrary,  justly,  that  since 
the  perception  or  consciousness,  which  we  have  of  our  own 
existence,  is  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to 
suppose  one  part  of  it  should  be  here  and  the  other  there  ; 
the  perceptive  power,  or  the  power  of  consciousness,  is 
indivisible  too  :  and  consequently  the  subject  in  which  it 
resides  ;  i.  e.  the  conscious  being. 

§  ii.    And,  if  not,  the  'body  is  mere  foreign  matter, 
without  nisus  towards  destroying  its. 

Now  upon  supposition  that  living  agent  each  man  calls 
himself,  is  thus  a  single  being,  which  there  is  at  least  no 
more  difficulty  in  conceiving  than  in  conceiving  it  to  be 
a  compound,  and  of  which  there  is  the  proof  now  mentioned  ; 
it  follows,  that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves 
or  part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter  around  us.  And 


0  See  Dr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr.  Dodwell,  and  the  defences  of  it. 


is  not  an  argument  to  prove  the  dissolution  of  the  soul,  considered 

immortality  of  the  soul  ;  but  only  as     natural     processes,     nothing 

to  show  that  no  presumption  of  whatever  ?    But    Butler    is    not 

its  mortality  arises  out  of  the  fact  made  responsible  by  what  he  has 

of  death,  unless  the  soul  be  dis-  written  for  Clarke's  doctrine.     It 

cerptibie,  and  therefore  material.  is    indivisibility    on    which    he 

The  passage  then  does  not  seek  to  argues  ;    and  so    he   escapes  the 

rule   the  question   of  the   soul's  association    with    matter   which 

immortality.     May  it  not  be  truly  attaches  to  the  word  <  indiscerp- 

said,  that  of  the  growth  and  dis-  tible/ 

solution   of  the  body   we  know  On  the  Natural  Immortality  of 

a  little,  but  of  the  generation  and  the  Soul,  see  wf.  §§  21,  31. 


26  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [I.  I. 

it  is  as  easy  to  conceive,  how  matter,  which  is  no  part  of 
ourselves,  may  be  appropriated  to  us  in  the  manner  which 
our  present  bodies  are  ;  as  how  we  can  receive  impressions 
from,  and  have  power  over  any  matter.  It  is  as  easy  to 
conceive,  that  we  may  exist  out  of  bodies,  as  in  them  ;  that 
we  might  have  animated  bodies  of  any  other  organs  and 
senses  wholly  different  from  these  now  given  us,  and  that 
we  may  hereafter  animate  these  same  or  new  bodies 
variously  modified  and  organized  ;  as  to  conceive  how  we 
can  animate  such  bodies  as  our  present '.  And  lastly,  the 
dissolution  of  all  these  several  organized  bodies,  supposing 
ourselves  to  have  successively  animated  them,  would  have 
no  more  conceivable  tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings 
ourselves,  or  deprive  us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties  of 
perception  and  of  action,  than  the  dissolution  of  any  foreign 
matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving  impressions  from, 
and  making  use  of  for  the  common  occasions  of  life 2. 

§  12.    Observation  liketvise  proves  the  lody  to  le  no 
part  of  ourselves. 

[II.]  The  simplicity  and  absolute  oneness  of  a  living 
agent  cannot  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be 
properly  proved  by  experimental  observations.  But  as 
these  fall  in  with  the  supposition  of  its  unity,  so  they 
plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  certainly,  that  our  gross  organized 
bodies,  with  which  we  perceive  the  objects  of  sense,  and 


1  This  appears  a  hazardous  as-  the  N.  T.  to  be  in  bodies  ;  and  the 
sertion.  May  it  not  even  be  asked  language  of  St.  Paul  (2  Cor.  xii. 
whether  the  human  faculties  have  2)  :  '  whether  in  the  body,  or  out 
ever  yet  fully  conceived  an  exis-  of  the  body,  I  cannot  tell.' 
tence  living  and  active,  and  yet  2  The  impressions  from  other 
wholly  discharged  from  body  ?  It  foreign  matter  are  upon  the  ex- 
is  of  course,  another  question  terior  organs  of  the  body.  But 
whether  there  may  not  actually  these  organs,  we  now  know,  trans- 
be  existence  under  such  con-  mit  tidings  to  the  brain,  and  there 
ditions.  the  body  has  communications 

In   Dante  the   spirits   cast  no  with  the  soul,   as   to   which  we 

shadow  from   the   sun,  yet  are,  know  that  there  is  nothing  similar 

as  in  all  other  points,  absolutely  in  the  contact  of  ordinary  matter, 

visible  in   shapes.     Compare  the  though     their     nature     remains 

case  of  the  anxiety  of  demons  in  wholly  inscrutable  to  us. 


§§  12-14]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  27 

with  which  we  act,  are  no  part  of  ourselves  l  ;  and  therefore 
show  us,  that  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  their  destruction 
to  be  ours :  even  without  determining  whether  our  living 
substances  be  material  or  immaterial.  For  we  see  by  ex- 
perience, that  men  may  lose  their  limbs,  their  organs  of 
sense,  and  even  the  greatest  part  of  these  bodies,  and  yet 
remain  the  same  living  agents.  And  persons  can  trace  up 
the  existence  of  themselves  to  a  time,  when  the  bulk  of 
their  bodies  was  extremely  small,  in  comparison  of  what  it 
is  in  mature  age  :  and  we  cannot  but  think,  that  they  might 
then  have  lost  a  considerable  part  of  that  small  body,  and 
yet  have  remained  the  same  living  agents  ;  as  they  may 
now  lose  great  part  of  their  present  body,  and  remain  so. 

§  13.   As  does  the  fluxion  of  its  particles. 

And  it  is  certain,  that  the  bodies  of  all  animals  are  in 
a  constant  flux,  from  that  never-ceasing  attrition,  which 
there  is  in  every  part  of  them.  Now  things  of  this  kind 
unavoidably  teach  us  to  distinguish,  between  these  living 
agents  ourselves,  and  large  quantities  of  matter,  in  which 
we  are  very  nearly  interested  :  since  these  may  be  alienated, 
and  actually  are  in  a  daily  course  of  succession,  and  changing 
their  owners  ;  whilst  we  are  assured,  that  each  living  agent 
remains  one  and  the  same  permanent  being d.  And  this 
general  observation  leads  us  on  to  the  following  ones. 

§  14.    Unless  the  living  agent  be  bulkier  than  the  atom, 
no  presumption  against  its  survival. 

First,  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  experience, 
what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being  each  man  calls 
himself :  and  yet,  till  it  be  determined  that  it  is  larger  in 


d  See  Dissertation  I. 

1  In  scripture,  the  body  is  in-  Butler's  assertion  we  must  confine 

deed  our  '  tabernacle '  :  but  it  is  it  strictly  to  that  which  indeed 

also    the    temple     of    the    Holy  he  is  arguing  upon,  namely,  the 

Ghost  (i  Cor.  vi.  19),  and  we  are  present  and  natural  body  as  dis- 

formed  of  body,   soul,  and  spirit  tinct  from  the  future  and  spiritual 

(i    Thess.    v.    23).     To    warrant  body. 


28  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [I.  I. 

bulk  than  the  solid  elementary  particles  of  matter,  which 
there  is  no  ground  to  think  any  natural  power  can  dissolve, 
there  is  no  sort  of  reason  to  think  death  to  be  the  dissolution 
of  it,  of  the  living  being,  even  though  it  should  not  be 
absolutely  indiscerptible. 

§  15.   If  our  bodies  be  not  the  ego,  no  ground  to  think 

any  other  matter  is. 

Secondly,  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to  and 
interested  in  certain  systems  of  matter,  suppose  our  flesh 
and  bones,  and  afterwards  ceasing  to  be  at  all  related  to 
them,  the  living  agents  ourselves  remaining  all  this 
while  undestroyed  notwithstanding  such  alienation;  and 
consequently  these  systems  of  matter  not  being  ourselves : 
it  follows  further,  that  we  have  no  ground  to  conclude 
any  other,  suppose  internal  systems  of  matter,  to  be  the 
living  agents  ourselves ;  because  we  can  have  no  ground 
to  conclude  this,  but  from  our  relation  to  and  interest 
in  such  other  systems  of  matter :  and  therefore  we  can 
have  no  reason  to  conclude,  what  befalls  those  systems 
of  matter  at  death,  to  be  the  destruction  of  the  living 
agents.  We  have  already  several  times  over  lost  a  great 
part  or  perhaps  the  whole  of  our  body,  according  to  certain 
common  established  laws  of  nature ;  yet  we  remain  the 
same  living  agents :  when  we  shall  lose  as  great  a  part, 
or  the  whole,  by  another  common  established  law  of  nature, 
death  ;  why  may  we  not  also  remain  the  same  ?  That  the 
alienation  has  been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  in  the  other 
will  be  more  at  once,  does  not  prove  any  thing  to  the 
contrary.  We  have  passed  undestroyed  through  those 
many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter,  so  peculiarly  appro- 
priated to  us  ourselves ;  why  should  we  imagine  death  will 
be  so  fatal  to  us  ? 

§  1 6.    No  proof  that  the  original  solid  body,  if  any, 

is  affected  by  death1. 

Nor  can  it  be  objected,  that  what  is  thus  alienated  or  lost, 
is  no  part  of  our  original  solid  body,  but  only  adventitious 

1  See  note  on  §  10. 


§§  ip-n]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  29 

matter  ;  because  we  may  lose  entire  limbs,  which  must  have 
contained  many  solid  parts  and  vessels  of  the  original  body  : 
or  if  this  be  not  admitted,  we  have  no  proof,  that  any  of 
these  solid  parts  are  dissolved  or  alienated  by  death.  Though, 
by  the  way,  we  are  very  nearly  related  to  that  extraneous  or 
adventitious  matter,  whilst  it  continues  united  to  and  dis- 
tending the  several  parts  of  our  solid  body.  But  after  all ; 
the  relation  a  person  bears  to  those  parts  of  his  body,  to 
which  he  is  the  most  nearly  related  ;  what  does  it  appear 
to  amount  to  but  this,  that  the  living  agent,  and  those  parts 
of  the  body,  mutually  affect  each  other?  And  the  same 
thing,  the  same  thing  in  kind  though  not  in  degree,  may 
be  said  of  all  foreign  matter,  which  gives  us  ideas,  and  which 
we  have  any  power  over.  From  these  observations  the 
whole  ground  of  the  imagination  is  removed,  that  the  dis- 
solution of  any  matter,  is  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent, 
from  the  interest  he  once  had  in  such  matter. 

§  1 7.  Like  other  instruments,  our  senses  present  objects, 
lut  do  not  perceive  \ 

Thirdly,  If  we  consider  our  body  somewhat  more  dis- 
tinctly, as  made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of  perception 
and  of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  same  conclusion. 
Thus  the  common  optical  experiments  show,  and  even  the 
observation  how  sight  is  assisted  by  glasses  shows,  that  we 
see  with  our  eyes  in  the  same  sense  as  we  see  with  glasses. 
Nor  is  there  any  reason  to  believe,  that  we  see  with  them 
in  any  other  sense  ;  any  other,  I  mean,  which  would  lead 
us  to  think  the  eye  itself  a  percipient.  The  like  is  to  be 
said  of  hearing  :  and  our  feeling  distant  solid  matter  by 
means  of  somewhat  in  our  hand,  seems  an  instance  of  the 
like  kind,  as  to  the  subject  we  are  considering.  All  these 
are  instances  of  foreign  matter,  or  such  as  is  no  part  of  our 
body,  being  instrumental  in  preparing  objects  for,  and  con- 
veying them  to,  the  perceiving  power,  in  a  manner  similar 
or  like  to  the  manner  in  which  our  organs  of  sense  prepare 

1  Plato,  Alcibiacles,  i.  51  :  trtpov       tTcpovapaavOpojirts  Icm 
apa  (T/fVToro/io?  KOI  KtOapiarr)?  x(iP^v        TOV  favrov. 
Kal   6(pOa\nwv   ols 


30  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [I.  I. 

and  convey  them.  Both  are  in  a  like  way  instruments  of 
our  receiving  such  ideas  from  external  objects,  as  the  Author 
of  nature  appointed  those  external  objects  to  be  the  occasions 
of  exciting  in  us.  However,  glasses  are  evidently  instances 
of  this;  namely  of  matter  which  is  no  part  of  our  body, 
preparing  objects  for  and  conveying  them  towards  the  per- 
ceiving power,  in  like  manner  as  our  bodily  organs  do.  And 
if  we  see  with  our  eyes  only  in  the  same  manner  as  we  do 
with  glasses,  the  like  may  justly  be  concluded,  from  analogy, 
of  all  our  other  senses.  It  is  not  intended,  by  any  thing 
here  said,  to  affirm,  that  the  whole  apparatus  of  vision,  or 
of  perception  by  any  other  of  our  senses,  can  be  traced 
through  all  its  steps,  quite  up  to  the  living  power  of  seeing, 
or  perceiving :  but  that  so  far  as  it  can  be  traced  by  experi- 
mental observations,  so  far  it  appears,  that  our  organs  of 
sense  prepare  and  convey  on  objects,  in  order  to  their  being 
perceived,  in  like  manner  as  foreign  matter  does,  without 
affording  any  shadow  of  appearance,  that  they  themselves 
perceive. 

§  18.   We  can  (7™$-)  part  with  them;  and  act,  In  dreams, 
without  them. 

And  that  we  have  no  reason  to  think  our  organs  of  sense 
percipients,  is  confirmed  by  instances  of  persons  losing  some 
of  them,  the  living  beings  themselves,  their  former  oc- 
cupiers, remaining  unimpaired.  It  is  confirmed  also  by  the 
experience  of  dreams ;  by  which  we  find  we  are  at  present 
possessed  of  a  latent,  and,  what  would  otherwise  be,  an 
unimagined  unknown  power  of  perceiving  sensible  objects, 
in  as  strong  and  lively  a  manner  without  our  external 
organs  of  sense  as  with  them. 

§  19.  Limbs  are  Instruments,  and  raise  no  presumption 
of  one  dying  with  them. 

So  also  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving,  or  directing 
motion  by  will  and  choice :  upon  the  destruction  of  a  limb, 
this  active  power  remains,  as  it  evidently  seems,  unlessened ; 
so  as  that  the  living  being,  who  has  suffered  this  loss,  would 
be  capable  of  moving  as  before,  if  it  had  another  limb  to 


§§  18-20]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  31 

move  with.  It  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg  ; 
just  as  it  can  make  use  of  a  pole  or  a  lever,  to  reach  towards 
itself  and  to  move  things,  beyond  the  length  and  the  power 
of  its  natural  arm  :  and  this  last  it  does  in  the  same  manner 
as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with  its  natural  arm,  things  nearer 
and  of  less  weight.  Nor  is  there  so  much  as  any  appearance 
of  our  limbs  being  endued  with  a  power  of  moving  or 
directing  themselves  ;  though  they  are  adapted,  like  the 
several  parts  of  a  machine,  to  be  the  instruments  of  motion 
to  each  other  ;  and  some  parts  of  the  same  limb,  to  be 
instruments  of  motion  to  other  parts  of  it. 

Thus  a  man  determines,  that  he  will  look  at  such  an 
object  through  a  microscope  ;  or  being  lame  suppose,  that 
he  will  walk  to  such  a  place  with  a  staff  a  week  hence.  His 
eyes  and  his  feet  no  more  determine  in  these  cases,  than  the 
microscope  and  the  staff.  Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  think 
they  any  more  put  the  determination  in  practice  ;  or  that 
his  eyes  are  the  seers  or  his  feet  the  movers,  in  any  other 
sense  than  as  the  microscope  and  the  staff  are.  Upon  the 
whole  then,  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are  certainly 
instruments,  which  the  living  persons  ourselves  make  use 
of  to  perceive  and  move  with  :  there  is  not  any  probability, 
that  they  are  any  more  ;  nor  consequently,  that  we  have 
any  other  kind  of  relation  to  them,  than  what  we  may  have 
to  any  other  foreign  matter  formed  into  instruments  of 
perception  and  motion,  suppose  into  a  microscope  or  a  staff ; 
(I  say  any  other  kind  of  relation,  for  I  am  not  speaking  of 
the  degree  of  it ;)  nor  consequently  is  there  any  probability, 
that  the  alienation  or  dissolution  of  these  instruments  is  the 
destruction  of  the  perceiving  and  moving  agent. 

§  20.  If  we  can  survive  such  matter,  wliy  not  all  matter  ? 

And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dissolution  of  matter,  in 
which  living  beings  were  most  nearly  interested,  is  not  their 
dissolution ;  and  that  the  destruction  of  several  of  the  organs 
and  instruments  of  perception  and  of  motion  belonging  to 
them,  is  not  their  destruction  ;  shows  demonstratively,  that 
there  is  no  ground  to  think  that  the  dissolution  of  any  other 


32  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [I.  I. 

matter,  or  destruction  of  any  other  organs  and  instruments, 
will  be  the  dissolution  or  destruction  of  living  agents,  from 
the  like  kind  of  relation.  And  we  have  no  reason  to  think 
we  stand  in  any  other  kind  of  relation  to  any  thing  which 
we  find  dissolved  by  death. 

§  21.  Obj.  Then  brutes  may  come  to  rational  and  moral 
nature.     Answ.  May,  but  need  not\ 

But  it  is  said  these  observations  are  equally  applicable  to 
brutes :  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable  difficulty,  that 
they  should  be  immortal,  and  by  consequence  capable  of 
everlasting  happiness.  Now  this  manner  of  expression  is 
both  invidious  and  weak  :  but  the  thing  intended  by  it, 
is  really  no  difficulty  at  all,  either  in  the  way  of  natural  or 
moral  consideration.  For  first,  Suppose  the  invidious  thing, 
designed  in  such  a  manner  of  expression,  were  really  implied, 
as  it  is  not  in  the  least,  in  the  natural  immortality  of  brutes ; 
namely,  that  they  must  arrive  at  great  attainments,  and 
become  rational  and  moral  agents  ;  even  this  would  be  no 
difficulty  :  since  we  know  not  what  latent  powers  and 
capacities  they  may  be  endued  with.  There  was  once,  prior 
to  experience,  as  great  presumption  against  human  creatures, 
as  there  is  against  the  brute  creatures,  arriving  at  that 
degree  of  understanding,  which  we  have  in  mature  age. 
For  we  can  trace  up  our  own  existence  to  the  same  original 
with  theirs.  And  we  find  it  to  be  a  general  law  of  nature, 
that  creatures  endued  with  capacities  of  virtue  and  religion 
should  be  placed  in  a  condition  of  being,  in  which  they  are 
altogether  without  the  use  of  them,  for  a  considerable  length 
of  their  duration  ;  as  in  infancy  and  childhood.  And  great 
part  of  the  human  species  go  out  of  the  present  world,  before 
they  come  to  the  exercise  of  these  capacities  in  any  degree 
at  all.  But  then,  secondly,  The  natural  immortality  of 


1  Angus   quotes   from  Clarke's  it  requires  the  present ;  and  after 

Reply  to  Collins:    'Bruges  may  all  there  are  other  and  stronger 

for  all  we  know  become  rational  arguments  for  the  future  life  of 

agents,  as  infants  do.    If  not,  the  man,  which  do  not  hold  equally 

system  of  the  universe  may  require  in  the  case  of  brutes.' 
the  future  existence  of  brutes,  as 


§§21-23]  OF  A    FUTURE    LIFE  33 

brutes  does  not  in  the  least  imply,  that  they  are  endued 
with  any  latent  capacities  of  a  rational  or  moral  nature  !. 
And  the  economy  of  the  universe  might  require,  that  there 
should  be  living  creatures  without  any  capacities  of  this 
kind. 

§  22.  Our  ignorance  regarding  them  no  bar  to  the 
argument  as  it  relates  to  man. 

And  all  difficulties  as  to  the  manner  how  they  are  to  be 
disposed  of  are  so  apparently  and  wholly  founded  in  our 
ignorance,  that  it  is  wonderful  they  should  be  insisted  upon 
by  any,  but  such  as  are  weak  enough  to  think  they  are 
acquainted  with  the  whole  system  of  things.  There  is  then 
absolutely  nothing  at  all  in  this  objection,  which  is  so 
rhetorically  urged,  against  the  greatest  part  of  the  natural 
proofs  or  presumptions  of  the  immortality  of  human  minds  : 
I  say  the  greatest  part ;  for  it  is  less  applicable  to  the 
following  observation,  which  is  more  peculiar  to  mankind  : 

§  23.  No  presumption  anywhere  against  survival  of  reason, 
memory,  and  affections*. 

[III.]  That  as  it  is  evident  our  present  powers  and 
capacities  of  reason,  memory,  and  affection,  do  not  depend 
upon  our  gross  body  in  the  manner  in  which  perception  by 
our  organs  of  sense  does ;  so  they  do  not  appear  to  depend 
upon  it  at  all  in  any  such  manner,  as  to  give  ground  to 
think,  that  the  dissolution  of  this  body  will  be  the  de- 


1  Disclaiming  any  positive  doc-  Dr.  Eagar  appears  to  make  a  vaki- 
trine   of   a    rational    and    moral  able   addition   by  producing  the 
nature   for   brutes,   Butler   stops  case  of  the  moral  powers  distinctly 
short  of  disclaiming  the  argument  and  apart  (Eagar,  p.  107)  : 

for  their  immortality,  as  implied  '  The  moral  powers  of  the  man 

in  a  spirit  distinct  from  the  body,  likewise  grow,  but  they  have  no 

which  arises  upon  §§  17-19.  period  of  decay,  confined  within 

The  natural  immortality  of  the  the  apparent  limits  of  life.     They 

human   soul   mentioned  here,  is  not  only  last,  but  maintain  their 

again    noticed    in    §   31,    but    in  full  vigour,  and  even  strengthen, 

neither  case  is  there  any  explicit  to  the  end.     The  brain,  as  well  as* 

acceptance  of  it.  the  senses,  grows  weak  ;  but  the 

2  To    the    whole    argument   of  man  does  not  weaken  in  truth, 
Butler  for  the    survival   of   the  honesty,  uprightness,  love.' 
reason,    memory,   and    affection, 

VOL.    I.  t> 


34  OF  A    FUTURE   LITE  [I.  I. 

struction  of  these  our  present  powers  of  reflection,  as  it  will 
of  our  powers  of  sensation  ;  or  to  give  ground  to  conclude, 
even  that  it  will  be  so  much  as  a  suspension  of  the  former. 

§  24.  Our  state  is  dual,  (a)  of  sensation,  (b)  of  reflection. 

No  sign  that  death  touches  (b). 

Human  creatures  exist  at  present  in  two  states  of  life  and 
perception,  greatly  different  from  each  other  ;  each  of  which 
has  its  own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  own  peculiar  enjoyments 
and  sufferings.  When  any  of  our  senses  are  affected  or 
appetites  gratified  with  the  objects  of  them,  we  may  be  said 
to  exist  or  live  in  a  state  of  sensation.  When  none  of  our 
senses  are  affected  or  appetites  gratified,  and  yet  we  perceive, 
and  reason,  and  act ;  we  may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in 
a  state  of  reflection.  Now  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that 
any  thing  which  is  dissolved  by  death,  is  any  way  necessary 
to  the  living  being  in  this  its  state  of  reflection,  after  ideas 
are  gained.  For,  though,  from  our  present  constitution  and 
condition  of  being,  our  external  organs  of  sense  are  necessary 
for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflecting  powers,  as  carriages, 
and  levers,  and  scaffolds  are  in  architecture  :  yet  when  these 
ideas  are  brought  in,  we  are  capable  of  reflecting  in  the  most 
intense  degree,  and  of  enjoying  the  greatest  pleasure,  and 
feeling  the  greatest  pain,  by  means  of  that  reflection, 
without  any  assistance  from  our  senses ;  and  without  any 
at  all,  which  we  know  of,  from  that  body  which  will  be 
dissolved  by  death.  It  does  not  appear  then,  that  the 
relation  of  this  gross  body  to  the  reflecting  being  is,  in  any 
degree,  necessary  to  thinking  ;  to  our  intellectual  enjoyments 
or  sufferings  :  nor,  consequently,  that  the  dissolution  or 
alienation  of  the  former  by  death,  will  be  the  destruction  of 
those  present  powers,  which  render  us  capable  of  this  state 
of  reflection. 

§  25.  As  some  mortal  diseases  leave  the  ego  unaffected, 
this  may  be  so  with  all. 

Further,  there  are  instances  of  mortal  diseases,  which  do 
not  at  all  affect  our  present  intellectual  powers  ;  and  this 
affords  a  presumption,  that  those  diseases  will  not  destroy 


§§24-26]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  35 

these  present  powers.  Indeed,  from  the  observations  made 
above e,  it  appears,  that  there  is  no  presumption,  from  their 
mutually  affecting  each  other,  that  the  dissolution  of  the 
body  is  the  destruction  of  the  living  agent.  And  by  the 
same  reasoning,  it  must  appear  too,  that  there  is  no  presump- 
tion, from  their  mutually  affecting  each  other,  that  the 
dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of  our  present 
reflecting  powers  :  but  instanpes  of  their  not  affecting  each 
other,  afford  a  presumption  of  the  contrary.  Instances  of 
mortal  diseases  not  impairing  our  present  reflecting  powers, 
evidently  turn  our  thoughts  even  from  imagining  such 
diseases  to  be  the  destruction  of  them.  Several  things 
indeed  greatly  affect  all  our  living  powers,  and  at  length 
suspend  the  exercise  of  them  ;  as  for  instance  drowsiness, 
increasing  till  it  ends  in  sound  sleep  :  and  from  hence  we 
might  have  imagined  it  would  destroy  them,  till  we  found 
by  experience  the  weakness  of  this  way  of  judging.  But  in 
the  diseases  nowT  mentioned,  there  is  not  so  much  as  this 
shadow  of  probability,  to  lead  us  to  any  such  conclusion,  as 
to  the  reflecting  powers  which  we  have  at  present.  For  in 
thSse  diseases,  persons  the  moment  before  death  appear  to 
be  in  the  highest  vigour  of  life.  They  discover  apprehension, 
memory,  reason,  all  entire ;  with  the  utmost  force  of 
affection  ;  sense  of  a  character,  of  shame  and  honour  ;  and 
the  highest  mental  enjoyments  and  sufferings,  even  to  the 
last  gasp  :  and  these  surely  prove  even  greater  vigour  of 
life  than  bodily  strength  does.  Now  what  pretence  is  there 
for  thinking,  that  a  progressive  disease  when  arrived  to  such 
a  degree,  I  mean  that  degree  which  is  mortal,  will  destroy 
those  powers,  which  were  not  impaired,  which  were  not 
affected  by  it,  during  its  whole  progress  quite  up  to  that 
degree  ?  And  if  death  by  diseases  of  this  kind  is  not  the 
destruction  of  our  present  reflecting  powers,  it  will  scarce 
be  thought  that  death  by  any  other  means  is. 

§  26.  Death  may  not  even  suspend  its  activity. 
It  is  obvious  that  this  general  observation  may  be  carried 
on  further  :  and  there  appears  so  little  connection  between 

e  Sup.  §§  15,  1 6. 
D    2 


36  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [I.  I. 

our  bodily  powers  of  sensation,  and  our  present  powers  of 
reflection,  that  there  is  no  reason  to  conclude,  that  death, 
which  destroys  the  former,  does  so  much  as  suspend  the 
exercise  of  the  latter,  or  interrupt  our  continuing  to  exist  in 
the  like  state  of  reflection  which  we  do  now.  For  suspension 
of  reason,  memory,  and  the  affections  which  they  excite,  is 
no  part  of  the  idea  of  death,  nor  is  implied  in  our  notion  of 
it.  And  our  daily  experiencing  these  powers  to  be  exercised, 
without  any  assistance,  that  we  know  of,  from  those  bodies, 
which  will  be  dissolved  by  death  ;  and  our  finding  often, 
that  the  exercise  of  them  is  so  lively  to  the  last;  these 
things  afford  a  sensible  apprehension,  that  death  may  not 
perhaps  be  so  much  as  a  discontinuance  of  the  exercise  of 
these  powers,  nor  of  the  enjoyments  and  sufferings  which  it 
implies  f.  So  that  our  posthumous  life,  whatever  there  may 
be  in  it  additional  to  our  present,  yet  may  not  be  entirely 
beginning  anew  ;  but  going  on. 

§  27.  Death  may  resemble  a  birth,  and  forthwith  enlarge 

life. 

Death  may,  in  some  sort,  and  in  some  respects,  answer  to 
our  birth  ;  which  is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties  which 
we  had  before  it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  state  of  life  in 
which  we  existed  when  in  the  womb  ;  but  a  continuation  of 
both,  with  such  and  such  great  alterations. 

Nay,  for  ought  we  know  of  ourselves,  of  our  present  life 
and  of  death  ;  death  may  immediately,  in  the  natural  course 
of  things,  put  us  into  a  higher  and  more  enlarged  state  of 
life,  as  our  birth  does  s  ;  a  state  in  which  our  capacities,  and 


f  There  are  three  distinct  questions,  relating  to  a  future  life,  here 
considered :  Whether  death  be  the  destruction  of  living 
fortiori  *     agents  5    if  not>  Whether  it  be  the  destruction  of  their 
present  powers  of  reflection,  as  it  certainly  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  their  present  powers  of  sensation ;  and  if  not,  Whether  it  be 
the   suspension,  or   discontinuance  of  the  exercise,  of  these  present 
reflecting  powers.     Now,  if  there  be  no  reason  to  believe  the  last, 
there  will  be,  if  that  were  possible,  less  for  the  next,  and  less  still  for 
the  first. 

g  This,  according   to   Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brachmans, 
vo(Jii£ttv  fjLtv  y&p  877  rbv  n\v  tvOadf  0iov,  us  &v  aKp.rtv 


§§27-29]  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  37 

sphere  of  perception  and  of  action,  may  be  much  greater 
than  at  present.  For  as  our  relation  to  our  external  organs 
of  sense,  renders  us  capable  of  existing  in  our  present  state 
of  sensation ;  so  it  may  be  the  only  natural  hindrance  to 
our  existing,  •  immediately  and  of  course,  in  a  higher  state 
of  reflection.  The  truth  is,  reason  does  not  at  all  show  us, 
in  what  state  death  naturally  leaves  us. 

§  28.    Distinguish  suspension  from  destruction. 

But  were  we  sure,  that  it  would  suspend  all  our  perceptive 
and  active  powers ;  yet  the  suspension  of  a  power  and  the 
destruction  of  it,  are  effects  so  totally  different  in  kind,  as 
we  experience  from  sleep  and  a  swoon,  that  we  cannot 
in  any  wise  argue  from  one  to  the  other ;  or  conclude  even 
to  the  lowest  degree  of  probability,  that  the  same  kind  of 
force  which  is  sufficient  to  suspend  our  faculties,  though 
it  be  increased  ever  so  much,  will  be  sufficient  to  destroy 
them. 

§  29.   Vegetables,  not  having  living  potcers,  supply  no 
.     analogy. 

These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to  show, 
how  little  presumption  there  is,  that  death  is  the  destruction 
of  human  creatures.  However,  there  is  the  shadow  of  an 
analogy,  which  may  lead  us  to  imagine  it  is ;  the  supposed 
likeness  which  is  observed  between  the  decay  of  vegetables, 
and  of  living  creatures.  And  this  likeness  is  indeed  sufficient 
to  afford  the  poets 1  very  apt  allusions  to  the  flowers  of  the 
field,  in  their  pictures  of  the  frailty  of  our  present  life. 
But  in  reason,  the  analogy  is  so  far  from  holding,  that 
there  appears  no  ground  even  for  the  comparison,  as  to  the 
present  question  :  because  one  of  the  two  subjects  compared 
is  wholly  void  of  that,  which  is  the  principal  and  chief 


St.  Qavarov,  ftveaiv  els  TW  oi>Tca$  fiiov,  KOI  TOV  evoai^ova  TOIS  (f>i\oao(f>r]craffi . 
Lib.  xv.  p.  1039,  ed.  Amst.  1707.  To  which  opinion  perhaps  Antoninus 
may  allude  in  these  words,  a;?  vvv  irfptpevets,  TTOTC  epPpvov  (K  TTJS  yamrpbs 


TJ}S  yvvaiKos  aov  f£t\0r},  OVTOJS  e/{8fXfo-0at  T^V  wpav  Iv  y  TO 
TOV  k \vrpov  TOVTOV  (Kirffffirai.     Lib.  ix.  c.  3. 
1  II.  vi.  146  ;  Moschus,  ii.  108. 


38  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  [I.  I. 

thing  in  the  other,  the  power  of  perception  and  of  action  ; 
and  which  is  the  only  thing  we  are  inquiring  about  the 
continuance  of.  So  that  the  destruction  of  a  vegetable  is 
an  event  not  similar  or  analogous  to  the  destruction  of 
a  living  agent. 

§  30.   Basis  mainly  twofold ;  (a)  Doctrine  of  continuance, 

(b)  Incapacity  of  death  to  destroy. 

But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  oif  the  delusive 
custom  of  substituting  imagination  in  the  room  of  experi- 
ence, we  would  confine  ourselves  to  what  we  do  know  and 
understand  ;  if  we  would  argue  only  from  that,  and  from 
that  form  our  expectations ;  it  would  appear  at  first  sight, 
that  as  no  probability  of  living  beings  ever  ceasing  to  be 
so,  can  be  concluded  from  the  reason  of  the  thing ;  so  none 
can  be  collected  from  the  analogy  of  nature  ;  because  we 
cannot  trace  any  living  beings  beyond  death.  But  as  we 
are  conscious  that  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  per- 
ception and  of  action,  and  are  living  persons  ;  what  we  are 
to  go  upon  is,  that  we  shall  continue  so,  till  we  foresee  some 
accident  or  event,  which  will  endanger  those  capacities,  or 
be  likely  to  destroy  us :  which  death  does  in  no  wise  appear 
to  be. 

§  31.   What  is  now  supernatural  may  in  the  new 

state  be  natural 

And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may  pass 
into  new  scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and  action,  just  as 
naturally  as  we  came  into  the  present.  And  this  new  state 
may  naturally  be  a  social  one.  And  the  advantages  of  it, 
advantages  of  every  kind,  may  naturally  be  bestowed, 
according  to  some  fixed  general  laws  of  wisdom,  upon 
eveiy  one  in  proportion  to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And 
though  the  advantages  of  that  future  natural  state  should 
not  be  bestowed,  as  these  of  the  present  in  some  measure 
are,  by  the  will  of  the  society  ;  but  entirely  by  his  more 
immediate  action,  upon  whom  the  whole  frame  of  nature 
depends :  yet  this  distribution  may  be  just  as  natural,  as 
their  being  distributed  here  by  the  instrumentality  of  men. 


§§  30,  3' J  OF  A    FUTURE   LIFE  39 

And  indeed,  though  one  were  to  allow  any  confused  unde- 
termined sense,  which  people  please  to  put  upon  the  word 
natural,  it  would  be  a  shortness  of  thought  scarce  credible, 
to  imagine,  that  no  system  or  course  of  things  can  be  so, 
but  only  what  we  see  at  present 1] :  especially  whilst  the 
probability  of  a  future  life,  or  the  natural  immortality  of 
the  soul,  is  admitted  upon  the  evidence  of  reason  l  ;  because 
this  is  really  both  admitting  and  denying  at  once,  a  state 
of  being  different  from  the  present  to  be  natural.  But  the 
only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  is,  stated,  fixed,  or  settled  : 
since  what  is  natural,  as  much  requires  and  presupposes  an 
intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,  i.  e.  to  effect  it  continually, 
or  at  stated  times ;  as  what  is  supernatural  or  miraculous 
does  to  effect  it  for  once.  And  from  hence  it  must  follow, 
that  persons'  notion  of  what  is  natural,  will  be  enlarged  in 
proportion  to  their  greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of  God, 
and  the  dispensations  of  his  Providence.  Nor  is  there  any 
absurdity  in  supposing,  that  there  may  be  beings  in  the 
universe,  whose  capacities,  and  knowledge,  and  views,  may 
be  so  extensive,  as  that  the  whole  Christian  dispensation 
may  to  them  appear  natural,  i.  e.  analogous  or  conformable 
to  God's  dealings  with  other  parts  of  his  creation ;  as 


h  See  Part  II.  chap.  ii.  and  Part  II.  chap.  iv. 

1  This  opinion,   not  explicitly  unless  and  until  the  Creator,  who 

adopted    by    Butler,    appears    to  had  given  it,  should  take  it  away, 

come  before  us  from  two  points  of  Combined  with  this,  however,  is 

view  :  an  assumption,  for  many  centuries 

1.  As  built  upon  the  evidence  almost  universal,  that  God   had 
of  reason  ;  revealed  to  us  His  design  not  to 

2.  As  a  part  of  Natural  Religion  take  it  away,  but  to  leave  it  in 
made  known  by  a  primitive  Re-  continuing    force    without    end. 
relation  (see  inf.  vi.  18,  II.  ii.  10).  Upon  this  proposition  hang  grave 

The  question  discussed  in  the  questions    of    controversy,    now 

first    chapter  is  properly  that  of  widely  spread.    They  cannot  with 

suivival    (beyond    death)    rather  advantage    be  touched   on   here, 

than  that  of  immortality,  or  per-  All  that  belongs  to  the  present 

petual  survival.    This  latter  ques-  occasion   is  that    Butler's    argu- 

tion  is  not  argued  by  Butler,  but  ment  in  this  chapter  is  really  on 

(in  i.  29)  included  under  the  name  survival  after  death  and  the  exist- 

of  natural  immortality.     This  did  ence  of  some  future  state.   So  that 

not  mean  an  existence  absolutely  the  subject  of  perpetual  survival 

indefeasible,  but  a  life  gifted  with  does  not  absolutely  fall  within  its 

power  of  perpetual  continuance  scope. 


40  OF   THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  [I.  II. 

natural  as  the  visible  known  course  of  things  appears  to  us. 
For  there  seems  scarce  any  other  possible  sense  to  be  put 
upon  the  word,  but  that  only  in  which  it  is  here  used  ; 
similar,  stated,  or  uniform. 

§  32.    Negative  presumptions  have  now  been  quashed ; 

and  survival  shown  to  le  highly  probable. 
This  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been  here 
insisted  upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our  curiosity, 
seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of  religion,  in  like  manner 
as  a  demonstrative  proof  would.  Indeed  a  proof,  even 
a  demonstrative  one,  of  a  future  life,  would  not  be  a  proof 
of  religion.  For,  that  we  are  to  live  hereafter,  is  just  as 
reconcilable  with  the  scheme  of  atheism,  and  as  well  to  be 
accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now  alive  is :  and 
therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to  argue  from 
that  scheme,  that  there  can  be  no  future  state.  But  as 
religion  implies  a  future  state,  any  presumption  against 
such  A  state,  is  a  presumption  against  religion.  And  the 
foregoing  observations  remove  all  presumptions  of  that  sort, 
and  prove,  to  a  very  considerable  degree  of  probability  \ 
one  fundamental  doctrine  of  religion  ;  which,  if  believed, 
would  greatly  open  and  dispose  the  mind  seriously  to 
attend  to  the  general  evidence  of  the  whole. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  BY  REWARDS  AND  PUNISH- 
MENTS ;  AND  PARTICULARLY  OF  THE  LATTER. 

§  i.  Future  life :  its  weight  due  to  our  capacity  to 

enjoy  and  suffer. 
rpHAT  which  makes  the  question  concerning  a  future  life 

to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  our  capacity  of 
happiness  and  misery.     And  that  which  makes   the  con- 

1  In  the  brief  summary  of  the  it  is  there  pronounced  « palpably 

argument   in   ch.  vii.   4,   this  is  absurd  to  conclude,  that  we  shall 

Stated  in  stronger  terms  as  against  cease  to  be,  at  death.' 
the  absolutely  negative  conclusion: 


§§  T,  2]          BY  REWARDS   AND   PUNISHMENTS  41 

sideration  of  it  to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  the 
supposition  of  our  happiness  and  misery  Hereafter,  depending 
upon  our  actions  Here.  Without  this  indeed,  curiosity  could 
not  but  sometimes  bring  a  subject,  in  which  we  may  be  so 
highly  interested,  to  our  thoughts ;  especially  upon  the 
mortality  of  others,  or  the  near  prospect  of  our  own.  But 
reasonable  men  would  not  take  any  further  thought  about 
Hereafter,  than  what  should  happen  thus  occasionally  to 
rise  in  their  minds,  if  it  were 'certain  that  our  future  interest 
no  way  depended  upon  our  present  behaviour  :  whereas  on 
the  contrary,  if  there  be  ground,  either  from  analogy  or  any 
thing  else,  to  think  it  does ;  then  there  is  reason  also  for 
the  most  active  thought  and  solicitude,  to  secure  that 
interest  ;  to  behave  so  as  that  we  may  escape  that  misery, 
and  obtain  that  happiness  in  another  life,  which  we  not  only 
suppose  ourselves  capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  also 
is  put  in  our  own  power.  And  whether  there  be  ground 
for  this  last  apprehension,  certainly  would  deserve  to  be 
most  seriously  considered,  were  there  no  other  proof  of 
a  future  life  and  interest,  than  that  presumptive  one,  which 
the  foregoing  observations  amount  to. 

§  2.  Here,  enjoyment,  and  suffering,  are  mainly  set  in 
our  own  power. 

Now  in  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy,  and  a  great 
part  of  what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  own  power.  For  pleasure 
and  pain  are  the  consequences  of  our  actions :  and  we  are 
endued  by  the  Author  of  our  nature  with  capacities  of  fore- 
seeing these  consequences.  We  find  by  experience  he  does 
not  so  much  as  preserve  our  lives,  exclusively  of  our  own 
care  and  attention,  to  provide  ourselves  with,  and  to  make 
use  of,  that  sustenance,  by  which  he  has  appointed  our  lives 
shall  be  preserved  ;  and  without  which,  he  has  appointed, 
they  shall  not  be  preserved  at  all.  And  in  general  we 
foresee,  that  the  external  things,  which  are  the  objects  of 
our  various  passions,  can  neither  be  obtained  nor  enjoyed, 
without  exerting  ourselves  in  such  and  such  manners  :  but 
by  thus  exerting  ourselves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy  these  objects, 
in  which  our  natural  good  consists ;  or  by  this  means 


42  OF   THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   COD  [I.  II. 

God  gives  us  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  them.  I  know 
not,  that  we  have  any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment,  but 
by  the  means  of  our  own  actions.  And  by  prudence  and 
care,  we  may,  for  the  most  part,  pass  our  days  in  tolerable 
ease  and  quiet :  or,  on  the  contrary,  we  may,  by  rashness, 
ungoverned  passion,  wilfulness,  or  even  by  negligence,  make 
ourselves  as  miserable  as  ever  we  please.  And  many  do  please 
to  make  themselves  extremely  miserable,  i.  e.  to  do  what 
they  know  beforehand  will  render  them  so.  They  follow 
those  ways,  the  fruit  of  which  they  know,  by  instruction, 
example,  experience,  will  be  disgrace,  and  poverty,  and 
sickness,  and  untimely  death.  This  every  one  observes  to 
be  the  general  course  of  things  ;  though  it  is  to  be  allowed, 
we  cannot  find  by  experience,  that  all  our  sufferings  are 
owing  to  our  own  follies. 

§  3.  Possible  reaswts  for  this.     It  operates  as  a  fore- 
warning. 

Why  the  Author  of  nature  does  not  give  his  creatures 
promiscuously  such  and  such  perceptions,  without  regard 
to  their  behaviour ;  why  he  does  not  make  them  happy 
without  the  instrumentality  of  their  own  actions,  and 
prevent  their  bringing  any  sufferings  upon  themselves  ;  is 
another  matter.  Perhaps  there  may  be  some  impossibilities 
in  the  nature  of  things,  which  we  are  unacquainted  with  a. 
Or  less  happiness,  it  may  be,  would  upon  the  whole  be  pro- 
duced by  such  a  method  of  conduct,  than  is  by  the  present.  Or 
perhaps  divine  goodness,  with  which,  if  I  mistake  not,  we 
make  very  free  in  our  speculations,  may  not  be  a  bare  single 
disposition  to  produce  happiness  ;  but  a  disposition  to  make 
the  good,  the  faithful,  the  honest  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  in- 
finitely perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased,  with  seeing  his  creatures 
behave  suitably  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  them  ;  to 
the  relations  which  he  has  placed  them  in  to  each  other  ; 
and  to  that,  which  they  stand  in  to  himself:  that  relation 
to  himself,  which,  during  their  existence,  is  even  necessary, 
and  which  is  the  most  important  one  of  all :  perhaps,  I  say, 


11  Part  I.  chap.  vii. 


§§3,4]          BY   REWARDS    AND    PUNISHMENTS  43 

an  infinitely  perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased  with  this  moral 
piety  of  moral  agents,  in  and  for  itself;  as  well  as  upon 
account  of  its  being  essentially  conducive  to  the  happiness 
of  his  creation.  Or  the  whole  end,  for  which  God  made, 
and  thus  governs  the  world,  may  be  utterly  beyond  the 
reach  of  our  faculties  :  there  may  be  somewhat  in  it  as 
impossible  for  us  to  have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind 
man  to  have  a  conception  of  colours.  But  however  this  be, 
it  is  certain  matter  of  universal  experience,  that  the  general 
method  of  divine  administration  is,  forewarning  us,  or  giving 
us  capacities  to  foresee,  with  more  or  less  clearness,  that  if 
we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall  have  such  enjoyments,  if  so  and 
so,  such  sufferings  ;  and  giving  us  those  enjoyments,  and 
making  us  feel  those  sufferings,  in  consequence  of  our 
actions. 

§4.  Due  to  nature;   that  is,  to  the  Author  of  nature*. 

'  But  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course  of 
nature.'  True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  I  am  observing. 
It  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course  of  nature  :  i.  e.  not 
surely  to  the  words  or  ideas,  course  of  nature ;  but  to  him 
who  appointed  it,  and  put  things  into  it :  or  to  a  course  of 
operation,  from  its  uniformity  or  constancy,  called  natural1'; 
and  which  necessarily  implies  an  operating  agent.  For 
when  men  find  themselves  necessitated  to  confess  an  Author 
of  nature,  or  that  God  is  the  natural  governor  of  the  world  ; 
•  they  must  not  deny  this  again,  because  his  government  is 


Sup.  i.  30. 


1  We  have  to  observe  that  there  See  Introcl.  §  16.     This  idea  of  a 

are  three  stages  in  Butler's  argu-  governing  agency  anterior  to  and 

ment,  viz. —  apart  from  direct  moral  govern- 

1.  The  constitution  and  course  ment,  as  a  constitution  and  course 
of  nature  ;  of  nature,  finds  perhaps   a   con- 

2.  Natural  Religion ;  venient  illustration    in  the   laws 

3.  Revealed  Religion  ;       ,  of  political  economy,  by  following 
and  that  we  are  introduced  to  the  or    neglecting  which   wealth    is 
existence  and  governing  activity  produced  or  wasted,  without  any 
of  God,  not  as  a  part  of  natural  direct    reference    to    moral    con- 
religion,  but  as  included  in  the  siderations. 

constitution  and  course  of  nature. 


44  OF   THE    GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  [I.  II. 

uniform  ;  they  must  not  deny  that  he  does  things  at  all, 
because  he  does  them  constantly;  because  the  effects  of  his 
acting  are  permanent,  whether  his  acting  bo  so  or  not ; 
though  there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  is  not.  In  short, 
every  man,  in  every  thing  he  does,  naturally  acts  upon  the 
forethought  and  apprehension  of  avoiding  evil  or  obtaining 
good1:  and  if  the  natural  course  of  things  be  the  appoint- 
ment of  God,  and  our  natural  faculties  of  knowledge  and 
experience  are  given  us  by  him ;  then  the  good  and  bad 
consequences  which  follow  our  actions,  are  his  appointment, 
and  our  foresight  of  those  consequences,  is  a  warning  given 
us  by  him,  how  we  are  to  act. 

§  5.  These  pleasures  and  pains  guide  us ;  but  in  a  general 

ivay. 

'Is  the  pleasure  then,  naturally  accompanying  every 
particular  gratification  of  passion,  intended  to  put  us  upon 
gratifying  ourselves  in  every  such  particular  instance,  and 
as  a  reward  to  us  for  so  doing  ?  '  No,  certainly.  Nor  is  it 
to  be  said,  that  our  eyes  were  naturally  intended  to  give  us 
the  sight  of  each  particular  object,  to  which  they  do  or  can 
extend  ;  objects  which  are  destructive  of  them,  or  which, 
for  any  other  reason,  it  may  become  us  to  turn  our  eyes 
from.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt,  but  that  our  eyes  were 
intended  for  us  to  see  with.  So  neither  is  there  any  doubt, 
but  that  the  foreseen  pleasures  and  pains  belonging  to  the 
passions,  were  intended,  in  general,  to  induce  mankind  to 
act  in  such  and  such  manners. 

§  6.  So  that  God  already  rewards  and  punishes. 

Now  from  this  general  observation,  obvious  to  every  one, 
that  God  has  given  us  to  understand,  he  has  appointed 
satisfaction  and  delight  to  be  the  consequence  of  our  acting 
in  one  manner,  and  pain  and  uneasiness  of  our  acting  in 
another,  and  of  our  not  acting  at  all ;  and  that  we  find  the 
consequences,  which  we  were  beforehand  informed  of,  uni- 

1   Comp.     Tldffa    T(\vrj   KOI    iraffa       pfais,    dyaOov    TWOS    e<pif.oQai    8o/rff. 
,  ofjioiasot  irpdtis  rf  ttal  irpoai-       Aristot.  Eth.  Xic.  i.  I. 


§§  5-7]        BY  REWARDS   AND    PUNISHMENTS  45 

formly  to  follow  ;  we  may  learn,  that  we  are  at  present 
actually  under  his  government  in  the  strictest  and  most 
proper  sense  ;  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  he  rewards  and 
punishes  us  for  our  actions.  An  Author  of  nature  being 
supposed,  it  is  not  so  much  a  deduction  of  reason,  as  a  matter 
of  experience,  that  we  are  thus  under  his  government  :  under 
his  government,  in  the  same  sense,  as  we  are  under  the 
government  of  civil  magistrates.  Because  the  annexing 
pleasure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power 
to  do  or  forbear,  and  giving  notice  of  this  appointment 
beforehand  to  those  whom  it  concerns ;  is  the  proper  formal 
notion  of  government. 

§  7.   Whether  by  propelled  or  l>y  self-acting  laws. 

Whether  the  pleasure  or  pain  which  thus  follows  upon 
our  behaviour,  be  owing  to  the  Author  of  nature's 
acting  upon  us  every  moment  which  we  feel  it ;  or  to  his 
having  at  once  contrived  and  executed  his  own  part  in  the 
plan  of  the  world  ;  makes  no  alteration  as  to  the  matter 
before  us.  For  if  civil  magistrates  could  make  the  sanctions 
of  their  laws  take  place,  without  interposing  at  all,  after 
they  had  passed  them  ;  without  a  trial,  and  the  formalities 
of  an  execution  :  if  they  were  able  to  make  their  laws 
execute  themselves,  or  every  offender  to  execute  them  upon 
himself ;  we  should  be  just  in  the  same  sense  under  their 
government  then,  as  we  are  now  ;  but  in  a  much  higher 
degree,  and  more  perfect  manner  \ 


1  Fitzgerald  observes  that  But-  replies,  that  on  this  principle  a 

ler  here  differs  from  Clarke  and  king  so  superlatively  good   that 

agrees    with    Leibnitz    (see    the  he  could  arrange  all  matters  on 

Correspondence  between    them).  behalf  of  his  subjects  in  a  way  so 

For  Clarke  holds  as  follows  :  '  The  admirable  that  he  should  never 

notion    of   the    world's    being   a  need  to  interfere  with  them  would 

great  machine,  going  on  without  be  only  a  nominal  king.     So  far 

the    interposition   of    God,    as  a  Fitzgerald.    The  two  combatants, 

clock  continues  to  go  without  the  however,  agreed  that  God  was  the 

assistance  of  the  clock-maker,  is  Continuator  as  well  as  the  Maker, 

the   notion   of   materialism    and  — See    Corresp.     of    Clarke    and 

fate,  and   tends  ...  to  exclude  Leibnitz  (London,  1717),  pp.  21, 

Providence.'    To  which  Leibnitz  45,  67. 


46  OF   THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  [I.  II. 

§  8.  Ami  ly  small  pains  as  well  as  great. 

Vain  is  the  ridicule  with  which,  one  foresees,  some 
persons  will  divert  themselves,  upon  finding  lesser  pains 
considered  as  instances  of  divine  punishment.  There  is  no 
possibility  of  answering  or  evading  the  general  thing  here 
intended,  without  denying  all  final  causes.  For  final  causes 
being  admitted,  the  pleasures  and  pains  now  mentioned 
must  be  admitted  too  as  instances  of  them.  And  if  they 
are ;  if  God  annexes  delight  to  some  actions,  and  uneasiness 
to  others,  with  an  apparent  design  to  induce  us  to  act  so 
and  so  ;  then  he  not  only  dispenses  happiness  and  misery, 
but  also  rewards  and  punishes  actions.  If,  for  example, 
the  pain  which  we  feel,  upon  doing  what  tends  to  the 
destruction  of  our  bodies,  suppose  upon  too  near  approaches 
to  fire,  or  upon  wounding  ourselves,  be  appointed  by  the 
Author  of  nature  to  prevent  our  doing  what  thus  tends  to 
our  destruction ;  this  is  altogether  as  much  an  instance  of  his 
punishing  our  actions,  and  consequently  of  our  being  under 
his  government,  as  declaring  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  that 
if  we  acted  so,  he  \vould  inflict  such  pain  upon  us,  and 
inflicting  it,  whether  it  be  greater  or  less. 

§  9.  God  is  (a)  Governor,  (b)  Moral  Governor. 

Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception  of  the 
Author  of  nature,  is  that  of  a  master  or  governor,  prior  to 
the  consideration  of  his  moral  attributes.  The  fact  of  our 
case,  which  we  find  by  experience,  is,  that  he  actually 
exercises  dominion  or  government  over  us  at  present,  by 
rewarding  and  punishing  us  for  our  actions,  in  as  strict  and 
proper  a  sense  of  these  words,  and  even  in  the  same  sense, 
as  children,  servants,  subjects,  are  rewarded  and  punished 
by  those  who  govern  them. 

And  thus  the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  the  whole  present 
course  of  things,  most  fully  shows,  that  there  is  nothing 
incredible  in  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  God  will 
reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions  hereafter  :  nothing 
incredible,  I  mean,  arising  out  of  the  notion  of  rewarding 
and  punishing.  For  the  whole  course  of  nature  is  a  present 


§§8-12]  BY  PUNISHMENTS  47 

instance  of  his  exercising  that  government  over  us,  which 
implies  in  it  rewarding  and  punishing. 

§  10.  Punishment  will  here  l)e  chiefly  considered,  because 
most  cavilled  at. 

BUT  as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly  object 
against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow  ;  it  may  be 
proper  to  mention  some  circumstances  in  the  natural  course 
of  punishments  at  present,  which  are  analogous  to  what 
religion  teaches  us  concerning  a  future  state  of  punishment  ; 
indeed  so  analogous,  that  as  they  add  a  farther  credibility 
to  it,  so  they  cannot  but  raise  a  most  serious  apprehension 
of  it  in  those  who  will  attend  to  them. 

§  ii.  Of  human  miseries,  a  large  part  are  self-inflicted. 

It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such  miseries 
naturally  follow  such  and  such  actions  of  imprudence  and 
wi If ulness,  as  well  as  actions  more  commonly  and  more 
distinctly  considered  as  vicious ;  and  that  these  conse- 
quences, when  they  may  be  foreseen,  are  properly  natural 
punishments  annexed  to  such  actions.  For  the  general 
thing  here  insisted  upon,  is,  not  that  we  see  a  great  deal  of 
misery  in  the  world,  but  a  great  deal  which  men  bring 
upon  themselves  by  their  own  behaviour,  which  they  might 
have  foreseen  and  avoided. 

§  12.  Often  (a)  following  after  pleasure  reaped,  (b)  exceeding 
it,  (c)  long  delayed,  (d)  hard  to  foresee. 

Now  the  circumstances  of  these  natural  punishments, 
particularly  deserving  our  attention,  are  such  as  these ; 
That  oftentimes  they  follow,  or  are  inflicted  in  consequence  of, 
actions,  which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  are 
accompanied  with  much  present  pleasure  :  for  instance,  sick- 
ness and  untimely  death  is  the  consequence  of  intemperance, 
though  accompanied  with  the  highest  mirth  and  jollity : 
That  these  punishments  are  often  much  greater,  than  the 
advantages  or  pleasures  obtained  by  the  actions,  of  which 


48  OF   THE    GOVERNMENT    OF  GOD  [I.  II. 

they  are  the  punishments  or  consequences  :  That  though 
we  may  imagine  a  constitution  of  nature,  in  which  these 
natural  punishments,  which  are  in  fact  to  follow,  would 
follow,  immediately  upon  such  actions  being  done,  or  very 
soon  after  ;  we  find  on  the  contrary  in  our  world,  that  they 
are  often  delayed  a  great  while,  sometimes  even  till  long  after 
the  actions  occasioning  them  are  forgot  ;  so  that  the  consti- 
tution of  nature  is  such,  that  delay  of  punishment  is  no 
sort  nor  degree  of  presumption  of  final  impunity  :  That 
after  such  delay,  these  natural  punishments  or  miseries 
often  come,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly,  with  violence, 
and  at  once  ;  however,  the  chief  misery  often  does  :  That  as 
certainty  of  such  distant  miseiy  following  such  actions,  is 
never  afforded  persons  ;  so  perhaps  during  the  actions,  they 
have  seldom  a  distinct  full  expectation  of  its  following0: 
and  many  times  the  case  is  only  thus,  that  they  see  in  general, 
or  may  see,  the  credibility,  that  intemperance,  suppose,  will 
bring  after  it  diseases  ;  civil  crimes,  civil  punishments  ; 
when  yet  the  real  probability  often  is,  that  they  shall  escape ; 
but  things  notwithstanding  take  their  destined  course,  and 
the  misery  inevitably  follows  at  its  appointed  time,  in  very 
many  of  these  cases. 

§  13.  May  le  due  to  habits  contracted  in  yotttJi. 

Thus  also  though  youth  may  be  alleged  as  an  excuse  for 
rashness  and  folly,  as  being  naturally  thoughtless,  and  not 
clearly  foreseeing  all  the  consequences  of  being  untractable 
and  profligate  ;  this  does  not  hinder,  but  that  these  conse- 
quences follow,  and  are  grievously  felt  throughout  the 
whole  course  of  mature  life.  Habits  contracted  even  in  that 
age,  are  often  utter  ruin  :  and  men's  success  in  the  world, 
not  only  in  the  common  sense  of  worldly  success,  but  their 
real  happiness  and  misery,  depends,  in  a  great  degree,  and 
in  various  ways,  upon  the  manner  in  which  they  pass  their 
youth  ;  which  consequences  they  for  the  most  part  neglect  to 
consider,  and  perhaps  seldom  can  properly  be  said  to  believe, 
beforehand. 


See  Part  II.  chap.  vi. 


§§  i3-i6]  BY  PUNISHMENTS  49 

§  14.  Note  that  lost  opportunities  rarely  recur. 

It  requires  also  to  be  mentioned,  that  in  numberless  cases, 
the  natural  course  of  things  affords  us  opportunities  for  pro- 
curing advantages  to  ourselves  at  certain  times,  which  we 
cannot  procure  when  we  will ;  nor  ever  recall  the  oppor- 
tunities, if  we  have  neglected  them.  Indeed  the  general 
course  of  nature  is  an  example  of  this.  If,  during 
the  opportunity  of  youth,  persons  are  indocile  and  self- 
willed  ;  they  inevitably  suffer  in  their  future  life,  for  want 
of  those  acquirements,  which  they  neglected  the  natural 
season  of  attaining.  If  the  husbandman  lets  his  seedtime 
pass  without  sowing,  the  whole  year  is  lost  to  him  beyond 
recovery.  In  like  manner,  though  after  men  have  been 
guilty  of  folly  and  extravagance  up  to  a  certain  degree,  it  is 
often  in  their  power,  for  instance,  to  retrieve  their  affairs,  to 
recover  their  health  and  character  ;  at  least  in  good  measure  : 
yet  real  reformation  is,  in  many  cases,  of  no  avail  at  all 
towards  preventing  the  miseries,  poverty,  sickness,  infamy, 
naturally  annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance  exceeding  that 
degree.  There  is  a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  mis- 
behaviour, which  being  transgressed,  there  remains  no  place 
for  repentance  in  the  natural  course  of  things. 

§  15.  Neglect  often  operates  as  misbehaviour. 

It  is  further  veiy  much  to  be  remarked,  that  neglects 
from  inconsiderateness,  want  of  attention  d,  not  looking 
about  us  to  see  what  we  have  to  do,  are  often  attended  with 
consequences  altogether  as  dreadful,  as  any  active  mis- 
behaviour, from  the  most  extravagant  passion. 

§  16.  Civil  punishments,  being  natural,  ojten  also  final. 

And  lastly,  civil  government  being  natural,  the  punish- 
ments of  it  are  so  too  :  and  some  of  these  punishments 
are  capital  ;  as  the  effects  of  a  dissolute  course  of  pleasure 
are  often  mortal.  So  that  many  natural  punishments  are 


J  Part  II.  chap.  vi. 
VOL.  I.  E 


50  OF   THE   GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  [I.  II. 

final e  to  him,  who  incurs  them,  if  considered  only  in  his 
temporal  capacity :  and  seem  inflicted  by  natural  appoint- 
ment, either  to  remove  the  offender  out  of  the  way  of  being 
further  mischievous ;  or  as  an  example,  though  frequently 
a  disregarded  one,  to  those  who  are  left  behind. 

§  17.  All  tlds  is  not  accidental,  Iwt  constant,  and 
confirmed  by  religion. 

These  things  are  not,  what  we  call  accidental,  or  to  be 
met  with  only  now  and  then  ;  but  they  are  things  of  every 
day's  experience  :  they  proceed  from  general  laws,  very 
general  ones,  by  which  God  governs  the  world,  in  the 
natural  course  of  his  providence.  And  they  are  so  ana- 
logous to  what  religion  teaches  us  concerning  the  future 
punishment  of  the  wicked,  so  much  of  a  piece  with  it,  that 
both  would  naturally  be  expressed  in  the  very  same  words, 
and  manner  of  description.  In  the  Book  of  Proverbs f,  for 


e  The  general  consideration  of  a  future  state  of  punishment,  most 

evidently  belongs  to  the  subject  of  natural  religion. 

Pet-elation  is  dis-      But  if  any  of  these  reflections  should  be  thought  to 

I'teMm'v^wr     relate  more  P6™11^1?  to  this  doctrine,  as  taught  in 
next  state"  scripture ;    the   reader   is  desired  to  observe,  that 

Gentile  writers,  both  moralists  and  poets,  speak 
of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  both  as  to  the  duration  and 
degree  of  it,  in  a  like  manner  of  expression  and  of  description,  as  the 
scripture  does.  So  that  all  which  can  positively  be  asserted  to  be 
matter  of  mere  revelation,  with  regard  to  this  doctrine,  seems  to  be, 
that  the  great  distinction  between  the  righteous  and  the  wicked,  shall 
be  made  at  the  end  of  this  world ;  that  each  shall  then  receive  ac- 
cording to  his  deserts.  Keason  did,  as  it  well  might,  conclude  that  it 
should,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  be  well  with  the  righteous,  and 
ill  with  the  wicked  :  but  it  could  not  be  determined  upon  any 
principles  of  reason,  whether  human  creatures  might  not  have  been 
appointed  to  pass  through  other  states  of  life  and  being,  before  that 
distributive  justice  should  finally  and  effectually  take  place.  Kevela- 
tion  teaches  us,  that  the  next  state  of  things  after  the  present  is 
appointed  for  the  execution  of  this  justice  ;  that  it  shall  be  110  longer 
delayed  ;  but  the  mystery  of  God,  the  great  mystery  of  his  suffering  vice 
and  confusion  to  prevail,  shall  then  be  finished;  and  he  will  take  to  him 
his  great  power  and  will  reign,  by  rendering  to  every  one  according  to 
his  works. 
1  Chap.  i. 


§§  i7,  1 8]  BY  PUNISHMENTS  51 

instance,  Wisdom  is  introduced,  as  frequenting  the  most 
public  places  of  resort,  and  as  rejected  when  she  offers 
herself  as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of  human  life.  How 
long,  speaking  to  those  who  are  passing  through  it,  how 
long,  ye  simple  ones,  will  ye  love  folly?  and  the  scorncrs 
delight  in  their  scorning,  and  fools  hate  knowledge  ?  Turn  ye 
at  my  reproof :  behold,  I  ivill  pour  out  my  spirit  upon  you, 
I  ic ill  make  known  my  ivords  unto  you.  But  upon  being 
neglected,  Because  I  have  called,  and  ye  refused;  I  have 
stretched  out  my  hand,  and  no  man  regarded ;  but  ye  have  set 
at  nought  all  my  counsel,  and  ivould  none  of  my  reproof : 
I  also  will  laugh  at  your  calamity ;  I  will  mock  when  your  fear 
cometh;  when  your  fear  cometh  as  desolation,  and  your 
destruction  cometh  as  a  whirlwind;  when  distress  and  anguish 
cometh  upon  you.  Then  shall  they  call  upon  me,  but  I  will 
not  answer;  they  shall  seek  me  early,  but  they  shall  not  find 
me.  This  passage,  every  one  sees,  is  poetical,  and  some 
parts  of  it  are  highly  figurative ;  but  their  meaning  is 
obvious.  And  the  thing  intended  is  expressed  more 
literally  in  the  following  words ;  For  that  they  hated  know- 
ledge, and  did  not  choose  the  fear  of  the  Lord : therefore 

shall  they  eat  of  the  fruit  of  their  own  way,  and  be  filled  with 
their  own  devices.  For  the  security  of  the  simple  shall  slay 
them,  and  the  prosperity  of  fools  shall  destroy  them.  And 
the  whole  passage  is  so  equally  applicable,  to  what  we 
experience  in  the  present  world,  concerning  the  consequences 
of  men's  actions,  and  to  what  religion  teaches  us  is  to  be 
expected  in  another,  that  it  may  be  questioned  which  of 
the  two  was  principally  intended. 

§  1 8.  The  force  of  the  topics  ought  to  bring  the 

subject  home. 

Indeed  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  proper  proofs 
of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments,  nothing 
methinks  can  give  one  so  sensible  an  apprehension  of  the 
latter,  or  representation  of  it  to  the  mind  ;  as  observing, 
that  after  the  many  disregarded  checks,  admonitions  and 
warnings,  which  people  meet  with  in  the  ways  of  vice  and 
folly  and  extravagance ;  warnings  from  their  very  nature ; 

£    2 


52       OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD,  ETC,       [I.  II.  §§  19,  20 

from  the  examples  of  others;  from  the  lesser  incon- 
veniences which  they  bring  upon  themselves ;  from  the 
instructions  of  wise  and  virtuous  men  :  after  these  have 
been  long  despised,  scorned,  ridiculed  :  after  the  chief  bad 
consequences,  temporal  consequences,  of  their  follies,  have 
been  delayed  for  a  great  while  ;  at  length  they  break  in 
irresistibly,  like  an  armed  force  :  repentance  is  too  late  to 
relieve,  and  can  serve  only  to  aggravate,  their  distress :  the 
case  is  become  desperate  :  and  poverty  and  sickness,  remorse 
and  anguish,  infamy  and  death,  the  effects  of  their  own 
doings,  overwhelm  them,  beyond  possibility  of  remedy  or 
escape.  This  is  an  account  of  what  is  in  fact  the  general 
constitution  of  nature. 

§  19.   Operation  of  the  scheme  not  uniform,  lut  sufficient 
to  establish  a  warning  likelihood, 

It  is  not  in  any  sort  meant,  that  according  to  what 
appears  at  present  of  the  natural  course  of  things,  men  are 
always  uniformly  punished  in  proportion  to  their  mis- 
behaviour :  but  that  there  are  very  many  instances  of 
misbehaviour  punished  in  the  several  ways  now  mentioned, 
and  very  dreadful  instances  too  ;  sufficient  to  show  what 
the  laws  of  the  universe  may  admit ;  and,  if  thoroughly 
considered,  sufficient  fully  to  answer  all  objections  against 
the  credibility  of  a  future  state  of  punishments,  from  any 
imaginations,  that  the  frailty  of  our  nature  and  external 
temptations,  almost  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices  : 
as  well  as  objections  of  another  sort ;  from  necessity  ;  from 
suppositions,  that  the  will  of  an  infinite  Being  cannot  be 
contradicted  ;  or  that  he  must  be  incapable  of  offence  and 
provocation  P. 

§  20.    And  rebuke  the  audacity  of  this  age. 

Eeflections  of  this  kind  are  not  without  their  terrors  to 

serious  persons,  the  most  free  from  enthusiasm,  and  of  the 

greatest   strength  of  mind  ;   but  it  is  fit  things  be  stated 

and  considered  as  they  really  are.     And   there  is,  in  the 


g  See  chaps,  iv.  and  vi. 


§  si;  III.  §  i]     OF  THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD     53 

present  age,  a  certain  fearlessness,  with  regard  to  what 
may  be  hereafter  under  the  government  of  God,  which 
nothing  but  an  universally  acknowledged  demonstration  on 
the  side  of  atheism  can  justify ;  and  which  makes  it  quite 
necessary,  that  men  be  reminded,  and  if  possible  made  to 
feel,  that  there  is  no  sort  of  ground  for  being  thus  pre- 
sumptuous, even  upon  the  most  sceptical  principles. 

§  21.  There  may  he  persons  lorn  only  to  serve  as 
imrn'mg  examples. 

For,  may  it  not  be  said  of  any  person  upon  his  being 
born  into  the  world,  he  may  behave  so,  as  to  be  of  no 
service  to  it,  but  by  being  made  an  example  of  the  woful 
effects  of  vice  and  folly  ?  That  he  may,  as  any  one  may, 
if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous  execution,  from  the  hands 
of  civil  justice  ;  or  in  some  other  course  of  extravagance 
shorten  his  days ;  or  bring  upon  himself  infamy  and 
diseases  worse  than  death  ?  So  that  it  had  been  better  for 
him,  even  with  regard  to  the  present  world,  that  he  had 
never  been  born.  And  is  there  any  pretence  of  reason,  for 
people  to  think  themselves  secure,  and  talk  as  if  they  had 
certain  proof,  that,  let  them  act  as  licentiously  as  they 
will,  there  can  be  nothing  analogous  to  this,  with  regard 
to  a  future  and  more  general  interest,  under  the  providence 
and  government  of  the  same  God  ? 


CHAPTER   III. 

OF   THE   MORAL   GOVERNMENT    OF   GOD. 

§  i.  Government,  like  Creation,  may  be  proved  refer- 
able to  design. 

A  S  the  manifold  appearances  of  design  and  of  final  causes, 
•*+•  in  the  constitution  of  the  world,  prove  it  to  be  the 
work  of  an  intelligent  Mind  ;  so  the  particular  final  causes 
of  pleasure  and  pain  distributed  amongst  his  creatures, 


54  OF   THE  MORAL  [I.  HI. 

prove  that  they  are  under  his  government ;  what  may  be 
called  his  natural  government  of  creatures  endued  with 
sense  and  reason.  This,  however,  implies  somewhat  more 
than  seems  usually  attended  to,  when  we  speak  of  God's 
natural  government  of  the  world.  It  implies  government 
of  the  very  same  kind  with  that,  which  a  master  exercises 
over  his  servants,  or  a  civil  magistrate  over  his  subjects. 
These  latter  instances  of  final  causes,  as  really  prove  an 
intelligent  Governor  of  the  world,  in  the  sense  now 
mentioned,  and  before  a  distinctly  treated  of ;  as  any  other 
instances  of  final  causes  prove  an  intelligent  Maker  of  it. 


§  2.   Where  reward  and  punishment  are  just,  the 
government  is  moral. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear  at  first  sight  to  determine 
any  thing  certainly,  concerning  the  moral  character  of  the 
Author  of  nature,  considered  in  this  relation  of  governor ; 
does  not  ascertain  his  government  to  be  moral,  or  prove 
that  he  is  the  righteous  judge  of  the  world.  Moral  govern- 
ment consists,  not  barely  in  rewarding  and  punishing  men 
for  their  actions,  which  the  most  tyrannical  person  may 
do :  but  in  rewarding  the  righteous,  and  punishing  the 
wicked  ;  in  rendering  to  men  according  to  their  actions, 
considered  as  good  or  evil.  And  the  perfection  of  moral 
government  consists  in  doing  this,  with  regard  to  all 
intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exact  proportion  to  their  personal 
merits  or  demerits. 


§  3.  Just;  that  is,  not  simply  benevolent,  but  righteous1. 

Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character  of  the 
Author  of  nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute  benevolence. 
This,  considered  as  a  principle  of  action  and  infinite  in 
degree,  is  a  disposition  to  produce  the  greatest  possible 

a  Chap.  ii. 


1  See  Dissertation  on  Virtue,  §§  12-16. 


§§  2,  3]  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  55 

happiness,  without  regard  to  persons'  behaviour,  otherwise 
than  as  such  regard  would  produce  higher  degrees  of  it. 
And  supposing  this  to  be  the  only  character  of  God, 
veracity  and  justice  in  him  would  be  nothing  but  benevo- 
lence conducted  by  wisdom.  Now  surely  this  ought  not 
to  be  asserted,  unless  it  can  be  proved  ;  for  we  should 
speak  with  cautious  reverence  upon  such  a  subject.  And 
whether  it  can  be  proved  or  no,  is  not  the  thing  here  to  be 
inquired  into  ;  but  whether  in  the  constitution  and  conduct 
of  the  world,  a  righteous  government  be  not  discernibly 
planned  out :  which  necessarily  implies  a  righteous  governor. 
There  may  possibly  be  in  the  creation  beings,  to  whom  the 
Author  of  nature  manifests  himself  under  this  most 
amiable  of  all  characters,  this  of  infinite  absolute  benevo- 
lence ;  for  it  is  the  most  amiable,  supposing  it  not,  as 
perhaps  it  is  not,  incompatible  with  justice  :  but  he 
manifests  himself  to  us  under  the  character  of  a  righteous 
governor.  He  may,  consistently  with  this,  be  simply  and 
absolutely  benevolent,  in  the  sense  now  explained :  but  he 
is,  for  he  has  given  us  a  proof  in  the  constitution  and 
conduct  of  the  world  that  he  is,  a  governor  over  servants, 
as  he  rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our  actions.  And  in 
the  constitution  and  conduct  of  it,  he  may  also  have  given, 
besides  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  natural  presages 
of  conscience,  clear  and  distinct  intimations,  that  his 
government  is  righteous  or  moral :  clear  to  such  as  think 
the  nature  of  it  deserving  their  attention;  and  yet  not  to 
every  careless  person,  who  casts  a  transient  reflection  upon 
the  subjectb. 

b  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it  not  being 
universal,  nor  so  strong  as  might  possibly  have 
been,  may  be  urged  against  natural  religion,  as     Insufficiency  of  proof. 

well    as    against    revealed.     And    therefore   the    Lie!  ^afinst  Rd^ion 

.....         ,,  .,         ,    ,  iii      r.     ,         ,     »    in  ootn  forms. 

consideration  of  them  belongs  to  the  first  part  of 

this  Treatise,  as  well  as  the  second.  But  as  these  objections  are 
chiefly  urged  against  revealed  religion,  I  chose  to  consider  them  in 
the  second  part.  And  the  answer  to  them  there,  chap,  vi,  as  urged 
against  Christianity,  being  almost  equally  applicable  to  them  as 
urged  against  the  religion  of  nature  ;  to  avoid  repetition,  the  reader 
is  referred  to  that  chapter. 


56  OF   THE   MORAL  [l.  III. 

§  4.  This  government  is  moral,  not  absolutely,  but  in  degree. 

But  it  is  particularly  to  be  observed,  that  the  divine 
government,  which  we  experience  ourselves  under  in  the 
present  state,  taken  alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the  perfection 
of  moral  government.  And  yet  this  by  110  means  hinders, 
but  that  there  may  be  somewhat,  be  it  more  or  less,  truly 
moral  in  it.  A  righteous  government  may  plainly  appear 
to  be  carried  on  to  some  degree  :  enough  to  give  us  the 
apprehension  that  it  shall  be  completed,  or  carried  on  to 
that  degree  of  perfection  which  religion  teaches  us  it  shall  ; 
but  which  cannot  appear,  till  much  more  of  the  divine 
administration  be  seen,  than  can  in  the  present  life.  And 
the  design  of  this  chapter  is  to  inquire,  how  far  this  is  the 
case  :  how  far,  over  and  above  the  moral  nature  c  which  God 
has  given  us,  and  our  natural  notion  of  him  as  righteous 
governor  of  those  his  creatures,  to  whom  he  has  given  this 
nature  d  ;  I  say  how  far  besides  this,  the  principles  and 
beginnings  of  a  moral  government  over  the  world  may  be 
discerned,  notwithstanding  and  amidst  all  the  confusion  and 
disorder  of  it. 

§  5.    The  balance  in  favour  of  virtue  not  invariable  : 
nor  always  clear.  t 

Now  one  might  mention  here,  what  has  been  often  urged 
with  great  force,  that  in  general,  less  uneasiness  and  more 
satisfaction,  are  the  natural  consequences6  of  a  virtuous" 
than  of  a  vicious  course  of  life,  in  the  present  state,  as  an 
instance  of  a  moral  government  established  in  nature  ;  an 
instance  of  it,  collected  from  experience  and  present  matter 
of  fact.  But  it  must  be  owned  a  thing  of  difficulty  to  weigh 
and  balance  pleasures  and  uneasinesses,  each  amongst  them- 
selves, and  also  against  each  other,  so  as  to  make  an 
estimate  with  any  exactness,  of  the  overplus  of  happiness  on 
the  side  of  virtue.  And  it  is  not  impossible,  that,  amidst 
the  infinite  disorders  of  the  world,  there  may  be  exceptions 


Dissertation  II.  a  Chap.  vi. 

See  Lord  Shaftesbury's  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue,  Part  II. 


§§4-8]  GOVERNMENT    OF   GOD  57 

to  the  happiness  of  virtue  ;  even  with  regard  to  those 
persons,  whose  course  of  life  from  their  youth  up  has  been 
blameless  : 

§  6.    Especially  in  cases  of  reformed  life. 

And  more  with  regard  to  those,  who  have  gone  on  for 
some  time  in  the  ways  of  vice,  and  have  afterwards  reformed. 
For  suppose  an  instance  of  the  latter  case  ;  a  person  with 
his  passions  inflamed,  his  natural  faculty  of  self-government 
impaired  by  habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his  vices 
about  him,  like  so  many  harpies,  craving  for  their  accus- 
tomed gratification  :  who  can  say  how  long  it  might  be, 
before  such  a  person  would  find  more  satisfaction  in  the 
reasonableness  and  present  good  consequences  of  virtue, 
than  difficulties  and  self-denial  in  the  restraints  of  it? 
Experience  also  shows,  that  men  can,  to  a  great  degree,  get 
over  their  sense  of  shame,  so  as  that  by  professing  them- 
selves to  be  without  principle,  and  avowing  even  direct 
villainy,  they  can  support  themselves  against  the  infamy  of 
it.  But  as  the  ill  actions  of  any  one  will  probably  be  more 
talked  of,  and  oftener  thrown  in  his  way,  upon  his  reforma- 
tion ;  so  the  infamy  of  them  will  be  much  more  felt,  after 
the  natural  sense  of  virtue  and  of  honour  is  recovered. 
Uneasinesses  of  this  kind  ought  indeed  to  be  put  to  the 
account  of  former  vices  :  yet  it  will  be  said,  they  are  in  part 
the  consequences  of  reformation. 

§  7.   But  clear  as  a  whole,  and  as  initial. 

Still  I  am  far  from  allowing  it  doubtful,  whether  virtue, 
upon  the  whole,  be  happier  than  vice  in  the  present  world. 
But  if  it  were,  yet  the  beginnings  of  a  righteous  administra- 
tion may  beyond  all  question  be  found  in  nature,  if  we  will 
attentively  inquire  after  them.  And, 

§  8.    God,  then,  being  Governor,  may  be  also  moral 
Governor. 

[I.]  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  moral 
government  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it  did  not 
appear,  whether  he  were  in  a  proper  sense  our  governor  at 


58  OF   THE  MORAL  [I.  III. 

all :  yet  when  it  is  certain  matter  of  experience,  that 
he  does  manifest  himself  to  us  under  the  character  of 
a  governor,  in  the  sense  explained  f ;  it  must  deserve  to  be 
considered,  whether  there  be  not  reason  to  apprehend,  that 
he  may  be  a  righteous  or  moral  governor.  Since  it  appears 
to  be  fact,  that  God  does  govern  mankind  by  the  method  of 
rewards  and  punishments,  according  to  some  settled  rules 
of  distribution  ;  it  is  surely  a  question  to  be  asked,  What 
presumption  is  there  against  his  finally  rewarding  and 
punishing  them  according  to  this  particular  rule,  namely, 
as  they  act  reasonably  or  unreasonably,  virtuously  or 
viciously  ? 

§  9.   The  moral  rule  of  award  is  more  natural  than  any 
other. 

Since  rendering  men  happy  or  miserable  by  this  rule, 
certainly  falls  in,  much  more  falls  in,  with  our  natural 
apprehensions  and  sense  of  things,  than  doing  so  by,  any 
other  rule  whatever  :  since  rewarding  and  punishing  actions 
by  any  other  rule,  would  appear  much  harder  to  be  ac- 
counted for,  by  minds  formed  as  he  has  formed  ours.  Be 
the  evidence  of  religion  then  more  or  less  clear,  the  expecta- 
tion which  it  raises  in  us,  that  the  righteous  shall,  upon  the 
whole,  be  happy,  and  the  wicked  miserable,  cannot  however 
possibly  be  considered  as  absurd  or  chimerical ;  because  it  is 
no  more  than  an  expectation,  that  a  method  of  government 
already  begun,  shall  be  carried  on,  the  method  of  rewarding 
and  punishing  actions  ;  and  shall  be  carried  on  by  a  parti- 
cular rule,  which  unavoidably  appears  to  us  at  first  sight 
more  natural  than  any  other,  the  rule  which  we  call  dis- 
tributive justice.  Nor, 

§  io.    Mental  states  attaching  to  good  and  evil  conduct,  and 

the  forecast  allowed  by  fixed  laws,  all  go  to  affirm  it. 

[II.]  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  passed  over,  that  tranquillity, 

satisfaction,    and   external   advantages,    being    the   natural 

consequences  of  prudent  management  of  ourselves,  and  our 

affairs  ;  and  rashness,  profligate  negligence,  and  wilful  folly, 

f  Chap.  ii. 


§§9-n]  GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  59 

bringing  after  them  many  inconveniences  and  sufferings  ; 
these  afford  instances  of  a  right  constitution  of  nature  :  as 
the  correction  of  children,  for  their  own  sakes,  and  by  way 
of  example,  when  they  run  into  danger  or  hurt  themselves, 
is  a  part  of  right  education.  And  thus,  that  God  governs 
the  world  by  general  fixed  laws,  that  he  has  endued  us  with 
capacities  of  reflecting  upon  this  constitution  of  things,  and 
foreseeing  the  good  and  bad  consequences  of  our  behaviour  ; 
plainly  implies  some  sort  of  moral  government :  since  from 
such  a  constitution  of  things  it  cannot  but  follow,  that 
prudence  and  imprudence,  which  are  of  the  nature  of  virtue 
and  vice  P,  must  be,  as  they  are,  respectively  rewarded  and 
punished. 

§  ii.   As  do  civil  punishments,  and  the  fear  of  them. 

[III.]  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious  actions 
are,  to  a  great  degree,  actually  punished  as  mischievous  to 
society  ;  and  besides  punishment  actually  inflicted  upon  this 
account,  there  is  also  the  fear  and  apprehension  of  it  in 
those  persons,  whose  crimes  have  rendered  them  obnoxious 
to  it,  in  case  of  a  discovery  ;  this  state  of  fear  being  itself 
often  a  very  considerable  punishment.  The  natural  fear 
and  apprehension  of  it  too,  which  restrains  from  such 
crimes,  is  a  declaration  of  nature  against  them.  It  is 
necessary  to  the  very  being  of  society,  that  vices  destructive 
of  it,  should  be  punished  as  being  so ;  the  vices  of  falsehood, 
injustice,  cruelty  :  which  punishment  therefore  is  as  natural 
as  society  ;  and  so  is  an  instance  of  a  kind  of  moral  govern- 
ment, naturally  established  and  actually  taking  place.  And, 
since  the  certain  natural  course  of  things  is  the  conduct  of 
Providence  or  the  government  of  God,  though  carried  on  by 
the  instrumentality  of  men ;  the  observation  here  made 
amounts  to  this,  that  mankind  find  themselves  placed  by 
him  in  such  circumstances,  as  that  they  are  unavoidably 
accountable  for  their  behaviour,  and  are  often  punished,  and 
sometimes  rewarded  under  his  government,  in  the  view  of 
their  being  mischievous,  or  eminently  beneficial  to  society. 

«  See  Dissertation  II.  (§  8). 


60  OF   THE  MORAL  [I.  III. 

§  12.  Good  acts  are  sometimes  punished ;    but  never 
as  being  good. 

If  it  be  objected  that  good  actions,  and  such  as  are 
beneficial  to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in  the  case  of 
persecution  and  in  other  cases  ;  and  that  ill  and  mischievous 
actions  are  often  rewarded  :  it  may  be  answered  distinctly  ; 
first,  that  this  is  in  no  sort  necessary,  and  consequently  not 
natural,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  necessary,  and  therefore 
natural,  that  ill  or  mischievous  actions  should  be  punished  : 
and  in  the  next  place,  that  good  actions  are  never  punished, 
considered  as  beneficial  to  society,  nor  ill  actions  rewarded, 
under  the  view  of  their  being  hurtful  to  it.  So  that  it  stands 
good,  without  any  thing  on  the  side  of  vice  to  be  set  over 
against  it,  that  the  Author  of  nature  has  as  truly  directed,  that 
vicious  actions,  considered  as  mischievous  to  society,  should 
be  punished,  and  put  mankind  under  a  necessity  of  thus 
punishing  them  ;  as  he  has  directed  and  necessitated  us  to 
preserve  our  lives  by  food. 

§  13.  Regard  is  had  not  to  acts  owTy,  lut  to  their  quality  as 
virtuous  or  vicious. 

[IV.]  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue  as  such  is 
actually  rewarded,  and  vice  as  such  punished  :  which  seems 
to  afford  an  instance  or  example,  not  only  of  government, 
but  of  moral  government,  begun  and  established  ;  moral  in 
the  strictest  sense ;  though  not  in  that  perfection  of  degree, 
which  religion  teaches  us  to  expect.  In  order  to  see  this 
more  clearly,  we  must  distinguish  between  actions  themselves, 
and  that  quality  ascribed  to  them,  which  we  call  virtuous  or 
vicious.  The  gratification  itself  of  every  natural  passion 
must  be  attended  with  delight :  and  acquisitions  of  fortune, 
however  made,  are  acquisitions  of  the  means  or  materials  of 
enjoyment.  An  action  then,  by  which  any  natural  passion 
is  gratified  or  fortune  acquired,  procures  delight  or  advan- 
tage ;  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  morality  of 
such  action.  Consequently,  the  pleasure  or  advantage 
in  this  case,  is  gained  by  the  action  itself,  not  by  the 
morality,  the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it ;  though  it  be, 


§§  12,  i3]  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  6l 

perhaps,  virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus,  to  say  such  an  action  or 
course  of  behaviour,  procured  such  pleasure  or  advantage,  or 
brought  on  such  inconvenience  and  pain,  is  quite  a  different 
thing  from  saying,  that  such  good  or  bad  effect  was  owing 
to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  such  action  or  behaviour.  In  one 
case,  an  action  abstracted  from  all  moral  consideration, 
produced  its  effect :  in  the  other  case,  for  it  will  appear  that 
there  are  such  cases,  the  morality  of  the  action,  the  action 
under  a  moral  consideration,  i.  e.  the  virtuousness  or  vicious- 
ness  of  it,  produced  the  effect.  Now  I  say  virtue  as  such, 
naturally  procures  considerable  advantages  to  the  virtuous, 
and  vice  as  such,  naturally  occasions  great  inconvenience  and 
even  misery  to  the  vicious,  in  very  many  instances.  The 
immediate  effects  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  the  mind  and 
temper,  are  to  be  mentioned  as  instances  of  it.  Vice  as 
such  is  naturally  attended  with  some  sort  of  uneasiness, 
and,  not  uncommonly,  with  great  disturbance  and  appre- 
hension. That  inward  feeling,  which,  respecting  lesser 
matters,  and  in  familiar  speech,  we  call  being  vexed  with 
oneself,  and  in  matters  of  importance  and  in  more  serious 
language,  remorse  ;  is  an  uneasiness  naturally  arising  from 
an  action  of  a  man's  own,  reflected  upon  by  himself  as  wrong, 
unreasonable,  faulty,  i.  e.  vicious  in  greater  or  less  degrees  : 
and  this  manifestly  is  a  different  feeling  from  that  uneasiness, 
which  arises  from  a  sense  of  mere  loss  or  harm.  What  is 
more  common,  than  to  hear  a  man  lamenting  an  accident  or 

event,  and  adding but  however  he  has  the  satisfaction 

that  he  cannot  blame  himself  for  it ;  or  on  the  contrary,  that 
he  has  the  uneasiness  of  being  sensible  it  was  his  own  doing  ? 
Thus  also  the  disturbance  and  fear,  which  often  follow  upon 
a  man's  having  done  an  injury,  arise  from  a  sense  of  his 
being  blameworthy  ;  otherwise  there  would,  in  many  cases, 
be  no  ground  of  disturbance,  nor  any  reason  to  fear  resent- 
ment or  shame.  On  the  other  hand,  inward  security  and 
peace,  and  a  mind  open  to  the  several  gratifications  of  life, 
are  the  natural  attendants  of  innocence  and  virtue.  To 
which  must  be  added  the  complacency,  satisfaction,  and 
even  joy  of  heart,  which  accompany  the  exercise,  the  real 
exercise,  of  gratitude,  friendship,  benevolence. 


62  OF   THE  MORAL  [I.  m. 

§  14.  Reckon  in,  too,  the  fears  and  hopes  of  a  future  life ; 

And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned,  the  fears  of 
future  punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a  better  life,  in 
those  who  fully  believe,  or  have  any  serious  apprehension  of 
religion  :  because  these  hopes  and  fears  are  present  uneasi- 
ness and  satisfaction  to  the  mind,  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of 
by  great  part  of  the  world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought 
most  thoroughly  upon  that  subject  of  religion.  And  no  one 
can  say,  how  considerable  this  uneasiness  and  satisfaction 
may  be,  or  what  upon  the  whole  it  may  amount  to. 

§  15.  And  the  favour  and  disfavour  especially  of  the  good; 

In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  consideration,  that 
all  honest  and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend  honest 
good  men  as  such,  and  to  discountenance  the  vicious  as 
such,  and  do  so  in  some  degree  ;  indeed  in  a  considerable 
degree :  from  which  favour  and  discouragement  cannot  but 
arise  considerable  advantage  and  inconvenience.  And 
though  the  generality  of  the  world  have  little  regard  to  the 
morality  of  their  own  actions,  and  may  be  supposed  to  have 
less  to  that  of  others,  when  they  themselves  are  not  con- 
cerned ;  yet  let  any  one  be  known  to  be  a  man  of  virtue, 
somehow  or  other  he  will  be  favoured,  and  good  offices  will 
be  done  him,  from  regard  to  his  character  without  remote 
views,  occasionally,  and  in  some  low  degree,  I  think,  by  the 
generality  of  the  world,  as  it  happens  to  come  in  their  way. 
Public  honours  too  and  advantages  are  the  natural  conse- 
quences, are  sometimes  at  least  the  consequences  in  fact,  of 
virtuous  actions  ;  of  eminent  justice,  fidelity,  charity,  love 
to  our  country,  considered  in  the  viewr  of  being  virtuous. 
And  sometimes  even  death  itself,  often  infamy  and  external 
inconveniences,  are  the  public  consequences  of  vice  as  vice. 
For  instance,  the  sense  which  mankind  have  of  tyranny, 
injustice,  oppression,  additional  to  the  mere  feeling  or  fear 
of  misery,  has  doubtless  been  instrumental  in  bringing 
about  revolutions,  which  make  a  figure  even  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  For  it  is  plain,  men  resent  injuries  as 
implying  faultiness,  and  retaliate,  not  merely  under  the 


§§  14-17]  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  63 

notion  of  having  received  harm,  but  of  having  received 
wrong  ;  and  they  have  this  resentment  in  behalf  of  others, 
as  well  as  of  themselves.  So  likewise  even  the  generality 
are,  in  some  degree,  grateful  and  disposed  to  return  good 
offices,  not  merely  because  such  an  one  has  been  the 
occasion  of  good  to  them,  but  under  the  view,  that  such  good 
offices  implied  kind  intention  and  good  desert  in  the  doer. 

§  1  6.  And  the  moral  quality  seen  in  (a)  civil  government,  (b) 
care  of  children,  (c)  in  virtues  per  se,  never  in  vices,  (d)  in 
pardons  given  in  absence  of  guilt. 

To  all  this  may  be  added  two  or  three  particular  things, 
which  many  persons  will  think  frivolous  ;  but  to  me 
nothing  appears  so,  which  at  all  comes  in  towards  de- 
termining a  question  of  such  importance,  as,  whether  there 
be,  or  be  not,  a  moral  institution  of  government,  in  the 
strictest  sense  moral,  visibly  established  and  begun  in  nature. 
The  particular  things  are  these  :  That  in  domestic  govern- 
ment, which  is  doubtless  natural,  children  and  others  also 
are  very  generally  punished  for  falsehood  and  injustice  and 
ill-behaviour,  as  such,  and  rewarded  for  the  contrary;  which 
are  instances  where  veracity,  and  justice,  and  right  be- 
haviour as  such,  are  naturally  enforced  by  rewards  and 
punishments,  whether  more  or  less  considerable  in  degree  : 
That,  though  civil  government  be  supposed  to  take  cogni- 
zance of  actions  in  no  other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to 
society,  without  respect  to  the  immorality  of  them  ;  yet  as 
such  actions  are  immoral,  so  the  sense  which  men  have  of 
the  immorality  of  them,  very  greatly  contributes,  in  differ- 
ent ways,  to  bring  offenders  to  justice  :  and  that  entire 
absence  of  all  crime  and  guilt  in  the  moral  sense,  when 
plainly  appearing,  will  almost  of  course  procure,  and  cir- 
cumstances of  aggravated  guilt  prevent,  a  remission  of  the 
penalties  annexed  to  civil  crimes,  in  many  cases,  though  by 
no  means  in  all. 


§  17.  Sum  of  results  on  behalf  of  well-doing  as  such, 

Upon  the  \vhole  then,  besides  the  good  and  bad  effects  of 
virtue  and  vice  upon  men's  own  minds,  the  course  of  the 


64  OF   THE   MORAL  [I.  III. 

world  does,  in  some  measure,  turn  upon  the  approbation 
and  disapprobation  of  them  as  such,  in  others.  The  sense 
of  well  and  ill-doing,  the  presages  of  conscience,  the  love  of 
good  characters  and  dislike  of  bad  ones,  honour,  shame, 
resentment,  gratitude  ;  all  these,  considered  in  themselves, 
and  in  their  effects,  do  afford  manifest  real  instances  of 
virtue  as  such  naturally  favoured,  and  of  vice  as  such 
discountenanced,  more  or  less,  in  the  daily  course  of  human 
life ;  in  every  age,  in  every  relation,  in  every  general 
circumstance  of  it.  That  God  has  given  us  a  moral  nature h, 
may  most  justly  be  urged  as  a  proof  of  our  being  under  his 
moral  government :  but  that  he  has  placed  us  in  a  condition, 
which  gives  this  nature,  as  one  may  speak,  scope  to  operate, 
and  in  which  it  does  unavoidably  operate  ;  i.  e.  influence 
mankind  to  act,  so  as  thus  to  favour  and  reward  virtue,  and 
discountenance  and  punish  vice ;  this  is  not  the  same,  but 
a  further,  additional  proof  of  his  moral  government :  for  it 
is  an  instance  of  it.  The  first  is  a  proof,  that  he  will 
finally  favour  and  support  virtue  effectually :  the  second  is 
an  example  of  his  favouring  and  supporting  it  at  present,  in 
some  degree. 

§  18.  This  regard  to  the  quale  is  due  to  (a)  our  moral 
nature,  (b)  its  effect  upon  related  destinies. 

If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it  arises,  that 
virtue  as  such  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice  as  such  is  punished, 
and  this  rule  never  inverted  :  it  will  be  found  to  proceed,  in 
part,  immediately  from  the  moral  nature  itself,  which  God 
has  given  us  ;  and  also  in  part,  from  his  having  given  us, 
together  with  this  nature,  so  great  a  power  over  each  other's 
happiness  and  miseiy.  For  first,  it  is  certain,  that  peace  and 
delight,  in  some  degree  and  upon  some  occasions,  is  the 
necessary  and  present  effect  of  virtuous  practice  ;  an  effect 
arising  immediately  from  that  constitution  of  our  nature. 
We  are  so  made,  that  well-doing  as  such  gives  us  satisfaction, 
at  least,  in  some  instances  ;  ill-doing  as  such,  in  none.  And 
secondly,  from  our  moral  nature,  joined  with  God's  having 
put  our  happiness  and  misery  in  many  respects  in  each 

h  See  Dissertation  II.  (§§  1-3). 


§§  i8-2o]  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  65 

other's  power,  it  cannot  but  be,  that  vice  as  such,  some  kinds 
and  instances  of  it  at  least,  will  be  infamous,  and  men  will 
be  disposed  to  punish  it  as  in  itself  detestable  ;  and  the 
villain  will  by  no  means  be  able  always  to  avoid  feeling  that 
infamy,  any  more  than  he  will  be  able  to  escape  this  further 
punishment,  which  mankind  will  be  disposed  to  inflict  upon 
him,  under  the  notion  of  his  deserving  it. 

§  19.  Any  like  regard  to  vice  a  dream  or  a  monster. 
But  there  can  be  nothing  on  the  side  of  vice,  to  answer 
this  ;  because  there  is  nothing  in  the  human  mind  contra- 
dictory, as  the  logicians  speak,  to  virtue.  For  virtue  consists 
in  a  regard  to  what  is  right  and  reasonable,  as  being  so  ;  in 
a  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  charity,  in  themselves :  and 
there  is  surely  no  such  thing,  as  a  like  natural  regard  to 
falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty.  If  it  be  thought,  that  there 
are  instances  of  an  approbation  of  vice,  as  such,  in  itself,  and 
for  its  own  sake,  (though  it  does  not  appear  to  me,  that 
there  is  any  such  thing  at  all  ;  but  supposing  there  be, )  it  is 
evidently  monstrous  :  as  much  so,  as  the  most  acknowledged 
perversion  of  any  passion  whatever.  .  Such  instances  of 
perversion  then  being  left  out  as  merely  imaginary,  or, 
however,  unnatural  ;  it  must  follow,  from  the  frame  of  our 
nature,  and  from  our  condition,  in  the  respects  now  described, 
that  vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  cannot  but  be,  favoured 
as  such  by  others,  upon  some  occasions  ;  and  happy  in 
itself,  in  some  degree.  For  what  is  here  insisted  upon,  is 
not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice  are  thus  distinguished, 
but  only  the  thing  itself,  that  they  are  so  in  some  degree  ; 
though  the  whole  good  and  bad  effect  of  virtue  and  vice  as 
such,  is  not  inconsiderable  in  degree.  But  that  they  must 
be  thus  distinguished  in  some  degree,  is  in  a  manner 
necessary  :  it  is  matter  of  fact  of  daily  experience,  even  in 
the  greatest  confusion  of  human  affairs. 

§  20.  Perverse  rules  intrude,  but  not  so  as  to  drown 

the  voice  of  nature  in  Providence. 

It  is  not  pretended  but  that   in  the   natural   course   of 
things,  happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distributed   by 
VOL.  i.  F 


66  OF    THE   MORAL  [I.  III. 

other  rules,  than  only  the  personal  merit  and  demerit  of 
characters.  They  may  sometimes  be  distributed  by  way  of 
mere  discipline.  There  may  be  the  wisest  and  best  reasons, 
why  the  world  should  be  governed  by  general  laws,  from 
whence  such  promiscuous  distribution  perhaps  must  follow  ; 
and  also  why  our  happiness  and  misery  should  be  put  in 
each  other's  power,  in  the  degree  which  they  are.  And 
these  things,  as  in  general  they  contribute  to  the  rewarding 
virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as  such  :  so  they  often  contribute 
also,  not  to  the  inversion  of  this,  which  is  impossible  ;  but 
to  the  rendering  persons  prosperous,  though  wicked  ;  afflicted, 
though  righteous  ;  and,  which  is  worse,  to  the  rewarding 
some  actions,  though  vicious,  and  punishing  other  actions, 
though  virtuous.  But  all  this  cannot  drown  the  voice  of 
nature  in  the  conduct  of  Providence,  plainly  declaring 
itself  for  virtue,  by  way  of  distinction  from  vice,  and  pre- 
ference to  it.  For  our  being  so  constituted  as  that  virtue 
and  vice  are  thus  naturally  favoured  and  discountenanced, 
rewarded  and  punished  respectively  as  such,  is  an  intuitive 
proof  of  the  intent  of  nature,  that  it  should  be  so  :  other- 
wise the  constitution  of  our  mind,  from  which  it  thus 
immediately  and  directly  proceeds,  would  be  absurd.  But 
it  cannot  be  said,  because  virtuous  actions  are  sometimes 
punished,  and  vicious  actions  rewarded,  that  nature  intended 
it.  For,  though  this  great  disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all 
actions  are  done,  by  means  of  some  natural  passion  ;  yot 
this  may  lc,  as  it  undoubtedly  is.  brought  about  by  the 
perversion  of  such  passion,  implanted  in  us  for  other,  and 
those  very  good  purposes.  And  indeed  these  other  and 
good  purposes,  even  of  every  passion,  may  be-  clearly 
seen. 

§  21.    God  takes  the  side  of  tltc  vir  bonus. 

We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  some  degree  of  present 
effect,  from  him  who  is  supreme  in  nature,  which  side  he  is 
of,  or  what  part  he  takes  :  a  declaration  for  virtue, _and 
against  vice.  So  far  therefore  as  a  man  is  true  to  virtue, 
to  veracity  and  justice,  to  equity  and  charity,  and  the  right 


§§  21, 22]  GOVP;RNMENI^  OF  GOD  67 

of  the  case,  in  whatever  he  is  concerned  ;  so  far  he  is  on  the 
side  of  the  divine  administration,  and  cooperates  with  it  : 
and  from  hence,  to  such  a  man,  arises  naturally  a  secret 
satisfaction  and  sense  of  security,  and  implicit  hope  of  some- 
what further.  And, 

§  22.  The  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  run  ahead  of  the 
present  facts. 

[V.]  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necessary  tendencies 
of  virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  effect,  yet  are  at 
present  discernible  in  nature  ;  and  so  aiford  an  instance  of 
somewhat  moral  in  the  essential  constitution  of  it.  There 
is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice 
to  produce  the  good  and  bad  effects  now  mentioned,  in  a 
greater  degree  than  they  do  in  fact  produce  them.  For 
instance  ;  good  and  bad  men  would  be  much  more  rewarded 
and  punished  as  such,  were  it  not,  that  justice  is  often 
artificially  eluded,  that  characters  are  not  known,  and  many, 
who  would  thus  favour  virtue  and  discourage  vice,  are 
hindered  from  doing  so  by  accidental  causes.  These  ten- 
dencies of  virtue  and  vice  are  obvious  with  regard  to 
individuals.  But  it  may  require  more  particularly  to  be 
considered,  that  powder  in  a  society,  by  being  under  the 
direction  of  virtue,  naturally  increases,  and  has  a  necessary 
tendency  to  prevail  over  opposite  power,  not  under  the 
direction  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as  power,  by  being  under 
the  direction  of  reason,  increases,  and  has  a  tendency  to 
prevail  over  brute  force.  There  are  several  brute  creatures 
of  equal,  and  several  of  superior  strength,  to  that  of  men  ; 
and  possibly  the  sum  of  the  whole  strength  of  brutes  may 
be  greater  than  that  of  mankind  :  but  reason  gives  us  the 
advantage  and  superiority  over  them ;  and  thus  man  is 
the  acknowledged  governing  animal  upon  the  earth.  Nor 
is  this  superiority  considered  by  any  as  accidental  ;  but  as 
what  reason  has  a  tendency,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
to  obtain.  And  yet  perhaps  difficulties  may  be  raised 
about  the  meaning,  as  well  as  the  truth,  of  the  assertion, 
that  virtue  has  the  like  tendency. 

F   2 


68  OF    THE   MORAL  [l.  III. 

§  23.  Compare,  the  tendency  of  reason  to  overcome  Irutc 
force  ly  union,  or  with  time;   this  too  not  uniform. 

To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  distinctly, 
how  the  case  stands  with  regard  to  reason  ;  which  is  so 
readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  advantageous  tendency. 
Suppose  then  two  or  three  men,  of  the  best  and  most  im- 
proved understanding,  in  a  desolate  open  plain,  attacked  by  ten 
times  the  number  of  beasts  of  prey  :  would  their  reason  secure 
them  the  victory  in  this  unequal  combat  ?  Power  then, 
though  joined  with  reason,  and  under  its  direction,  cannot 
be  expected  to  prevail  over  opposite  power,  though  merely 
brutal,  unless  the  one  bears  some  proportion  to  the  other. 
Again  :  put  the  imaginary  case,  that  rational  and  irrational 
creatures  were  of  like  external  shape  and  manner  :  it  is 
certain,  before  there  were  opportunities  for  the  first  to 
distinguish  each  other,  to  separate  from  their  adversaries, 
and  to  form  an  union  among  themselves,  they  might  be 
upon  a  level,  or  in  several  respects  upon  great  disadvantage ; 
though  united  they  might  be  vastly  superior :  since  union 
is  of  such  efficacy,  that  ten  men  united,  might  be  able  to 
accomplish,  what  ten  thousand  of  the  same  natural  strength 
and  understanding  wholly  ununited,  could  not.  In  this 
case  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain  its  ground 
against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among  the  rational 
creatures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men  to  land  upon  an 
island  inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts ;  a  number  of  men 
who,  by  the  regulations  of  civil  government,  the  inventions 
of  art,  and  the  experience  of  some  years,  could  they  be 
preserved  so  long,  would  be  really  sufficient  to  subdue  the 
wild  beasts,  and  to  preserve  themselves  in  security  from 
them  :  yet  a  conjuncture  of  accidents  might  give  such  ad- 
vantage to  the  irrational  animals,  as  that  they  might  at 
once  overpower,  and  even  extirpate,  the  whole  species  of 
rational  ones.  Length  of  time  then,  proper  scope  and 
opportunities,  for  reason  to  exert  itself,  may  be  absolutely 
necessary  to  its  prevailing  over  brute  force.  Further  still  : 
there  are  many  instances  of  brutes  succeeding  in  attempts, 
which  they  could  not  have  undertaken,  had  not  their 


§§  23,  24]  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  69 

irrational  nature  rendered  them  incapable  of  foreseeing  the 
danger  of  such  attempts,  or  the  fury  of  passion  hindered 
their  attending  to  it  ;  and  there  are  instances  of  reason 
and  real  prudence  preventing  men's  undertaking  what,  it 
hath  appeared  afterwards,  they  might  have  succeeded  in  by 
a  lucky  rashness.  And  in  certain  conjunctures,  ignorance 
and  folly,  weakness  and  discord,  may  have  their  advantages. 
So  that  rational  animals  have  not  necessarily  the  superiority 
over  irrational  ones  :  but,  how  improbable  soever  it  may  be, 
it  is  evidently  possible,  that,  in  some  globes,  the  latter  may 
be  superior.  And  were  the  former  wholly  at  variance  and 
disunited,  by  false  self-interest  and  envy,  by  treachery  and 
injustice,  and  consequent  rage  and  malice  against  each  other, 
whilst  the  latter  were  firmly  united  among  themselves  by 
instinct  ;  this  might  greatly  contribute  to  the  introducing 
such  an  inverted  order  of  things.  For  every  one  would 
consider  it  as  inverted  :  since  reason  has,  in  the  nature  of 
it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force  ;  notwithstanding 
the  possibility  it  may  not  prevail,  and  the  necessity,  which 
there  is,  of  many  concurring  circumstances  to  render  it 
prevalent. 

§  24.  So  virtue  tends  to  the  acquisition  of  potuer ; 

Now  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency  to 
procure  superiority  and  additional  power :  wrhether  this 
power  be  considered  as  the  means  of  security  from  opposite 
power,  or  of  obtaining  other  advantages.  And  it  has  this 
tendency,  by  rendering  public  good,  an  object  and  end,  to 
eveiy  member  of  the  society  ;  by  putting  every  one  upon 
consideration  and  diligence,  recollection  and  self-government, 
both  in  order  to  see  what  is  the  most  effectual  method,  and 
also  in  order  to  perform  their  proper  part,  for  obtaining 
and  preserving  it ;  by  uniting  a  society  within  itself,  and  so 
increasing  its  strength;  and,  which  is  particularly  to  be 
mentioned,  uniting  it  by  means  of  veracity  and  justice.  For 
as  these  last  are  principal  bonds  of  union,  so  benevolence  or 
public  spirit,  undirected,  unrestrained  by  them,  is,  nobody 
knows  what. 


7o 


OF   THE   MORAL 


[I.  III. 


§  25.  And  is  likely  to  prevail,  if  ii'itli  a  fair  field. 

And  suppose  the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisible  dis- 
pensations of  Providence,  to  be,  in  any  sort,  analogous  to 
what  appears  :  or  that  both  together  make  up  one  uniform 
scheme,  the  two  parts  of  which,  the  part  which  we  see,  and 
that  which  is  beyond  our  observation,  are  analogous  to  each 
other :  then,  there  must  be  a  like  natural  tendency  in  the 
derived  power,  throughout  the  universe,  under  the  direction 
of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over  that,  which  is  not  under 
its  direction  ;  as  there  is  in  reason,  derived  reason  in  the 
universe,  to  prevail  over  brute  force.  But  then,  in  order 
to  the  prevalence  of  virtue,  or  that  it  may  actually  produce, 
what  it  has  a  tendency  to  produce  ;  the  like  concurrences 
are  necessary,  as  are,  to  the  prevalence  of  reason.  There 
must  be  some  proportion,  between  the  natural  power  or 
force  which  is,  and  that  which  is  not.  under  the  direction  of 
virtue :  there  must  be  sufficient  length  of  time  ;  for  the 
complete  success  of  virtue,  as  of  reason,  cannot,  from  the 
nature  of  the  thing,  be  otherwise  than  gradual :  there  must 
be,  as  one  may  speak,  a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and 
extensive  enough,  proper  occasions  and  opportunities,  for 
the  virtuous  to  join  together,  to  exert  themselves  against 
lawless  force,  and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  united  labours. 
Now  indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that  the  disproportion  between 
the  good  and  bad,  even  here  on  earth,  is  not  so  great,  but 
that  the  former  have  natural  power  sufficient  to  their  pre- 
vailing to  a  considerable  degree,  if  circumstances  would 
permit  this  power  to  be  united.  For,  much  less,  very  much 

ss,  power  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  would  prevail  over 

tich  greater  not  under  the  direction  of  it. 

26.   Virtue,  hindered  and  militant  here,  may  have  full 
scope  hereafter; 

However,  good  men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  cannot  unite  ; 
as  for  other  reasons,  so  because  they  cannot  be  sufficiently 
ascertained  of  each  other's  characters.  And  the  known 
course  of  human  things,  the  scene  we  are  now  passing 
through,  particularly  the  shortness  of  life,  denies  to  virtue 


§§25-28]  GOVERNMENT    OF   GOD  71 

its  full  scope  in  several  other  respects.  The  natural 
tendency  which  we  have  been  considering,  though  real,  is 
hindered  from  being  carried  into  effect  in  the  present  state  : 
but  these  hindrances  may  be  removed  in  a  future  one. 
Virtue,  to  borrow  the  Christian  allusion,  is  militant  here  ; 
and  various  untoward  accidents  contribute  to  its  being  often 
overborne  :  but  it  may  combat  with  greater  advantage 
hereafter,  and  prevail  completely,  and  enjoy  its  consequent 
rewards,  in  some  future  states.  Neglected  as  it  is,  perhaps 
unknown,  perhaps  despised  and  oppressed  here  ;  there  may 
be  scenes  in  eternity,  lasting  enough,  and  in  every  other 
way  adapted,  to  afford  it  a  sufficient  sphere  of  action  ;  and 
a  sufficient  sphere  for  the  natural  consequences  of  it  to 
follow  in  fact.  If  the  soul  be  naturally  immortal J,  and  this 
state  be  a  progress  towards  a  future  one,  as  childhood  is 
towards  mature  age ;  good  men  may  naturally  unite,  not 
only  amongst  themselves,  but  also  with  other  orders  of 
virtuous  creatures,  in  that  future  state. 

§  27.   Is,  per  se,  a  bond  of  union ; 

For  virtue,  from  the  very  nature  of  it,  is  a  principle  and 
bond  of  union,  in  some  degree,  amongst  all  who  are  endued 
with  it,  and  known  to  each  other  ;  so  as  that  by  it,  a  good 
man  cannot  but  recommend  himself  to  the  favour  and 
protection  of  all  virtuous  beings,  throughout  the  whole 
universe,  who  can  be  acquainted  with  his  character,  and  can 
any  way  interpose  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his  duration. 

§  28.   And  may  far  hence  win  over  sitirits  capable  of 
improvement. 

And  one  might  add,  that  suppose  all  this  advantageous 
tendency  of  virtue  to  become  effect,  amongst  one  or  more 
orders  of  creatures,  in  any  distant  scenes  and  periods,  and  to 
be  seen  by  any  orders  of  .vicious  creatures,  throughout  the 
universal  kingdom  of  God  ;  this  happy  effect  of  virtue  would 
have  a  tendency,  by  way  of  example,  and  possibly  in  other 


1  Natural  immortality  of  the   soul   is   put  liypothetically  here,  as 
j>.  i.  21,  31. 


72 


OF   THE  MORAL  [I.  HI, 


ways,  to  amend  those  of  them,  who  are  capable  of  amend- 
ment, and  being  recovered  to  a  just  sense  of  virtue.  If  our 
notions  of  the  plan  of  Providence  were  enlarged  in  any  sort 
proportionable  to  what  late  discoveries  have  enlarged  our 
views  with  respect  to  the  material  world  ;  representations  of 
this  kind  would  not  appear  absurd  or  extravagant.  How- 
ever, they  are  not  to  be  taken  as  intended  for  a  literal 
delineation  of  what  is  in  fact  the  particular  scheme  of  the 
universe,  which  cannot  be  known  without  revelation  :  for 
suppositions  are  not  to  be  looked  on  as  true,  because  not 
incredible  :  but  they  are  mentioned  to  show,  that  our  nnd- 
ing  virtue  to  be  hindered  from  procuring  to  itself  such 
superiority  and  advantages,  is  no  objection  against  its 
having,  in  the  essential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to 
procure  them.  And  the  suppositions  now  mentioned  do 
plainly  show  this  :  for  they  show,  that  these  hindrances  are 
so  far  from  being  necessary,  that  we  ourselves  can  easily 
conceive,  how  they  may  be  removed  in  future  states,  and  full 
scope  be  granted  to  virtue.  And  all  these  advantageous 
tendencies  of  it  are  to  be  considered  as  declarations  of  God 
in  its  favour.  This  however  is  taking  a  pretty  large  com- 
pass :  though  it  is  certain,  that,  as  the  material  world  appears 
to  be,  in  a  manner  boundless  and  immense  ;  there  must 
be  some  scheme  of  Providence  vast  in  proportion  to  it. 

§  29.   Suppose  an  ideal  state. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  earth  our  habitation  ;  and  we 
shall  see  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  imagining  an 
instance  not  so  vast  and  remote  :  by  supposing  a  kingdom 
or  society  of  men  upon  it,  perfectly  virtuous,  for  a  succession 
of  many  ages  ;  to  which,  if  you  please,  may  be  given  a 
situation  advantageous  for  universal  monarchy.  In  such 
a  state,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as  faction  :  but  men 
of  the  greatest  capacity  would  of  course,  all  along,  have  the 
chief  direction  of  affairs  willingly  yielded  to  them  ;  and 
they  would  share  it  among  themselves  without  envy.  Each 
of  these  would  have  the  part  assigned  him,  to  which  his 
genius  was  peculiarly  adapted  :  and  others,  who  had  not 
any  distinguished  genius,  would  be  safe,  and  think  them- 


§§  29,  30]  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  73 

selves  very  happy,  by  being  under  the  protection  and  guidance 
of  those  who  had.  Public  determinations  would  really  be 
the  result  of  the  united  wisdom  of  the  community  :  and 
they  would  faithfully  be  executed,  by  the  united  strength  of 
it.  Some  would  in  a  higher  way  contribute,  but  all  would 
in  some  way  contribute,  to  the  public  prosperity  :  and  in  it, 
each  would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And  as  in- 
justice whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  unknown  among 
themselves  ;  so  they  would  be  sufficiently  secured  from  it 
in  their  neighbours.  For  cunning  and  false  self-interest, 
confederacies  in  injustice,  ever  slight,  and  accompanied 
with  faction  and  intestine  treachery  ;  these  on  one  hand 
would  be  found  mere  childish  folly  and  weakness,  when  set 
in  opposition  against  wisdom,  public  spirit,  union  inviolable, 
and  fidelity  on  the  other  :  allowing  both  a  sufficient  length 
of  years  to  try  their  force. 


§  30.   Such  a  state  would  acquire  immense 

Add  the  general  influence,  which  such  a  kingdom  would 
have  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by  way  of  example  parti- 
cularly, and  the  reverence  which  would  be  paid  it.  It 
would  plainly  be  superior  to  all  others,  and  the  world  must 
gradually  come  under  its  empire  :  not  by  means  of  lawless 
violence  ;  but  partly  by  what  must  be  allowed  to  be  just 
conquest  ;  and  partly  by  other  kingdoms  submitting  them- 
selves voluntarily  to  it,  throughout  a  course  of  ages,  and 
claiming  its  protection,  one  after  another,  in  successive 
exigencies.  The  head  of  it  would  be  an  universal  monarch, 
in  another  sense  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been  ;  and  the 
eastern  style  would  be  literally  applicable  to  him,  that 
all  people,  nations,  and  languages  should  serve  him.  And 
though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  the 
whole  history  of  mankind,  show  the  impossibility,  without 
some  miraculous  interposition,  that  a  number  of  men,  here 
on  earth,  should  unite  in  one  society  or  government,  in  the 
fear  of  God  and  universal  practice  of  virtue  ;  and  that  such 
a  government  should  continue  so  united  for  a  succession  of 
ages  :  yet  admitting  or  supposing  this,  the  effect  would  be 
as  now  drawn  out.  And  thus,  for  instance,  the  wonderful 


74 


OF   THE   MORAL  [I.  III. 


power  and  prosperity  promised  to  the  Jewish  nation  in  the 
scripture,  would  be,  in  a  great  measure,  the  consequence  of 
what  is  predicted  of  them  ;  that  the  people  should  be  all 
righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  for  ever'1 ;  were  we  to  under- 
stand the  latter  phrase  of  a  long  continuance  only,  sufficient 
to  give  things  time  to  work.  The  predictions  of  this  kind, 
for  there  are  many  of  them,  cannot  come  to  pass,  in  the 
present  known  course  of  nature  ;  but  suppose  them  come  to 
pass,  and  then,  the  dominion  and  preeminence  promised 
must  naturally  follow,  to  a  very  considerable  degree. 

§  31.  If  these  anticipations  seem  trifles  for  virtue,  what, 
if  they  ivere  far  vice  ? 

Consider  now  the  general  system  of  religion  :  that  the 
government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one,  and  moral ; 
that  virtue  and  right  shall  finally  have  the  advantage,  and 
prevail  over  fraud  and  lawless  force,  over  the  deceits,  as 
well  as  the  violence  of  wickedness,  under  the  conduct  of 
one  supreme  governor  :  and  from  the  observations  above 
made,  it  will  appear,  that  God  has,  by  our  reason,  given  us 
to  see  a  peculiar  connection  in  the  several  parts  of  this 
scheme,  and  a  tendency  towards  the  completion  of  it  arising 
out  of  the  very  nature  of  virtue  :  which  tendency  is  to  be 
considered  as  somewhat  moral  in  the  essential  constitu- 
tion of  things.  If  any  one  should  think  all  this  to  be  of 
little  importance  ;  I  desire  him  to  consider,  what  he  would 
think,  if  vice  had,  essentially,  and  in  its  nature,  these  advan- 
tageous tendencies ;  or  if  virtue  had  essentially  the  direct 
contrary  ones. 

§  32.  His  aim  is  to  show  tvhithcr  the  facts  of  nature 

point. 

But  it  may  be  objected,  that,  notwithstanding  all  these 
natural  effects  and  these  natural  tendencies  of  virtue  ;  yet 
things  may  be  now  going  on  throughout  the  universe,  and 
may  go  on  hereafter,  in  the  same  mixed  way  as  here  at 
present  upon  earth :  virtue  sometimes  prosperous,  some- 
times depressed ;  vice  sometimes  punished,  sometimes 

1  Isa.  Ix.  21. 


§§  31-34]  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  75 

successful.  The  answer  to  which  is,  that  it  is  not  the 
purpose  of  this  chapter,  nor  of  this  Treatise,  properly  to 
prove  God's  perfect  moral  government  over  the  world,  or 
the  truth  of  Religion  ;  but  to  observe  what  there  is  in  the 
constitution  and  course  of  nature,  to  confirm  the  proper 
proof  of  it.  supposed  to  be  known  :  and  that  the  weight 
of  the  foregoing  observations  to  this  purpose  may  be  thus 
distinctly  proved. 

§  33.   But  this  mixed  state,  if  continued,  would  not 

conclude  in  favour  of  vice. 

Pleasure  and  pain  are  indeed  to  a  certain  degree,  say  to 
a  very  high  degree,  distributed  amongst  us  without  any 
apparent  regard  to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  characters.  And 
were  there  nothing  else  'concerning  this  matter  discernible 
in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  ;  there  would  be 
no  ground  from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  to 
hope  or  to  fear,  that  men  would  be  rewarded  or  punished 
hereafter  according  to  their  deserts :  which,  however,  it 
is  to  be  remarked,  implies,  that  even  then  there  would  be 
no  ground  from  appearances  to  think,  that  vice  upon  the 
whole  would  have  the  advantage,  rather  than  that  virtue 
would.  And  thus  the  proof  of  a  future  state  of  retribution 
would  rest  upon  the  usual  known  arguments  for  it :  which 
are  I  think  plainly  unanswerable  ;  and  would  be  so,  though 
there  were  no  additional  confirmation  of  them  from  the 
things  above  insisted  on.  But  these  things  are  a  very 
strong  confirmation  of  them.  For, 

§  34.    For  God  is  shown  to  have  taken  sides  already 

in  the  contest. 

First,  They  show,  that  the  Author  of  nature  is  not  in- 
different to  virtue  and  vice.  They  amount  to  a  declaration 
from  him,  determinate  and  not  to  be  evaded,  in  favour 
of  one,  and  against  the  other :  such  a  declaration,  as  there 
is  nothing  to  be  set  over  against  or  answer,  on  the  part  of 
vice.  So  that  were  a  man,  laying  aside  the  proper  proof 
of  religion,  to  determine  from  the  course  of  nature  only, 
whether  it  were  most  probable,  that  the  righteous  or  the 


76  OF   THE  MORAL  [I.  ill. 

wicked  would  have  the  advantage  in  a  future  life  ;  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  but  that  he  would  determine  the  proba- 
bility to  be,  that  the  former  would.  The  course  of  nature 
then,  in  the  view  of  it  now  given,  furnishes  us  with  a  real 
practical  proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion. 

§  35.  The  change  ice  hope  is  in  degree  only,  not  in  kind. 

Secondly,  When,  conformably  to  what  religion  teaches  us, 
God  shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and  vice  as  such,  so 
as  that  every  one  shall,  upon  the  whole,  have  his  deserts  ; 
this  distributive  justice  will  not  be  a  thing  different  in  kind, 
but  only  in  degree,  from  what  we  experience  in  his  present 
government.  It  will  be  that  in  effect,  toward  which  we 
now  see  a  tendency.  It  will  be  no  jinoro  than  the  completion 
of  that  moral  government,  the  principles  and  beginning  of 
which  have  been  shown,  beyond  all  dispute,  discernible  in 
the  present  constitution  and  course  of  nature.  And  from 
hence  it  follows, 

§  36.  The  lower  degree  warrants  hope  of  the  higher. 
Thirdly,  That,  as  under  the  natural  government  of  God, 
our  experience  of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of  happiness  and 
misery,  which  we  do  experience  at  present,  gives  just 
ground  to  hope  for  and  to  fear,  higher  degrees  and  other 
kinds  of  both  in  a  future  state,  supposing  a  future  state 
admitted  :  so  under  his  moral  government,  our  experience, 
that  virtue  and  vice  are,  in  the  manners  above  mentioned, 
actually  rewarded  and  punished  at  present,  in  a  certain 
degree,  gives  just  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear,  that  they 
may  le  rewarded  and  punished  in  an  higher  degree  here- 
after. It  is  acknowledged  indeed  that  this  alone  is  not 
sufficient  ground  to  think,  that  they  actually  mil  le  rewarded 
and  punished  in  an  higher  degree,  rather  than  in  a  lower : 
but  then, 

§  37.  Essential  tendency  supplies  a  firmer  basis  than 

accidental  hindrance. 

Lastly,  There  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so,  from  the 
good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  these 


§§  35-38l  GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  77 

tendencies  are  essential,  and  founded  in  the  nature  of 
things  :  whereas  the  hindrances  to  their  becoming  eifect 
are,  in  numberless  cases,  not  necessary,  but  artificial  only. 
Now  it  may  be  much  more  strongly  argued,  that  these 
tendencies,  as  well  as  the  actual  rewards  and  punishments, 
of  virtue  and  vice,  which  arise  directly  out  of  the  nature 
of  things,  will  remain  hereafter,  than  that  the  accidental 
hindrances  of  them  will.  And  if  these  hindrances  do  not 
remain  ;  those  rewards  and  punishments  cannot  but  be 
carried  on  much  further  towards  the  perfection  of  moral 
government :  i.  e.  the  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  will 
become  eifect :  but  when,  or  where,  or  in  what  particular 
way,  cannot  be  known  at  all,  but  by  revelation. 

§  38.   Sum  of  tlte  foregoing  arguments. 

Upon  the  whole  :  There  is  a  kind  of  moral  government 
implied  in  God's  natural  government k  :  virtue  and  vice  are 
naturally  rewarded  and  punished  as  beneficial  and  mis- 
chievous to  society 1  ;  and  rewarded  and  punished  directly 
as  virtue  and  vice in.  The  notion  then  of  a  moral  scheme 
of  government  is  not  fictitious,  but  natural ;  for  it  is 
suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the  constitution  and  course 
of  nature :  and  the  execution  of  this  scheme  is  actually 
begun,  in  the  instances  here  mentioned.  And  these  things 
are  to  be  considered  as  a  declaration  of  the  Author  of 
nature,  for  virtue,  and  against  vice  :  they  give  a  credibility 
to  the  supposition  of  their  being  rewarded  and  punished 
hereafter  ;  and  also  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear,  that  they 
may  be  rewarded  and  punished  in  higher  degrees  than  they 
are  here.  And  as  all  this  is  confirmed,  so  the  argument 
for  religion,  from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  is 
carried  on  further,  by  observing,  that  there  are  natural 
tendencies,  and,  in  innumerable  cases,  only  artificial 
hindrances,  to  this  moral  scheme's  being  carried  on  much 
further  towards  perfection,  than  it  is  at  present".  The 
notion  then  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government,  much  more 
perfect  than  what  is  seen,  is  not  a  fictitious,  but  a  natural 

k  Sup.  §§  8-1 1.  !  IbUJ.  m  Sup.  §§  12,  13. 

"  Sup.  §§  22-26, 


78  PROBATION,  [I.  IV. 

notion  ;  for  it  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts,  by  the  essen- 
tial tendencies  of  virtue  .and  vice.  And  these  tendencies 
are  to  be  considered  as  intimations,  as  implicit  promises 
and  threatenings,  from  the  Author  of  nature,  of  much 
greater  rewards  and  punishments  to  follow  virtue  and 
vice,  than  do  at  present.  And  indeed,  every  natural 
tendency,  which  is  to  continue,  but  which  is  hindered 
from  becoming  effect  by  only  accidental  causes,  affords 
a  presumption,  that  such  tendency  will,  some  time  or 
other,  become  effect :  a  presumption  in  degree  propor- 
tionable to  the  length  of  the  duration,  through  which  such 
tendency  will  continue.  And  from  these  things  together, 
arises  a  real  presumption,  that  the  moral  scheme  of  govern- 
ment established  in  nature,  shall  be  carried  on  much  further 
towards  perfection  hereafter  ;  and,  I  think,  a  presumption 
that  it  will  be  absolutely  completed.  But  from  these 
things,  joined  with  the  moral  nature  which  God  has  given 
us,  considered  as  given  us  by  him,  arises  a  practical  proof  ° 
that  it  will  be  completed  :  a  proof  from  fact ;  and  therefore 
a  distinct  one  from  that,  which  is  deduced  from  the  eternal 
and  unalterable  relations,  the  ntness  and  unfitness  of 
actions. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF    A    STATE    OF    PROBATION,   AS    IMPLYING    TRIAL,    DIFFI- 
CULTY.  AND   DANGER. 

§  i.   Tins  probationary  life  involves  trial,  difficulty,  danger, 

and  future  account. 

general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  our  present  life  is 
a  state  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  comprehends 
under  it  several  particular  things,  distinct  from  each  other. 
But  the  first,  and  most  common  meaning  of  it  seems  to  be, 
that  our  future  interest  is  now  depending,  and  depending 
upon  ourselves  ;  that  we  have  scope  and  opportunities  here, 

0  Sec  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  chap.  vi. 


§§  i,  2]  AS    IMPLYING    TRIAL  79 

for  that  good  and  bad  behaviour,  which  God  will  reward 
and  punish  hereafter ;  together  with  temptations  to  one,  as 
well  as  inducements  of  reason  to  the  other.  And  this  is,  in 
great  measure,  the  same  with  saying,  that  we  are  under 
the  moral  government  of  God,  and  to  give  an  account  of 
our  actions  to  him.  For  the  notion  of  a  future  account  and 
general  righteous  judgment,  implies  some  sort  of  temptations 
to  what  is  wrong :  otherwise  there  would  be  no  moral 
possibility  of  doing  wrong,  nor  ground  for  judgment,  or 
discrimination.  But  there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word 
probation  is  more  distinctly  and  particularly  expressive  of 
allurements  to  wrong,  or  difficulties  in  adhering  uniformly 
to  what  is  right,  and  of  the  danger  of  miscarrying  by  such 
temptations,  than  the  words  moral  government.  A  state  ot 
probation  then,  as  thus  particularly  implying  in  it  trial, 
difficulties,  and  danger,  may  require  to  be  considered 
distinctly  by  itself. 

§  2.    Docs  the  like  for  this  world  by  natural  government, 

And  as  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  religion 
teaches  us,  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial  with 
regard  to  a  future  world  :  so  also  his  natural  government 
over  us  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial,  in  the  like 
sense,  with  regard  to  the  present  world.  Natural  government 
by  rewards  and  punishments,  as  much  implies  natural  trial, 
as  moral  government  does  moral  trial.  The  natural  govern- 
ment of  God  here  meant  a  consists  in  his  annexing  pleasure 
to  some  actions,  and  pain  to  others,  which  are  in  our  power 
to  do  or  forbear,  and  in  giving  us  notice  of  such  appoint- 
ment beforehand.  This  necessarily  implies,  that  he  has 
made  our  happiness  and  misery,  or  our  interest,  to  depend 
in  part  upon  ourselves.  And  so  far  as  men  have  temptations 
to  any  course  of  action  which  will  probably  occasion  them 
greater  temporal  inconvenience  and  uneasiness,  than  satis- 
faction ;  so  far  their  temporal  interest  is  in  danger  from 
themselves,  or  they  are  in  a  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  it. 
Now  people  often  blame  others,  and  even  themselves,  for 


Chap.  ii. 


8o  PROBATION,  [I.  IV. 

their  misconduct  in  their  temporal  concerns.  And  we  find 
many  are  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  and  miss  of  that 
natural  happiness,  which  they  might  have  obtained  in  the 
present  life  :  perhaps  every  one  does  in  some  degree.  But 
many  run  themselves  into  great  inconvenience,  and  into 
extreme  distress  and  misery  :  not  through  incapacity  of 
knowing  better,  and  doing  better  for  themselves,  which 
would  be  nothing  to  the  present  purpose  ;  but  through 
their  own  fault  And  these  things  necessarily  imply 
temptation,  and  danger  of  miscarrying,  in  a  greater  or 
less  degree,  with  respect  to  our  worldly  interest  or  happi- 
ness. Every  one  too,  without  having  religion  in  his  thoughts, 
speaks  of  the  hazards  which  young  people  run,  upon  their 
setting  out  in  the  world  :  hazards  from  other  causes,  than 
merely  their  ignorance,  and  unavoidable  accidents.  And  some 
courses  of  vice,  at  least,  being  contrary  to  men's  worldly 
interest  or  good  ;  temptations  to  these  must  at  the  same 
time  be  temptations  to  forego  our  present  and  our  future  in- 
terest. Thus  in  our  natural  or  temporal  capacity,  we  are 
in  a  state  of  trial,  i.  e.  of  difficulty  and  danger,  analogous, 
or  like  to  our  moral  and  religious  trial. 

§  3.    This  probation,  in  both  spheres,  is  twofold :  (a)  by 
temptation  ab  extra  ; 

This  will  more  distinctly  appear  to  any  one,  who  thinks 
it  worth  while,  more  distinctly,  to  consider,  what  it  is 
which  constitutes  our  trial  in  both  capacities,  and  to  observe, 
how  mankind  behave  under  it. 

And  that  which  constitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both  these 
capacities,  must  be  somewhat  either  in  our  external  circum- 
stances, or  in  our  nature.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  persons 
may  be  betrayed  into  wrong  behaviour  upon  surprise,  or 
overcome  upon  any  other  very  singular  and  extraordinary 
external  occasions ;  who  would,  otherwise,  have  preserved 
their  character  of  prudence  and  of  virtue :  in  which  cases, 
every  one,  in  speaking  of  the  wrong  behaviour  of  these 
persons,  would  impute  it  to  such  particular  external  cir- 
cumstances. 


§§3,4]  *4S   IMPLYING    TRIAL  8l 

§  4.  And  (b)  l>y  ill  habits  contracted,  and  passion*. 

And  on  the  other  hand,  men  who  have  contracted  habits 
of  vice  and  folly  of  any  kind,  or  have  some  particular 
passions  in  excess,  will  seek  opportunities,  and,  as  it  were, 
go  out  of  their  way,  to  gratify  themselves  in  these  respects, 
at  the  expense  of  their  wisdom  and  their  virtue  ;  led  to  it, 
as  every  one  would  say,  not  by  external  temptations,  but 
by  such  habits  and  passions.  And  the  account  of  this  last 
case  is,  that  particular  passions  are  110  more  coincident1 
with  prudence,  or  that  reasonable  self-love2,  the  end  of 
which  is  our  worldly  interest,  than  they  are  with  the 
principle  of  virtue  and  religion  ;  but  often  draw  contrary 
ways  to  one,  as  well  as  to  the  other :  and  so  such  particular 
passions  are  as  much  temptations,  to  act  imprudently 
with  regard  to  our  worldly  interest,  as  to  act  viciously1'. 
However,  as  wTheii  we  say,  men  are  misled  by  external 
circumstances  of  temptation  •  it  cannot  but  be  understood, 
that  there  is  somewhat  within  themselves,  to  render  those 
circumstances  temptations,  or  to  render  them  susceptible  of 
impressions  from  them  :  so  when  we  say,  they  are  misled 
by  passions  ;  it  is  always  supposed,  that  there  are  occasions, 
circumstances,  and  objects,  exciting  these  passions,  and 


b  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  1726,  2nd  ed.  p.  205,  &c. 
Prof.  p.  25,  &c.  Serin,  p.  21,  &c.  [I  have  no  means  of  tracing  this 
reference  exactly,  but  I  think  it  contemplates  Preface  §  30,  and 
perhaps  Serin.  III.  §§  3,  4.  ED.] 


1  In   the   Sermons   Butler  has  '  Self-love  then,  though  confined 
set  forth  that  self-love  is  entirely  to    the    interest    of    the    present 
distinct  from  particular  passions  world,   does  in  general  perfectly 
and  affections.     Serm.  i.  6,  xi.  8;  coincide  with  virtue:'   'though' 
also  Serm.  ii.  15.  being  equivalent  to 'even  if,' 'even 

2  I  understand  Butler  here  to  when.'     It  may  be  admitted  that 
mean   no   more  than   his  words  the  grammatical  form  is  awkward: 
actually    convey,     namely,     that  but  the  alternative  interpretation 
there  is  a  form  or  attitude  of  self-  seems   to   be    nothing   less   than 
love  which  addresses  itself  to  our  absurd.      For    Butler    associates 
worldly  interest,   and  that   it  is  reasonable    self-love    with    con- 
reasonable  :     but    not    that    this  science  as  the  'chief  or  superior 
interest  is  the  only  one  content-  principles '  in  our  nature.     Serm. 
plated    by  self-love.     There   is   a  iii.  13  sub  fin. 

parallel  passage  in  Serm.  iii.  12  : 

VOL.  I.  G 


82  PROBATION,  [I.  IV. 

affording  means  for  gratifying  them.  And  therefore, 
temptations  from  within,  and  from  without,  coincide,  and 
mutually  imply  each  other.  Now  the  several  external 
objects  of  the  appetites,  passions,  and  affections,  being 
present  to  the  senses,  or  offering  themselves  to  the  mind, 
and  so  exciting  emotions  suitable  to  their  nature ;  not 
only  in  cases  where  they  can  be  gratified  consistently 
with  innocence  and  prudence,  but  also  in  cases  where  they 
cannot,  and  yet  can  be  gratified  imprudently  and  viciously  : 
this  as  really  puts  them  in  danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing, 
their  present  interest  or  good,  as  their  future ;  and  as  really 
renders  self-denial  necessary  to  secure  one,  as  the  other  : 
i.  e.  we  are  in  a  like  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  both,  by 
the  very  same  passions,  excited  by  the  very  same  means. 

§  5.    The  trial  is  identic :  lut  -is,  in  the  femoral  sphere, 
of  our  prudence ; 

Thus  mankind  having  a  temporal  interest  depending  upon 
themselves,  arid  a  prudent  course  of  behaviour  being  neces- 
sary to  secure  it ;  passions  inordinately  excited,  whether  by 
means  of  example,  or  by  any  other  external  circumstance, 
towards  such  objects,  at  such  times,  or  in  such  degrees,  as 
that  they  cannot  be  gratified  consistently  with  worldly 
prudence ;  are  temptations,  dangerous,  and  too  often  suc- 
cessful temptations,  to  forego  a  greater  temporal  good  for 
a  less  ;  i.  e.  to  forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  temporal 
interest,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  gratification. 

§  6.    I)i  the  religious,  of  our  virtue  \ 

This  is  a  description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal 
capacity.  Substitute  now  the  word  future  for  temporal,  and 


1  Inasmuch  as  prudence  is  here  it  draws  to  itself  and  assimilates 

so  clearly  distinguished  from  vir-  virtuous  elements,  while  it  like- 

tue,    he  appears,   when   he   says  wise  has  regard  to  other  indue*-- 

elsewhere  that  it  has  the  nature  ments  not  in  themselves  virtuous, 

of  virtue  (see  Diss.  II.  8),  to  mean  though    allied   with   virtue,    and 

that  it  has  a  share  of  that  nature,  consequent  upon  it. 
In  its  reckoning  with  the  future 


§§  5-8]  AS   IMPLYING    TRIAL  83 

virtue  fox  prudence ;  and  it  will  be  just  as  proper  a  description 
of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  religious  capacity  ;  so  analogous 
are  they  to  each  other. 

§  7.    Some  arc  deceived  into  wrong ;    others  face  it  with 
deliberate  intent,  and  for  both  spheres. 

If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of  trial  in 
both  capacities,  we  go  on  to  observe  further,  how  mankind 
! behave  under  it ;  we  shall  find  there  are  some,  who  have 
so  little  sense  of  it,  that  they  scarce  look  beyond  the  passing 
day :  they  are  so  taken  up  with  present  gratifications,  as  to 
have,  in  a  manner,  110  feeling  of  consequences,  no  regard 
to  their  future  ease  or  fortune  in  this  life ;  any  more  than 
to  their  happiness  in  another.  Some  appear  to  be  blinded 
and  deceived  by  inordinate  passion,  in  their  worldly  concerns, 
as  much  as  in  religion.  Others  are,  not  deceived,  but,  as 
it  were,  forcibly  carried  away  by  the  like  passions,  against 
their  better  judgment,  and  feeble  resolutions  too  of  acting 
butter.  And  there  are  men,  and  truly  they  are  not  a  few, 
who  shamelessly  avow,  not  their  interest,  but  their  mere 
will  and  pleasure,  to  be  their  law  of  life  :  and  who,  in  open 
defiance  of  every  thing  that  is  reasonable,  will  go  on  in 
a  course  of  vicious  extravagance,  foreseeing,  with  no  remorse 
and  little  fear,  that  it  will  be  their  temporal  ruin  ;  and  some 
of  them,  under  the  apprehension  of  the  consequences  of 
wickedness  in  another  state.  And  to  speak  in  the  most 
moderate  way,  human  creatures  are  not  only  continually 
liable  to  go  wrong  voluntarily,  but  we  see  likewise  that 
they  often  actually  do  so,  with  respect  to  their  temporal 
interests,  as  well  as  with  respect  to  religion. 

§  8.    Our  state  in  each  is  analogous  to  the  other. 

Thus  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials,  in  our 
temporal  and  our  religious  capacity,  as  they  proceed 
from  the  same  causes,  and  have  the  same  effect  upon 
men's  behaviour,  are  evidently  analogous,  and  of  the  same 
kind. 

a  2 


84  PROBATION,  [I.  IV. 

§  9.    Our  dangers  aggravated   by  (a)  ads   of  other*,    (b)  ill 
training,   (c)  corruptions   in   religion,   (d)  our  own  prior 

acts. 

It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of 
miscarrying  in  our  religious  state  of  trial,  are  greatly 
increased,  and  one  is  ready  to  think,  in  a  manner  wholly 
wade,  by  the  ill  behaviour  of  others  ;  by  a  wrong  education, 
wrong  in  a  moral  sense,  sometimes  positively  vicious  ;  by 
general  bad  example ;  by  the  dishonest  artifices  which  are 
got  into  business  of  all  kinds  ;  and,  in  veiy  many  parts  of* 
the  world,  by  religion's  being  corrupted  into  superstitions  \ 
which  indulge  men  in  their  vices  :  so  in  like  manner,  the 
difficulties  of  conducting  ourselves  prudently  in  respect  to 
our  present  interest,  and  our  danger  of  being  led  aside  from 
pursuing  it,  are  greatly  increased,  by  a  foolish  education  ; 
and,  after  we  come  to  mature  age,  by  the  extravagance  and 
carelessness  of  others,  whom  we  have  intercourse  with  ; 
and  by  mistaken  notions,  very  generally  prevalent,  and 
taken  up  from  common  opinion,  concerning  temporal  happi- 
ness, and  wherein  it  consists.  And  persons,  by  their  own 
negligence  and  folly  in  their  temporal  affairs,  no  less  than 
by  a  course  of  vice,  bring  themselves  into  new  difficulties  ; 
and,  by  habits  of  indulgence,  become  less  qualified  to  go 
through  them  :  and  one  irregularity  after  another,  embar- 
rasses things  to  such  a  degree,  that  they  know  not  where- 
about they  are  ;  and  often  makes  the  path  of  conduct  so 
intricate  and  perplexed,  that  it  is  difficult  to  trace  it  out ; 
difficult  even  to  determine  what  is  the  prudent  or  the  moral 
part.  Thus,  for  instance,  wrong  behaviour  2  in  one  stage  of 
life,  youth ;  wrong,  I  mean,  considering  ourselves  only  in 


1  Here  Butler  evidently  looks  himself  from  §  4.    Our  ill  conduct 

beyond   the   Christian  pale.     In  impairs  our  subsequent  position 

other   passages    he    specially   re-  5tx<£j— 

gards  it.     See  II.  i.  13,  vi.  5.     In  i.  By  the  habits  formed,  bias- 

Six  Sermons,  i.  4,  he  points  out  sing  us  «?>  infra  (§  4). 

the  provision  of  the  Divine  word,  2.  By  marring  our  environment 

whereby,  with  the  corruption,  the  al  extra,  e.g.  by  ill  repute, 

confutation  is  transmitted.  The  second  is  what  he  here  deals 

a  Butler  is  not  here  repeating  with  exclusivelv. 


§§9 -ii]  AS   IMPLYING    TRIAL  85 

our  temporal  capacity,  without  taking  in  religion  ;  this,  in 
several  ways,  increases  the  difficulties  of  right  behaviour 
in  mature  age ;  i.  e.  puts  us  into  a  more  disadvantageous 
state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 

§  10.  In  neither  sphere  are  the  demands  on  us  extravagant. 

We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God.  There  are 
natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  degradation  c. 
And  we  certainly  are  in  a  condition,  which  does  not  seem, 
by  any  means,  the  most  advantageous  we  could  imagine  or 
desire,  either  in  our  natural  or  moral  capacity,  for  securing 
either  our  present  or  future  interest.  However,  this  con- 
dition, low  and  careful  and  uncertain  as  it  is,  does  not  afford 
any  just  ground  of  complaint.  For,  as  men  may  manage 
their  temporal  affairs  with  prudence,  and  so  pass  their  days 
here  on  earth  in  tolerable  ease  and  satisfaction,  by  a  moderate 
degree  of  care :  so  likewise  with  regard  to  religion,  there  is 
no  more  required  than  what  they  are  well  able  to  do,  and 
what  they  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  if  they 
neglect.  And  for  persons  to  have  that  put  upon  them,  which 
they  are  well  able  to  go  through,  and  no  more,  we  naturally 
consider  as  an  equitable  thing  ;  supposing  it  done  by  proper 
authority.  Nor  have  we  any  more  reason  to  complain  of  it, 
with  regard  to  the  Author  of  nature,  than  of  his  not  having 
given  us  other  advantages,  belonging  to  other  orders  of 
creatures. 

§  ii.  The  religious  part  is  accredited  by  the  natural  part. 

But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the  state  of  trial 
\vhich  Religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is  rendered  credible, 
by  its  being  throughout  uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the 
general  conduct  of  Providence  towards  us,  in  all  other 
respects  within  the  compass  of  our  knowledge.  Indeed  if 
mankind,  considered  in  their  natural  capacity,  as  inhabitants 
of  this  world  only,  found  themselves,  from  their  birth  to 
their  death,  in  a  settled  state  of  security  and  happiness, 


c  Part  II.  chap.  v. 


86  PROBATION,  [I.  IV. 

without  any  solicitude  or  thought  of  their  own  :  or  if  they 
were  in  no  danger  of  being  brought  into  inconveniences  and 
distress,  by  carelessness,  or  the  folly  of  passion,  through 
bad  example,  the  treachery  of  others,  or  the  deceitful  appear- 
ances of  things  :  were  this  our  natural  condition,  then  it 
might  seem  strange,  and  be  some  presumption  against  the 
truth  of  religion,  that  it  represents  our  future  and  more 
general  interest,  as  not  secure  of  course,  but  as  depending 
upon  our  behaviour,  and  requiring  recollection  and  self- 
government  to  obtain  it.  For  it  might  be  alleged,  'What 
you  say  is  our  condition  in  one  respect,  is  not  in  any  wise  of 
a  sort  with  what  we  find,  by  experience,  our  condition  is  in 
another.  Our  whole  present  interest  is  secured  to  our  hands, 
without  any  solicitude  of  ours  ;  and  why  should  not  our 
future  interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be  so  too  ?  '  But  since, 
on  the  contrary,  thought  and  consideration,  the  voluntary 
denying  ourselves  many  things  which  we  desire,  and  a  course 
of  behaviour,  far  from  being  always  agreeable  to  us  ;  are 
absolutely  necessaiy  to  our  acting  even  a  common  decent, 
and  common  prudent  part,  so  as  to  pass  with  any  satisfac- 
tion through  the  present  world,  and  be  received  upon  any 
tolerable  good  terms  in  it :  since  this  is  the  case,  all  pre- 
sumption against  self-denial  and  attention  being  necessary 
to  secure  our  higher  interest,  is  removed.  Had  we  not 
experience,  it  might,  perhaps  speciously,  be  urged,  that  it 
is  improbable  any  thing  of  hazard  and  danger  should  be 
put  upon  us  by  an  infinite  Being  ;  when  eveiy  thing  which 
is  hazard  and  danger  in  our  manner  of  conception,  and  will 
end  in  error,  confusion,  and  misery,  is  now  already  certain 
in  his  foreknowledge. 

§  12.  Though  tcliy  u'e  arc  put  in  hazard  ire  cannot  say. 

And  indeed,  why  any  thing  of  hazard  and  danger  should 
be  put  upon  such  frail  creatures  as  we  are.  may  well  be 
thought  a  difficulty  in  speculation  1  ;  and  cannot  but  be  so, 

1  This  mystery,  however,  like  mitted  introduction  of  evil  into 
most  others,  seems  to  run  up  into  the  universe,  through  the  creation 
the  one  grand  mystery,  the  per-  of  free  wills. 


§§  is,  13]  AS    IMPLYING    TRIAL  87 

till  we  know  the  whole,  or,  however,  much  more  of  the 
case.  But  still  the  constitution  of  nature  is  as  it  is.  Our 
happiness  and  misery  are  trusted  to  our  conduct,  and  made 
to  depend  upon  it.  Somewhat,  and,  in  many  circumstances, 
a  great  deal  too,  is  put  upon  us,  either  to  do,  or  to  suffer,  as 
we  choose.  And  all  the  various  miseries  of  life,  which 
people  bring  upon  themselves  \>y  negligence  and  folly,  and 
might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are  instances  of  this  : 
which  miseries  are  beforehand  just  as  contingent  and  unde- 
termined as  their  conduct,  and  left  to  be  determined  bv  it. 


§  13.  In  rcl-if/ion,  as  in  nature,  we  do  not  aeecpt, 
but  acquire. 

These  observations  are  an  answer  to  the  objections  against 
the  credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  implying  temptations, 
and  real  danger  of  miscarrying  with  regard  to  our  general 
interest,  under  the  moral  government  of  God  :  and  they 
show,  that,  if  we  are  at  all  to  be  considered  in  such  a 
capacity,  and  as  having  such  *  an  interest  ;  the  general 
analogy  of  Providence  must  lead  us  to  apprehend  ourselves 
in  danger  of  miscarrying,  in  different  degrees,  as  to  this 
interest,  by  our  neglecting  to  act  the  proper  part  belonging 
to  us  in  that  capacity.  For  we  have  a  present  interest, 
under  the  government  of  God  which  we  experience  here 
upon  earth.  And  this  interest,  as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us, 
so  neither  is  it  offered  to  our  acceptance,  but  to  our  acquisi- 
tion ;  in  such  sort,  as  that  we  are  in  danger  of  missing  it, 
by  means  of  temptations  to  neglect,  or  act  contrary  to  it  ; 
and  without  attention  and  self-denial,  must  and  do  miss  of 
it.  It  is  then  perfectly  credible,  that  this  may  be  our  case, 
with  respect  to  that  chief  and  final  good,  which  religion 
proposes  to  us. 


88  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF   A    STATE   OF   PROBATION,   AS   INTENDED    FOR    MORAL 
DISCIPLINE   AND   IMPRO^7EMENT. 

§  i.   We  cannot  supply  fully  the  why  of  our  condition. 

FROM  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a  probation-state, 
of  so  much  difficulty  and  hazard,  naturally  arises  the 
question,  how  we  came  to  be  placed  in  it.  But  such 
a  general  inquiry  as  this  would  be  found  involved  in 
insuperable  difficulties.  For,  though  some  of  these  diffi- 
culties would  be  lessened  by  observing,  that  all  wickedness 
is  voluntary,  as  is  implied  in  its  very  notion  ;  and  that 
many  of  the  miseries  of  life  have  apparent  good  effects  : 
yet,  when  we  consider  other  circumstances  belonging  to 
both,  and  what  must  be  the  consequence  of  the  former  in 
a  life  to  come  ;  it  cannot  but  be  acknowledged  plain  folly 
and  presumption,  to  pretend  to  give  an  account  of  the 
whole  reasons  of  this  matter  :  the  whole  reasons  of  our 
being  allotted  a  condition,  out  of  which  so  much  wickedness 
and  misery,  so  circumstanced,  would  in  fact  arise.  Whether 
it  be  not  beyond  our  faculties,  not  only  to  find  out,  but 
even  to  understand,  the  whole  account  of  this  ;  or,  though 
we  should  be  supposed  capable  of  understanding  it,  yet, 
whether  it  would  be  of  service  or  prejudice  to  us  to  be 
informed  of  it,  is  impossible  to  say. 

§  2.  No  proof  lies  against  this  why :   and  religion  shows 
its  aim  to  be  our  improvement. 

But  as  our  present  condition  can  in  no  wise  be  shown 
inconsistent  with  the  perfect  moral  government  of  God  : 
so  religion  teaches  us  we  were  placed  in  it,  that  we  might 
qualify  ourselves,  by  the  practice  of  virtue,  for  another  state 
which  is  to  follow  it.  And  this,  though  but  a  partial 
answer,  a  very  partial  one  indeed,  to  the  inquiry  now 
mentioned  ;  yet,  is  a  more  satisfactory  answer  to  another, 


§§  i-4]  DISCIPLINE   AND    IMPROVEMENT  89 

which  is  of  real,  and  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to  have 
answered  :  the  inquiry,  What  is  our  business  here  ?  The 
known  end  then,  why  we  are  placed  in  a  state  of  so  much 
affliction,  hazard,  and  difficulty,  is,  our  improvement  in 
virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite  qualification  for  a  future 
state  of  security  and  happiness. 

§  3.  That  this  life  is  to  a  future  one  as  youth  to  manhood, 
is  credible. 

Now  the  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an  education  for 
mature  age  in  the  present  world,  appears  plainly,  at  first 
sight,  analogous  to  this  our  trial  for  a  future  one  :  the 
former  being  in  our  temporal  capacity,  what  the  latter  is  in 
our  religious  capacity.  But  some  observations  common  to 
both  of  them,  and  a  more  distinct  consideration  of  each, 
will  more  distinctly  show  the  extent  and  force  of  the 
analogy  between  them  ;  and  the  credibility,  which  arises 
from  hence,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  that 
the  present  life  was  intended  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for 
a  future  one. 

§  4.  Our  environment  corresponds  with  our  selves. 

[I.]  Every  species  of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed  for 
a  particular  way  of  life  ;  to  which,  the  nature,  the  capacities, 
temper,  and  qualifications  of  each  species,  are  as  necessary, 
as  their  external  circumstances.  Both  come  into  the  notion 
of  such  state,  or  particular  way  of  life,  and  are  constituent 
parts  of  it.  Change  a  man's  capacities  or  character  to  the 
degree,  in  which  it  is  conceivable  they  may  be  changed  ; 
and  he  would  be  altogether  incapable  of  a  human  course 
of  life,  and  human  happiness  :  as  incapable,  as  if,  his 
nature  continuing  unchanged,  he  were  placed  in  a  world, 
where  he  had  no  sphere  of  action,  nor  any  objects  to  answrer 
his  appetites,  passions,  and  affections  of  any  sort.  One 
thing  is  set  over  against  another,  as  an  ancient  writer 
expresses  it.  Our  nature  corresponds  to  our  external  con- 
dition. Without  this  correspondence,  there  would  be  no 
possibility  of  any  such  thing  as  human  life  and  human 
happiness  :  which  life  and  happiness  are,  therefore,  a  rcsuU 


90  PROBATION,    AS    INTENDED    FOR  [l.  v. 

from  our  nature  and  condition  jointly  :  meaning  by  human 
life,  not  living  in  the  literal  sense,  but  the  whole  complex 
notion  commonly  understood  .by  those  words.  So  that, 
without  determining  what  will  be  the  employment  and 
happiness,  the  particular  life  of  good  men  hereafter ;  there 
must  be  some  determinate  capacities,  some  necessary 
character  and  qualifications,  without  which  persons  cannot 
but  be  utterly  incapable  of  it  :  in  like  manner,  as  there 
must  be  some,  without  which  men  would  be  incapable  of 
their  present  state  of  life.  Now. 

§  5.   Our  powers  of  storage,  self-adaptation,  attain iw/ 
fitness  and  facility  by  use. 

[II.]  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  indeed  of 
all  creatures  which  come  under  our  notice,  is  such,  as  that 
they  are  capable  of  naturally  becoming  qualified  for  states 
of  life,  for  which  they  were  once  wholly  unqualified.  In 
imagination  we  may  indeed  conceive  of  creatures,  as  incap- 
able of  having  any  of  their  faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or 
as  being  unable  naturally  to  acquire  any  new  qualifications  : 
but  the  faculties  of  every  species  known  to  us  are  made  for 
enlargement ;  for  acquirements  of  experience  and  habits. 
We  find  ourselves  in  particular  endued  with  capacities,  not 
only  of  perceiving  ideas,  and  of  knowledge  or  perceiving 
truth,  but  also  of  storing  up  our  ideas  and  knowledge  by 
memory.  We  are  capable,  not  only  of  acting,  and  of  having 
different  momentary  impressions  made  upon  us  ;  but  of 
getting  a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  action,  and  of  settled 
alterations  in  our  temper  or  character.  The  power  of  the 
two  last  is  the  power  of  habits.  But  neither  the  perception 
of  ideas,  nor  knowledge  of  any  sort,  are  habits  ;  though 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  forming  of  them.  However, 
apprehension,  reason,  memory,  which  are  the  capacities  of 
acquiring  knowledge,  are  greatly  improved  by  exercise. 
Whether  the  word  habit  is  applicable  to  all  these  improve- 
ments, and  in  particular  how  far  the  powers  of  memory  and 
of  habits  may  be  powers  of  the  same  nature,  I  shall  not 
inquire.  But  that  perceptions  come  into  our  minds  readily 
and  of  course,  by  means  of  their  having  been  there  before. 


§J  5_7]  DISCIPLINE   AND  IMPROVEMENT  91 

seems  a  thing  of  the  same  sort,  as  readiness  in  any  particular 
kind  of  action,  proceeding  from  being  accustomed  to  it. 

§  6.  Habits,  bodily  and  mental,  are  both  passive  and  active. 

And  aptness  to  recollect  practical  observations  of  service 
in  our  conduct,  is  plainly  habit  in  many  cases.  There  are 
habits  of  perception,  and  habits  of  action.  An  instance  of 
the  former,  is  our  constant  and  even  involuntary  readiness, 
in  correcting  the  impressions  of  our  sight  concerning  magni- 
tudes and  distances,  so  as  to  substitute  judgment  in  the 
room  of  sensation  imperceptibly  to  ourselves.  And  it  seems 
as  if  all  other  associations  of  ideas  not  naturally  connected 
might  be  called  passire  habits ;  as  properly  as  our  readiness 
in  understanding  languages  upon  sight,  or  hearing  of  words. 
And  our  readiness  in  speaking  and  writing  them  is  an  in- 
stance of  the  latter,  of  active  habits.  For  distinctness,  we 
may  consider  habits,  as  belonging  to  the  body,  or  the  mind  : 
and  the  latter  will  be  explained  by  the  former.  Under  the 
former  are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities  or  motions, 
whether  graceful  or  unbecoming,  which  are  owing  to  use  : 
under  the  latter,  general  habits  of  life  and  conduct ;  such  as 
those  of  obedience  and  submission  to  authority,  or  to  any 
particular  person  ;  those  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity ; 
those  of  attention,  industry,  self-government,  envy,  revenge. 
And  habits  of  this  latter  kind  seem  produced  by  repeated 
acts ',  as  well  as  the  former. 

§  7.    These  last  begot  by  inward  principles  carried  into  act. 

And  in  like  manner  as  habits  belonging  to  the  body  are 
produced  by  external  acts  :  so  habits  of  the  mind  are  pro- 
duced by  the  exertion  of  inward  practical  principles,  i.  e.  by 
carrying  them  into  act,  or  acting  upon  them  ;  the  principles 
of  obedience,  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity.  Nor  can 
those  habits  be  formed  by  any  external  course  of  action,  v 
otherwise  than  as  it  proceeds  from  these  principles  :  because 


1  Comp.  Aristotle,  Eth.  Nic.  II.       <3/Wo>j/  tvfpyftwv  at  t^c/s  yivovrai. 
7,    8  :    teal    li't    ST)  Ao^o;  €/f  TWJ/       5(t  ras  tvfpydas 


92  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED   FOR  [I.  V. 

it  is  only  these  inward  principles  exerted,  which  are  strictly 
acts  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  of  justice,  and  of  charity.  So 
likewise  habits  of  attention,  industry,  self-government,  are 
in  the  same  manner  acquired  by  exercise  ;  and  habits  of 
envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence,  whether  in  outward  act, 
or  in  thought  and  intention,  i.  e.  inward  act :  for  such  inten- 
tion is  an  act.  Resolutions  also  to  do  well  are  properly  acts. 
And  endeavouring  to  enforce  upon  our  own  minds  a  practical 
sense  of  virtue,  or  to  beget  in  others  that  practical  sense  of 
it,  which  a  man  really  has  himself,  is  a  virtuous  act.  All 
these,  therefore,  may  and  will  contribute  towards  forming 
good  habits. 


§  8.    Passive  habit  loses  in  power  />//  tvpctitioH,  active  (fains. 

But  going  over  the  theory  of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts, 
talking  well,  and  drawing  fine  pictures,  of  it  ;  this  is  so  far 
from  necessarily  or  certainly  conducing  to  form  an  habit  of 
it,  in  him  who  thus  employs  himself,  that  it  may  harden 
the  mind  in  a  contrary  course,  and  render  it  gradually  more 
insensible,  i.e.  form  an  habit  of  insensibility,  to  all  moral 
considerations.  For,  from  our  very  faculty  of  habits,  passive 
impressions,  by  being  repeated,  grow  weaker.  Thoughts,  by 
often  passing  through  the  mind,  are  felt  less  sensibly  :  being 
accustomed  to  danger,  begets  intrepidity,  i.  e.  lessens  fear ; 
to  distress,  lessens  the  passion  of  pity ;  to  instances  of  others' 
mortality,  lessens  the  sensible  apprehension  of  our  own. 
And  from  these  two  observations  together  ;  that  practical 
habits  are  formed  and  strengthened  by  repeated  acts,  and 
that  passive  impressions  grow  weaker  by  being  repeated 
upon  us  ;  it  must  follow,  that  active  habits  may  be  gradually 
forming  and  strengthening,  by  a  course  of  acting  upon  such 
and  such  motives  and  excitements,  whilst  these  motives  and 
excitements  themselves  are,  by  proportionable  degrees,  grow- 
ing less  sensible,  i.  e.  are  continually  less  and  less  sensibly 
felt,  even  as  the  active  habits  strengthen.  And  experience 
confirms  this :  for  active'  principles,  at  the  very  time  that 
they  are  less  lively  in  perception  than  they  were,  are  found 
to  be,  somehow,  wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the  temper 


§§8-io]  DISCIPLINE   AND   IMPROVEMENT  93 

and  character,  and  become  more  effectual  in  influencing 
our  practice.  The  three  things  just  mentioned  may  afford 
instances  of  it. 

§  9.    Though  perhaps  icitli  diminished  emotion. 

Perception  of  danger  is  a  natural  excitement  of  passive 
fear,  and  active  caution  :  and  by  being  inured  to  danger, 
habits  of  the  latter  are  gradually  wrought,  at  the  same  time 
that  the  former  gradually  lessens.  Perception  of  distress 
in  others  is  a  natural  excitement,  passively  to  pity,  and 
actively  to  relieve  it :  but  let  a  man  set  himself  to  attend 
to,  inquire  out,  and  relieve  distressed  persons,  and  he  cannot 
but  grow  less  and  less  sensibly  affected  with  the  various 
mi-series  of  life,  with  which  he  must  become  acquainted  ; 
when  yet,  at  the  same  time,  benevolence,  considered  not 
as  a  passion,  but  as  a  practical  principle  of  action,  will 
strengthen :  and  whilst  he  passively  compassionates  the 
distressed  less,  he  will  acquire  a  greater  aptitude  actively 
l<>  assist  'and  befriend  them.  So  also  at  the  same  time  that 
the  daily  instances  of  men's  dying  around  us  give  us  daily 
a  less  sensible  passive  feeling  or  apprehension  of  our  own 
mortality,  such  instances  greatly  contribute  to  the  strengthen- 
ing a  practical  regard  to  it  in  serious  men  ;  i.  e.  to  forming  an 
habit  of  acting  with  a  constant  view  to  it. 

§  io.    The  passive  may  give  aid  in  forming  the  active. 

And  this  seems  again  further  to  show,  that  passive  im- 
pressions made  upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  experience, 
example,  though  they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy,  and  a  very 
great  one,  towards  forming  active  habits,  yet,  can  have  this 
efficacy  no  otherwise  than  by  inducing  us  to  such  a  course 
of  action  :  and  that  it  is  not  being  affected  so  and  so,  but 
acting,  which  forms  those  habits :  only  it  must  be  always 
remembered,  that  real  endeavours  to  enforce  good  impres- 
sions upon  ourselves  are  a  species  of  virtuous  action.  Nor 
do  we  know  how  far  it  is  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  effects  should  be  wrought  in  us  at  once,  equivalent  to 
habits,  i.  e.  what  is  wrought  by  use  and  exercise.  However, 


94  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED   FOR  [I.  V. 

the  thing  insisted  upon  is,  not  what  may  be  possible,  but 
what  is  in  fact  the  appointment  of  nature  :  which  is,  that 
active  habits  are  to  be  formed  by  exercise. 

§  ii.    The  formation  hard  to  tracc^  but  proved  by 
experience. 

Their  progress  may  be  so  gradual,  as  to  be  imperceptible 
of  its  steps  :  it  may  be  hard  to  explain  the  faculty,  by  which 
we  are  capable  of  habits,  throughout  its  several  parts  ;  and 
to  trace  it  up  to  its  original,  so  as  to  distinguish  it  from  all 
others  in  our  mind  :  and  it  seems  as  if  contrary  effects  were 
to  be  ascribed  to  it.  But  the  thing  in  general,  that  our 
nature  is  formed  to  yield,  in  some  such  manner  as  this,  to 
use  and  exercise,  is  matter  of  certain  experience. 

§  12.   J lubit  gives  readiness,  case,  pleasure. 

Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of  action, 
we  get  an  aptness  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readiness,  and  often 
pleasure,  in  it.  The  inclinations  which  rendered  us  averse 
to  it  grow  weaker  :  the  difficulties  in  it,  not  only  the 
imaginary  but  the  real  ones,  lessen  :  the  reasons  for  it  offer 
themselves  of  course  to  our  thoughts  upon  all  occasions  : 
and  the  least  glimpse  of  them  is  sufficient  to  make  us  go  on, 
in  a  course  of  action,  to  which  we  have  been  accustomed. 
And  practical  principles  appear  to  grow  stronger,  absolutely 
in  themselves,  by  exercise  ;  as  well  as  relatively,  with  regard 
to  contrary  principles  ;  which,  by  being  accustomed  to  sub- 
mit, do  so  habitually,  and  of  course.  And  thus  a  new 
character,  in  several  respects,  may  be  formed  ;  and  many 
habitudes  of  life,  not  given  by  nature,  but  which  nature 
directs  us  to  acquire. 

§  13.  Without  habit,  nothing  in  us  would  mature. 
[III.]  Indeed  we  may  be  assured,  that  we  should  never 
have  had  these  capacities  of  improving  by  experience,  ac- 
quired knowledge,  and  habits,  had  they  not  been  necessary, 
and  intended  to  be  made  use  of.  And  accordingly  we  find 
them  so  necessary,  and  so  much  intended,  that  without  them 


§§  11-14]         DISCIPLINE   AND    IMPROVEMENT  95 

we  should  be  utterly  incapable  of  that,  which  was  the  end 
for  which  we  were  made,  considered  in  our  temporal  capacity 
only:  the  employments  and  satisfactions  of  our  mature  state 
of  life. 

§  14.    Mature  powers  given  at  birth  would  embarrass 
and  disable. 

Nature  does  in  no  wise  qualify  us  wholly,  much  less  at 
once,  for  this  mature  state  of  life.  Even  maturity  of  under- 
standing and  bodily  strength,  are  not  only  arrived  to 
gradually,  but  are  also  veiy  much  owing  to  the  continued 
exercise  of  our  powers  of  body  and  mind  from  infancy.  But 
if  we  suppose  a  person  brought  into  the  world  with  both 
these  in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  conceivable  ;  he  woidd 
plainly  at  first  be  as  unqualified  for  the  human  life  of 
mature  age,  as  an  idiot1.  He  would  be  in  a  manner  dis- 
tracted, with  astonishment,  and  apprehension,  and  curiosity, 
and  suspense  :  nor  can  one  guess,  how  long  it  would  be, 
before  he  would  be  familiarized  to  himself  and  the  objects 
about  him  enough,  even  to  set  himself  to  any  thing.  It 
may  be  questioned  too,  whether  the  natural  information  of 
his  sight  and  hearing  would  be  of  any  manner  of  use  at  all 
to  him  in  acting;  before  experience.  And  it  seems,  that 
men  would  be  strangely  headstrong  and  self-willed,  and 
disposed  to  exert  themselves  with  an  impetuosity,  which 
would  render  society  insupportable,  and  the  living  in  it 
impracticable  ;  were  it  not  for  some  acquired  moderation 
and  self-government,  some  aptitude  and  readiness  in  restrain- 
ing themselves,  and  concealing  their  sense  of  things.  Want 
of  every  thing  of  this  kind  which  is  learnt  would  render 
a  man  as  uncapable  of  society,  as  want  of  language  would  ; 
or  as  his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of  the  particular  employ- 
ments of  life  would  render  him  uncapable  of  providing 
himself  with  the  common  conveniences,  or  supplying  the 
necessary  wants  of  it. 


1  This  argument  (perhaps  some-  argued  above  (§  4)  as  to  the  cor- 
what  succinctly  expressed)  ad-  rospon donee  between  self  and  the 
mirably  illustrates  what  lie  has  environment. 


96  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 

§  15.    Nature  leaves  us  unfurnished, 

In  these  respects,  and  probably  in  many  more,  of  which 
we  have  no  particular  notion,  mankind  is  left,  by  nature,  an 
unformed,  unfinished  creature  ;  utterly  deficient  and  un- 
qualified, before  the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  experience, 
and  habits,  for  that  mature  state  of  life,  which  was  the  end 
of  his  creation,  considering  him  as  related  only  to  this  world. 


§  16.    But  w/M  a  capacity  for  furnishing, 

But  then,   as   nature   has    endued    us  with  a  power  of 

supplying   those   deficiencies,   by  acquired   knowledge,   ex- 

perience, and  habits  :  so  likewise  we  are  placed  in  a  condition, 

in  infancy,  childhood,  and  youth,  fitted  for  it  ;  fitted  for  our 

acquiring  those  qualifications  of  all  sorts,  which  we  stand  in 

need  of  in  mature  age.     Hence  children,  from  their  very 

birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted  with  the  objects  about 

,       them,  with  the  scene  in  which  they  are  placed,  and  to  have 

/        a  future  part  ;  and  learning  somewhat  or  other,  necessary 

to  the  performance  of  it.     The  subordinations,  to  which  they 

are  accustomed  in  domestic  life,  teach  them  self-government 

in  common  behaviour  abroad,  and  prepare  them  for  subjec- 

tion and  obedience  to  civil  authority. 

§  17.  By  effort,  and  progress  of  life. 

What  passes  before  their  eyes,  and  daily  happens  to 
them,  gives  them  experience,  caution  against  treachery  and 
deceit,  together  with  numberless  little  rules  of  action  and 
conduct,  which  we  could  not  live  without  ;  and  which  are 
learnt  so  insensibly  and  so  perfectly,  as  to  be  mistaken 
perhaps  for  instinct  :  though  they  are  the  effect  of  long 
experience  and  exercise  ;  as  much  so  as  language,  or 
knowledge  in  particular  business,  or  the  qualifications  and 
behaviour  belonging  to  the  several  ranks  and  professions. 
Thus  the  beginning  of  our  days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is, 
a  state  of  education  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  mature 
life.  We  are  much  assisted  in  it  by  example,  instruction, 
and  the  care  of  others  ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left  to  ourselves 
to  do.  And  of  this,  as  part  is  done  easily  and  of  course  ; 


§§  15-^9]        DISCIPLINE   AND   IMPROVEMENT  97 

so  part  requires  diligence  and  care,  the  voluntary  foregoing 
many  things  which  we  desire,  and  setting  ourselves  to  what 
we  should  have  no  inclination  to,  but  for  the  necessity  or 
expedience  of  it.  For,  that  labour  and  industry,  which 
the  station  of  so  many  absolutely  requires,  they  would  be 
greatly  unqualified  for,  in  maturity ;  as  those  in  other 
stations  would  be,  for  any  other  sorts  of  application  ;  if 
both  were  not  accustomed  to  them  in  their  youth.  And 
according  as  persons  behave  themselves,  in.  the  general 
education  which  all  go  through,  and  in  the  particular  ones 
adapted  to  particular  employments  ;  their  character  is 
formed,  and  made  appear  ;  they  recommend  themselves 
more  or  less  ;  and  are  capable  of,  and  placed  in,  different 
stations  in  the  society  of  mankind. 

§  18.  Analogy  between  preparation  for  matwityy  and 
for  survival. 

The  former  part  of  life  then  is  to  be  considered  as  an 
important  opportunity,  which  nature  puts  into  our  hands  ; 
and  which,  when  lost,  is  not  to  be  recovered.  And  our 
being  placed  in  a  state  of  discipline  throughout  this  life, 
for  another  world,  is  a  providential  disposition  of  things, 
exactly  of  the  same  kind,  as  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of 
discipline  during  childhood,  for  mature  age.  Our  condition 
in  both  respects  is  uniform  and  of  a  piece,  and  compre- 
hended under  one  and  the  same  general  law  of  nature. 

§  19.   Which  miyht  hold  ccen  were  the  how  of  this 
p reparation  u ndisco verable. 

And  if  we  were  not  able  at  all  to  discern,  how  or  in  what 
way  the  present  life  could  be  our  preparation  for  another ; 
this  would  be  no  objection  against  the  credibility  of  its 
being  so.  For  we  do  not  discern,  how  food  and  sleep 
contribute  to  the  growth  of  the  body :  nor  could  have  any 
thought  that  they  would,  before  we  had  experience.  Nor  do 
children  at  all  think,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  sports  and 
exercises,  to  which  they  are  so  much  addicted,  contribute  to 
their  health  and  growth  ;  nor,  on  the  other,  of  the  necessity 

VOL.   I.  H 


98  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 

which  there  is  for  their  being  restrained  in  them  :  nor  are 
they  capable  of  understanding  the  use  of  many  parts  of 
discipline,  which  nevertheless  they  must  be  made  to  go 
through,  in  order  to  qualify  them  for  the  business  of  mature 
age.  Were  we  not  able  then  to  discover,  in  what  respects 
the  present  life  could  form  us  for  a  future  one  :  yet  nothing 
would  be  more  supposable  than  that  it  might,  in  some 
respects  or  other,  from  the  general  analogy  of  Providence. 

§  20.  Is  corroborated,  if  we  take  God's  moral 
government  into  view. 

And  this,  for  ought  I  see,  might  reasonably  be  said,  even 
though  we  should  not  take  in  the  consideration  of  God's 
moral  government  over  the  world.  But, 

[IV.]  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequently,  that 
the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  necessaiy  qualification 
for  the  future  state  ;  and  then  we  may  distinctly  see,  how, 
and  in  what  respects,  the  present  life  may  be  a  preparation 
for  it :  since  we  ivant,  and  are  capable  of,  improvement  in  that 
character,  ~by  moral  and  religious  habits ;  and  the  present  life  is 
fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  such  improvement :  in  like 
manner  as  we  have  already  observed,  how,  and  in  what 
respects,  infancy,  childhood,  and  youth,  are  a  necessary 
preparation,  and  a  natural  state  of  discipline,  for  mature 
age. 

§21.  The  future  life  is  probably  active;  common;  and  more 
sensibly  under  divine  government. 

Nothing  which  we  at  present  see  would  lead  us  to  the 
thought  of  a  solitary  unactive  state  hereafter :  but,  if  we 
judge  at  all  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  we  must  suppose, 
according  to  the  scripture  account  of  it,  that  it  will  be  a  com- 
munity. And  there  is  no  shadow  of  any  thing  unreasonable 
in  conceiving,  though  there  be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this 
community  will  be,  as  the  scripture  represents  it,  under  the 
more  immediate,  or,  if  such  an  expression  may  be  used,  the 
more  sensible  government  of  God.  Nor  is  our  ignorance, 
what  will  be  the  employments  of  this  happy  community,  nor 


§  20-23]       DISCIPLINE   AND   IMPROVEMENT  99 

our  consequent  ignorance,  what  particular  scope  or  occasion 
there  will  be  for  the  exercise  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity, 
amongst  the  members  of  it  with  regard  to  each  other  ;  any 
proof,  that  there  will  be  no  sphere  of  exercise  for  those 
virtues.  Much  less,  if  that  were  possible,  is  our  ignorance 
any  proof,  that  there  will  be  no  occasion  for  that  frame  of 
mind,  or  character,  which  is  formed  by  the  daily  practice 
of  those  particular  virtues  here,  and  which  is  a  result  from 
it.  This  at  least  must  be  owned  in  general,  that,  as  the 
government  established  in  the  universe  is  moral,  the  cha- 
racter of  virtue  and  piety  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  be 
the  condition  of  our  happiness,  or  the  qualification  for  it. 

§  22.  Habits  are  the  fitting  antidote  for  our  liability 
to  lapse, 

Now  from  what  is  above  observed,  concerning  our  natural 
power  of  habits,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  we  are  capable  of 
moral  improvement  by  discipline.  And  how  greatly  we 
want  it,  need  not  be  proved  to  any  one  who  is  acquainted 
with  the  great  wickedness  of  mankind  ;  or  even  with  those 
imperfections,  which  the  best  are  conscious  of.  But  it  is 
not  perhaps  distinctly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the 
occasion  which  human  creatures  have  for  discipline,  to 
improve  in  them  this  character  of  virtue  and  piety,  is  to  be 
traced  up  higher  than  to  excess  in  the  passions,  by  indul- 
gence and  habits  of  vice.  Mankind,  and  perhaps  all  finite 
creatures,  from  the  very  constitution  of  their  nature,  before 
habits  of  virtue,  are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of  deviating 
from  what  is  right :  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  virtuous 
habits,  for  a  security  against  this  danger  \ 

§  23.   Which  arises  because  we  have  propensions  not 
subjected  to  virtue. 

For,  together  with  the  general  principle  of  moral  under- 
standing, we  have  in  our  inward  frame  various  affections 
towards  particular  external  objects.  These  affections  are 


1  Inf.  §  29, 
H  2 


100  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED   t>OR  [l.  V. 

naturally,  and  of  right,  subject  to  the  government  of  the 
moral  principle,  as  to  the  occasions  upon  which  they  may 
be  gratified ;  as  to  the  times,  degrees,  and  manner,  in  which 
the  objects  of  them  may  be  pursued  :  but  then  the  principle 
of  virtue  can  neither  excite  them,  nor  prevent  their  being 
excited.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt,  when  the 
objects  of  them  are  present  to  the  mind,  not  only  before 
all  consideration,  whether  they  can  be  obtained  by  lawful 
means,  but  after  it  is  found  they  cannot.  For  the  natural 
objects  of  affection  continue  so  ;  the  necessaries,  conveni- 
ences, and  pleasures  of  life,  remain  naturally  desirable ; 
though  they  cannot  be  obtained  innocently  :  nay,  though 
they  cannot  possibly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when  the 
objects  of  any  affection  whatever  cannot  be  obtained  with- 
out unlawful  means ;  but  may  be  obtained  by  them  :  such 
affection,  though  its  being  excited,  and  its  continuing  some 
time  in  the  mind,  be  as  innocent  as  it  is  natural  and 
necessary ;  yet  cannot  but  be  conceived  to  have  a  tendency 
to  incline  persons  to  venture  upon  such  unlawful  means  : 
and  therefore  must  be  conceived  as  putting  them  in  some 
danger  of  it. 

§  24.  Habit  (fives  us  a  security  ab  intra. 

Now  what  is  the  general  security  against  this  danger, 
against  their  actually  deviating  from  right  ?  As  the  danger 
is,  so  also  must  the  security  be,  from  within  :  from  the 
practical  principle  of  virtue11.  And  the  strengthening  or 

a  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  effectually 

Sense  of  interest,  as      restrain  creatures  from  doing  wrong.      But  if  by 

mere  pleasure  in-      a  Sense  °^  tnterest  is  meant  a  speculative  conviction 

sufficient;  as  com-      °r  belief>  that  such  and  «ucn  indulgence  would 

prehensive  regard      occasion  them  greater  uneasiness,  upon  the  whole, 

to    happiness,    is      than  satisfaction  ',  it  is  contrary  to  present  expe- 

part  of  virtue!  nence  to  say,  that  this  sense  of  interest  is  sufficient 

to  restrain  them  from  thus  indulging  themselves. 

And  if  by  a  sense  of  interest  is  meant  a  practical  regard  to  what  is  iqwu 
the  whole  our  happiness  :  this  is  not  only  coincident  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  virtue  or  moral  rectitude,  but  is  a  part  of  the  idea  itself.  And 
it  is  evident  this  reasonable  sclf-love  wants  to  be  improved,  as  really 


§§  24,  25]          DISCIPLINE   AND    IMPROVEMENT  IOI 

improving  this  principle,  considered  as  practical,  or  as  a 
principle  of  action,  will  lessen  the  danger,  or  increase  the 
security  against  it.  And  this  moral  principle  is  capable 
of  improvement,  by  proper  discipline  and  exercise  :  by 
recollecting  the  practical  impressions  which  example  and 
experience  have  made  upon  us  :  and,  instead  of  following 
humour  and  mere  inclination,  by  continually  attending 
to  the  equity  and  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  we  are 
engaged,  be  it  in  greater  or  less  matters  ;  and  accustoming 
ourselves  always  to  act  upon  it  ;  as  being  itself  the  just 
and  natural  motive  of  action  :  and  as  this  moral  course  of 
behaviour  must  necessarily,  under  divine  government,  be 
our  final  interest.  Thus  the  principle  of  virtue,  improved  into 
an  habit,  of  which  improvement  we  are  thus  capable,  will  plainly 
be,  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  it,  a  security  against  the 
danger  which  finite  creatures  arc  in,  from  the  -very  nature  of 
propension,  or  particular  affections. 

§  25.  May  have  place  in  a  future  life ;   is  anyhow  an 
advance  in  virtue. 

This  way  of  putting  the  matter,  supposes  particular 
affections  to  remain  in  a  future  state  ;  which  it  is  scarce 
possible  to  avoid  supposing.  And  if  they  do  ;  we  clearly 
see,  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue  and  self-government  may 
be  necessary  for  the  regulation  of  them.  However,  though 
we  were  not  distinctly  to  take  in  this  supposition,  but  to 
speak  only  in  general ;  the  thing  really  comes  to  the  same. 
For  habits  of  virtue,  thus  acquired  by  discipline,  are  im- 
provement in  virtue  :  and  improvement  in  virtue  must 
be  advancement  in  happiness,  if  the  government  of  the 
universe  be  moral. 


as  any  principle  in  our  nature.  For  we  daily  see  it  overmatched,  net 
only  by  the  more  boisterous  passions,  but  by  curiosity,  shame,  love 
of  imitation,  by  any  thing,  even  indolence:  especially  if  the  interest, 
the  temporal  interest,  suppose,  which  is  the  end  of  such  self-love, 
be  at  a  distance.  So  greatly  are  profligate  men  mistaken,  when 
they  affirm  they  are  wholly  governed  by  interestedness  and  self-love. 
And  so  little  cause  is  there  for  moralists  to  disclaim  this  principle. 
See  pp.  80-83. 


102  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED   FOR  [I.  v. 

§  26.  Liberty  renders  falling  possible,  Init  does  not 
account  for  it. 

From  these  things  we  may  observe,  and  it  will  further 
show  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of  being  improved 
by  discipline,  how  it  comes  to  pass,  that  creatures  made 
upright  fall ;  and  that  those  who  preserve  their  upright- 
ness, by  so  doing,  raise  themselves  to  a  more  secure  state 
of  virtue.  To  say  that  the  former  is  accounted  for  by  the 
nature  of  liberty,  is  to  say  110  more,  than  that  an  event's 
actually  happening  is  accounted  for  by  a  mere  possibility  of 
its  happening. 

§  27.  It  seems  explained  Inj  the  nature  of  partieular 
propensions. 

But  it  seems  distinctly  conceivable  from  the  very  nature 
of  particular  affections  or  propensions.  For,  suppose  crea- 
tures intended  for  such  a  particular  state  of  life,  for  which 
such  propensions  were  necessary :  suppose  them  endued 
with  such  propensions,  together  with  moral  understanding, 
as  well  including  a  practical  sense  of  virtue,  as  a  speculative 
perception  of  it ;  and  that  all  these  several  principles,  both 
natural  and  moral,  forming  an  inward  constitution  of  mind, 
were  in  the  most  exact  proportion  possible  ;  i.  e.  in  a  pro- 
portion the  most  exactly  adapted  to  their  intended  state  of 
life  :  such  creatures  would  be  made  upright,  or  finitely  per- 
fect. Now  particular  propensions,  from  their  very  nature, 
must  be  felt,  the  objects  of  them  being  present  ;  though 
they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all,  or  not  with  the  allowance  of 
the  moral  principle.  But  if  they  can  be  gratified  without 
its  allowance,  or  by  contradicting  it ;  then  they  must  be 
conceived  to  have  some  tendency,  in  how  low  a  degree 
soever,  yet  some  tendency,  to  induce  persons  to  such  for- 
bidden gratification.  This  tendency,  in  some  one  particular 
propension,  may  be  increased,  by  the  greater  frequency  of 
occasions  naturally  exciting  it,  than  of  occasions  exciting 
others.  The  least  voluntary  indulgence  in  forbidden  circum- 
stances, though  but  in  thought,  will  increase  this  wrong 
tendency ;  and  may  increase  it  further,  till,  peculiar  con- 


§§  26-29]         DISCIPLINE  AND   IMPROVEMENT  103 

junctures  perhaps  conspiring,  it  becomes  effect  ;  and  danger 
of  deviating  from  right,  ends  in  actual  deviation  from  it : 
a  danger  necessarily  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  propen- 
sion  ;  and  which  therefore  could  not  have  been  prevented, 
though  it  might  have  been  escaped,  or  got  innocently 
through.  The  case  would  be,  as  if  we  were  to  suppose  a 
strait  path  marked  out  for  a  person,  in  which  such  a  degree 
of  attention  would  keep  him  steady  :  but  if  he  would  not 
attend  in  this  degree,  any  one  of  a  thousand  objects,  catching 
his  eye,  might  lead  him  out  of  it. 

§  28.  Disobedience,  single,  produces  disorder,  of  unde- 
fined amount ;   if  repeated,  habit. 

Now  it  is  impossible  to  say,  how  much  even  the  first 
full  overt  act  of  irregularity  might  disorder  the  inward 
constitution  ;  unsettle  the  adjustments,  and  alter  the  pro- 
portions, which  formed  it,  and  in  which  the  uprightness  of 
its  make  consisted  :  but  repetition  of  irregularities  would 
produce  habits.  And  thus  the  constitution  would  be 
spoiled  ;  and  creatures  made  upright,  become  corrupt  and 
depraved  in  their  settled  character,  proportionally  to  their 
repeated  irregularities  in  occasional  acts. 

§  29.  Is  the  counterpart  to  that  capacity  of  betterment, 
which  might  raise  its  up  to  safety. 

But  on  the  contrary,  these  creatures  might  have  improved 
and  raised  themselves,  to  an  higher  and  more  secure  state 
of  virtue,  by  the  contrary  behaviour  :  by  steadily  following 
the  moral  principle,  supposed  to  be  one  part  of  their  nature ; 
and  thus  withstanding  that  unavoidable  danger  of  defection, 
which  necessarily  arose  from  propension,  the  other  part  of 
it.  For,  by  thus  preserving  their  integrity  for  some  time, 
their  danger  would  lessen  ;  since  propensions,  by  being 
inured  to  submit,  would  do  it  more  easily  and  of  course  : 
and  their  security  against  this  lessening  danger  would 
increase  ;  since  the  moral  principle  would  gain  additional 
strength  by  exercise  :  both  which  things  are  implied  in  the 
notion  of  virtuous  habits.  Thus  then  vicious  indulgence  is 


104  PROBATION,    AS    INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 

not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but  also  depraves  the  inward 
constitution  and  character.  And  virtuous  self-government 
is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but  also  improves  the  inward 
constitution  or  character:  and  may  improve  it  to  such  a 
degree,  that  though  we  should  suppose  it  impossible,  for 
particular  affections  to  be  absolutely  coincident  with  the 
moral  principle ;  and  consequently  should  allow,  that  such 
creatures  as  have  been  above  supposed,  would  for  ever 
remain  defectible  ;  yet  their  danger  of  actually  deviating 
from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely  lessened,  and  they 
fully  fortified  against  what  remains  of  it  :  if  that  may  be 
called  danger,  against  which  there  is  an  adequate  effectual 
security.  But  still,  this  their  higher  perfection  may  con- 
tinue to  consist  in  habits  of  virtue  formed  in  a  state  of 
discipline,  and  this  their  more  complete  security  remain 
to  proceed  from  them.  And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable, 
that  creatures  without  blemish,  as  they  came  out  of  the 
hands  of  God,  may  be  in  danger  of  going  wrong ;  and  so 
may  stand  in  need  of  the  security  of  virtuous  habits,  addi- 
tional to  the  moral  principle  wrought  into  their  natures  by 
him.  That  which  is  the  ground  of  their  danger,  or  their 
want  of  security,  may  be  considered  as  a  deficiency  in  them, 
to  which  virtuous  habits  are  the  natural  supply1,  And  as 
they  are  naturally  capable  of  being  raised  and  improved 
by  discipline,  it  may  be  a  thing  fit  and  requisite  that  they 
should  be  placed  in  circumstances  with  an  eye  to  it :  in 
circumstances  peculiarly  fitted  to  be,  to  them,-  a  state  of 
discipline  for  their  improvement  in  virtue. 

§  30.  Need  of  train  inf/  enhanced  for  us  wlto  Jiare 
'corrupted  our  natures/ 

But  how  much  more  strongly  must  this  hold  with  respect 
to  those,  who  have  corrupted  their  natures,  are  fallen  from 
their  original  rectitude,  and  whose  passions  are  become 
excessive  by  repeated  violations  of  their  inward  constitution? 
Upright  creatures  may  want  to  be  improved :  depraved 


1    Sup.   §  22. 


§§30-3']          DISCIPLINE   AND    IMPROVEMENT  105 

creatures  want  to  be  renewed.  Education  and  discipline, 
which  may  be  in  all  degrees  and  sorts  of  gentleness  and 
of  severity,  is  expedient  for  those  :  but  must  be  absolutely 
necessary  for  these.  For  these,  discipline  of  the  severer  sort 
too,  and  in  the  higher  degrees  of  it,  must  be  necessary,  in 
order  to  wear  out  vicious  habits  ;  to  recover  their  primitive 
strength  of  self-government,  which  indulgence  must  have 
weakened  ;  to  repair,  as  well  as  raise  into  an  habit,  the 
moral  principle,  in  order  to  their  arriving  at  a  secure  state 
of  virtuous  happiness. 

§  31.  The  varied  lessons  of  tlie  present  state  peculiarly 
fit  it  for  discipline. 

Now  whoever  will  consider  the  thing,  may  clearly  see, 
that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  dis- 
cipline for  this  purpose,  to  such  as  will  set  themselves  to 
mend  and  improve.  For,  the  various  temptations  with 
which  we  are  surrounded  ;  our  experience  of  the  deceits 
of  wickedness  ;  having  been  in  many  instances  led  wrong 
ourselves  ;  the  great  viciousness  of  'the  world  ;  the  infinite 
disorders  consequent  upon  it ;  our  being  made  acquainted 
\vith  pain  and  sorrow,  either  from  our  own  feeling  of  it,  or 
from  the  sight  of  it  in  others  ;  these  things,  though  some 
of  them  may  indeed  produce  wrong  effects  upon  our  minds, 
yet  when  duly  reflected  upon,  have,  all  of  them,  a  direct 
tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  settled  moderation  and  reasonable- 
ness of  temper  :  the  contrary  both  to  thoughtless  levity, 
and  also  to  that  unrestrained  self-will,  and  violent  bent 
to  follow  present  inclination,  which  may  be  observed  in 
undisciplined  minds.  Such  experience,  as  the  present  state 
affords,  of  the  frailty  of  our  nature ;  of  the  boundless 
extravagance  of  ungoverned  passion  ;  of  the  power  which 
an  infinite  Being  has  over  us,  by  the  various  capacities  of 
misery  which  he  has  given  us ;  in  short,  that  kind  and 
degree  of  experience,  which  the  present  state  affords  us, 
that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such  as  to  admit  the 
possibility,  the  danger,  and  the  actual  event,  of  creatures 
losing  their  innocence  and  happiness,  and  becoming  vicious 


106  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 

and  wretched  ;  hath  a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical  sense 
of  things,  very  different  from  a  mere  speculative  knowledge 
that  we  are  liable  to  vice,  and  capable  of  misery.  And  who 
knows,  whether  the  security  of  creatures  in  the  highest  and 
most  settled  state  of  perfection,  may  not  in  part  arise,  from 
their  having  had  such  a  sense  of  things  as  this,  formed,  and 
habitually  fixed  within  them,  in  some  state  of  probation? 
And  passing  through  .the  present  world  with  that  moral 
attention,  which  is  necessary  to  the  acting  a  right  part  in 
it,  may  leave  everlasting  impressions  of  this  sort  upon  our 
minds.  But  to  be  a  little  more  distinct :  allurements  to 
what  is  wrong ;  difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty  ; 
our  not  being  able  to  act  an  uniform  right  part  without 
some  thought  and  care  ;  and  the  opportunities  which  we 
have,  or  imagine  we  have,  of  avoiding  what  we  dislike,  or 
obtaining  what  we  desire,  by  unlawful  means,  when  we 
either  cannot  do  it  at  all,  or  at  least  not  so  easily,  by  lawful 
ones ;  these  things,  i.  e.  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice, 
are  what  render  the  present  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a 
state  of  discipline,  to  those  wrho  will  preserve  their  integrity : 
because  they  render  being  upon  our  guard,  resolution,  and 
the  denial  of  our  passions,  necessary  in  order  to  that  end. 

§  32.   Wherein  habit  is  confirmed  fy/  persistent  effort, 

and  by  wariness  against  temptations. 

And  the  exercise  of  such  particular  recollection,  intention 
of  mind,  and  self-government,  in  the  practice  of  virtue,  has, 
from  the  make  of  our  nature,  a  peculiar  tendency  to  form 
habits  of  virtue  ;  as  implying,  not  only  a  real,  but  also  a 
more  continued,  and  a  more  intense  exercise  of  the  virtuous 
principle  ;  or  a  more  constant  and  a  stronger  effort  of  virtue 
exerted  into  act.  Thus  suppose  a  person  to  know  himself 
to  be  in  particular  danger,  for  some  time,  of  doing  any 
thing  wrong,  which  yet  he  fully  resolves  not  to  do  :  con- 
tinued recollection,  and 'keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order 
to  make  good  his  resolution,  is  a  continued  exerting  of  that 
act  of  virtue  in  a  hinh  degree,  which  need  have  been,  and 
perhaps  would  have  been,  only  instantaneous  and  weak,  had 
the  temptation  been  so.  It  is  indeed  ridiculous  to  assert, 


§§  32,  33 ]          DISCIPLINE   AND    IMPROVEMENT  107 

that  self-denial  is  essential  to  virtue  and  piety:  but  it  would 
have  been  nearer  the  truth,  though  not  strictly  the  truth 
itself,  to  have  said,  that  it  is  essential  to  discipline  and 
improvement  \  Tor  though  actions  materially  virtuous, 
which  have  no  sort  of  difficulty,  but  are  perfectly  agreeable 
to  our  particular  inclinations,  may  possibly  be  done  only 
from  these  particular  inclinations,  and  so  may  not  be  any 
exercise  of  the  principle  of  virtue,  i.  e.  not  be  virtuous 
actions  at  all ;  yet,  on  the  contrary,  they  may  be  an  exercise 
of  that  principle  :  and  when  they  are,  they  have  a  tendency 
to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of  virtue,  But  when  the  exercise 
of  the  virtuous  principle  is  more  continued,  oftener  repeated, 
and  more  intense  ;  as  it  must  be  in  circumstances  of  danger, 
temptation,  and  difficulty,  of  any  kind  and  in  any  degree  ; 
this  tendency  is  increased  proportionably,  and  a  more 
confirmed  habit  is  the  consequence. 

§  33.  This  law,  even  if  limited  by  the  latv  of  a  mean 
in  moral  character,  is  not  subverted. 

This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length  :  but  how  far 
it  may  hold,  I  know  not.  Neither  our  intellectual  powers, 
nor  our  bodily  strength,  can  be  improved  beyond  such  a 
degree :  and  both  may  be  over-wrought.  Possibly  there 
may  be  somewhat  analogous  to  this,  with  respect  to  the 
moral  character ;  which  is  scarce  worth  considering.  And 
I  mention  it  only,  lest  it  should  come  into  some  persons' 
thoughts,  not  as  an  exception  to  the  foregoing  observations, 
which  perhaps  it  is  ;  but  as  a  confutation  of  them,  which 
it  is  not.  And  there  may  be  several  other  exceptions. 
Observations  of  this  kind  cannot  be  supposed  to  hold 
minutely,  and  in  every  case.  It  is  enough  that  they  hold 
in  general.  And  these  plainly  hold  so  far,  as  that  from 
them  may  be  seen  distinctlj7',  which  is  all  that  is  intended 
by  them,  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline,  for  our  improvement  in  virtue  and  piety :  in  the 


1  Because  if  the  state  of  virtue       or  mortify.    Comp.  also  Aristotle, 
be  perfect,  all  the  inclinations  are       Eth.  Nic.  II.  iii.  i. 
right,  and  there  is  nothing  to  deny 


108  PROBATION,    AS    INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 

same  sense  as  some  sciences,  by  requiring  and  engaging  the 
attention,  not  to  be  sure  of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but 
of  such  as  will,  set  themselves  to  them  ;  are  fit  to  form  the 
mind  to  habits  of  attention. 

§  34.  Life  as  a  discipline  of  vice  to  the  majority  is  thereby 
enhanced  as  a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  good. 

Indeed  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving,  in  event, 
a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of  men,  that,  on  the 
contrary,  they  seem  to  make  it  a  discipline  of  vice.  And 
the  viciousness  of  the  world  is,  in  different  ways,  the  great 
temptation,  which  renders  it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline, 
in  the  degree  it  is,  to  good  men.  The  whole  end,  and  the 
whole  occasion,  of  mankind's  being  placed  in  such  a  state 
as  the  present,  is  not  pretended  to  be  accounted  for.  That 
which  appears  amidst  the  general  corruption,  is,  that  there 
are  some  persons,  who,  having  within  them  the  principle  of 
amendment  and  recovery,  attend  to  and  follow  the  notices 
of  virtue  and  religion,  be  they  more  clear  or  more  obscure, 
which  are  afforded  them  ;  and  that  the  present  world  is,  not 
only  an  exercise  of  virtue  in  these  persons,  but  an  exercise 
of  it  in  ways  and  degrees,  peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it  :  apt 
to  improve  it,  in  some  respects,  even  beyond  what  would 
be,  by  the  exercise  of  it,  required  in  a  perfectly  virtuous 
society,  or  in  a  society  of  equally  imperfect  virtue  with 
themselves.  But  that  the  present  world  does  not  actually 
become  a  state  of  moral  discipline  to  many,  even  to  the 
generality,  i.  e.  that  they  do  not  improve  or  growr  better  in 
it,  cannot  be  urged  as  a  proof,  that  it  was  not  intended  for 
moral  discipline,  by  any  who  at  all  observe  the  analogy  of 
nature. 


§  35-   The  enormous  waste  in  creation,  though  nnaccountaUc, 
does  not  disprove  design. 

For,  of  the  numerous  seeds  of  vegetables  and  bodies  of 
animals,  which  are  adapted  and  put  in  the  way,  to  improve 
to  such  a  point  or  state  of  natural  maturity  and  perfection, 
we  do  not  see  perhaps  that  one  in  a  million  actually  does. 


§§34-36]         DISCIPLINE   AND    IMPROVEMENT  109 

Far  the  greatest  part  of  them  decay  before  they  are  improved 
to  it ;  and  appear  to  be  absolutely  destroyed.  Yet  no  one, 
who  does  not  deny  all  final  causes,  will  deny,  that  those 
seeds  and  bodies,  which  do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity 
and  perfection,  answer  the  end  for  which  they  were  really 
designed  by  nature ;  and  therefore  that  nature  designed 
them  for  such  perfection  !.  And  I  cannot  forbear  adding, 
though  it  is  not  to  the  present  purpose,  that  the  appearance 
of  such  an  amazing  tvaste  in  nature,  with  respect  to  these 
seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  causes,  is  to  us  as  unaccount- 
able, as,  what  is  much  more  terrible,  the  present  and  future 
ruin  of  so  many  moral  agents  by  themselves,  i.  e.  by  vice. 

§  36.  Obedience  from  hope  or  fear  forms  habits, 
and  grows  into  morality'*. 

Against  this  whole  notion  of  moral  discipline,  it  may 
be  objected,  in  another  way  ;  that  so  far  as  a  course  of 
behaviour,  materially  virtuous,  proceeds  from  hope  and  fear, 
so  far  it  is  only  a  discipline  and  strengthening  of  self-love. 
But  doing  what  God  commands,  because  he  commands  it, 
is  obedience,  though  it  proceeds  from  hope  or  fear.  And 
a  course  of  such  obedience  will  form  habits  of  it.  And  a 
constant  regard  to  veracity,  justice  and  charity,  may  form 
distinct  habits  of  these  particular  virtues  ;  and  will  certainly 
form  habits  of  self-government,  and  of  denying  our  inclina- 
tions, whenever  veracity,  justice  or  charity  requires  it.  Nor 
is  there  any  foundation  for  this  great  nicety,  with  which 
some  affect  to  distinguish  in  this  case,  in  order  to  depreciate 
all  religion  proceeding  from  hope  or  fear.  For,  veracity, 
justice  and  charity,  regard  to  God's  authority,  and  to  our 
own  chief  interest,  are  not  only  all  three  coincident ;  but 
each  of  them  is,  in  itself,  .a  just  and  natural  motive  or 
principle  of  action.  And  he  who  begins  a  good  life  from 
any  one  of  them,  and  perseveres  in  it,  as  he  is  already  in 
some  degree,  so  he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more, 


1  The  waste  impairs  design  as       duced,  is  not  destroyed, 
a  whole  :    but   not  as  to  all  the  2  See   Shaftesbury,  Inquiiy  coit- 

parts.     So   the   argument,   if  re-       ccniing  Virtue,  Part  III.  iii.  3. 


110  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 

of  that  character,  which  is  correspondent  to  the  constitution 
of  nature  as  moral ;  and  to  the  relation,  which  God  stands 
in  to  us  as  moral  Governor  of  it :  nor  consequently  can  he 
fail  of  obtaining  that  happiness  which  this  constitution  and 
relation  necessarily  suppose  connected  with  that  character. 

§  37.  Passive  virtue,  or  resignation,  is  also  good. 
Training  in  patience  may  be  needful. 

These  several  observations,  concerning  the  active  principle 
of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  commands,  are  applicable 
to  passive  submission  or  resignation  to  his  will l :  which  is 
another  essential  part  of  a  right  character,  connected  with 
the  former,  and  very  much  in  our  power  to  form-  ourselves 
to.  It  may  be  imagined,  that  nothing  but  afflictions  can 
give  occasion  for,  or  require  this  virtue  ;  that  it  can  have  no 
respect  to,  nor  be  any  way  necessary  to  qualify  for,  a  state 
of  perfect  happiness :  but  it  is  not  experience  which  can 
make  us  think  thus.  Prosperity  itself,  whilst  any  thing 
supposed  desirable  is  not  ours,  begets  extravagant  and 
unbounded  thoughts.  Imagination  is  altogether  as  much 
a  source  of  discontent,  as  any  thing  in  our  external  con- 
dition. It  is  indeed  true,  that  there  can  be  110  scope  for 
patience,  when  sorrow  shall  be  no  more  :  but  there  may  be 
need  of  a  temper  of  mind,  which  shall  have  been  formed  by 
patience. 

§  38.  Self-love,  not  always  conforming  to  God's  ivill,  may 
require  aid  from  the  habit  of  resignation  '2. 

For,  though  self-love,  considered  merely  as  an  active 
principle  leading  us  to  pursue  our  chief  interest,  cannot 
but  be  uniformly  coincident  with  the  principle  of  obedience 
to  God's  commands,  our  interest  being  rightly  understood  ; 
because  this  obedience,  and  the  pursuit  of  our  own  chief 


1  In  Serm.  xiv.  §§  5,  6,  on  the  Human  Nature,  §  15,  self-love  is 
love  of  God,  a  much  larger  scope  described  as  a  principle  superior 
is  given  to  resignation  :  perhaps  in  kind  to  passion  ;  but  then  it  is 
one  beyond  what  the  word  itself  self-love  under  watch  and  ward, 
in  ^strictness  admits.  so    to    speak  :    *  reasonable  '   and 

2  In    the    Second    Sermon    on  '  cool '  self-love. 


§§37-39]          DISCIPLINE    AND    IMPROVEMENT  III 

interest,  must  be  in  every  case  one  and  the  same  thing :  yet 
it  may  be  questioned,  whether  self-love,  considered  merely 
as  the  desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  can,  from 
its  nature,  be  thus  absolutely  and  uniformly  coincident  with 
the  will  of  God  ;  any  more  than  particular  affections  can  b  : 
coincident  in  such  sort,  as  not  to  be  liable  to  be  excited 
upon  occasions  and  in  degrees,  impossible  to  be  gratified 
consistently  with  the  constitution  of  things,  or  the  divine 
appointments.  So  that  habits  of  resignation  may,  upon  this 
account,  be  requisite  for  all  creatures  :  habits,  I  say ;  which 
signify  what  is  formed  by  use.  However,  in  general  it 
is  obvious  that  both  self-love  and  particular  affections  in 
human  creatures,  considered  only  as  passive  feelings,  distort 
and  rend  the  mind  ;  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  disci- 
pline *.  Now  denial  of  those  particular  affections,  in  a  course 
of  active  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  will,  has  a  tendency 
to  moderate  them ;  and  seems  also  to  have  a  tendency  to 
habituate  the  mind,  to  be  easy  and  satisfied  with  that 
degree  of  happiness  which  is  allotted  us,  i.  e.  to  moderate 
self-love. 

§  39.  Passive  obedience  is  suited  to  affliction,  and 
integrates  the  active. 

But  the  proper  discipline  for  resignation  is  affliction. 
For  a  right  behaviour  under  that  trial ;  recollecting  our- 
selves so  as  to  consider  it  in  the  view,  in  which  religion 
teaches  us  to  consider  it,  as  from  the  hand  of  God ;  receiving 
it  as  what  he  appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to  permit,  in  his 
world  and  under  his  government ;  this  will  habituate  the 
mind  to  a  dutiful  submission.  And  such  submission, 
together  with  the  active  principle  of  obedience,  make  up 
the  temper  and  character  in  us,  which  answers  to  his  sove- 
reignty ;  and  which  absolutely  belongs  to  the  condition  of 
our  being,  as  dependent  creatures.  Nor  can  it  be  said,  that 
this  is  only  breaking  the  mind  to  a  submission  to  mere 


Sup.  §  23. 


1  Comp.  Serm.  xi.  7. 


112  PROBATION,    AS   INTENDED    FOR  [I.  V. 

power ;  for  mere  power  may  be  accidental,  and  precarious, 
and  usurped  :  but  it  is  forming  within  ourselves  the  temper 
of  resignation  to  his  rightful  authority,  who  is,  by  nature, 
supreme  over  all. 

§  40.   Character  proper  for  this  life  and  another  depends 
upon  action. 

Upon  the  whole :  Such  a  character,  and  such  qualifica- 
tions, are  necessary  for  a  mature  state  of  life  in  the  present 
world,  as  nature  alone  does  in  no  wise  bestow ;  but  has  put 
it  upon  us,  in  great  part,  to  acquire,  in  our  progress  from 
one  stage  of  life  to  another,  from  childhood  to  mature  age  : 
put  it  upon  us  to  acquire  them,  by  giving  us  capacities  of 
doing  it,  and  by  placing  us,  in  the  beginning  of  life,  in 
a  condition  fit  for  it.  And  this  is  a  general  analogy  to  our 
condition  in  the  present  world,  as  in  a  state  of  moral  dis- 
cipline for  another.  It  is  in  vain  then  to  object  against 
the  credibility  of  the  present  life's  being  intended  for  this 
purpose,  that  all  the  trouble  and  the  danger,  unavoidably 
accompanying  such  discipline,  might  have  been  saved  us, 
by  our  being  made  at  once  the  creatures  and  the  characters, 
which  ice  were  to  be.  For  we  experience,  that  what  we  were 
to  be,  was  to  be  the  effect  of  what  we  would  do :  and  that 
the  general  conduct  of  nature  is,  not  to  save  us  trouble  or 
danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of  going  through  them,  and 
to  put  it  upon  us  to  do  so. 

§  41.  Attainment  of  right  qualifications  parallel  to 

the  supply  of  legitimate  wants. 

Acquirements  of  our  own,  experience  and  habits,  are  the 
natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  security  against  our 
dangers:  since  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  set  ourselves  to 
acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  external  things,  which  we 
stand  in  need  of.  In  particular,  it  is  as  plainly  a  general 
law  of  nature,  that  we  should,  with  regard  to  our  temporal 
interest,  form  and  cultivate  practical  principles  within  us, 
by  attention,  use,  and  discipline,  as  any  thing  whatever  is 
a  natural  law;  chiefly  in  the  beginning  of  life,  but  also 


§§  4o  -  4 2  ]         DISCIPLINE  A  ND   IMPR  O  YEMEN T  113 

throughout  the  whole  course  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is 
left  to  our  choice  :  either  to  improve  ourselves,  and  better 
our  condition ;  or,  in  default  of  such  improvement,  to  remain 
deficient  and  wretched.  It  is  therefore  perfectly  credible, 
from  the  analogy  of  nature,  that  the  same  may  be  our  case, 
with  respect  to  the  happiness  of  a  future  state,  and  the 
qualifications  necessary  for  it. 

§  42.  Manifestation  of  character  may  be  Tr 
*•  a  further  purpose  of  our  probation. 

There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  seem  implied  in  the 
present  world's  being  a  state  of  probation  ;  that  it  is  a 
theatre  of  action,  for  the  manifestation  of  persons'  charac- 
ters, with  respect  to  a  future  one :  not  to  be  sure  to  an  all- 
knowing  Being,  but  to  his  creation  or  part  of  it.  This 
may,  perhaps,  be  only  a  consequence  of  our  being  in  a 
state  of  probation  in  the  other  senses.  However,  it  is  not 
impossible,  that  men's  showing  and  making  manifest  what 
is  in  their  heart,  what  their  real  character  is,  may  have 
respect  to  a  future  life,  in  ways  and  manners  which  we  are 
not  acquainted  with  :  particularly  it  may  be  a  means,  for  the 
Author  of  nature  does  not  appear  to  do  any  thing  without 
means,  of  their  being  disposed  of  suitably  to  their  charac- 
ters ;  and  of  its  being  known  to  the  creation,  by  way  of 
example,  that  they  are  thus  disposed  of.  But  not  to  enter 
upon  any  conjectural  account  of  this  ;  one  may  just  mention, 
that  the  manifestation  of  persons'  characters  contributes 
very  much,  in  various  ways,  to  the  carrying  on  a  great  part 
of  that  general  course  of  nature,  respecting  mankind,  which 
comes  under  our  observation  at  present.  I  shall  only  add, 
that  probation,  in  both  these  senses,  as  well  as  in  that 
treated  of  in  the  foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral 
government :  since  by  persons'  behaviour  under  it,  their 
characters  cannot  but  be  manifested,  and,  if  they  behave 
well,  improved. 


VOL.  I. 


1 14  OF   THE    OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [I.  VI. 


CHAPTER   VI1. 

OF   THE   OPINION   OF   NECESSITY,   CONSIDERED    AS 
INFLUENCING   PRACTICE. 

§  i.  If  this  opinion  comports  until  nature,  why  not  also 
with  religion  ? 

fTlHROUGHOUT  the  foregoing  Treatise  it  appears,  that 
J-  the  condition  of  mankind,  considered  as  inhabitants 
of  this  world  only,  and  under  the  government  of  God  which 
we  experience,  is  greatly  analogous  to  our  condition,  as 
designed  for  another  world,  or  under  that  further  govern- 
ment, which  religion  teaches  us.  If  therefore  any  assert, 
as  a  fatalist  must,  that  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity 
is  reconcilable  with  the  former2;  there  immediately  arises 
a  question  in  the  way  of  analogy,  whether  he  must  not  also 
own  it  to  be  reconcilable  with  the  latter,  i.  e.  with  the 
system  of  religion  itself,  and  the  proof  of  it  The  reader 
then  will  observe,  that  the  question  now  before  us  is  not 
absolute,  Whether  the  opinion  of  fate  be  reconcilable  with 
religion ;  but  hypothetical,  Whether,  upon  supposition  of 
its  being  reconcilable  with  the  constitution  of  nature,  it 
be  not  reconcilable  with  religion  also  :  or,  what  pretence 


1  This  chapter  may  be  said  not  port  from  the  Calvinistic  school, 

to  fall  strictly  within  the  lines  of  most   powerfully  represented   by 

the  proper  argument  of  the  work.  Jonathan  Edwards,  whose  work, 

It  removes,  however,  out  of  But-  however,    did    not    appear    until 

ler's  way  a  superficial  objection,  1754. 

which  he  shows  to  be  inapplicable  a  A  fatalist  holds  as  such  '  the 

to  the  treatment  of  practical  ques-  opinion    of  universal    necessity/ 

tions.     He   may  have   done   this  Mr.  Stephen  (English  Thought,  c.  v. 

because  the  idea  was  too  promi-  §  18)    distinguishes    fatalism,  as 

nent    among    the    philosophical  an  occasional  necessity,  from  nni- 

notions  of  the  day  to  be  simply  versa!   necessity,   charges  Butler 

passed    by  with    safety.     For   he  with  confounding  them,  and  hence 

tells  us  (§  14)  that  the  opinion  of  infers    Butler's    weakness    as    a 

necessity  was  the  fashionable  plea  metaphysician.     But  we  see  from 

for  unbelief.     It  is  to  be  borne  this  passage  that   fatalism  is  in 

in  mind  that  the  notions  of  the  Butler's    view    a    synonym     for 

fatalists  received  a  powerful  sup-  universal  necessity.  " 


J§  T_3]  AS   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE  115 

a  fatalist,  not  other  persons,  but  a  fatalist,  has  to  conclude 
from  his  opinion,  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  religion. 
And  as  the  puzzle  and  obscurity,  which  must  unavoidably 
arise  from  arguing  upon  so  absurd l  a  supposition  as  that 
of  universal  necessity,  will,  I  fear,  easily  be  seen  ;  it  will, 
I  hope,  as  easily  be  excused. 

But  since  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted,  as  a 
thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature, 
or  natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  and  since  an  objection 
may  be  made  against  the  proof  of  this,  from  the  opinion 
of  universal  necessity,  as  it  may  be  supposed,  that  such 
necessity  will  itself  account  for  the  origin  and  preservation 
of  all  things  :  it  is  requisite,  that  this  objection  be  distinctly 
answered  ;  or  that  it  be  shown,  that  a  fatality,  supposed 
consistent  with  what  we  certainly  experience,  does  not 
destroy  the  proof  of  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of 
nature ;  before  we  proceed  to  consider,  whether  it  destroys 
the  proof  of  a  moral  Governor  of  it,  or  of  our  being  in  a 
state  of  religion. 

§  2.   Fate  or  no  fate,  agency  by  choice  is  matter  of  experience. 

Now,  when  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist,  that  the  whole  constitu- 
tion of  nature,  and  the  actions  of  men,  that  every  thing,  and 
every  mode  and  circumstance  of  every  thing,  is  necessary, 
and  could  not  possibly  have  been  otherwise ;  it  is  to  be 
observed,  that  this  necessity  does  not  exclude  deliberation, 
choice,  preference,  and  acting  from  certain  principles,  and 
to  certain  ends:  because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted 
experience,  acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every  man  may, 
every  moment,  be  conscious  of. 

§  3.   Only  alleges  an  incident  of  being,  no  way  explains  the  how. 

And  from  hence  it  follows,  that  necessity,  alone  and  of 
itself,  is  in  no  sort  an  account  of  the  constitution  of  nature, 
and  how  things  came  to  l)e  and  to  continue  as  they  are  ;  but 
only  an  account  of  this  circumstance  relating  to  their  origin 


1  Comp.  §  8. 
I  2 


Il6  OF   THE   OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [I.  VI. 

and  continuance,  that  they  could  not  have  been  otherwise 
than  they  are  and  have  been.  The  assertion,  that  eveiy  thing 
is  by  necessity  of  nature,  is  not  an  answer  to  the  question; 
Whether  the  world  came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent 
agent  forming  it  thus,  or  not :  but  to  quite  another  question  ; 
Whether  it  came  into  being  as  it  is,  in  that  way  and  manner 
which  we  call  necessarily,  or  in  that  way  and  manner  which 
we  call  freely.  For  suppose  further,  that  one  who  was  a 
fatalist,  and  one  who  kept  to  his  natural  sense  of  things, 
and  believed  himself  a  free  agent,  were  disputing  together, 
and  vindicating  their  respective  opinions ;  and  they  should 
happen  to  instance  in  a  house  :  they  would  agree  that  it  was 
built  by  an  architect.  Their  difference  concerning  necessity 
and  freedom  would  occasion  no  difference  of  judgment  con- 
cerning this  ;  but  only  concerning  another  matter  ;  whether 
the  architect  built  it  necessarily  or  freely.  Suppose  then  they 
should  proceed  to  inquire  concerning  the  constitution  of 
nature  :  in  a  lax  way  of  speaking,  one  of  them  might  say, 
it  was  by  necessity  ;  and  the  other,  by  freedom  :  but  if  they 
had  any  meaning  to  their  words,  as  the  latter  must  mean 
a  free  agent,  so  the  former  must  at  length  be  reduced  to 
mean  an  agent,  whether  he  would  say  one  or  more,  acting 
by  necessity  :  for  abstract  notions  can  do  nothing. 

§  4.  God  exists  l)y  a  necessity  antecedent  to  design  :  this  is 
but  a  manner  of  speech. 

Indeed  we  ascribe  to  God  a  necessary  existence,  uncaused 
by  any  agent.  For  we  find  within  ourselves  the  idea  of 
infinity,  i.  e.  immensity  and  eternity,  impossible,  even  in 
imagination,  to  be  removed  out  of  being.  We  seem  to  discern 
intuitively,  that  there  must,  and  cannot  but  be  somewhat, 
external  to  ourselves,  answering  this  idea,  or  the  archetype 
of  it.  And  from  hence  (for  tins  abstract,  as  much  as  any 
other,  implies  a  concrete)  we  conclude,  that  there  is  and  cannot 
but  be,  an  infinite,  an  immense  eternal  Being  existing,  prior 
to  all  design  contributing  to  his  existence,  and  exclusive 
of  it.  And  from  the  scantiness  of  language,  a  manner  of 
speaking  has  been  introduced  ;  that  necessity  is  the  founda- 
tion, the  reason,  the  account  of  the  existence  of  God.  But 


§§4-6]  AS   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE  117 

it  is  not  alleged,  nor  can  it  be  at  all  intended,  that  ecery  thing 
exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of  necessity ;  a  necessity  ante- 
cedent in  nature  to  design  :  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  meant  that 
every  thing  exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of  necessity,  upon 
several  accounts  ;  and  particularly  because  it  is  admitted,  that 
design,  in  the  actions  of  men,  contributes  to  many  alterations 
in  nature.  For  if  any  deny  this,  I  shall  not  pretend  to  reason 
with  them. 

§  5.  Fatalism  postulates  an  agent,  as  much  as  freedom. 

From  these  things  it  follows  ;  first,  That  when  a  fatalist 
asserts,  that  every  thing  is  l)y  necessity,  he  must  mean,  by  an 
agent  acting  necessarily ;  he  must,  I  say,  mean  this,  for  I  am 
very  sensible  he  would  not  choose  to  mean  it :  and  secondly, 
That  the  necessity,  by  which  such  an  agent  is  supposed  to 
act,  does  not  exclude  intelligence  and  design.  So  that,  were 
the  system  of  fatality  admitted,  it  would  just  as  much  account 
for  the  formation  of  the  world,  as  for  the  structure  of  an 
house,  and  no  more.  Necessity  as  much  requires  and  sup- 
poses a  necessary  agent,  as  freedom  requires  and  supposes 
a  free  agent,  to  be  the  former  of  the  world.  And  the  appear- 
ances of  design  and  of  final  causes  in  the  constitution  of 
nature  as  really  prove  this  acting  agent  to  be  an  intelligent 
designer,  or  to  act  from  choice  ;  upon  the  scheme  of  necessity, 
supposed  possible,  as  upon  that  of  freedom. 

§  6.  Destroys  no  proof  of  religion. 

It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  necessity  does  not 
destroy  the  proof,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of 
nature  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  the  present 
question,  which  the  analogy  before  mentioned a  suggests, 
and  which,  I  think,  it  will  answer,  is  this  :  Whether  the 
opinion  of  necessity,  supposed  consistent  with  possibility, 
with  the  constitution  of  the  world,  and  the  natural  govern- 
ment which  we  experience  exercised  over  it,  destroys  all 
reasonable  ground  of  belief,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion : 

<v  Sup.  §  i. 


Il8  OF   THE    OPINION    OF  NECESSITY  [I.  VI. 

or  whether  that  opinion  be  reconcilable  with  religion  ;  with 
the  system,  and  the  proof  of  it. 

§  7.  A  child,  trained  as  not  accountable,  would  be  insupportable, 
and  would  find  his  own  life  so. 

Suppose  then  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one,  from  his  youth 
up,  in  his  own  principles  ;  that  the  child  should  reason  upon 
them,  and  conclude,  that  since  he  cannot  possibly  behave 
otherwise  than  he  does,  he  is  not  a  subject  of  blame  or  com- 
mendation, nor  can  deserve  to  be  rewarded  or  punished  : 
imagine  him  to  eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and 
commendation  out  of  his  mind,  by  means  of  this  system  ;  to 
form  his  temper,  and  character,  and  behaviour  to  it  ;  and 
from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment  he  was  to  expect,  say, 
from  reasonable  men,  upon  his  coming  abroad  into  the  world : 
as  the  fatalist  judges  from  this  system,  what  he  is  to  expect 
from  the  Author  of  nature,  and  with  regard  to  a  future  state. 
I  cannot  forbear  stopping  here  to  ask,  whether  any  one  of 
common  sense  would  think  fit,  that  a  child  should  be  put 
upon  these  speculations,  and  be  left  to  apply  them  to  practice. 
And  a  man  has  little  pretence  to  reason,  who  is  not  sensible, 
that  we  are  all  children  in  speculations  of  this  kind.  How- 
ever, the  child  would  doubtless  be  highly  delighted  to  find 
himself  freed  from  the  restraints  of  fear  and  shame,  with 
which  his  playfellows  were  fettered  and  embarrassed  ;  and 
highly  conceited  in  his  superior  knowledge,  so  far  beyond 
his  years.  But  conceit  and  vanity  would  be  the  least  bad 
part  of  the  influence,  which  these  principles  must  have,  when 
thus  reasoned  and  acted  upon,  during  the  course  of  his  educa- 
tion. He  must  either  be  allowed  to  go  on  and  be  the  plague 
of  all  about  him,  and  himself  too,  even  to  his  own  destruc- 
tion :  or  else  correction  must  be  continually  made  use  of,  to 
supply  the  want  of  those  natural  perceptions  of  blame  and 
commendation,  which  we  have  supposed  to  be"  removed  ; 
and  to  give  him  a  practical  impression,  of  what  he  had 
reasoned  himself  out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was  in  fact  an 
accountable  child,  and  to  be  punished  for  doing  what  he  was 
forbid.  It  is  therefore  in  reality  impossible,  but  that  the 


§§  7-9 J  4S   INFLUENCING    PRACTICE  lie) 

correction  which  he  must  meet  with,  in  the  course  of  his 
education,  must  convince  him,  that  if  the  scheme  he  AVUS 
instructed  in  wrere  not  false  ;  yet  that  he  reasoned  incon- 
clusively upon  it,  and  somehow  or  other  misapplied  it  to 
practice  and  common  life  :  as  what  the  fatalist  experiences 
of  the  conduct  of  Providence  at  present,  ought  in  all  reason 
to  convince  him,  that  this  scheme  is  misapplied  when  applied 
to  the  subject  of  religion \  But  supposing  the  child's  temper 
could  remain  still  formed  to  the  system,  and  his  expectation 
of  the  treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be  regulated 
by  it ;  so  as  to  expect  that  no  reasonable  man  would  blame 
or  punish  him,  for  any  thing  which  he  should  do,  because  he 
could  not  help  doing  it :  upon  this  supposition  it  is  manifest 
he  would,  upon  his  coming  abroad  into  the  world,  be  insup- 
portable to  society,  and  the  treatment  which  he  would  receive 
from  it  would  render  it  so  to  him  ;  and  he  could  not  fail  of 
doing  somewhat,  very  soon,  for  which  he  would  be  delivered 
over  into  the  hands  of  civil  justice.  And  thus,  in  the  end. 
he  would  be  convinced  of  the  obligations  he  was  under  to 
his  wise  instructor. 

§  8.  The  scheme,  however  tested,  lands  in  absurdity. 

Or  suppose  this  scheme  of  fatality,  in  any  other  way, 
applied  to  practice,  such  practical  application  of  it  will 
be  found  equally  absurd  !  ;  equally  fallacious  in  a  practical 
sense  :  for  instance,  that  if  a  man  be  destined  to  live  such 
a  time,  he  shall  live  to  it,  though  he  take  no  care  of  his 
own  preservation  ;  or  if  he  be  destined  to  die  before  that 
time,  no  care  can  prevent  it :  therefore  all  care  about  pre- 
serving one's  life  is  to  be  neglected  :  which  is  the  fallacy 
instanced  in  by  the  ancients. 

§  9.  Our  entire  state  is  as  if  ive  were  free. 

But  now  on  the  contrary,  none  of  these  practical  absur- 
dities can  be  drawn,  from  reasoning  upon  the  supposition, 

b    Sup.  §   21. 


1  Comp.  §  r. 


120  OF   THE   OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [I.  VI. 

that  we  are  free  ;  but  all  such  reasoning  with  regard  to  the 
common  affairs  of  life  is  justified  by  experience.  And 
therefore,  though  it  were  admitted  that  this  opinion  of 
necessity  were  speculatively  true  ;  yet,  with  regard  to 
practice,  it  is  as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as  our  experience 
reaches  ;  that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  present  life.  For,  the 
constitution  of  the  present  world,  and  the  condition  in 
which  we  are  actually  placed,  is,  as  if  we  were  free.  And 
it  may  perhaps  justly  be  concluded,  that  since  the  whole 
process  of  action,  through  every  step  of  it,  suspense,  de- 
liberation, inclining  one  way,  determining,  and  at  last 
doing  as  we  determine,  is  as  if  we  were  free,  therefore  we 
are  so.  But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  under 
the  present  natural  government  of  the  world,  we  find  we 
are  treated  and  dealt  with,  as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all 
consideration  whether  we  are  or  not. 


§  10.  It  misleads  then  if  true  :  so  may  it  not  ayain 
mislead,  and  in  maximis? 

Were  this  opinion  therefore  of  necessity  admitted  to  be 
ever  so  true  ;  yet  such  is  in  fact  our  condition  and  the 
natural  course  of  things,  that  whenever  we  apply  it  to 
life  and  practice,  this  application  of  it  always  misleads  us, 
and  cannot  but  mislead  us,  in  a  most  dreadful  manner,  with 
regard  to  our  present  interest.  And  how  can  people  think 
themselves  so  very  secure  then,  that  the  same  application  of 
the  same  opinion  may  not  mislead  them  also,  in  some  analo- 
gous manner,  with  respect  to  a  future,  a  more  general  and 
more  important  interest  ?  For,  religion  being  a  practical  sub- 
ject ;  and  the  analogy  of  nature  showing  us,  that  we  have  not 
faculties  to  apply  this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to  practical 
subjects  ;  whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  subject  of  religion, 
and  thence  conclude,  that  we  are  free  from  its  obligations,  it 
is  plain  this  conclusion  cannot  be  depended  upon.  There 
will  still  remain  just  reason  to  think,  whatever  appearances 
are,  that  we  deceive  ourselves ;  in  somewhat  of  a  like 
manner,  as  when  people  fancy  they  can  draw  contradictory 
conclusions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 


§§  ID-IS]  AS   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE  121 

§  ii.  It  being  as  it  false,  to  entertain  it  is  against  reason. 

From  these  things  together,  the  attentive  reader  will  see 
it  follows,  that  if  upon  supposition  of  freedom  the  evidence 
of  religion  be  conclusive,  it  remains  so,  upon  supposition  of 
necessity  ;  because  the  notion  of  necessity  is  not  applicable 
to  practical  subjects  :  i.  e.  with  respect  to  them,  is  as  if  it 
were  not  true.  Nor  does  this  contain  any  reflection  upon 
reason  :  but  only  upon  what  is  unreasonable.  For  to  pre- 
tend to  act  upon  reason,  in  opposition  to  practical  principles, 
which  the  Author  of  our  nature  gave  us  to  act  upon  ;  and 
to  pretend  to  apply  our  reason  to  subjects,  with  regard  to 
which,  our  own  short  views,  and  even  our  experience,  will 
show  us,  it  cannot  be  depended  upon  ;  and  such,  at  best, 
the  subject  of  necessity  must  be  ;  this  is  vanity,  conceit, 
and  unreasonableness. 

§  12.  As  it  allows  of  will  and  character  in  us,  so  it 
may  in  our  Author. 

But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  find  within  ourselves  a  will, 
and  are  conscious  of  a  character.  Now  if  this,  in  us,  be 
reconcilable  with  fate,  it  is  reconcilable  with  it,  in  the 
Author  of  nature.  And  besides,  natural  government  and 
final  causes  imply  a  character  and  a  will  in  the  Governor 
and  Designer0  ;  a  will  concerning  the  creatures  whom  he 
governs.  The  Author  of  nature  then  being  certainly  of 
some  character  or  other,  notwithstanding  necessity  ;  it  is 
evident  this  necessity  is  as  reconcilable  with  the  particular 
character  of  benevolence,  veracity,  and  justice  in  him,  which 
attributes  are  the  foundation  of  religion,  as  with  any  other 


c  By  will  and  character  is  meant l  that,  which,  in  speaking  of  men, 
we  should  express,  not  only  by  these  words,  but  also  by  the  words 

temper,  taste,  dispositions,  practical  principles,  that  ivhole  frame  of  mind,  from 
u'hence  we  act  in  one  manner  rather  than  another. 


1  Not  that  each  of  the  ovva^fis  to  determine  action,  they  are  in- 

he  proceeds  to  mention  is  a  syno-  eluded   in  the  phrase    '  will   and 

iiym   for   character   or  for  will ;  character '  from  which  action  im- 

but  that,  as  powers  contributing  mediately  springs. 


122  OF   THE   OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [l.  VI. 

character :  since  we  find  this  necessity  no  more  hinders  men 
from  being  benevolent,  than  cruel  ;  true,  than  faithless  ; 
just,  than  unjust  ;  or  if  the  fatalist  pleases,  what  we  call 
unjust.  For  it  is  said  indeed,  that  what,  upon  supposition 
of  freedom,  would  be  just  punishment ;  upon  supposition  of 
necessity,  becomes  manifestly  unjust :  because  it  is  punish- 
ment inflicted  for  doing  that  which  persons  could  not  avoid 
doing.  As  if  the  necessity,  which  is  supposed  to  destroy 
the  injustice  of  murder,  for  instance,  would  not  also  destroy 
the  injustice  of  punishing  it.  However,  as  little  to  the 
purpose  as  this  objection  is  in  itself,  it  is  veiy  much  to 
the  purpose  to  observe  from  it,  how  the  notions  of  justice 
and  injustice  remain,  even  whilst  we  endeavour  to  suppose 
them  removed  ;  how  they  force  themselves  upon  the  mind, 
even  whilst  we  are  making  suppositions  destructive  of  them  : 
for  there  is  not,  perhaps,  a  man  in  the  world,  but  would  be 
ready  to  make  this  objection  at  first  thought. 

§  13.  It  leaves  Intact  the  relation  of  God  to  veracity 
and  justice, 

But  though  it  is  most  evident,  that  universal  necessity, 
if  it  be  reconcilable  with  any  thing,  is  reconcilable  with 
that  character  in  the  Author  of  nature,  which  is  the  founda- 
tion of  religion  ;  {  Yet,  does  it  not  plainly  destroy  the  proof, 
that  he  is  of  that  character,  and  consequently  the  proof  of 
religion?  '  By  no  means.  For  we  find,  that  happiness  and 
misery  are  not  our  fate,  in  any  such  sense  as  not  to  be 
the  consequences  of  our  behaviour  ;  but  that  they  are  the 
consequences  of  it <l.  We  find  God  exercises  the  same  kind 
of  government  over  us,  with  that,  which  a  father  exercises 
over  his  children,  and  a  civil  magistrate  over  his  subjects. 
Now,  whatever  becomes  of  abstract  questions  concerning 
liberty  and  necessity,  it  evidently  appears  to  us,  that 
veracity  and  justice  must  be  the  natural  rule  and  measure 
of  exercising  this  authority  or  government,  to  a  Being  who 
can  have  no  competitions  or  interfering  of  interests,  with 
his  creatures  and  his  subjects. 


Chap.  ii. 


§§  i3,  14]  4S   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE  123 

§  14.    And  all  that  shows  his  government  to  correspond 
with  our  nature. 

But  as  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  though  we  experience  its 
truth,  may  be  perplexed  with  difficulties,  which  run  up 
into  the  most  abstruse  of  all  speculations  ;  and  as  the 
opinion  of  necessity  seems  to  be  the  very  basis,  upon  which 
infidelity  grounds  itself;  it  may  be  of  some  use  to  offer  a 
more  particular  proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  which 
may  distinctly  be  shown  not  to  be  destroyed  by  this  opinion. 

The  proof  from  final  causes  of  an  intelligent  Author  of 
nature  is  not  affected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity  ;  supposing 
necessity  a  thing  possible  in  itself,  and  reconcilable  with 
the  constitution  of  things e.  And  it  is  a  matter  of  fact, 
independent  on  this  or  any  other  speculation,  that  he 
governs  the  world  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punish- 
mentsf:  and  also  that  he  hath  given  us  a  moral  faculty, 
by  which  we  distinguish  between  actions,  and  approve 
some  as  virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and  disapprove  others 
as  vicious  and  of  ill  desert  %.  Now  this  moral  discernment 
implies,  in  the  notion  of  it,  a  rule  of  action,  and  a  rule  of 
a  very  peculiar  kind  :  for  it  carries  in  it  authority  and 
a  right  of  direction  ;  authority  in  such  a  sense,  as  that 
we  cannot  depart  from  it  without  being  self-condemned  h. 
And  that  the  dictates  of  this  moral  faculty,  which  are  by 
nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  moreover  the  laws  of  God,  laws 
in  a  sense  including  sanctions  ;  may  be  thus  proved.  Con- 
sciousness of  a  rule  or  guide  of  action,  in  creatures  who 
are  capable  of  considering  it  as  given  them  by  their  Maker, 
not  only  raises  immediately  a  sense  of  duty,  but  also  a 
sense  of  security  in  following  it,  and  of  danger  in  deviating 
from  it.  A  direction  of  the  Author  of  nature,  given  to 
creatures  capable  of  looking  upon  it  as  such,  is  plainly 
a  command  from  him  :  and  a  command  from  him  neces- 
sarily includes  in  it,  at  least,  an  implicit  promise  in  case 
of  obedience,  or  threatening  in  case  of  disobedience.  But 


Sap.  §§  i,  2.  f    Cliap.  ii. 

Dissert.  II.  *  Serm.  ii.  at  the  Kolls. 


124  OF   THE   OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [l.  vi. 

then  the  sense  or  perception  of  good  and  ill  desert ',  which 
is  contained  in  the  moral  discernment,  renders  the  sanction 
explicit,  and  makes  it  appear,  as  one  may  say,  expressed. 
For   since   his   method  of  government   is   to   reward   and 
punish   actions,   his  having  annexed   to   some   actions   an 
inseparable  sense  of  good  desert,  and  to  others  of  ill,  this 
surely  amounts  to  declaring,  upon  whom  his  punishments 
shall  be  inflicted,  and  his  rewards  be  bestowed.     For  he 
must  have  given  us  this  discernment  and  sense  of  things 
as  a  presentiment  of  what  is  to  be  hereafter :    that  is   by 
way   of  information   beforehand,    what   we   are   finally   to 
expect  in  his  world. 

§  15.    As  then  God  governs,  we  infer  the  duty  of 

ivor ship  to  him. 

There  is  then  most  evident  ground  to  think,  that  the 
government  of  God,  upon  the  whole,  will  be  found  to 
correspond  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  us:  and  that 
in  he  upshot  and  issue  of  things,  happiness  and  misery 
shall,  in  fact  and  event,  be  made  to  follow  virtue  and  vice 
respectively ;  as  he  has  already,  in  so  peculiar  a  manner, 
associated  the  ideas  of  them  in  our  minds.  And  from 
lence  might  easily  be  deduced  the  obligations  of  religious 
worship,  were  it  only  to  be  considered  as  a  means  of  pre- 
serving upon  our  minds  a  sense  of  this  moral  government 
(*od,  and  securing  our  obedience  to  it:  which  yet  is 
extremely  imperfect  view  of  that  most  important  duty. 

§  16.    Against  this  general  proof,  necessity  has 

nothing  to  say. 

Now  I  say,  no  objection  from  necessity  can  lie  gainst 
this  general  proof  of  religion.  None  against  the  propoSn 
leasoned  upon  that  we  have  such  a  moral  faulty  and 
discernment;  because  this  is  a  mere  matter  of  fact,  a 

nonega     .CTf™nce'  that  hu™»  kind  is  thus  constituted: 
none  against  the  conclusion;  because  it  is  immediate  and 


Dissert.  II. 


§§  I5_I7]  AS   INFLUENCING    PRACTICE  125 

wholly  from  this  fact.  For  the  conclusion,  that  God  will 
finally  reward  the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked,  is 
not  here  drawn,  from  its  appearing  to  us  fitk  that  lie 
should;  but  from  its  appearing,  that  he  has  told  us,  he 
win.  And  this  he  hath  certainly  told  us,  in  the  promise 
and  threatening,  which  it  hath  been  observed  the  notion 
of  a  command  implies,  and  the  sense  of  good  and  ill  desert 
which  he  has  given  us,  more  distinctly  expresses.  And 
this  reasoning  from  fact  is  confirmed,  and  in  some  degree 
even  verified,  by  other  facts  ;  by  the  natural  tendencies  of 
virtue  and  of  vice*;  and  by  this,  that  God,  in  the  natural 
course  of  his  providence,  punishes  vicious  actions  as  mis- 
chievous to  society  ;  and  also  vicious  actions  as  such  in 
the  strictest  sense '".  So  that  the  general  proof  of  religion 
is  unanswerably  real,  even  upon  the  wild  supposition  which 
we  are  arguing  upon. 

§  17.    Nor  against  the  evidence  ab  extra  afforded  ly 

long  duration. 

It  must  likewise  be  observed  further,  that  natural  religion 
hath,  besides  this,  an  external  evidence  ;  which  the  doctrine 
of  necessity,  if  it  could  be  true,  would  not  affect.  For 

k  However,  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny,  that  the  will  of  God  is 
determined,  by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reason  of  ^  ^  Q/  ^ 
the  case  ;  th ough  one  chooses  to  decline  matters  of  such  .g  deiermined 
abstract  speculation,  and  to  speak  with  caution  when  ^  what  isflt 
one  does  speak  of  them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to 
say  th-it  it  is  fit  and  reasonable  for  every  one  to  consult  his  own  happiness,  then 
fitness  of  action,  or  the  right  and  reason  of  the  case,  is  an  intelligible  manner 
of  speaking.  And  it  seems  as  inconceivable,  to  suppose  God  to  approve 
one  course  of  action,  or  one  end,  preferably  to  another,  which  yet  his 
acting  at  all  from  design  implies  that  he  does,  without  supposing  some- 
what prior  in  that  end,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  preference  ;  as  to  suppose 
him  to  discern  an  abstract  proposition  to  be  true,  without  supposing 
somewhat  prior  in  it,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  discernment.  It  doth 
not  therefore  appear,  that  moral  right  is  any  more  relative  to  perception 
than  abstract  truth  is  :  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper,  to  speak  of 
the  fitness  and  rightness  of  actions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  nature 
of  things,  than  to  speak  of  abstract  truth,  as  thus  founded. 

i  Sup.  chap.  iii.  §§  22-24.  ra  S«P.  chap.  iii.  §§  11-13- 


126  OF   THE   OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [I.  VI. 

suppose  a  person,  by  the  observations  and  reasoning 
above,  or  by  any  other,  convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion  ; 
that  there  is  a  God,  who  made  the  world,  who  is  the 
moral  Governor  and  Judge  of  mankind,  and  will  upon  the 
whole  deal  with  every  one  according  to  his  works :  I 
say,  suppose  a  person  convinced  of  this  by  reason  ;  but 
to  know  nothing  at  all  of  antiquity,  or  the  present  state 
of  mankind.  It  would  be  natural  for  such  an  one  to  be 
inquisitive,  what  was  the  history  of  this  system  of  doctrine  ; 
at  what  time,  and  in  what  manner,  it  came  first  into  the 
world  ;  and  whether  it  were  believed  by  any  considerable 
part  of  it.  And  were  he  upon  inquiry  to  find,  that  a  par- 
ticular person,  in  a  late  age,  first  of  all  proposed  it,  as 
a  deduction  of  reason,  and  that  mankind  were  before  wholly 
ignorant  of  it :  then,  though  its  evidence  from  reason  would 
remain,  there  would  be  110  additional  probability  of  its  truth, 
from  the  account  of  its  discovery.  But  instead  of  this 
being  the  fact  of  the  case,  on  the  contraiy,  he  would  find, 
what  could  not  but  afford  him  a  very  strong  confirmation 
of  its  truth  :  First,  That  somewhat  of  this  system,  with 
more  or  fewer  additions  and  alterations,  hath  been  pro- 
fessed in  all  ages  and  countries,  of  which  we  have  any 
certain  information  relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly, 
That  it  is  certain  historical  fact,  so  far  as  we  can  trace 
things  up,  that  this  whole  system  of  belief,  that  there 
is  one  God,  the  Creator  and  moral  Governor  of  the  world, 
and  that  mankind  is  in  a  state  of  religion,  was  received 
in  the  first  ages. 

§  18.    Which  "began  with  a  primitive  revelation1. 

And  Thirdly,  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation 
in  history,  that  this  system  was  first  reasoned  out ;  so 
there  is  no  express  historical  or  traditional  evidence,  as 
ancient  as  history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by  revelation. 
Now  these  things  must  be  allowed  to  be  of  great  weight. 
The  first  of  them,  general  consent,  shows  this  system 


On  the  origin  of  natural  religion  comp.  II.  ii.  10. 


§  i8]  AS   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE  127 

to  be  conformable  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind. 
The  second,  namely,  that  religion  was  believed  in  the 
first  ages  of  the  world,  especially  as  it  does  not  appear 
that  there  were  then  any  superstitious  or  false  additions  to 
it,  cannot  but  be  a  further  confirmation  of  its  truth.  For 
it  is  a  proof  of  this  alternative :  either  that  it  came  into 
the  world  by  revelation  ;  or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious, 
and  forces  itself  upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  these  is 
the  conclusion  of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will  con- 
sider, how  unapt  for  speculation  rude  and  uncultivated 
minds  are,  will,  perhaps  from  hence  alone,  be  strongly 
inclined  to  believe  it  the  truth.  And  as  it  is  shown  in 
the  second  part"  of  this  Treatise,  that  there  is  nothing 
of  such  peculiar  presumption  against  a  revelation  in  the 
beginning  of  the  world,  as  there  is  supposed  to  be  against 
subsequent  ones  :  a  sceptic  could  not,  I  think,  give  any 
account,  which  would  appear  more  probable  even  to  himself, 
of  the  early  pretences  to  revelation  ;  than  by  supposing 
some  real  original  one,  from  whence  they  were  copied  '. 
And  the  third  thing  above  mentioned,  that  there  is  express 
historical  or  traditional  evidence  as  ancient  as  history,  o 
the  system  of  religion  being  taught  mankind  by  revelation  ; 
this  must  be  admitted  as  some  degree  of  real  proof,  that 
it  was  so  taught.  For  why  should  not  the  most  ancient 
tradition  be  admitted,  as  some  additional  proof  of  a  fact, 
against  which  there  is  no  presumption?  And  this  proof 
is  mentioned  here,  because  it  has  its  weight  to  show,  that 
religion  came  into  the  world  by  revelation,  prior  to  all 
consideration  of  the  proper  authority  of  any  book  supposed 
to  contain  it ;  and  even  prior  to  all  consideration,  whether 
the  revelation  itself  be  uncorruptly  handed  down  and  re- 


;C 


n  Part  II.  chap.  ii. 

1  Unless  the  sceptic  (supposed  by  some,  that  all  approaches  to 
to  be  a  theist)  held  it  to  be  im-  religion  were  made  by  innumer- 
possible  for  the  Creator  to  find  able  slow  and  gradual  steps,  reach- 
any  means  beyond  what  external  ing,  after  this  illimitable  series, 
nature  supplies  for  conveying  his  the  idea  of  God  :  which  is  against 
will  to  the  minds  of  his  creatures:  all  testimony  concerning  the 
or  else  held,  as  is  now  pretended  earliest  history  of  our  race. 


128  OF   THE    OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [I.  VI. 

lated,  or  mixed  and  darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the 
historical  account,  which  we  have,  of  the  origin  of  religion, 
taking  in  all  circumstances,  is  a  real  confirmation  of  its 
truth,  no  way  aifected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity.  And 
the  external  evidence1,  even  of  natural  religion,  is  by  no 
means  inconsiderable. 

§  19.    Our  perceptions,  though  faulty,  are  still  our  guides, 
and  are  not  to  be  superseded  ~by  fashion. 

But  it  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be 
recollected  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion,  which  are 
only  general ;  that  as  speculative  reason  may  be  neglected, 
prejudiced,  and  deceived,  so  also  may  our  moral  under- 
standing be  impaired  and  perverted,  and  the  dictates  of  it 
not  impartially  attended  to.  This  indeed  proves  nothing 
against  the  reality  of  our  speculative  or  practical  faculties 
of  perception  ;  against  their  being  intended  by  nature, 
to  inform  us  in  the  theory  of  things,  and  instruct  us  how 
we  are  to  behave,  and  what  we  are  to  expect  in  consequence 
of  our  behaviour.  Yet  our  liableness,  in  the  degree  we 
are  liable,  to  prejudice  and  perversion,  is  a  most  serious 
admonition  to  us  to  be  upon  our  guard,  with  respect  to 
what  is  of  such  consequence,  as  our  determinations  con- 
cerning virtue  and  religion  :  and  particularly  not  to  take 
custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight  notions  of  honour,  or 
imaginations  of  present  ease,  use,  and  convenience  to 
mankind,  for  the  only  moral  rule  °. 

§  20.    Suppose  the  fatalist  to  argue  against  religion  that 
punishment  of  necessary  action  is  incredible, 

The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  nature  of 
the  thing,  and  the  histoiy  of  religion,  amount,  when  taken 
together,  to  a  real  practical  proof  of  it,  not  to  be  confuted : 
such  a  proof  as,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of  the 

0  Dissert.  II. 


1  Videlicet,  that  of  history,  monu-       some  reference  has  already  been 
ments,  and  traditions ;  to  which      made. 


§§  i9-2i]  AS   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE  129 

thing,  I  apprehend,  would  be  admitted  fully  sufficient, 
in  reason,  to  influence  the  actions  of  men,  who  act  upon 
thought  and  reflection ;  if  it  were  admitted  that  there 
is  no  proof  of  the  contrary.  But  it  may  be  said  :  '  There 
are  many  probabilities,  which  cannot  indeed  be  confuted, 
i.  e.  shown  to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may  be  over- 
balanced by  greater  probabilities  on  the  other  side ;  much 
more  by  demonstration.  And  there  is  no  occasion  to 
object  against  particular  arguments  alleged  for  an  opinion, 
when  the  opinion  itself  may  be  clearly  shown  to  be  false, 
without  meddling  with  such  arguments  at  all,  but  leaving 
them  just  as  they  arei'.  Now  the  method  of  government 
by  rewards  and  punishments,  and  especially  rewarding 
and  punishing  good  and  ill  desert  as  such  respectively, 
must  go  upon  supposition,  that  we  are  free  and  not  neces- 
sary agents l.  And  it  is  incredible,  that  the  Author  of 
nature  should  govern  us  upon  a  supposition  as  true,  which 
he  knows  to  be  false  ;  and  therefore  absurd  to  think,  he 
will  reward  or  punish  us  for  our  actions  hereafter ;  espe- 
cially that  he  will  do  it  under  the  notion,  that  they  are 
of  good  or  ill  desert.' 

§  21.   Necessary  action  is  not  punishable :  but  ice  have 
the  experimental  fact  of  moral  government ; 

Here  then  the  matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And 
the  answer  to  all  this  is  full,  and  not  to  be  evaded : 
that  the  whole  constitution  and  course  of  things,  the 
whole  analogy  of  Providence,  shows  beyond  possibility  of 
doubt,  that  the  conclusion  from  this  reasoning  is  false  ; 


P  Pages  i,  10  [corresponding  with  Introd.  §§  i,  2,  14-16,  in  the 
present  edition.  I  fail,  however,  to  trace  the  reference  intended 
by  the  author.— ED.]. 


1  Fitzgerald  thinks  it  important  that  there  is  a  persuasion  of  our 

to  distinguish  between  the  '  reli-  being   free,  though  a  false   per- 

gious  necessitarian,'  who  in  regard  suasion.        But     Butler's     argu- 

to  a  particular  action  denies  that  ment  strikes  alike  both  of  these 

he  could  have  willed  otherwise,  unfounded  and  mischievous  opi- 

and  the  irreligious,  who  allows  nions. 

VOL.  I.  K 


130  OF   THE    OPINION   OF  NECESSITY  [l.  VI. 

wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine  of  freedom  indeed 
clearly  shows  where :  in  supposing  ourselves  necessary, 
when  in  truth  we  are  free  agents.  But  upon  the  supposi- 
tion of  necessity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  taking  for  granted,  that 
it  is  incredible  necessary  agents  should  be  rewarded  and 
punished.  But  that,  somehow  or  other,  the  conclusion 
now  mentioned  is  false,  is  most  certain.  For  it  is  fact, 
that  God  does  govern  even  brute  creatures  by  the  method 
of  rewards  and  punishments,  in  the  natural  course  of  things. 
And  men  are  rewarded  and  punished  for  their  actions, 
punished  for  actions  mischievous  to  society  as  being  so, 
punished  for  vicious  actions  as  such  ;  by  the  natural  instru- 
mentality of  each  other,  under  the  present  conduct  of 
Providence.  Nay  even  the  affection  of  gratitude,  and  the 
passion  of  resentment,  and  the  rewards  and  punishments 
following  from  them,  which  in  general  are  to  be  considered 
as  natural,  i.  e.  from  the  Author  of  nature ;  these  rewards 
and  punishments,  being  naturally  o  annexed  to  actions  con- 
sidered as  implying  good  intention  and  good  desert,  ill 
intention  and  ill  desert ;  these  natural  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, I  say,  are  as  much  a  contradiction  to  the  conclusion 
above,  and  show  its  falsehood,  as  a  more  exact  and  com- 
plete rewarding  and  punishing  of  good  and  ill  desert 
as  such. 


§  22.  Which  consequently  shows  our  actions  not  to  le 
necessary. 

So  that  if  it  be  incredible,  that  necessary  agents  should 
be  thus  rewarded  and  punished  ;  then,  men  are  not  neces- 
sary but  free  ;  since  it  is  matter  of  fact,  that  they  are  thus 
rewarded  and  punished.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  which  is 
the  supposition  we  have  been  arguing  upon,  it  be  insisted, 
that  men  are  necessary  agents ;  then,  there  is  nothing  in- 
credible in  the  further  supposition  of  necessary  agents  being 
thus  rewarded  and  punished :  since  we  ourselves  are  thus 
dealt  with. 

i  Serm.  viii.  at  the  Rolls. 


§§  22-24]  4S   INFLUENCING   PRACTICE  131 


§  23.    So,  as  an  opinion  referable  to  practice,  it  is  false. 

From  the  whole  therefore  it  must  follow,  that  a  necessity 
supposed  possible,  and  reconcilable  with  the  constitution 
of  things,  does  in  no  sort  prove  that  the  Author  of  Nature 
will  not,  nor  destroy  the  proof  that  he  will,  finally  and 
upon  the  whole,  in  his  eternal  government,  render  his 
creatures  happy  or  miserable,  by  some  means  or  other,  as 
they  behave  well  or  ill.  Or,  to  express  this  conclusion  in 
words  conformable  to  the  title  of  the  chapter,  the  analogy 
of  nature  shows  us,  that  the  opinion  of  necessity,  con- 
sidered as  practical,  is  false.  And  if  necessity,  upon  the 
supposition  above  mentioned,  doth  not  destroy  the  proof 
of  natural  religion,  it  evidently  makes  no  alteration  in  the 
proof  of  revealed. 


§  24.    But,  if  at  peace  ivitli  fact,  it  would  be  at  peace 
with  relief  ion. 

From  these  things  likewise  \ve  may  learn,  in  what  sense 
to  understand  that  general  assertion,  that  the  opinion  of 
necessity  is  essentially  destructive  of  all  religion.  First, 
in  a  practical  sense ;  that  by  this  notion,  atheistical  men 
pretend  to  satisfy  and  encourage  themselves  in  vice,  and 
justify  to  others  their  disregard  to  all  religion.  And 
secondly,  in  the  strictest  sense  ;  that  it  is  a  contradiction 
to  the  whole  constitution  of  nature,  and  to  what  we  may 
every  moment  experience  in  ourselves,  and  so  overturns 
every  thing1.  But  by  no  means  is  this  assertion  to  be 
understood,  as  if  necessity,  supposing  it  could  possibly 
be  reconciled  with  the  constitution  of  things  and  with  what 
we  experience,  were  not  also  reconcilable  with  religion  :  for 
upon  this  supposition,  it  demonstrably  is  so. 


1  Some  commentators  on  Butler  such  a  sense  :  and  surely  as  vision 

hold  that 'necessity' is  admissible  is  a  thing  totally  separate   from 

and  just,  in  the  sense  of  foreknow-  causation,  so  is  prevision  :  and  it 

ledge.     So  Angus  and  Chalmers.  is   a  confusion   of  ideas  to   mix 

But    he    nowhere    acknowledges  certainty  with  necessity. 

K  2 


132  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  [l.  VII. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF   GOD,  CONSIDERED  AS  A   SCHEME 
OR   CONSTITUTION,    IMPERFECTLY   COMPREHENDED. 

§  i.  Analogy  proves  the  fact  rather  than  the  right  of 
the  divine  government. 

rPHOUGH  it  be,  as  it  cannot  but  be,  acknowledged,  that 
J-  the  analogy  of  nature  gives  a  strong  credibility  to  the 
general  doctrine  of  religion,  and  to  the  several  particular 
things  contained  in  it,  considered  as  so  many  matters  of 
fact ;  and  likewise  that  it  showrs  this  credibility  not  to  be 
destroyed  by  any  notions  of  necessity :  yet  still,  objections 
may  be  insisted  upon,  against  the  wisdom,  equity,  and 
goodness  of  the  divine  government  implied  in  the  notion 
of  religion,  and  against  the  method  by  which  this  govern- 
ment is  conducted  ;  to  which  objections  analogy  can  be  no 
direct  answer.  For  the  credibility,  or  the  certain  truth,  of 
a  matter  of  fact,  does  not  immediately  prove  any  thing  con- 
cerning the  wisdom  or  goodness  of  it :  and  analogy  can  do 
no  more,  immediately  or  directly,  than  show  such  and  such 
things  to  be  true  or  credible,  considered  only  as  matters 
of  fact. 

§  2.  Effects  something,  if  showing  it  to  be  (a)  a  scheme, 
(b)  imperfectly  comprehended. 

But  still,  if,  upon  supposition  of  a  moral  constitution  of 
nature  and  a  moral  government  over  it,  analogy  suggests 
and  makes  it  credible  that  this  government  must  be 
a  scheme,  system,  or  constitution  of  government,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  number  of  single  unconnected  acts  of 
distributive  justice  and  goodness  ;  and  likewise,  that  it 
must  be  a  scheme,  so  imperfectly  comprehended,  and 
of  such  a  sort  in  other  respects,  as  to  aiford  a  direct 
general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and 
goodness  of  it  :  then  analogy  is,  remotely,  of  great  service 
in  answering  those  objections  ;  both  by  suggesting  the 
answer,  and  showing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 


§§  i-5]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  133 

§  3.  So  much  it  effects. 

Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the  case. 
For,  First,  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral 
government  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural 
government  suggests  and  makes  it  credible,  that  his 
moral  government  must  be  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our 
comprehension  :  and  this  affords  a  general  answer  to  all 
objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  it.  And, 
Secondly,  A  more  distinct  observation  of  some  particular 
things  contained  in  God's  scheme  of  natural  government, 
the  like  things  being  supposed,  by  analogy,  to  be  contained 
in  his  moral  government,  will  further  show,  how  little 
weight 1  is  to  be  laid  upon  these  objections. 

§  4.  In  Mil  points  the  moral  government  is  analogous 

to  the  natural. 

[I.]  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral  govern- 
ment over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural  government 
suggests  and  makes  it  credible,  that  his  moral  government 
must  be  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  comprehension  :  and 
this  affords  a  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the 
justice  and  goodness  of  it.  It  is  most  obvious,  analogy 
renders  it  highly  credible,  that,  upon  supposition  of  a  moral 
government,  it  must  be  a  scheme  ;  for  the  world,  and  the 
whole  natural  government  of  it,  appears  to  be  so  :  to  be 
a  scheme,  system,  or  constitution,  whose  parts  correspond 
to  each  other,  and  to  a  whole  ;  as  really  as  any  work  of  art, 
or  as  any  particular  model  of  a  civil  constitution  and 
government.  In  this  great  scheme  of  the  natural  world, 
individuals  have  various  peculiar  relations  to  other  in- 
dividuals of  their  own  species.  And  whole  species  are, 
we  find,  variously  related  to  other  species,  upon  this  earth. 

§  5.  Earthly  relations  may  extend  beyond  earth. 

Nor  do  we  know,  how  much  further  these  kinds  of 
relations  may  extend  2.  And,  as  there  is  not  any  action 

1  Compare  Introd.  §  17.  Butler's   disposition   to   refer    to 

2  Inf.  viii.    i.     It  seems   as  if      portions  of  the  universe  outside 


134  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  [I.  VII. 

or  natural  event,  which  we  are  acquainted  with,  so  single 
and  unconnected,  as  not  to  have  a  respect  to  some  other 
actions  and  events  :  so  possibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has 
not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a  remote,  natural  relation 
to  other  actions  and  events,  much  beyond  the  compass  of 
this  present  world.  There  seems  indeed  nothing,  from 
whence  we  can  so  much  as  make  a  conjecture,  whether 
all  creatures,  actions,  and  events,  throughout  the  whole 
of  nature,  have  relations  to  each  other.  But,  as  it 
is  obvious,  that  all  events  have  future  unknown  conse- 
quences ;  so  if  we  trace  any,  as  far  as  we  can  go,  into 
what  is  connected  with  it,  we  shall  find,  that  if  such  event 
were  not  connected  with  somewhat  further  in  nature 
unknown  to  us,  somewhat  both  past  and  present,  such 
event  could  not  possibly  have  been  at  all. 

§6.   We  cannot  glee  cm  entire  account  of  any  one  thing*. 

Nor  can  we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing 
whatever :  of  all  its  causes,  ends,  and  necessary  adjuncts  ; 
those  adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  which  it  could  not  have  been. 
By  this  most  astonishing  connection,  these  reciprocal  corre- 
spondencies and  mutual  relations,  every  thing  which  we  see 
in  the  course  of  nature  is  actually  brought  about.  And  things 
seemingly  the  most  insignificant  imaginable  are  perpetually 
observed  to  be  necessary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the 
greatest  importance  :  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever  may, 
for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  be  a  necessary  condition 
to  any  other.  The  natural  world  then,  and  natural  govern- 
ment of  it,  being  such  an  incomprehensible  scheme ;  so 
incomprehensible,  that  a  man  must,  really  in  the  literal 
sense,  know  nothing  at  all,  who  is  not  sensible  of  his  igno- 


this  earth  as  possibly  concerned  creation  at  large, 
in  an  earthly  dispensation,  may  l  Butler's  views  of  human  igno- 

have  been  due  to  his  considering  ranee  are  set  forth  in  Serm.  xv, 

the  vastness  and  weight  of  the  which  deals  professedly  with  the 

Divine  Incarnation  in  relation  to  subject :  much  of  it  in  the  manner 

the  smallness  of  this  world,  and  of  the  Analogy.     See  particularly 

possibly  of  its  inhabitants,  as  com-  Serm.  xv.  §§  3-9,  and  12  with  its 

pared  with  the  immense  range  of  note. 


§§6-8]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  135 

ranee  in  it :  this  immediately  suggests,  and  strongly  shows 
the  credibility,  that  the  moral  world  and  government  of  it 
may  be  so  too. 

§  7.  Natural  government  may  be  subservient  to  moral, 
and  blent  with  it. 

Indeed  the  natural  and  moral  constitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  world  are  so  connected,  as  to  make  up  together 
but  one  scheme  :  and  it  is  highly  probable,  that  the  first 
is  formed  and  carried  on  merely  in  subserviency  to  the 
latter  ;  as  the  vegetable  world  is  for  the  animal,  and  or- 
ganized bodies  for  minds.  But  the  thing  intended  here  is, 
without  inquiring  how  far  the  administration  of  the  natural 
world  is  subordinate  to  that  of  the  moral,  only  to  ojbserve 
the  credibility,  that  one  should  be  analogous  or  similar  to 
the  other  : 

§  8.  Each  part  of  moral  government  may  be  subservient 
to  other  parts,  or  to  the  ichole. 

That  therefore  every  act  of  divine  justice  and  goodness 
may  be  supposed  to  look  much  beyond  itself,  and  its 
immediate  object T  ;  may  have  some  reference  to  other 
parts  of  God's  moral  administration,  and  to  a  general  moral 
plan  :  and  that  every  circumstance  of  this  his  moral  govern- 
ment may  be  adjusted  beforehand  with  a  view  to  the  whole 
of  it.  Thus  for  example  :  the  determined  length  of  time, 
and  the  degrees  and  ways,  in  which  virtue  is  to  remain 
in  a  state  of  warfare  and  discipline,  and  in  which  wicked- 
ness is  permitted  to  have  its  progress  ;  the  times  appointed 
for  the  execution  of  justice  ;  the  appointed  instruments  of 
it ;  the  kinds  of  rewards  and  punishments,  and  the  manners 
of  their  distribution  ;  all  particular  instances  of  divine 
justice  and  goodness,  and  every  circumstance  of  them,  may 
have  such  respects  to  each  other,  as  to  make  up  altogether 
a  whole,  connected  and  related  in  all  its  parts  :  a  scheme  or 


1  This  is  in  fact  proved  by  the      of  a  scheme  necessarily  has  refer- 
proof  of  a  scheme,  since  each  part       ence  to  the  other  parts. 


136  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  [I.  vil. 

system,  which  is  as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world  is, 
and  of  the  like  kind. 

§  9.  Our  ignorance  of  the  whole  precludes  judgments 
upon  the  parts ; 

And  supposing  this  to  be  the  case ;  it  is  most  evident, 
that  we  are  not  competent  judges  of  this  scheme,  from  the 
small  parts  of  it  which  come  within  our  view  in  the  present 
life  :  and  therefore  no  objections  against  any  of  these  parts 
can  be  insisted  upon  by  reasonable  men. 

§  10.  And  ansivers  objections  against  Providence, 
This  our  ignorance,  and  the  consequence  here  drawn  from 
it,  are  universally  acknowledged  upon  other  occasions  ;  and 
though  scarce  denied,  yet  are  universally  forgot,  when 
persons  come  to  argue  against  religion.  And  it  is  not 
perhaps  easy,  even  for  the  most  reasonable  men,  always 
to  bear  in  mind  the  degree  of  our  ignorance,  and  make  due 
allowances  for  it.  Upon  these  accounts,  it  may  not  be 
useless  to  go  on  a  little  further,  in  order  to  show  more 
distinctly,  how  just  an  answer  our  ignorance  is.  to 
objections  against  the  scheme  of  Providence. 

§  ii.  And  ivouU  hold  in  the  main  even  were  there 

no  scheme,  or  the  scheme  a  defect. 

Suppose  then  a  person  boldly  to  assert,  that  the  things 
complained  of,  the  origin  and  continuance  of  evil,  might 
easily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated  interpositions a  ; 
interpositions  so  guarded  and  circumstanced,  as  would 
preclude  all  mischief  arising  from  them ;  or,  if  this  were 
impracticable,  that  a  scheme  of  government  is  itself  an 
imperfection  ;  since  more  good  might  have  been  produced, 
without  any  scheme,  system,  or  constitution  at  all,  by 
continued  single  unrelated  acts  of  distributive  justice  and 
goodness;  because  these  would  have  occasioned  no  irre- 
gularities. And  further  than  this,  it  is  presumed,  the 

a  Inf.  §§  17-19. 


§§9-i3]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  137 

objections  will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is  obvious  : 
that  were  these  assertions  true,  still  the  observations  above, 
concerning  our  ignorance  in  the  scheme  of  divine  govern- 
ment, and  the  consequence  drawn  from  it,  would  hold,  in 
great  measure  ;  enough  to  vindicate  religion,  against  all 
objections  from  the  disorders  of  the  present  state.  Were 
these  assertions  true,  yet  the  government  of  the  world 
might  be  just  and  good  notwithstanding  ;  for,  at  the  most, 
they  would  infer  nothing  more  than  that  it  might  have 
been  better. 

§  12,   Which  are  indeed  fait  arbitrary  untested 
assertions. 

But  indeed  they  are  mere  arbitrary  assertions  :  no  man 
being  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  possibilities  of  things, 
to  bring  any  proof  of  them,  to  the  lowest  degree  of  proba- 
bility. For  however  possible  what  is  asserted  may  seem  ; 
yet  many  instances  may  be  alleged,  in  things  much  less 
out  of  our  reach,  of  suppositions  absolutely  impossible,  and 
reducible  to  the  most  palpable  self-contradictions,  which, 
not  every  one  by  any  means  would  perceive  to  be  such,  nor 
perhaps  any  one  at  first  sight  suspect. 

§  13.   The  ansiver  may  lie  in  some  unknown 
relation,  or  impossibility. 

From  these  things,  it  is  easy  to  see  distinctly,  how  our 
ignorance,  as  it  is  the  common,-  is  really  a  satisfactory 
answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness 
of  Providence.  If  a  man,  contemplating  any  one  provi- 
dential dispensation,  which  had  no  relation  to  any  others, 
should  object,  that  he  discerned  in  it  a  disregard  to  justice, 
or  a  deficiency  of  goodness ;  nothing  would  be  less  an 
answer  to  such  objection,  than  our  ignorance  in  other 
parts  of  Providence,  or  in  the  possibilities  of  things,  no 
way  related  to  what  he  was  contemplating.  But  when 
we  know  not  but  the  parts  objected  against  may  be  relative 
to  other  parts  unknown  to  us  ;  and  when  we  are  unacquainted 
with  what  is,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  practicable  in  the 


138  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  [I.  VII. 

case  before  us  ;  then  our  ignorance  is  a  satisfactory  answer  : 
because,  some  unknown  relation,  or  some  unknown  impos- 
sibility, may  render  what  is  objected  against,  just  and  good  ; 
nay  good  in  the  highest  practicable  degree. 

§  14.    Experience  slioivs  us  ends  are  siibservcd  by 
means  we  should  think  unlikely ; 

[II.]  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such 
objections,  will  further  appear,  by  a  more  distinct  observa- 
tion of  some  particular  things  contained  in  the  natural 
government  of  God,  the  like  to  which  may  be  supposed, 
from  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral  government. 

First,  As  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  no  ends 
appear  to  be  accomplished  without  means :  so  we  find 
that  means  very  undesirable,  often  conduce  to  bring  about 
ends  in  such  a  measure  desirable,  as  greatly  to  overbalance 
the  disagreeableness  of  the  means.  And  in  cases  where 
such  means  are  conducive  to  such  ends,  it  is  not  reason, 
but  experience,  which  shows  us,  that  they  are  thus  con- 
ducive. Experience  also  shows  many  means  to  be  conducive 
and  necessary  to  accomplish  ends,  which  means,  before 
experience,  we  should  have  thought,  would  have  had  even 
a  contrary  tendency. 

§  15.    And  such  provisions  of  the  moral  scheme  may 
le  good,  even  indispensable. 

Now  from  these  observations  relating  to  the  natural 
scheme  of  the  world,  the  moral  being  supposed  analogous 
to  it,  arises  a  great  credibility,  that  the  putting  our  misery 
in  each  other  s  power  to  the  degree  it  is,  and  making  men 
liable  to  vice  to  the  degree  we  are;  and  in  general,  that 
those  things  which  are  objected  against  the  moral  scheme 
of  Providence,  may  be,  upon  the  whole,  friendly  and 
assistant  to  virtue,  and  productive  of  an  overbalance  of 
happiness  :  i.  e.  the  things  objected  against  may  be  means, 
by  which  an  overbalance  of  good  will,  in  the  end,  be  found 
produced.  And  from  the  same  observations,  it  appears  to 
be  no  presumption  against  this,  that  we  do  not,  if  indeed 


§§  i4-i6]          IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  139 

we  do  not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such  tendency ; 
or  that  they  seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary  one.  Thus 
those  things,  which  we  call  irregularities,  may  not  be  so 
at  all :  because  they  may  be  means  of  accomplishing  wise 
and  good  ends  more  considerable.  And  it  may  be  added, 
as  above  b,  that  they  may  also  be  the  only  means,  by  which 
these  wise  and  good  ends  are  capable  of  being  accomplished. 

§  1 6.   Evils  may  work  for  good,  though  ice  might 
have  l)cen  letter  without  them*. 

After  these  observations  it  may  be  proper  to  add,  in  order 
to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  conclusion  from  any  of 
them,  that  though  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  from 
whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and  misery,  may,  as  it 
undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to  the  perfection  and  happi- 
ness of  the  world  ;  and  though  the  actual  permission  of 
evil  may  be  beneficial  to  it :  (i.  e.  it  would  have  been 
more  mischievous,  not  that  a  wicked  person  had  himself 
abstained  from  his  own  wickedness,  but  that  any  one 
had  forcibly  prevented  it,  than  that  it  was  permitted :) 
yet  notwithstanding,  it  might  have  been  much  better  for 
the  world,  if  this  veiy  evil  had  never  been  done.  Nay, 
it  is  most  clearly  conceivable,  that  the  very  commission 
of  wickedness  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world,  and  yet, 
that  it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for  men  to 
refrain  from  it. 


b  Sup.  §  13. 


1  Not  that  vice  contributes,  but  (6)  That  if  so,  God  must  choose 

that  freedom  of  choice  between  it,  and  with  a  wise  and  holy  choice, 

good  and  evil  contributes,  to  ele-  (c)  That  men  will   sin  as  sin, 

vate    our   condition.      Fitzgerald  which  God  does  not. 

shows  how   Jonathan    Edwards,  But  is  it  not  rather  true  that 

overleaping  all  barriers,  carries  us  men  do  not  will  sin  as  sin,  but  for 

into  peril,  teaching  as  follows  :  the  sake  of  obtaining  enjoyment 

(a)  That  no  sensible  man  will  by  it  ?    The    whole   speculation, 

declare  it,  for  certain,  to  be  im-  however,  is  on  forbidden  ground, 

possible  that  it   is  best   for  the  useless  as  to  results  ;  and  we  see 

world  that  there  should  be  such  a  pious  man  on   the   borders,  at 

a  thing  as  moral  evil  in  it.  the  least,  of  sheer  impiety. 


140  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF  GOD  [I.  VII. 

§  17.   Like  those  disorders  ^vh^ch  bring  their  own  ewe. 

For  thus,  in  the  wise  and  good  constitution  of  the  natural 
world,  there  are  disorders  which  bring  their  own  cures  ; 
diseases,  which  are  themselves  remedies.  Many  a  man 
would  have  died,  had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  a  fever ; 
yet  it  would  be  thought  madness  to  assert,  that  sickness  is 
a  better  or  more  perfect  state  than  health  :  though  the  like, 
with  regard  to  the  moral  world,  has  been  asserted.  But, 

§  1 8.   Natural  government,  worked  under  general  laivs, 
thus  alloivs  action  ivith  forethought. 

Secondly,  The  natural  government  of  the  world  is  carried 
on  by  general  laws !.  "  For  this  there  may  be  wise  and  good 
reasons :  the  wisest  and  best,  for  ought  we  know  to  the 
contrary.  And  that  there  are  such  reasons,  is  suggested 
to  our  thoughts  by  the  analogy  of  nature  :  by  our  being 
made  to  experience  good  ends  to  be  accomplished,  as  indeed 
all  the  good  which  we  enjoy  is  accomplished,  by  this  means, 
that  the  laws,  by  which  the  world  is  governed,  are  general. 
For  we  have  scarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments,  but  what  we 
are,  in  some  way  or  other,  instrumental  in  procuring  our- 
selves, by  acting  in  a  manner  which  we  foresee  likely  to 
procure  them  :  now  this  foresight  could  not  be  at  all, 
were  not  the  government  of  the  world  carried  on  by 
general  laws.  And  though,  for  ought  we  know  to  the 
contrary,  every  single  case  may  be,  at  length,  found  to 
have  been  provided  for  even  by  these :  yet  to  prevent 
all  irregularities,  or  remedy  them  as  they  arise,  by  the 
wisest  and  best  general  laws,  may  be  impossible  in  the 
nature  of  things ;  as  we  see  it  is  absolutely  impossible 
in  civil  government. 

§  19.   Irregular  interpositions  might  do  more  harm 
than  good. 

But  then  we  are  ready  to  think,  that,  the  constitution 
of  nature  remaining  as  it  is,  and  the  course  of  things  being 


1  Comp.  Berkeley,  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  pp.  30,  31. 


§§  17-19]          IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  141 

permitted  to  go  on,  in  other  respects,  as  it  does,  there 
might  be  interpositions  to  prevent  irregularities  ;  though 
they  could  not  have  been  prevented  or  remedied  by  any 
general  laws.  And  there  would  indeed  be  reason  to  wish, 
which,  by  the  way,  is  veiy  different  from  a  right  to  claim, 
that  all  irregularities  were  prevented  or  remedied  by  present 
interpositions,  if  these  interpositions  would  have  no  other 
effect  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they  would  have  some 
visible  and  immediate  bad  effects :  for  instance,  they  would 
encourage  idleness  and  negligence ;  and  they  would  render 
doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life,  which  is  ascertained  by 
this  very  thing,  that  the  course  of  the  world  is  carried 
on  by  general  laws.  And  further,  it  is  certain  they  would 
have  distant  effects,  and  very  great  ones  too ;  by  means 
of  the  wonderful  connections  before  mentioned  c.  So  that 
we  cannot  so  much  as  guess,  what  would  be  the  whole 
result  of  the  interpositions  desired.  It  may  be  said,  any 
bad  result  might  be  prevented  by  further  interpositions, 
whenever  there  was  occasion  for  them :  but  this  again  is 
talking  quite  at  random,  and  in  the  darkd.  Upon  the 
whole  then,  we  see  wise  reasons,  why  the  course  of  the 
world  should  be  carried  on  by  general  laws,  and  good  ends 
accomplished  by  this  means :  and,  for  ought  we  know, 
there  may  be  the  wisest  reasons  for  it,  and  the  best 
ends  accomplished  by  it.  We  have  no  ground  to  believe, 
that  all  irregularities  could  be  remedied  as  they  arise, 
or  could  have  been  precluded,  by  general  laws.  We  find 
that  interpositions  would  produce  evil,  and  prevent  good  : 
and,  for  ought  we  know,  they  would  produce  greater  evil 
than  they  would  prevent ;  and  prevent  greater  good  than 
they  would  produce.  And  if  this  be  the  case,  then  the 
not, jnterposing  is  so  far  from  being  a  ground  of  complaint, 
that  it  is  an  instance  of  goodness.  This  is  intelligible  and 
sufficient  :  and  going  further,  seems  beyond  the  utmost 
reach  of  our  faculties. 


Sup.  §§  5-9-  d  Sup.  §§  12,  13. 


142  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   GOD  [I.  vii. 

§  20.    Our  ignorance,  not  being  total,  need  not  Hind 
us  to  the  positive  proofs  of  religion  \ 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  'after  all,  these  supposed 
impossibilities  and  relations  are  what  we  are  unacquainted 
with  ;  and  we  must  judge  of  religion,  as  of  other  things, 
by  what  we  do  know,  and  look  upon  the  rest  as  nothing : 
or  however,  that  the  answers  here  given  to  what  is  objected 
against  Religion,  may  equally  be  made  use  of  to  invalidate 
the  proof  of  it ;  since  their  stress  lies  so  very  much  upon 
our  ignorance.'  But, 

First,  Though  total  ignorance  in  any  matter  does  indeed 
equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude,  all  proof  concerning 
it,  and  objections  against  it  ;  yet  partial  ignorance  does 
not.  For  we  may  in  any  degree  be  convinced,  that  a 
person  is  of  such  a  character,  and  consequently  will 
pursue  such  ends ;  though  we  are  greatly  ignorant,  what 
is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the  most  effectually  to 
obtain  those  ends :  and  in  this  case,  objections  against  his 
manner  of  acting,  as  seemingly  not  conducive  to  obtain 
them,  might  be  answered  by  our  ignorance  ;  though  the 
proof  that  such  ends  were  intended,  might  not  at  all  be 
invalidated  by  it.  Thus,  the  proof  of  religion  is  a  proof 
of  the  moral  character  of  God,  and  consequently  that 
his  government  is  moral,  and  that  every  one  upon  the 
whole  shall  receive  according  to  his  deserts  ;  a  proof  that 
this  is  the  designed  end  of  his  government.  But  we  are 
not  competent  judges,  what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting, 
in  order  the  most  effectually  to  accomplish  this  end6. 
Therefore  our  ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objections  against 
the  conduct  of  Providence,  in  permitting  irregularities, 
as  seeming  contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since  it  is  so 
obvious,  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  satisfactory  answer 
to  objections  against  a  thing,  and  yet  not  affect  the  proof 
of  it ;  till  it  can  be  shown,  it  is  frivolous  to  assert,  that 


e  Introd.  §  12. 

1  Our  ignorance,  being  in  the       presumptively  blind    us    within 
nature  of  a  limitation,  does  not      the  range  still  permitted  to  us. 


§§  20-22]          IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  143 

our  ignorance  invalidates  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  does 
the  objections  against  it. 

§  21.   Were  religion  unknown,  moral  duties  would  remain, 
(a)  as  right,  (b)  as  perhaps  rcirardalle. 

Secondly,  Suppose  unknown  impossibilities,  and  un- 
known relations,  might  justly  be  urged  to  invalidate  the 
proof  of  religion,  as  well  as  to  answer  objections  against 
it :  and  that  in  consequence  of  this,  the  proof  of  it  were 
doubtful.  Yet  still,  let  the.  assertion  be  despised,  or  let  it 
be  ridiculed,  it  is  undeniably  true,  that  moral  obligations 
would  remain  certain,  though  it  were  not  certain  what 
would,  upon  the  whole,  be  the  consequences  of  observing  or 
violating  them.  For,  these  obligations  arise  immediately  and 
necessarily  from  the  judgment  of  our  own  mind,  unless 
perverted,  which  we  cannot  violate  without  being  self-con- 
demned. And  they  would  be  certain  too,  from  considerations 
of  interest.  For  though  it  were  doubtful,  what  will  be  the 
future  consequences  of  virtue  and  vice ;  yet  it  is,  how- 
ever, credible,  that  they  may  have  those  consequences, 
which  Religion  teaches  us  they  will  :  and  this  credibility 
is  a  certain  f  obligation  in  point  of  prudence,  to  abstain  from 
all  wickedness,  and  to  live  in  the  conscientious  practice  of 
all  that  is  good.  But, 

§  22.  Shotvs  hoiv  ignorance,  while  ansicering  objections, 
need  not  injure  proofs  '. 

Thirdly,  The  answers  above  given  to  the  objections 
against  Religion  cannot  equally  be  made  use  of  to  invalidate 
the  proof  of  it.  For,  upon  supposition  that  God  exercises 
a  moral  government  over  the  world,  analogy  does  most 
strongly  lead  us  to  conclude,  that  this  moral  government 


f  Introd.  §  5  ;  and  Part  II.  ch.  vi. 

1  That  ignorance  may  be  a  plea  which  in  ignorance  we  might  con- 
valid  to  exclude  objection  without  demn,  may  prove  to  be  themselves 
marring  proof  is  almost  self-  actual  goods,  which  would  bring 
evident :  but  in  this  section  Butler  them  to  be  not  merely  neutralised, 
further  shows  that  the  very  things,  but  actual  witnesses  in  favour. 


144  THE    GOVERNMENT    OF   COD,    ETC.       [I.  VII.  §  23 

must  be  a  scheme,  or  constitution,  beyond  our  comprehen- 
sion. And  a  thousand  particular  analogies  show  us,  that 
parts  of  such  a  scheme,  from  their  relation  to  other  parts, 
may  conduce  to  accomplish  ends,  which  we  should  have 
thought  they  had  no  tendency  at  all  to  accomplish  :  nay 
ends,  which,  before  experience,  we  should  have  thought 
such  parts  were  contradictory  to,  and  had  a  tendency  to 
prevent.  And  therefore  all  these  analogies  show,  that  the 
way  of  arguing  made  use  of  in  objecting  against  religion 
is  delusive :  because  they  show  it  is  not  at  all  incredible, 
that,  could  we  comprehend  the  whole,  we  should  find 
the  permission  of  the  disorders  objected  against  to  be 
consistent  with  justice  and  goodness  ;  and  even  to  be  in- 
stances of  them.  Now  this  is  not  applicable  to  the  proof 
of  Keligion,  as  it  is  to  the  objections  against  it  e  ;  and 
therefore  cannot  invalidate  that  proof,  as  it  does  these 
objections  *. 

§  23.  The  ignorance  is  such  ignorance,  as  experience 
shoivs  to  disable  in  like  cases. 

Lastly,  From  the  observation  now  made,  it  is  easy  to 
see,  that  the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections  against 
Providence,  though,  in  a  general  way  of  speaking,  they 
may  be  said  to  be  taken  from  our  ignorance ;  yet  are 
by  no  means  taken  merely  from  that,  but  from  somewhat 
which  analogy  shows  us  concerning  it.  For  analogy  shows 
us  positively,  that  our  ignorance  in  the  possibilities  of 
things,  and  the  various  relations  in  nature,  renders  us 
incompetent  judges,  and  leads  us  to  false  conclusions, 
in  cases  similar  to  this,  in  which  we  pretend  to  judge 
and  to  object.  So  that  the  things  above  insisted  upon 


g  Serm.  at  the  Rolls,  p.  312,  2nd  ed. 

1  The  objections  are  inadmis-  to  the  matters  which  have  been 

sible  because  it  is  plain  that  the  alleged  in  proof  of  religion, 

things  objected  to  may  not  be  bad,  The  proofs  may  be  fully  known : 

but  even  good  ;  and  the  objection  whereas  the  disability  of  objection 

may  be  subverted,  even  reversed.  comes  from  this,  that  we  know  only 

But  no  similar  observation  applies  in  part,  and  that  a  very  small  part. 


VIII.  §§  i,  2]  CONCLUSION  145 

are  not  mere  suppositions  of  unknown  impossibilities 
and  relations :  but  they  are  suggested  to  our  thoughts, 
and  even  forced  upon  the  observation  of  serious  men,  and 
rendered  credible  too,  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  And 
therefore,  to  take  these  things  into  the  account,  is  to 
judge  by  experience  and  what  we  do  know  :  and  it  is 
not  judging  so,  to  take  no  notice  of  them. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

CONCLUSION. 

§  i.  This  scene  of  human  life  is  (a)  related  to  something 
beyond  it,  (b)  progressive,  (c)  not  fully  comprehensible. 

HPHE  observations  of  the  last  chapter  lead  us  to  consider 
-*-  this  little  scene  of  human  life,  in  which  we  are  so 
busily  engaged,  as  having  a  reference,  of  some  sort  or 
other,  to  a  much  larger  plan  of  things.  Whether  we  are, 
any  way,  related  to  the  more  distant  parts  of  the  boundless 
universe,  into  which  we  are  brought,  is  altogether  uncertain. 
But  it  is  evident,  that  the  course  of  things,  which  comes 
within  our  view,  is  connected  with  somewhat  past,  present, 
and  future,  beyond  ita.  So  that  we  are  placed,  as  one 
may  speak,  in  the  middle  of  a  scheme,  not  a  fixed  but 
a  progressive  one,  every  way  incomprehensible  :  incompre- 
hensible, in  a  manner  equally,  with  respect  to  what  has 
been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall  be  hereafter.  And  this 
scheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it  somewhat  as  wonderful, 
and  as  much  beyond  our  thought  and  conception  b,  as  any 
thing  in  that  of  religion. 

§  2.  No  escape  found  by  denying  an  intelligent  Author; 

For,  will  any  man  in  his  senses  say,  that  it  is  less  difficult 
to  conceive,  how  the  world  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  it 


a  Svp.  eh.  vii.  §§  5,  6.  b  See  Part  II.  ch.  ii. 

VOL.  I,  L 


I46  CONCLUSION  [I.  VIII. 

is,  without,  than  with,  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor 
of  it?  Or,  admitting  an  intelligent  Governor  of  it,  that 
there  is  some  other  rule  of  government  more  natural,  and 
of  easier  conception,  than  that  which  we  call  moral  ?  In- 
deed, without  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  nature, 
no  account  at  all  can  be  given,  how  this  universe,  or  the 
part  of  it  particularly  in  which  we  are  concerned,  came  to 
be,  and  the  course  of  it  to  be  carried  on,  as  it  is :  nor  any, 
of  its  general  end  and  design,  without  a  moral  Governor  of 
it.  That  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  and 
natural  Governor  of  the  world,  is  a  principle  gone  upon 
in  the  foregoing  Treatise  ;  as  proved,  and  generally  known 
and  confessed  to  be  proved. 

§  3.   WJiose  character  and  goodness  give  us  an  interest 
in  his  scheme. 

And  the  very  notion  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature, 
proved  by  particular  final  causes,  implies  a  will  and  a  char- 
acter0. Now,  as  our  whole  nature,  the  nature  which  he 
has  given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude  his  will  and  character 
to  be  moral,  just,  and  good  :  so  we  can  scarce  in  imagination 
conceive,  what  it  can  be  otherwise.  However,  in  con- 
sequence of  this  his  will  and  character,  whatever  it  be, 
he  formed  the  universe  as  it  is,  and  carries  on  the  course 
of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other  manner ;  and  has 
assigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living  creatures,  a  part  and  a  lot 
in  it.  Irrational  creatures  act  this  their  part,  and  enjoy  and 
undergo  the  pleasures  and  the  pains  allotted  them,  without 
any  reflection.  But  one  would  think  it  impossible,  that 
creatures  endued  with  reason  could  avoid  reflecting  some- 
times upon  all  this  :  reflecting,  if  not  from  whence  we  came, 
yet,  at  least,  whither  we  are  going  ;  and  what  the  mysterious 
scheme,  in  the  midst  of  which  we  find  ourselves,  will,  at 
length,  come  out  and  produce  :  a  scheme  in  which  it  is 
certain  we  are  highly  interested,  and  in  which  we  may  be 
interested  even  beyond  conception. 


c  Sup.  ch.  vi.  §  13. 


§§  3-5]  CONCLUSION  147 

§  4.  To  presume  extinction  at  death  is  no\\ax^s  irrational. 

For  many  things  prove  it  palpably  absurd  to  conclude, 
that  we  shall  cease  to  be,  at  death.  Particular  analogies 
do  most  sensibly  show  us,  that  there  is  nothing  to  be 
thought  strange,  in  our  being  to  exist  in  another  state  of 
life.  And  that  we  are  now  living  beings,  affords  a  strong 
probability  that  we  shall  continue  so  ;  unless  there  be  some 
positive  ground,  and  there  is  none  from  reason  or  analogy, 
to  think  death  will  destroy  us  \  Were  a  persuasion  of  this 
kind  ever  so  well  grounded,  there  would,  surely,  be  little 
reason  to  take  pleasure  in  it.  But  indeed  it  can  have  no 
other  ground,  than  some  such  imagination,  as  that  of  our  gross 
bodies  being  ourselves 2 ;  which  is  contrary  to  experience. 
Experience  too  most  clearly  shows  us  the  folly  of  concluding, 
from  the  body  and  the  living  agent  affecting  each  other 
mutually,  that  the  dissolution  of  the  former  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  latter.  And  there  are  remarkable  instances  of 
their  not  affecting  each  other,  which  lead  us  to  a  contrary 
conclusion.  The  supposition  then,  which  in  all  reason  we 
are  to  go  upon,  is,  that  our  living  nature  will  continue  after 
death. 

§  5.  Hence  a  scope  for  hope  and  fear  in  the  future ;  ivliicli, 
like  as  in  the  present,  may  It  ear  upon  conduct. 

And  it  is  infinitely  unreasonable  to  form  an  institution  of 
life,  or  to  act,  upon  any  other  supposition.  No  wall  expecta- 
tion of  immortality,  whether  more  or  less  certain,  opens 
an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes  and  our  fears  :  since 
we  see  the  constitution  of  nature  is  such,  as  to  admit  of 
misery  as  well  as  to  be  productive  of  happiness,  and  expe- 
rience ourselves  to  partake  of  both  in  some  degree ;  and 
since  we  cannot  but  know,  what  higher  degrees  of  both 


1  See  I.  i.  4.  Butler  would  probably  have  dis- 

2  I.e.  our  whole  selves  :  or  our-  tinguished  between  the  body  here 
selves  so  far  as  to  determine  the  mentioned,  and   the  sensuous  or 
fate  of  the  whole.     Still  the  body  ;  gross '  bodies  which  he  denies  to 
of  the  Christian  is  a  temple  of  the  be  '  ourselves.' 

Holy  Ghost  (i  Cor.  iii.  16  ;  vi.  19). 

L  2 


I48  CONCLUSION  [I.  Vin. 

we  are  capable  of.  And  there  is  no  presumption  against 
believing  further,  that  our  future  interest  depends  upon  our 
present  behaviour :  for  we  see  our  present  interest  doth  ; 
and  that  the  happiness  and  misery,  which  are  naturally 
annexed  to  our  actions,  very  frequently  do  not  follow,  till 
long  after  the  actions  are  done,  to  which  they  are  respectively 
annexed.  So  that  were  speculation  to  leave  us  uncertain, 
whether  it  were  likely,  that  the  Author  of  nature,  in  giving 
happiness  and  misery  to  his  creatures,  hath  regard  to  their 
actions  or  not :  yet,  since  we  find  by  experience  that  he 
hath  such  regard,  the  whole  sense  of  things  which  he  has 
given  us,  plainly  leads  us,  at  once  and  without  any  elaborate 
inquiries,  to  think,  that  it  may,  indeed  must,  be  to  good 
actions  chiefly  that  he  hath  annexed  happiness,  and  to  bad 
actions  misery  ;  or  that  he  will,  upon  the  whole,  reward 
those  who  do  well,  and  punish  those  who  do  evil. 

§  6.   Natural  government  has  a  moral  clement,  leaning 
to  virtue,  operative  in  part, 

To  confirm  this  from  the  constitution  of  the  world,  it  has 
been  observed,  that  some  sort  of  moral  government  is  ne- 
cessarily implied  in  that  natural  government  of  God,  which 
we  experience  ourselves  under :  that  good  and  bad  actions, 
at  present,  are  naturally  rewarded  and  punished,  not  only 
as  beneficial  and  mischievous  to  society,  but  also  as  virtuous 
and  vicious :  and  that  there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
thing,  a  tendency  to  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  in 
a  much  higher  degree  than  they  are  at  present.  And 
though  this  higher  degree  of  distributive  justice,  which 
nature  thus  points  out  and  leads  towards,  is  prevented 
for  a  time  from  taking  place :  it  is  by  obstacles,  which 
the  state  of  this  world  unhappily  throws  in  its  way,  and 
which  therefore  are  in  their  nature  temporary.  Now,  as 
these  things  in  the  natural  conduct  of  Providence  are 
•  observable  on  the  side  of  virtue  ;  so  there  is  nothing  to 
be  set  agianst  them  on  the  side  of  vice.  A  moral  scheme  * 


See  sup.  iii.  4,  5. 


§§  6-8]  CONCLUSION  149 

of  government  then  is  visibly  established,   and,  in  some 
degree,  carried  into  execution  : 

§  7.  And,  subject  to  risk  and  lalour,  promises  an 
enlarged  action  in  a  future  state. 

And  this,  together  with  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue 
and  vice  duly  considered,  naturally  raise  in  us  an  apprehen- 
sion, that  it  will  be  carried  on  further  towards  perfection  in 
a  future  state,  and  that  every  one  shall  there  receive  according 
to  his  deserts.  And  if  this  be  so,  then  our  future  and 
general  interest,  under  the  moral  government  of  God,  is 
appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behaviour ;  notwithstanding 
the  difficulty,  which  this  may  occasion,  of  securing  it,  and 
the  danger  of  losing  it :  just  in  the  same  manner  as  our 
temporal  interest,  under  his  natural  government,  is  appointed 
to  depend  upon  our  behaviour ;  notwithstanding  the  like 
difficulty  and  danger.  For,  from  our  original  constitution, 
and  that  of  the  world  which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally 
trusted  with  ourselves  ;  with  our  own  conduct  and  our  own 
interest.  And  from  the  same  constitution  of  nature,  espe- 
cially joined  with  that  course  of  things  which  is  owing  to 
men,  we  have  temptations  to  be  unfaithful  in  this  trust ; 
to  forfeit  this  interest,  to  neglect  it,  and  run  ourselves 
into  misery  and  ruin.  From  these  temptations  arise  the 
difficulties  of  behaving  so  as  to  secure  our  temporal  interest, 
and  the  hazard  of  behaving  so  as  to  miscarry  in  it.  There 
is  therefore  nothing  incredible  in  supposing  there  may  be 
the  like  difficulty  and  hazard  with  regard  to  that  chief  and 
final  good,  which  religion  lays  before  us. 

§  8.   We  can  partly  give  the  why  of  our  position  ; 
l}ut  not  fully. 

Indeed  the  whole  account,  how  it  came  to  pass  that  we 
were  placed  in  such  a  condition  as  this,  must  be  beyond  our 
comprehension.  But  it  is  in  part  accounted  for  by  what 
religion  teaches  us,  that  the  character  of  virtue  and  piety 
must  be  a  necessary  qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security 
and  happiness,  under  the  moral  government  of  God  ;  in 


I50  CONCLUSION  [I.  VIII. 

like  manner,  as  some  certain  qualifications  or  other  are 
necessary  for  every  particular  condition  of  life,  under  his 
natural  government :  and  that  the  present  state  was  intended 
to  be  a  school  of  discipline,  for  improving  in  ourselves  that 
character. 

§  9.  ire  observe  an  intention  for  our  improvement. 
Now  this  intention  of  nature  is  rendered  highly  credible 
by  observing  ;  that  we  are  plainly  made  for  improvement  of 
all  kinds :  that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of  Providence, 
that  we  cultivate  practical  principles,  and  form  within 
ourselves  habits  of  action,  in  order  to  become  fit  for  what 
we  were  wholly  unfit  for  before  :  that  in  particular,  child- 
hood and  youth  is  naturally  appointed  to  be  a  state  of 
discipline  for  mature  age :  and  that  the  present  world  is 
peculiarly  fitted  for  a  state  of  moral  discipline. 

§  10.  Fatalism  is  disabled  from  objecting. 

And,  whereas  objections  are  urged  against  the  whole 
notion  of  moral  government  and  a  probation-state,  from 
the  opinion  of  necessity ;  it  has  been  shown,  that  God  has 
given  us  the  evidence,  as  it  were,  of  experience,  that  all 
objections  against  religion,  on  this  head,  are  vain  and 
delusive. 

§  ii.  Natural  government  is  a  buttress  to  moral 

He  has  also,  in  his  natural  government,  suggested  an 
answer  to  all  our  short-sighted  objections,  against  the  equity 
and  goodness  of  his  moral  government :  and  in  general  he 
has  exemplified  to  us  the  latter  by  the  former. 

§  12.  Hence  we  are  bound  to  self-discipline  and  piety. 

These  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are  matters 
of  fact,  ought,  in  all  common  sense,  to  awaken  mankind  ;  to 
induce  them  to  consider  in  earnest  their  condition,  and 
what  they  have  to  do.  It  is  absurd,  absurd  to  the  degree 
of  being  ridiculous,  if  the  subject  were  not  of  so  serious 
a  kind,  for  men  to  think  themselves  secure  in  a  vicious 


§§  9-is]  CONCLUSION  151 

life  ;  or  even  in  that  immoral  thoughtlessness,  which  far 
the  greatest  part  of  them  are  fallen  into.  And  the  credi- 
bility of  religion,  arising  from  experience  and  facts  here 
considered,  is  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  engage  them  to 
live  in  the  general  practice  of  all  virtue  and  piety ;  under 
the  serious  apprehension,  though  it  should  be  mixed  with 
some  doubt d,  of  a  righteous  administration  established 
in  nature,  and  a  future  judgment  in  consequence  of  it : 
especially  when  we  consider,  how  very  questionable  it  is, 
whether  any  thing  at  all  can  be  gained  by  vice e ;  how 
unquestionably  little,  as  well  as  precarious,  the  pleasures 
arid  profits  of  it  are  at  the  best ;  and  how  soon  they  must 
be  parted  with  at  the  longest1.  For,  in  the  deliberations 
of  reason,  concerning  what  we  are  to  pursue  and  what  to 
avoid,  as  temptations  to  any  thing  from  mere  passion  are 
supposed  out  of  the  case :  so  inducements  to  vice,  from 
cool  expectations  of  pleasure  and  interest  so  small  and 
uncertain  and  short,  are  really  so  insignificant,  as,  in  the 
view  of  reason,  to  be  almost  nothing  in  themselves ;  and 
in  comparison  with  the  importance  of  religion,  they  quite 
disappear  and  are  lost. 

§  13.  Temporal  regards,  adverse  to  vice;  coincide  with 
virtue. 

Mere  passion  indeed  may  be  alleged,  though  not  as 
a  reason,  yet  as  an  excuse,  for  a  vicious  course  of  life.  And 
how  sorry  an  excuse  it  is,  will  be  manifest  by  observing, 
that  we  are  placed  in  a  condition,  in  which  we  are  unavoid- 
ably inured  to  govern  our  passions,  by  being  necessitated 
to  govern  them  ;  and  to  lay  ourselves  under  the  same  kind 
of  restraints,  and  as  great  ones  too,  from  temporal  regards, 
as  virtue  and  piety,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  require. 
The  plea  of  ungovernable  passion  then,  on  the  side  of 
vice,  is  the  poorest  of  all  things :  for  it  is  no  reason,  and 
but  a  poor  excuse. 


d  Part  II.  ch.  vi.  e  Sup.  ch.  iii.  §§  5-7. 


1  Argued  more  at  length  in  Serm.  iii.  on  Human  Nature,  §§  9-11. 


152  CONCLUSION 

§  14.  Religious  proofs  are  religions  motives. 
But  the  proper  motives  to  religion  are  the  proper  proofs 
of  it,  from  our  moral  nature,  from  the  presages  of  conscience, 
and  our  natural  apprehension  of  God  under  the  character 
of  a  righteous  Governor  and  Judge;  a  nature  and  conscience 
and  apprehension  given  us  by  him  :  and  from  the  confirma- 
tion of  the  dictates  of  reason,  by  life  and  immortality  brought 
to  light  ~by  the  Gospel;  and  the  uratli  of  God  revealed  from 
heaven  against  all  ungodliness  and  unrighteousness  of  men. 


THE    END    OF    THE    FIRST    PART. 


THE 

ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION 

TO   THE 

CONSTITUTION    AND    COURSE    OF    NATURE 

PART  II 

OF   REVEALED    RELIGION 
CHAPTER  I. 

OF   THE   IMPORTANCE   OF   CHRISTIANITY. 

§  i.  A  Revelation  ivas  (a)  required,  (b)  serviceable. 

OOME  persons,  upon  pretence  of  the  sufficiency  of  the 
^  light  of  nature,  avowedly  reject  all  revelation,  as,  in 
its  very  notion,  incredible,  and  what  must  be  fictitious. 
And  indeed  it  is  certain,  no  revelation  would  have  been 
given,  had  the  light  of  nature  been  sufficient  in  such  a  sense, 
as  to  render  one  not  wanting  and  useless.  But  no  man,  in 
seriousness  and  simplicity  of  mind,  can  possibly  think  it 
so,  who  considers  the  state  of  religion  in  the  heathen  world 
before  revelation,  and  its  present  state  in  those  places  which 
have  borrowed  no  light  from  it :  particularly  the  doubt- 
fulness of  some  of  the  greatest  men,  concerning  things  of 
the  utmost  importance,  as  well  as  the  natural  inattention 
and  ignorance  of  mankind  in  general.  It  is  impossible  to 


I54  OF   THE  IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

say,  who  would  have  been  able  to  have  reasoned  out  that 
whole  system,  which  we  call  natural  religion,  in  its  genuine 
simplicity,  clear  of  superstition  :  but  there  is  certainly  no 
ground  to  affirm  that  the  generality  could  \  If  they  could, 
there  is  no  sort  of  probability  that  they  would.  Admitting 
there  were,  they  would  highly  want  a  standing  admonition 
to  remind  them  of  it,  and  inculcate  it  upon  them2.  And 
further  still,  were  they  as  much  disposed  to  attend  to 
religion,  as  the  better  sort  of  men  are  :  yet  even  upon 
this  supposition,  there  would  be  various  occasions  for 
supernatural  instruction  and  assistance,  and  the  greatest 
advantages  might  be  afforded  by  them.  So  that  to  say 
revelation  is  a  thing  superfluous,  what  there  was  no  need 
of,  and  what  can  be  of  no  service,  is,  I  think,  to  talk  quite 
wildly  and  at  random.  Nor  would  it  be  more  extravagant 
to  affirm,  that  mankind  is  so  entirely  at  ease  in  the  present 
state,  and  life  so  completely  happy,  that  it  is  a  contradiction 
to  suppose  our  condition  capable  of  being,  in  any  respect, 
better. 

§  2.   Weiyli  ivett  Christianity  as  to  (a)  its  importance, 
(b)  its  credibility,  as  added  to  natural  religion. 

There  are  other  persons,  not  to  be  ranked  with  these, 
who  seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglecting,  and,  as 
it  were,  overlooking  revelation,  as  of  small  importance, 
provided  natural  religion  be  kept  to.  With  little  regard 
either  to  the  evidence  of  the  former,  or  to  the  objections 
against  it,  and  even  upon  supposition  of  its  truth ;  t  the 
only  design  of  it,'  say  they,  'must  be,  to  establish  a  belief 
of  the  moral  system  of  nature,  and  to  enforce  the  practice 


1  For  the  origin  of  natural  re-  would  lie  partly  in  the  sins  and 

ligion  see  sup.  I.  vi.  18,  and  inf.  ii.  shortcomings  of  the  individual?, 

10.  partly  in  the  degradation  of  the 

*  Fitzgerald  refers,  for  the  de-  current  religions  of  the  heathen 

velopment  of  this  argument,  to  world,  which  had  sunk  far  below 

Leland's  Advantage  and  Necessity  of  the  level  of  natural  religion. 

the  Christian  Revelation ;  shown  from  Butler's  propositions  do  not  stand 

the  state  of  Religion  in  the  ancient  in  need  of  particular  illustrations, 

heathen  icorld.  and  ed.,  Dublin,  but  such  illustrations,  infinite  in 

1765.  The  ground  of  this  necessity  detail,  are  of  the  deepest  interest. 


§§  a,  3]  OF   CHRISTIANITY  155 

of  natural  piety  and  virtue.  The  belief  and  practice  of 
these  things  were,  perhaps,  much  promoted  by  the  first 
publication  of  Christianity :  but  whether  they  are  believed 
and  practised,  upon  the  evidence  and  motives  of  nature 
or  of  revelation,  is  no  great  matter3.'  This  way  of  con- 
sidering revelation,  though  it  is  not  the  same  with  the 
former1,  yet  borders  nearly  upon  it,  and  very  much,  at 
length,  runs  up  into  it :  and  requires  to  be  particularly 
considered,  with  regard  to  the  persons  who  seem  to  be 
getting  into  this  way.  The  consideration  of  it  will  like- 
wise further  show  the  extravagance  of  the  former  opinion, 
and  the  truth  of  the  observations  in  answer  to  it,  just  men- 
tioned. And  an  inquiry  into  the  importance  of  Christianity, 
cannot  be  an  improper  introduction  to  a  Treatise  concerning 
the  credibility  of  it. 

§  3.   If  its  commands  be  divine,  it  is  certain. 

Now  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind,  and  com- 
manded those  things  which  are  commanded  in  Christianity  ; 
it  is  evident,  at  first  sight,  that  it  cannot  in  any  wise  be  an 
indifferent  matter,  whether  we  obey  or  disobey  those  com- 
mands :  unless  we  are  certainly  assured,  that  we  know  all 
the  reasons  for  them,  and  that  all  those  reasons  are  now 
ceased,  with  regard  to  mankind  in  general,  or  to  ourselves 
in  particular.  And  it  is  absolutely  impossible  we  can  be 
assured  of  this.  For  our  ignorance  of  these  reasons  proves 
nothing  in  the  case  :  since  the  whole  analogy  of  nature 
shows,  what  is  indeed  in  itself  evident,  that  there  may 
be  infinite  reasons  for  things,  with  which  we  are  not 
acquainted. 

a  Invents  multos propterea    nolle  fieri  Christianos,  quia   quasi 

sufficiunt  sibi  de  bona  vita  sua.  Bene  vivere  opus  est,  ait.  Quid  milii 
praecepturus  est  Christus  ?  Ut  bene  vivam  ?  Jam  bene  vivo.  Quid 
inihi  necessarius  est  Christus?  Nullum  homicidium,  nullum  furtum, 
nullam  rapinain  facio,  res  alienas  non  concupisco,  nullo  adulterio  con- 
taminor.  Nam  inveniatur  in  vita  mea  aliquid  quod  reprehendatur, 
et  qui  reprehenderit  faciat  Christianum.  Aug.  in  Psal.  xxxi. 


1  Viz.  (§  i)  '  to  say  revelation  is  a  thing  superfluous.' 


156  OF    THE  IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

§  4.  It  purports  to  teach  religion,  as  (a)  natural, 
(b)  revealed. 

But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  distinctly 
appear,  by  considering  it  more  distinctly :  first,  as  a  repub- 
lication,  and  external  institution,  of  natural  or  essential 
religion,  adapted  to  the  present  circumstances  of  mankind, 
and  intended  to  promote  natural  piety  and  virtue:  and 
secondly,  as  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things 
not  discoverable  by  reason,  in  consequence  of  which,  several 
distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  For  though  natural 
religion  is  the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Christianity, 
it  is  not  in  any  sense  the  whole  of  it. 

§  5.  Vi2.  as  a  ^publication  \ 

[I.]  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  religion.  It 
instructs  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of  the  world  :  that 
it  is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  and  under  his 
government ;  that  virtue  is  his  law ;  and  that  he  will 
finally  judge  mankind  in  righteousness,  and  render  to  all 
according  to  their  works,  in  a  future  state.  And,  which 
is  very  material,  it  teaches  natural  religion  in  its  genuine 
simplicity  ;  free  from  those  superstitions,  with  which  it  was 
totally  corrupted,  and  under  which  it  was  in  a  manner  lost. 

§  6.  With  fresh  authority. 

Revelation  is  further,  an  authoritative  publication  of 
natural  religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of  testimony 
for  the  truth  of  it.  Indeed  the  miracles  and  prophecies 
recorded  in  scripture,  were  intended  to  prove  a  particular 
dispensation  of  Providence,  the  redemption  of  the  world  by 
the  Messiah  :  but  this  does  not  hinder,  but  that  they  may 
also  prove  God's  general  providence  over  the  world,  as  our 
moral  Governor  and  Judge.  And  they  evidently  do  prove 
it ;  because  this  character  of  the  Author  of  nature,  is  neces- 
sarily connected  with  and  implied  in  that  particular  revealed 


1  See,  on  this  republication,  the  first  of  the  Six  Sermons,  §  3. 


§§  4-8]  OF   CHRISTIANITY  157 

dispensation  of  things :  it  is  likewise  continually  taught 
expressly,  and  insisted  upon,  by  those  persons  who  wrought 
the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies.  So  that  indeed 
natural  religion  seems  as  much  proved  by  the  scripture  reve- 
lation, as  it  would  have  been,  had  the  design  of  revelation 
been  nothing  else  than  to  prove  it. 

§  7.  For  miracle  (including  prophecy)  adds  to 
credibility. 

But  it  may  possibly  be  disputed,  how  far  miracles  can 
prove  natural  religion  ;  and  notable  objections  may  be 
urged  against  this  proof  of  it,  considered  as  a  matter  of 
speculation  :  but  considered  as  a  practical  thing,  there  can 
be  none.  For  suppose  a  person  to  teach  natural  religion 
to  a  nation,  who  had  lived  in  total  ignorance  or  forgetful- 
ness  of  it ;  and  to  declare  he  was  commissioned  by  God  so 
to  do :  suppose  him ,  in  proof  of  his  commission,  to  foretell 
things  future,  which  no  human  foresight  could  have  guessed 
at ;  to  divide  the  sea  with  a  word ;  feed  great  multitudes 
with  bread  from  heaven ;  cure  all  manner  of  diseases ;  and 
raise  the  dead,  even  himself,  to  life  :  would  not  this  give 
additional  credibility  to  his  teaching,  a  credibility  beyond 
what  that  of  a  common  man  would  have  ;  and  be  an  authori- 
tative publication  of  the  law  of  nature,  i.  e.  a  new  proof  of 
it  ?  It  would  be  a  practical  one,  of  the  strongest  kind, 
perhaps,  which  human  creatures  are  capable  of  having  given 
them.  The  law  of  Moses  then,  and  the  gospel  of  Christ, 
are  authoritative  publications  of  the  religion  of  nature  ;  they 
afford  a  proof  of  God's  general  providence,  as  moral  Gover- 
nor of  the  world,  as  well  as  of  his  particular  dispensations 
of  providence  towards  sinful  creatures,  revealed  in  the  law 
and  the  gospel.  As  they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the  latter, 
so  they  are  an  additional  evidence  of  the  former. 

§  8.    Has  force  in  confirming  a  wavering  mind. 

To  show  this  further,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the  greatest 
and  most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never  heard  of  reve- 
lation, convinced  upon  the  whole,  notwithstanding  the 


158  OF   THE   IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

disorders  of  the  world,  that  it  was  under  the  direction  and 
moral  government  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being  ;  but  ready 
to  question,  whether  he  were  not  got  beyond  the  reach  of 
his  faculties :  suppose  him  brought,  by  this  suspicion,  into 
great  danger  of  being  carried  away  by  the  universal  bad 
example  of  almost  every  one  around  him,  who  appeared  to 
have  no  sense,  no  practical  sense  at  least,  of  these  things  : 
and  this,  perhaps,  would  be  as  advantageous  a  situation  with 
regard  to  religion,  as  nature  alone  ever  placed  any  man  in. 
What  a  confirmation  now  must  it  be  to  such  a  person,  all 
at  once,  to  find,  that  this  moral  system  of  things  was  re- 
vealed to  mankind,  in  the  name  of  that  infinite  Being,  whom 
he  had  from  principles  of  reason  believed  in  ;  and  that  the 
publishers  of  the  revelation  proved  their  commission  from 
him,  by  making  it  appear,  that  he  had  entrusted  them  with 
a  power  of  suspending  and  changing  the  general  laws  of 
nature. 

§  9.  Eminently  brings  life  and  immortality  to  light. 

Nor  must  it  by  any  means  be  omitted,  for  it  is  a  thing 
of  the  utmost  importance,  that  life  and  immortality  are 
eminently  brought  to  light  by  the  gospel  '.  The  great 
doctrines  of  a  future  state,  the  danger  of  a  course  of  wicked- 
ness, and  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  are  not  only  confirmed 
in  the  gospel,  but  are  taught,  especially  the  last  is,  with  a 
degree  of  light,  to  which  that  of  nature  is  but  darkness. 

§  10.   Miracle,  taken  up  and  recorded  l)y  tlie  church, 
has  advanced  natural  religion. 

Further  :  As  Christianity  served  these  ends  and  purposes, 
when  it  was  first  published,  by  the  miraculous  publication 


1  But  if  immortality  were  known  Butler's    position    would   be   far 

already  and  independent  of  the  stronger  if,  with  many  Christian 

gospel,  it  is  only  in  a  feeble  and  writers  of  the  earliest  centuries, 

secondary  sense  that  we  can  say  he  had  been   liberated  from  the 

of  it  (as  e.g.  of  right  and  wrong)  belief    that   the    soul  was   inde- 

that  it  was  brought  to  light  by  feasibly  immortal, 
the  gospel.   Seel,  i.  31.   Evidently 


§§  9>  10]  OF  CHRISTIANITY  159 

itself ;  so  it  was  intended  to  serve  the  same  purposes  in 
future  ages,  by  means  of  the  settlement  of  a  visible  church ]  : 
of  a  society,  distinguished  from  common  ones,  and  from  the 
rest  of  the  world,  by  peculiar  religious  institutions  ;  by  an 
instituted  method  of  instruction,  and  an  instituted  form  of 
external  religion.  Miraculous  powers  were  given  to  the 
first  preachers  of  Christianity,  in  order  to  their  introducing 
it  into  the  world  :  a  visible  church  was  established,  in  order 
to  continue  it,  and  carry  it  on  successively  throughout  all 
ages.  Had  Moses  and  the  Prophets,  Christ  and  his  Apostles, 
only  taught,  and  by  miracles  proved,  religion  to  their  contem- 
poraries ;  the  benefits  of  their  instructions  would  have  reached 
but  to  a  small  part  of  mankind2.  Christianity  must  have 
been,  in  a  great  degree,  sunk  and  forgot  in  a  very  few  ages. 
To  prevent  this,  appears  to  have  been  one  reason  why  a 
visible  church  was  instituted :  to  be,  like  a  city  upon  an  hill, 
a  standing  memorial  to  the  world  of  the  duty  which  we  owe 
our  Maker :  to  call  men  continually,  both  by  example  and 
instruction,  to  attend  to  it,  and,  by  the  form  of  religion, 
ever  before  their  eyes,  remind  them  of  the  reality  :  to  be 
the  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God  :  to  hold  up  the  light 
of  revelation  in  aid  to  that  of  nature,  and  propagate  it 
throughout  all  generations  to  the  end  of  the  world — the 
light  of  revelation,  considered  here  in  no  other  view,  than 
as  designed  to  enforce  natural  religion.  And  in  proportion 
as  Christianity  is  professed  and  taught  in  the  world,  religion, 
natural  or  essential  religion,  is  thus  distinctly  and  advan- 
tageously laid  before  mankind,  and  brought  again  and  again 
to  their  thoughts,  as  a  matter  of  infinite  importance. 


1  For  the  'development  of  this  of  these  bodies,  upon  which  their 
idea  see  Sermon  before  the  S. P. G.,  vitality  depends,  is  in  truth  in- 
§  4.  eluded  within  the  creeds  of  the 

2  At  first  sight  a  doubt  may  be  universal  church  (with  some  small 
suggested  as  to  the  validity  of  this  allowance  perhaps  for  partial  ex- 
argument     from    the    prolonged  aggerations).    So  that  they  are,  so 
existence  in  modern  times  of  sects  to   speak,    in   tow    of  the    visible 
who  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  church,  carried  onwards  with  and 
collectively  a  visible  church,  such  by  it.     At   least,  it   supplies   for 
as Congregationalistsand Quakers.  them  that  portion  of    Christian 
But  the  answer  is,  I  think,  con-  evidence,  in  which  they  seem  to 
elusive.    All  the  positive  teaching  be  defective. 


!6o  OF   THE  IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

§11.    Especially  as  a  cliurcli  implies  positive  teaching 
institutions. 

A  visible  church  has  also  a  further  tendency  to  promote 
natural  religion,  as  being  an  instituted  method  of  education, 
originally  intended  to  be  of  more  peculiar  advantage  to 
those  who  would  conform  to  it.  For  one  end  of  the 
institution  was,  that  by  admonition  and  reproof,  as  well 
as  instruction  ;  by  a  general  regular  discipline,  and  public 
exercises  of  religion  ;  the  body  of  Christ,  as  the  scripture 
speaks,  should  be  edified ;  i.  e.  trained  up  in  piety  and  virtue 
for  a  higher  and  better  state.  This  settlement  then  appearing 
thus  beneficial ;  tending  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  answer, 
and  in  some  degree  actually  answering,  those  ends  ;  it  is  to 
be  remembered,  that  the  very  notion  of  it  implies  positive 
institutions  ;  for  the  visibility  of  the  church  consists  in  them. 
Take  away  every  thing  of  this  kind,  and  you  lose  the  very 
notion  itself.  So  that  if  the  things  now  mentioned  are  ad- 
vantages, the  reason  and  importance  of  positive  institutions 
in  general  is  most  obvious ;  since  without  them  these 
advantages  could  not  be  secured  to  the  world.  And  it  is 
mere  idle  wantonness,  to  insist  upon  knowing  the  reasons, 
why  such  particular  ones  were  fixed  upon  rather  than  others. 

§  12.   Thus  natural  religion  has  had  supernatural  aid. 

The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  assistance, 
which  Christianity  affords  to  natural  religion,  is  what 
some  persons  are  very  slow  in  apprehending.  And  yet 
it  is  a  thing  distinct  in  itself,'  and  a  very  plain  obvious 
one.  For  will  any  in  good  earnest  really  say,  that  the 
bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world  were  in  as  advan- 
tageous a  situation  with  regard  to  natural  religion,  as  they 
are  now  amongst  us :  that  it  was  laid  before  them,  and 
enforced  upon  them,  in  a  manner  as  distinct,  and  as  much 
tending  to  influence  their  practice? 

§  13.    Despite  perversions  of  Christianity, 
The  objections  against  all   this,  from  the  perversion  of 
Christianity,  and   from   the  supposition  of  its  having  had 


§§  11-14]  OF  CHRISTIANITY  161 

but  little  good  influence,  however  innocently  they  may 
be  proposed,  yet  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  conclusive, 
upon  any  principles,  but  such  as  lead  to  downright  atheism  : 
because  the  manifestation  of  the  law  of  nature  by  reason, 
which,  upon  all  principles  of  theism,  must  have  been  from 
God,  has  been  perverted  and  rendered  ineffectual  in  the 
same  manner.  It  may  indeed,  I  think,  truly  be  said,  that 
the  good  effects  of  Christianity  have  not  been  small ;  nor 
its  supposed  ill  effects,  any  effects  at  all  of  it,  properly 
speaking.  Perhaps  too  the  things  themselves  done  have 
been  aggravated  ;  and  if  not,  Christianity  hath  been  often 
only  a  pretence  ;  and  the  same  evils  in  the  main  would 
have  been  done  upon  some  other  pretence.  However,  great 
and  shocking  as  the  corruptions  and  abuses  of  it  have  really 
been,  they  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  arguments  against  it, 
upon  principles  of  theism. 

§  14.   Divine  government  leaves  its  provisions  open  to  abuse. 

For  one  cannot  proceed  one  step  in  reasoning  upon 
natural  religion,  any  more  than  upon  Christianity,  without 
laying  it  down  as  a  first  principle,  that  the  dispensations  of 
Providence  are  not  to  be  judged  of  by  their  perversions, 
but  by  their  genuine  tendencies :  not  by  what  they  do 
actually  seem  to  effect,  but  by  what  they  would  effect 
if  mankind  did  their  part ;  that  part  which  is  justly  put 
and  left  upon  them.  It  is  altogether  as  much  the  language 
of  one  as  of  the  other ;  He  that  is  unjust,  let  liim  l)e  unjust 
still :  and  lie  that  is  holy,  let  him  be  holy  still b.  The  light 
of  reason  does  not,  any  more  than  that  of  revelation,  force 
men  to  submit  to  its  authority ;  both  admonish  them  of 
what  they  ought  to  do  and  avoid,  together  with  the  con- 
sequences of  each  ;  and  after  this,  leave  them  at  full  liberty 
to  act  just  as  they  please,  till  the  appointed  time  of  judg- 
ment. Every  moment's  experience  shows,  that  this  is 
God's  general  rule  of  government. 


b  Rev.  xxii.  n. 
VOL.  I.  M 


1 62  OF   THE   IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

§  15.   As  such  a  r&publication,  Christianity  has  a  title  to 
l)e  examined. 

To  return  then  :  Christianity  being  a  promulgation  of 
the  law  of  nature ;  being  moreover  an  authoritative  pro- 
mulgation of  it ;  with  new  light,  and  other  circumstances 
of  peculiar  advantage,  adapted  to  the  wants  of  mankind  ; 
these  things  fully  show  its  importance.  And  it  is  to  be 
observed  further,  that  as  the  nature  of  the  case  requires, 
so  all  Christians  are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their 
profession  of  Christianity,  to  preserve  it  in  the  world,  and 
render  it  such  a  promulgation  and  enforcement  of  religion. 
Tor  it  is  the  very  scheme  of  the  gospel,  that  each  Christian 
should,  in  his  degree,  contribute  towards  continuing  and 
carrying  it  on  :  all  by  uniting  in  the  public  profession  and 
external  practice  of  Christianity ;  some  by  instructing,  by 
having  the  oversight  and  taking  care  of  this  religious  com- 
munity, the  church  of  God.  Now  this  further  shows  the 
importance  of  Christianity ;  and,  which  is  what  I  chiefly 
intend,  its  importance  in  a  practical  sense  :  or  the  high 
obligations  we  are  under,  to  take  it  into  our  most  serious 
consideration  ;  and  the  danger  there  must  necessarily  be, 
not  only  in  treating  it  despitefully,  which  I  am  not  now 
speaking  of,  but  in  disregarding  and  neglecting  it.  For 
this  is  neglecting  to  do  what  is  expressly  enjoined  us,  for 
continuing  those  benefits  to  the  world,  and  transmitting 
them  down  to  future  times.  And  all  this  holds,  even 
though  the  only  thing  to  be  considered  in  Christianity, 
were  its  subserviency  to  natural  religion.  But, 

§  16.   Is  also  a  new  plan  of  recovery  for  a  world  in  ruins. 

[II.]  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further  view  : 
as  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things,  not 
at  all  discoverable  by  reason,  in  consequence  of  which 
several  distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  Christianity  is 
not  only  an  external  institution  of  natural  religion,  and  a 
new  promulgation  of  God's  general  providence,  as  righteous 
Governor  and  Judge  of  the  world  ;  but  it  contains  also 
a  revelation  of  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence, 


§§  i5-i8]  OF   CHRISTIANITY  163 

carrying  011  by  his  Son  and  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and 
salvation  of  mankind,  who  are  represented,  in  scripture,  to 
be  in  a  state  of  ruin. 


§  17.  'Revelation  is  especially  of  the  Son  and  Spirit. 

And  in  consequence  of  this  revelation  being  made,  we  are 
commanded  to  be  baptized,  not  only  in  the  name  of  the  Father, 
but  also,  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost :  and  other 
obligations  of  duty,  unknown  before,  to  the  Son  and  the 
Holy  Ghost,  are  revealed.  Now  the  importance  of  these 
duties  may  be  judged  of,  by  observing  that  they  arise,  not 
from  positive  command  merely,  but  also  from  the  offices, 
which  appear,  from  scripture,  to  belong  to  those  divine 
persons  in  the  gospel  dispensation  ;  or  from  the  relations, 
which,  we  are  there  informed,  they  stand  in  to  us.  By 
reason  is  revealed  the  relation,  which  God  the  Father 
stands  in  to  us.  Hence  arises  the  obligation  of  duty 
which  we  are  under  to  him.  In  scripture  are  revealed  the 
relations,  which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  stand  in  to  us. 
Hence  arise  the  obligations  of  duty,  which  we  are  under 
to  them. 

§  1 8.    Hence  baptism  is  triune. 

The  truth  of  the  case,  as  one  may  speak,  in  each  of  these 
three  respects  being  admitted  :  that  God  is  the  Governor 
of  the  world,  upon  the  evidence  of  reason  ;  that  Christ  is 
the  Mediator  between  God  and  man,  and  the  Holy  Ghost 
our  Guide  and  Sanctifier,  upon  the  evidence  of  revelation  : 
the  truth  of  the  case,  I  say,  in  each  of  these  respects  being- 
admitted  ;  it  is  no  more  a  question,  why  it  should  be  com- 
manded, that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of 
the  Holy  Ghost,  than  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of 
the  Father.  This  matter  seems  to  require  to  be  more 
fully  stated  c. 


c  See  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy  qf  the  Christian  Sacraments,  &c. 
[by  Archdeacon  Waterland,  1734],  and  Colliber,  Of  revealed  Religion  t  as 
there  quoted. 

M    2 


164  OF   THE  IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

§  19.    Christianity  has  two  parts,  loth  essential:  (a)  Inward, 
(b)  outward. 

Let  it  be  remembered  then,  that  religion  comes  under 
the  twofold  consideration  of  internal  and  external :  for  the 
latter  is  as  real  a  part  of  religion,  of  true  religion,  as 
the  former.  Now  when  religion  is  considered  under  the 
first  notion,  as  an  inward  principle,  to  .be  exerted  in  such 
and  such  inward  acts  of  the  mind  and  heart ;  the  essence 
of  natural  religion  may  be  said  to  consist  in  religious 
regards  to  God  the  Father  Almighty  :  and  the  essence  of 
revealed  religion,  as  distinguished  from  natural,  to  consist 
in  religious  regards  to  the  Son,  and  to  the  Holt/  Ghost.  And 
the  obligation  we  are  under,  of  paying  these  religious 
regards  to  each  of  these  divine  persons  respectively,  arises 
from  the  respective  relations  which  they  each  stand  in  to 
us.  How  these  relations  are  made  known,  whether  by 
reason  or  revelation,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  case  : 
because  the  duties  arise  out  of  the  relations  themselves, 
not  out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of  them. 

§  20.   Dictates  religious  regards  to  Son  and  Spirit. 

The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper  office  in  that 
great  dispensation  of  Providence,  the  redemption  of  the 
world  ;  the  one  our  Mediator,  the  other  our  Sanctifier. 
Does  not  then  the  duty  of  religious  regards  to  both  these 
divine  persons,  as  immediately  arise,  to  the  view  of  reason, 
out  of  the  very  nature  of  these  offices  and  relations ; 
as  the  inward  good-will  and  kind  intention,  which  we  owe 
to  our  fellow-creatures,  arises  out  of  the  common  relations 
between  us  and  them?  But  it  will  be  asked,  'What  are 
the  inward  religious  regards,  appearing  thus  obviously  due 
to  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit ;  as  arising,  not  merely  from 
command  in  scripture,  but  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
revealed  relations,  which  they  stand  in  to  us  ?'  I  answer, 
the  religious  regards  of  reverence,  honour,  love,  trust, 
gratitude,  fear,  hope. 


§§  19-22]  OF  CHRISTIANITY  165 

§  21.  Form  of  flic  outward  is  governed  by  command. 
In  what  external  manner  this  inward  worship  is  to 
be  expressed,  is  a  matter  of  pure  revealed  command  ;  as 
perhaps  the  external  manner,  in  which  God  the  Father  is 
to  be  worshipped,  may  be  more  so,  than  we  are  ready  to 
think :  but  the  worship,  the  internal  worship  itself,  to  the 
Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  is  no  further  matter  of  pure  revealed 
command,  than  as  the  relations  they  stand  in  to  us  are  matter 
of  pure  revelation  :  for  the  relations  being  known,  the 
obligations  to  such  internal  worship  are  obligations  of  reason, 
arising  out  of  those  relations  themselves.  In  short,  the 
history  of  the  gospel  as  immediately  shows  us  the  reason  of 
these  obligations,  as  it  shows  us  the  meaning  of  the  words, 
Son  and  Holy  Ghost. 

§  22.    Our  relation  to  Christ  is  strictly  moral,  and  under 
moral  sanctions. 

If  this  account  of  the  Christian  religion  be  just ;  those 
persons  who  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  little  consequence, 
provided  natural  religion  be  kept  to,  plainly  forget,  that 
Christianity,  even  what  is  peculiarly  so  called,  as  distin- 
guished from  natural  religion,  has  yet  somewhat  very  im- 
portant, even  of  a  moral  nature.  For  the  office  of  our  Lord 
being  made  known,  and  the  relation  he  stands  in  to  us,  the 
obligation  of  religious  regards  to  him  is  plainly  moral,  as 
much  as  charity  to  mankind  is ;  since  this  obligation  arises, 
before  external  command,  immediately  out  of  that  his 
office  and  relation  itself.  Those  persons  appear  to  forget, 
that  revelation  is  to  be  considered,  as  informing  us  of 
somewhat  new,  in  the  state  of  mankind,  and  in  the 
government  of  the  world  :  as  acquainting  us  with  some 
relations  we  stand  in,  which  could  not  otherwise  have  been 
known.  And  these  relations  being  real,  (though  before 
revelation  we  could  be  under  no  obligations  from  them, 
yet  upon  their  being  revealed,)  there  is  110  reason  to  think, 
but  that  neglect  of  behaving  suitably  to  them  will  be 
attended  with  the  same  kind  of  consequences  under  God's 
government,  as  neglecting  to  behave  suitably  to  any  other 
relations  made  known  to  us  by  reason.  And  ignorance. 


166  OF   THE   IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

whether  unavoidable  or  voluntary,  so  far  as  we  can  possibly 
see,  will  just  as  much,  and  just  as  little,  excuse  in  one 
case  as  in  the  other :  the  ignorance  being  supposed  equally 
unavoidable,  or  equally  voluntary,  in  both  cases. 

'   §  23.   Disregard  whereof  may  entail  penalty  in  a  natural 

way. 

If  therefore  Christ  be  indeed  the  Mediator  between  God 
and  man,  i.  e.  if  Christianity  be  true  ;  if  he  be  indeed  our 
Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God  ;  no  one  can  say,  what 
may  follow,  not  only  the  obstinate,  but  the  careless  dis- 
regard to  him,  in  those  high  relations.  Nay  no  one  can 
say,  what  may  follow  such  disregard,  even  in  the  way  of 
natural  consequence (1.  For,  as  the  natural  consequences 
of  vice  in  this  life  are  doubtless  to  be  considered  as  judicial 
punishments  inflicted  by  God  ;  so  likewise,  for  ought  we 
know,  the  judicial  punishments  of  the  future  life  may  be, 
in  a  like  way  or  a  like  sense,  the  natural  consequence  of 
vice  e  :  of  men's  violating  or  disregarding  the  relations  which 
God  has  placed  them  in  here,  and  made  known  to  them. 

§  24.   Same  is  true  as  to  use  of  enjoined  means  of  grace. 

Again  :  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved  in  their 
moral  character,  and  so  are  unfit  for  that  state,  which 
Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples  ;  and  if  the 
assistance  of  God's  Spirit  be  necessary  to  renew  their  nature, 
in  the  degree  requisite  to  their  being  qualified  for  that 
state  ;  all  which  is  implied  in  the  express,  though  figura- 
tive declaration,  Except  a  man  be  lorn  of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot 
enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God  f :  supposing  this,  is  it  possible 
any  serious  person  can  think  it  a  slight  matter,  whether  or 
no  he  makes  use  of  the  means,  expressly  commanded  by  God, 
for  obtaining  this  divine  assistance  ?  Especially  since  the 
whole  analogy  of  nature  shows,  that  we  are  not  to  expect 
any  benefits  without  making  use  of  the  appointed  means  for 
obtaining  or  enjoying  them.  Now  reason  shows  us  nothing, 
of  the  particular  immediate  means  of  obtaining  either  tem- 


d  Sup.  I.  i.  31.  e  Chap.  v.  f  John  iii.  5. 


§§23-26]  OF  CHRISTIANITY  167 

poral  or  spiritual  benefits.  This  therefore  we  must  learn, 
either  from  experience  or  revelation.  And  experience,  the 
present  case  does  not  admit  of. 

§  25.  Conclusion :  that  to  treat  Christianity  with  levity  is 
wildly  rash. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  that,  Chris- 
tianity being  supposed  either  true  or  credible,  it  is  unspeak- 
able irreverence,  and  really  the  most  presumptuous  rashness, 
to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter.  It  can  never  justly  be 
esteemed  of  little  consequence,  till  it  be  positively  supposed 
false.  Nor  do  I  know  a  higher  and  more  important  obliga- 
tion which  we  are  under,  than  that  of  examining  most 
seriously  into  the  evidence  of  it,  supposing  its  credibility  ; 
and  of  embracing  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth. 

§  26.    Commands  distinguished  as  (a)  positive,  (b)  moral. 

The  two  following  deductions  may  be  proper  to  be  added, 
in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  observations,  and  to 
prevent  their  being  mistaken. 

First,  Hence  we  may  clearly  see,  where  lies  the  distinc- 
tion between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral  in  religion. 
Moral  precepts  are  precepts,  the  reasons  of  which  we  see : 
positive  precepts  are  precepts,  the  reasons  of  which  we 
do  not  see  £.  Moral  duties  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the 
case  itself,  prior  to  external  command.  Positive  duties  do 
not  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  from  external 
command  ;  nor  would  they  be  duties  at  all,  were  it  not 
for  such  command,  received  from  him  whose  creatures  and 
subjects  we  are. 


%  This  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts  con- 
sidered respectively  as  such.     But  yet,  since  the  latter 
have  somewhat  of  a  moral  nature,  we  may  see  the  reason 
of  them,  considered  in  this  view.     Moral  and  positive        ag™e>  an 
precepts  are   in   some  respects   alike,  in  other  respects 
different.     So  far  as  they  are  alike,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  both  ; 
so  far  as  they  are  different,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  the  former,  but 
not  of  the  latter.     See  sup.  §  10  sqq.  [But  I  do  not  see  the  relevancy  of 
the  reference. — ED.],  and  inf.  §  27. 


168  OF  THE  IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

§  27.   But  the  positive  have  a  moral  force ;  and  may  rest 
either  on  natural  or  revealed  religion. 

But  the  manner  in  which  the  nature  of  the  case,  or  the  fact 
of  the  relation,  is  made  known,  this  doth  not  denominate 
any  duty  either  positive  or  moral.  That  we  be  baptized  in 
the  name  of  the  Father,  is  as  much  a  positive  duty,  as  that 
we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son  ;  because  both  arise 
equally  from  revealed  command  :  though  the  relation  which 
we  stand  in  to  God  the  Father  is  made  known  to  us  by 
reason ;  the  relation  we  stand  in  to  Christ,  by  revelation  only. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  dispensation  of  the  gospel  admitted, 
gratitude  as  immediately  becomes  due  to  Christ,  from  his 
being  the  voluntary  minister  of  this  dispensation,  as  it  is 
due  to  God  the  Father,  from  his  being  the  fountain  of  all 
good  ;  though  the  first  is  made  known  to  us  by  revelation 
only,  the  second  by  reason.  Hence  also  we  may  see,  and, 
for  distinctness  sake,  it  may  be  worth  mentioning,  that 
positive  institutions  come  under  a  twofold  consideration. 
They  are  either  institutions  founded  on  natural  religion,  as 
baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Father  ;  though  this  has  also  a 
particular  reference  to  the  gospel  dispensation,  for  it  is  in 
the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ :  or 
they  are  external  institutions  founded  on  revealed  religion  ; 
as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

§  28.  In  principle  they  have  a  moral  basis :   but  take  the 
second  place. 

Secondly,  From  the  distinction  between  what  is  moral 
and  what  is  positive  in  religion,  appears  the  ground  of 
that  peculiar  preference,  which  the  scripture  teaches  us 
to  be  due  to  the  former. 

The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general  is  very 
obvious ;  though  we  should  not  see  the  reason,  why  such 
particular  ones  are  pitched  upon  rather  than  others.  Who- 
ever therefore,  instead  of  cavilling  at  words,  will  attend  to 
the  thing  itself,  may  clearly  see,  that  positive  institutions 
in  general,  as  distinguished  from  this  or  that  particular 
one,  have  the  nature  of  moral  commands ;  since  the 


§§27-3o]  OF  CHRISTIANITY  169 

reasons  of  them  appear.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  external 
worship  of  God  is  a  moral  duty,  though  no  particular  mode 
of  it  be  so.  Care  then  is  to  be  taken,  when  a  comparison 
is  made  between  positive  and  moral  duties,  that  they  be 
compared  no  further  than  as  they  are  different ;  no  further 
than  as  the  former  are  positive,  or  arise  out  of  mere 
external  command,  the  reasons  of  which  we  are  not 
acquainted  with  ;  and  as  the  latter  are  moral,  or  arise  out 
of  the  apparent  reason  of  the  case,  without  such  external 
command.  Unless  this  caution  be  observed,  we  shall  run 
into  endless  confusion. 

§  29.   In  case  of  conflict,  the  moral  precept  prevails. 

Now  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing  precepts 
enjoined  by  the  same  authority ;  that,  in  certain  con- 
junctures, it  is  impossible  to  obey  both  ;  that  the  former 
is  moral,  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  see  the  reasons,  and 
that  they  hold  in  the  particular  case  before  us  ;  but  that  the 
latter  is  positive,  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  do  not  see 
the  reasons :  it  is  indisputable  that  our  obligations  are  to 
obey  the  former ;  because  there  is  an  apparent  reason  for 
this  preference,  and  none  against  it.  Further,  positive  in- 
stitutions, I  suppose  all  those  which  Christianity  enjoins, 
are  means  to  a  moral  end  :  and  the  end  must  be  acknow- 
ledged  more  excellent  than  the  means.  Nor  is  observance 
of  these  institutions  any  religious  obedience  at  all,  or  of 
any  value,  otherwise  than  as  it  proceeds  from  a  moral 
principle.  This  seems  to  be  the  strict  logical  way  of 
stating  and  determining  this  matter  ;  but  will,  perhaps, 
be  found  less  applicable  to  practice,  than  may  be  thought 
at  first  sight. 

§  30.    Has  double  title,  from  (a)  scripture,  (b)  natural  law. 

And  therefore,  in  a  more  practical,  though  more  lax  way 
of  consideration,  and  taking  the  words,  moral  law  and 
positive  institutions,  in  the  popular  sense  ;  I  add,  that  the 
whole  moral  law  is  as  much  matter  of  revealed  command, 
as  positive  institutions  are  :  for  the  scripture  enjoins  every 
moral  virtue,  In  this  respect  then  they  are  both  upon 


170  OF   THE  IMPORTANCE  [II.  I. 

a  level.  But  the  moral  law  is,  moreover,  written  upon 
our  hearts ;  interwoven  into  our  very  nature.  And  this 
is  a  plain  intimation  of  the  Author  of  it,  which  is  to  be 
preferred,  when  they  interfere. 

§  31.  Men  strive  to  substitute  rite  for  virtiie ;  l)ut  in  vain. 
But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necessity  for  the 
determination  of  this  question,  as  some  persons  seem  to 
think.  Nor  are  we  left  to  reason  alone  to  determine  it. 
For,  first,  Though  mankind  have,  in  all  ages,  been  greatly 
prone  to  place  their  religion  in  peculiar  positive  rites,  by  way 
of  equivalent  for  obedience  to  moral  precepts  ;  yet,  without 
making  any  comparison  at  all  between  them,  and  con- 
sequently without  determining  which  is  to  have  the  prefer- 
ence, the  nature  of  the  thing  abundantly  shows  all  notions 
of  that  kind  to  be  utterly  subversive  of  tiye  religion  :  as 
they  are,  moreover,  contraiy  to  the  whole  general  tenor  of 
scripture ;  and  likewise  to  the  most  express  particular 
declarations  of  it,  that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of 
God,  without  moral  virtue.  Secondly,  Upon  the  occasion 
of  mentioning  together  positive  and  moral  duties,  the 
scripture  always  puts  the  stress  of  religion  upon  the  latter, 
and  never  upon  the  former:  which,  though  no  sort  of* 
allowance  to  neglect  the  former,  when  they  do  not  interfere 
with  the  latter,  yet  is  a  plain  intimation,  that  when  they 
do,  the  latter  are  to  be  preferred. 

§  32.    Our  Lord  lias  settled  the  matter,  by  his  teaching  on 

the  Sabbath. 

And  further,  as  mankind  are  for  placing  the  stress  of 
their  religion  any  where,  rather  than  upon  virtue  ;  lest 
both  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  general  spirit  of 
Christianity,  appearing  in  the  intimation  now  mentioned, 
should  be  ineffectual  against  this  prevalent  folly :  our 
Lord  himself,  from  whose  command  alone  the  obligation 
of  positive  institutions  arises,  has  taken  occasion  to  make 
the  comparison  between  them  and  moral  precepts  ;  when 
the  Pharisees  censured  him,  for  eating  with  publicans  and 
sinners;  and  also  when  they  censured  his  disciples,  for 
plucking  the  ears  of  corn  on  the  Sabbath-day.  Upon  this 


§§  31-33]  OF  CHRISTIANITY  171 

comparison,  he  has  determined  expressly,  and  in  form, 
which  shall  have  the  preference  when  they  interfere.  And 
by  delivering  his  authoritative  determination  in  a  proverbial 
manner  of  expression,  he  has  made  it  general :  I  ivill  have 
wcrcy\  and  not  sacrifice**.  The  propriety  of  the  word  proverbial 
is  not  the  thing  insisted  upon  :  though  I  think  the  manner 
of  speaking  is  to  be  called  so.  But  that  the  manner  of 
speaking  veiy  remarkably  renders  the  determination  general, 
is  surely  indisputable.  For,  had  it,  in  the  latter  case,  been 
said  only,  that  God  preferred  mercy  to  the  rigid  observance 
of  the  Sabbath  ;  even  then,  by  parity  of  reason,  most 
justly  might  we  have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy 
likewise,  to  the  observance  of  other  ritual  institutions ;  and 
in  general,  moral  duties,  to  positive  ones.  And  thus  the 
determination  would  have  been  general ;  though  its  being 
so  were  inferred  and  not  expressed.  But  as  the  passage 
really  stands  in  the  gospel,  it  is  much  stronger.  For  the 
sense  and  the  very  literal  words  of  our  Lord's  answer  are 
as  applicable  to  any  other  instance  of  a  comparison,  be- 
tween positive  and  moral  duties,  as  to  this  upon  which 
they  were  spoken.  And  if,  in  case  of  competition,  mercy 
is  to  be  preferred  to  positive  institutions,  it  will  scarce  be 
thought,  that  justice  is  to  give  place  to  them. 

§  33-    Superiority  of  virtue  to  observance  taught  by  the  Old 

Testament. 

It  is  remarkable  too,  that,  as  the  words  are  a  quota- 
tion from  the  Old  Testament,  they  are  introduced,  on  both 
the  forementioned  occasions,  with  a  declaration,  that  the 
Pharisees  did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  them.  This, 
I  say,  is  very  remarkable.  For,  since  it  is  scarce  possible, 
for  the  most  ignorant  person,  not  to  understand  the  literal 
sense  of  the  passage,  in  the  prophet1 ;  and  since  under- 

h  Matt.  ix.  13  and  xii.  7.  *  Hos.  vi. 


1  '  Obedience  to  positive   com-  spring  from  a  principle  of  natural 

mand,  it  will  be  noticed,  is  often  morality;  the  former,  if  not  the  re- 

a  more  decisive  test  of  religious  suit  of  hypocrisy  or  of  mechanical 

character,    than    the   practice   of  habit,  is  an  evidence  of  reverence 

moral    duties.     The    latter    may  for  the  divine  will.'     Angus. 


172  OF   THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY 

standing  the  literal  sense  would  not  have  prevented  their 
condemning  the  guiltless k ;  it  can  hardly  be  doubted,  that 
the  thing  which  our  Lord  really  intended  in  that  declaration 
was,  that  the  Pharisees  had  not  learnt  from  it,  as  they 
might,  wherein  the  general  spirit  of  religion  consists  :  that  it 
consists  in  moral  piety  and  virtue,  as  distinguished  from 
forms,  and  ritual  observances.  However,  it  is  certain  we 
may  learn  this  from  his  divine  application  of  the  passage, 
in  the  gospel. 

§  34.    The  obligation  to  obey  positive  precepts  is  moral. 

But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weaknesses  of  human 
nature,  when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two  things,  one  is  found 
to  be  of  greater  importance  than  the  other,  to  consider  this 
other  as  of  scarce  any  importance  at  all :  it  is  highly 
necessary  that  we  remind  ourselves,  how  great  presumption 
it  is,  to  make  light  of  any  institutions  of  divine  appoint- 
ment ;  that  our  obligations  to  obey  all  God's  commands 
whatever  are  absolute  and  indispensable  ;  and  that  com- 
mands merely  positive,  admitted  to  be  from  him,  lay  us 
under  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  them  :  an  obligation  moral 
in  the  strictest  and  most  proper  sense. 

§  35-  WG  arc  t°  accept  the  sense  of  scripture,  not  import  it. 
To  these  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the  account 
now  given  of  Christianity  most  strongly  shows  and  en- 
forces upon  us  the  obligation  of  searcliing  the  scriptures, 
in  order  to  see,  what  the  scheme  of  revelation  really  is  ; 
instead  of  determining  beforehand,  from  reason,  what  the 
scheme  of  it  must  be1.  Indeed  if  in  revelation  there  be 
found  any  passages,  the  seeming  meaning  of  which  is 
contrary  to  natural  religion  ;  we  may  most  certainly  con- 
clude, such  seeming  meaning  not  to  be  the  real  one.  But 
it  is  not  any  degree  of  a  presumption  against  an  interpreta- 
tion of  scripture,  that  such  interpretation  contains  a  doctrine, 
which  the  light  of  nature  cannot  discover m ;  or  a  precept, 
which  the  law  of  nature  does  not  oblige  to. 

k  See  Matt.  xii.  7.  *  See  chap.  iii.  m  Inf.  ii.  3,  4. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  THE  SUPPOSED  PRESUMPTION  AGAINST  A  REVELATION, 
CONSIDERED  AS  MIRACULOUS. 


§  i.   Witt  deal  (a)  wltli  presumption,  (b)  with  positive 
evidence. 

TTAVING  shown  the  importance  of  the  Christian  revela- 
A*  tion,  and  the  obligations  which  we  are  under  seriously 
to  attend  to  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  or  its  credi- 
bility :  the  next  thing  in  order,  is  to  consider  the  supposed 
presumptions  against  revelation  in  general  ;  which  shall  be 
the  subject  of  this  chapter  :  and  the  objections  against 
the  Christian  in  particular ;  which  shall  be  the  subject  of 
some  following  onesa.  For  it  seems  the  most  natural 
method,  to  remove  these  prejudices  against  Christianity, 
before  we  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  the  positive 
evidence  for  it,  and  the  objections  against  that  evidence b. 

§  2.    He  discusses  under  protest  a  plea  lie  deems  frivolous. 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed,  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against 
the  Christian  scheme  of  things  ;  at  least  against  miracles  : 
so  as  that  stronger  evidence  is  necessaiy  to  prove  the  truth 
and  reality  of  them,  than  would  be  sufficient  to  convince  us 
of  other  events,  or  matters  of  fact.  Indeed  the  considera- 
tion of  this  supposed  presumption  cannot  but  be  thought 
very  insignificant,  by  many  persons.  Yet,  as  it  belongs  to 
the  subject  of  this  Treatise;  so  it  may  tend  to  open  the 
mind,  and  remove  some  prejudices  :  however  needless  the 
consideration  of  it  be,  upon  its  own  account. 


a  Chaps,  iii,  iv,  v,  vi.  b  Chap.  vii. 


174  SUPPOSED   PRESUMPTION  AGAINST  [II.  II. 

§  3.   Nature  sustains  no  presumption  against  the  gospel  idea, 

[I.]  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presumption,  from  the 
analogy  of  nature,  against  the  general  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  God  created  and  invisibly  governs  the  world 
by  Jesus  Christ ;  and  by  him  also  will  hereafter  judge  it 
in  righteousness,  i.  e.  render  to  every  one  according  to  his 
works  :  and  that  good  men  are  under  the  secret  influence 
of  his  Spirit.  Whether  these  things  are,  or  are  not,  to  be 
called  miraculous,  is,  perhaps,  only  a  question  about  words  ; 
or  however,  is  of  no  moment  in  the  case.  If  the  analogy  of 
nature  raises  any  presumption  against  this  general  scheme 
of  Christianity,  it  must  be,  either  because  it  is  not  discover- 
able by  reason  or  experience  ;  or  else,  because  it  is  unlike 
that  course  of  nature,  which  is.  But  analogy  raises  no  pre- 
sumption against  the  truth  of  this  scheme,  upon  either  of 
these  accounts. 

§  4.  (a)  Because  it  is  undiseoverable ;   like  so  mueh  else ; 

First,  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
the  truth  of  it,  upon  account  of  its  not  being  discoverable 
by  reason  or  experience.  For  suppose  one  who  never  heard 
of  revelation,  of  the  most  improved  understanding,  and 
acquainted  with  our  whole  system  of  natural  philosophy 
and  natural  religion :  such  an  one  could  not  but  be 
sensible,  that  it  was  but  a  very  small  part  of  the  natural 
and  moral  system  of  the  universe,  which  he  was  acquainted 
with.  He  could  not  but  be  sensible,  that  there  must  be 
innumerable  things,  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence 
past,  in  the  invisible  government  over  the  world  at  present 
carrying  on,  and  in  what  is  to  come  ;  of  which  he  was 
wholly  ignorant0,  and  which  could  not  be  discovered 
without  revelation.  Whether  the  scheme  of  nature  be, 
in  the  strictest  sense,  infinite  or  not  ;  it  is  evidently 
vast,  even  beyond  all  possible  imagination.  And  doubt- 
less that  part  of  it,  which  is  opened  to  our  view,  is  but 
as  a  point,  in  comparison  of  the  whole  plan  of  Providence, 

0  Sup.  I.  vii.  2-4. 


§§3-6]  A    REVELATION    WITH  MIRACLE  175 

reaching  throughout  eternity  past  and  future ;  in  com- 
parison of  what  is  even  now  going  on  in  the  remote  parts 
of  the  boundless  universe  ;  nay  in  comparison  of  the  whole 
scheme  of  this  world.  And  therefore,  that  things  lie 
beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no  sort  of 
presumption  against  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  :  because 
it  is  certain,  there  are  innumerable  things,  in  the  con- 
stitution and  government  of  the  universe,  which  are  thus 
beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties. 

§  5.  Or  (b)  because  not  always  like  nature :  which  is  not 
uniform;   nor  is  moral  government. 

Secondly,  Analogy  raises  no  presumption  against  any  of 
the  things  contained  in  this  general  doctrine  of  scripture 
now  mentioned,  upon  account  of  their  being  unlike  the 
known  course  of  nature.  For  there  is  no  presumption  at 
all  from  analogy,  that  the  tvhole  course  of  things,  or  divine 
government,  naturally  unknown  to  us,  and  every  tiling  in 
it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that  which  is  known  ;  and  there- 
fore no  peculiar  presumption  against  any  thing1  in  the 
former,  upon  account  of  its  being  unlike  to  any  thing  in 
the  latter.  And  in  the  constitution  and  natural  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  as  well  as  in  the  moral  government 
of  it,  we  see  things,  in  a  great  degree,  unlike  one  another : 
and  therefore  ought  not  to  wonder  at  such  unlikeness 
between  things  visible  and  invisible.  However,  the  scheme 
of  Christianity  is  by  no  means  entirely  unlike  the  scheme  of 
nature ;  as  will  appear  in  the  following  part  of  this  Treatise. 

§  6.  So  that  analogy  supplies  no  adverse  presumption'1. 

The  notion  of  a  miracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of  a  divine 
mission,  has  been  stated  with  great  exactness  by  divines  ; 


1  That  is,  against  any  particular  that  the  fact  of  their  having  been 
thing.     For,  were  there  an  uni-  used  to  prove  Christianity  raises 
versal   or  general  unlikeness,  it  no  presumption  against  its  truth, 
would  contradict  the  purpose  of  The  definition  of  a  miracle  had 
this  work  as  declared  in  the  title.  not  been  perhaps  as  closely  ex- 

2  Butler's  argument  is  not  con-  amined  in  mediaeval,  or  even  in 
cerned  with  proving  the  Christian  Butler's,    days,    as   in    our    own. 
miracles,  but  only  with  showing  Aliquid  dititur  esse  miraculum,  quod  fit 


176  SUPPOSED   PRESUMPTION  AGAINST  [II.  II. 

and  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  understood  by  every  one.  There 
are  also  invisible  miracles,  the  Incarnation  of  Christ,  for 
instance,  which,  being  secret,  cannot  be  alleged  as  a  proof 
of  such  a  mission  ;  but  require  themselves  to  be  proved  by 
visible 1  miracles.  Revelation  itself  too  is  miraculous  ;  and 
miracles  are  the  proof  of  it :  and  the  supposed  presumption 
against  these  shall  presently  be  considered.  All  which  I 
have  been  observing  here  is,  that,  whether  we  choose  to  call 
every  thing  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence,  not  dis- 
coverable without  revelation,  nor  like  the  known  course 
of  things,  miraculous  ;  and  whether  the  general  Christian 
dispensation  now  mentioned  is  to  be  called  so,  or  not ;  the 
foregoing  observations  seem  certainly  to  show,  that  there  is 
no  presumption  against  it  from  the  analogy  of  nature. 

§  7.   Was  there  a  primaeval  revelation  ?  is  a  question 
of  common  fact, 

[II.]  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
some  operations,  which  we  should  now  call  miraculous ; 
particularly  none  against  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of 
the  world  :  nothing  of  such  presumption  against  it,  as  is 
supposed  to  be  implied  or  expressed  in  the  word  miraculous. 
For  a  miracle,  in  its  very  notion,  is  relative  to  a  course 
of  nature ;  and  implies  somewhat  different  from  it,  con- 
sidered as  being  so.  Now,  either  there  was  no  course  of 
nature  at  the  time  which  we  are  speaking  of:  or  if  there 
were,  we  are  not  acquainted  what  the  course  of  nature  is, 
upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And  therefore  the 
question,  whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made  to  them 
at  that  time,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as  a  question  con- 
cerning a  miracle,  but  as  a  common  question  of  fact.  And 

praeter  ordinem  totius  naturae  creatae.  age  might,  owing  to  the  advance 
So  Aquinas,  Sumnia,  I.  Qu.  ex.  of  natural  knowledge  and  re- 
Art.  4.  What  seems  the  essence  source,  cease  to  be  a  miracle  for 
is  perhaps  this,  that  the  act  should  another. 

reasonably  convey  to  the  human  '  Evidently  meaning  sensible  : 

mind  the  belief  that  it  could  only  cf.  the   miracle   of  the  'rushing 

be  done   by  an   exertion  of  the  mighty  wind/  and  the  speech  in 

divine  power  above  and  beyond  tongues  previously  unknown   to 

the  settled  order  of  things.     It  is  the  speaker  (Acts  ii.  4)  on  the  day 

conceivable,  that  a  miracle  of  one  of  Pentecost,  and  thereafter. 


§§7-io]          A    REVELATION   WITH  MIRACLE  177 

we  have  the  like  reason,  be  it  more  or  less,  to  admit  the 
report  of  tradition,  concerning  this  question,  and  concerning 
common  matters  of  fact  of  the  same  antiquity  ;  for  instance, 
what  part  of  the  earth  was  first  peopled. 

§  8.  Certainly  foreign  to  the  present  course  of  nature. 
Or  thus :  When  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this  state, 
there  was  a  power  exerted,  totally  different  from  the  present 
course  of  nature.  Now,  whether  this  power,  thus  wholly 
different  from  the  present  course  of  nature,  for  we  cannot 
properly  apply  to  it  the  word  miraculous l ;  whether  this 
power  stopped  immediately  after  it  had  made  man,  or  went 
on,  and  exerted  itself  further  in  giving  him  a  revelation,  is 
a  question  of  the  same  kind,  as  whether  an  ordinary  power 
exerted  itself  in  such  a  particular  degree  and  manner,  or  not. 

§  9.  Our  Lord's  miracles  not  a  question  of  degree. 

Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of  the 
world  be  considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be  called  by 
that  name ;  the  case  will  not  be  different :  since  it  must 
be  acknowledged,  that  such  a  power  was  exerted.  For 
supposing  it  acknowledged,  that  our  Saviour  spent  some 
years  in  a  course  of  working  miracles  :  there  is  no  more 
presumption,  worth  mentioning,  against  his  having  exerted 
this  miraculous  power,  in  a  certain  degree  greater,  than  in 
a  certain  degree  less ;  in  one  or  two  more  instances,  than  in 
one  or  two  fewer  ;  in  this,  than  in  another  manner. 

It  is  evident  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar  pre- 
sumption, from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  supposing 
a  revelation,  when  man  was  first  placed  upon  the  earth. 

§  10.   Upon  the  evidences,  religion  first  came  by  revelation. 

Inferred  doubly*. 

Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  intimation  in 
history  or  tradition,  that  religion  was  first  reasoned  out : 

1  The  following  up  of  creation  '  course  of  nature '  from  which 
by  revelation  can  hardly  be  called  it  could  be  (see  §  7)  i  somewhat 
miraculous :  for  there  was  not  at  different.' 

the  time,  so  far  as  known  to  us,          2  On  the  origin  of  natural  reli- 
and  perhaps  hardly  could  be,  any      gion,  comp.  I.  vi.  18. 

VOL.  I.  N 


178  SUPPOSED   PRESUMPTION  AGAINST  [II.  II. 

but  the  whole  of  history  and  tradition  makes  for  the  other 
side,  that  it  came  into  the  world  by  revelation.  Indeed  the 
state  of  religion  in  the  first  ages,  of  which  we  have  any 
account,  seems  to  suppose  and  imply,  that  this  was  the 
original  of  it  amongst  mankind.  And  these  reflections 
together,  without  taking  in  the  peculiar  authority  of  scrip- 
ture, amount  to  real  and  a  very  material  degree  of  evidence, 
that  there  was  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world. 
Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirmation  of  natural  religion,  and 
therefore  mentioned  in  the  former  part  of  this  Treatise d : 
so  likewise  it  has  a  tendency  to  remove  any  prejudices 
against  a  subsequent  revelation. 

§  ii.  Strong  presumptions  lie  against  many  known  facts. 

[III.]  But  still  it  may  be  objected,  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  analogy,  against  miracles ; 
particularly  against  revelation,  after  the  settlement  and 
during  the  continuance  of  a  course  of  nature. 

Now  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption,  it  is  to 
be  observed  in  general,  that  before  we  can  have  ground 
for  raising  what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be  called  an 
argument  from  analogy,  for  or  against  revelation  considered 
as  somewhat  miraculous,  we  must  be  acquainted  with  a 
similar  or  parallel  case.  But  the  history  of  some  other 
world,  seemingly  in  like  circumstances  with  our  own,  is 
no  more  than  a  parallel  case :  and  therefore  nothing  short 
of  this  can  be  so.  Yet,  could  we  come  at  a  presumptive 
proof,  for  or  against  a  revelation,  from  being  informed, 
whether  such  world  had  one,  or  not ;  such  a  proof,  being 
drawn  from  one  single  instance  only,  must  be  infinitely 
precarious.  More  particularly :  First  of  all ;  There  is  a 
very  strong  presumption  against  common  speculative  truths, 
and  against  the  most  ordinary  facts,  before  the  proof  of 
them  ;  which  yet  is  overcome  by  almost  any  proof  \  There 

d  Sup.  I.  vi.  18. 


1  It  is  difficult  to  comprehend  ler  founds  probability  upon  like- 

Butler's  mode  of  arrival  at  this  ness  (Iiitrod.  §  3).    Improbability 

proposition,  and  the  proposition  therefore  requires  an  unlikeness 

itself  seems  hard  to  defend.   But-  of  the  same  kind.     But  there  is 


A    REVELATION    WITH  MIRACLE 


179 


is  a  presumption  of  millions  to  one,  against  the  story  of 
Caesar,  or  of  any  other  man.  For  suppose  a  number  of 
common  facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  of  which  one  had 
no  kind  of  proof,  should  happen  to  come  into  one's  thoughts ; 
every  one  would,  without  any  possible  doubt,  conclude  them  to 
be  false.  And  the  like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fact. 


no  such  unlikeness  in  these  most 
ordinary  facts,  which  are  here 
declared  improbable.  True,  the 
improbability  spoken  of  is  one 
before  proof.  But  surely  it  is  a 
startling  assertion  that  very  high 
improbability  can  be  overcome  by 
almost  any  thing  in  the  nature 
of  proof ;  which  I  take  to  be  the 
meaning  of  Butler's  words.  Sup- 
pose it  autumn :  I  am  looking 
at  a  great  tree  with  an  hundred 
thousand  leaves,  and  the  fall  of 
the  leaf  has  commenced  at  what 
may  be  called  an  uniform  rate. 
A  leaf  falls  :  the  chances  (appre- 
ciable by  me)  that  that  particular 
leaf  would  fall  at  that  particular 
moment  was  one  to  ten  thousand. 
Still  these  ch'ances,  as  I  should 
say,  constituted  something  in  its 
nature  different  from  an  improb- 
ability. But  could  I  have  seen 
into  the  physical  condition  of  the 
ligaments  which  connected  each 
leaf  with  the  tree,  according  as 
they  .still  lived  or  came  near  to 
death,  I  might  then  have  said  the 
early  fall  of  this  leaf  is  probable, 
of  that  one  improbable.  But  the 
improbability  to  be  real  must  be 
somewhat  in  the  thing  itself  and 
in  its  relation  to  other  things. 
There  is  improbability,  antecedent 
to  proof,  in  the  life  of  Alexander 
the  Great  or  of  Mahomet,  but  it 
is  because  those  lives  are  so  unlike 
the  lives  of  common  men,  or  the 
ordinary  course  of  nature.  Ac- 
cordingly BishopFitzgerald  quotes 
with  a  just  approval  the  conten- 
tion of  Mill  (Logic,  ii.  192,  194) 
that  these  observations  of  Butler 
afford  no  answer  to  the  argument 


of  Hume  against  miracles,  because 
that  argument  proceeds  upon 
'  contrariety  to  the  uniform  course 
of  experience.'  Chance,  on  which 
Butler  here  rests,  can  only  be 
predicated  where  there  is  no  sub- 
stantial unlikeness,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  tickets  in  a  lottery.  The  case 
of  Caesar  (standing  alone)  imports 
an  element  of  improbability, 
founded  on  unlikeness:  but  an 
improbability  removable  by  proof 
(see  Fitzgerald's  Analogy,  p.  184  n.  \ 

The  word  presumption,  then, 
appears,  as  well  as  improbability, 
to  be  inapplicable  to  the  case  now 
before  us. 

Mill  takes  his  distinction  in  a 
convenient  form  between  improb- 
ability before  the  fact,  and  im- 
probability after  the  fact. 

All  this  is  quite  independent  of 
the  validity  of  Hume's  argument. 
If  we  set  up  contrariety  to  the 
uniform  law  of  nature  it  may 
surely  be  observed,  (i)  that  nature 
is  extremely  various  ;  (2)  that  we 
are  not  entitled  to  assert  that  we 
know  the  limit  of  these  variations ; 
(3)  that  as  by  our  will  we  can  set 
in  motion  forces  antagonistic  to 
other  known  natural  forces,  so  it 
is  possible  that,  by  will-power 
other  and  greater  than  ours,  other 
natural  forces  may  be  contra- 
vened ;  (4)  that  this  action  of 
will  is  as  much  a  part  of  the  law 
and  course  of  nature  as  any  other> 
portion  of  the  operations  estab-' 
lished  by  experience. 

This  subject  is  discussed  in  Mr. 
Leslie  Stephen's  History  of  English 
Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century, 
ch.  viii.  §  28. 


N    2 


l8o  SUPPOSED   PRESUMPTION  AGAINST  [II.  n. 

§  12.  (a)  The  real  question :  Is  there  a  presumption  against 
miracles,  such  as  to  make  them  incredible? 

And  from  hence  it  appears,  that  the  question  of  impor- 
tance, as  to  the  matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree 
of  the  peculiar  presumption  supposed  against  miracles ;  not 
whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all  against 
them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of  millions  to  one, 
against  the  most  common  facts  ;  what  can  a  small  presump- 
tion, additional  to  this,  amount  to,  though  it  be  peculiar  ?  It 
cannot  be  estimated,  and  is  as  nothing.  The  only  material 
question  is,  whether  there  be  any  such  presumption  against 
miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any  sort  incredible. 

§  13.  (b)  Antecedent  to  proof,  the  presumption  against 
miracles  in  general  less  than  against  particular  facts. 

Secondly,  If  we  leave  out  the  consideration  of  religion, 
we  are  in  such  total  darkness,  upon  what  causes,  occasions, 
reasons,  or  circumstances,  the  present  course  of  nature 
depends ;  that  there  does  not  appear  any  improbability 
for  or  against  supposing,  that  five  or  six  thousand  years 
may  have  given  scope  for  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or 
circumstances,  from  whence  miraculous  interpositions  may 
have  arisen.  And  from  this,  joined  with  the  foregoing 
observation,  it  will  follow,  that  there  must  be  a  presump- 
tion, beyond  all  comparison,  greater,  against  the  particular 
common  facts  just  now  instanced  in,  than  against  miracles 
in  general ;  before  any  evidence  of  either  *. 

§  14.    (c)  But  religion  supplies  particular  reasons  for  them. 

But,  thirdly,  Take  in  the  consideration  of  religion,  or  the 
moral  system  of  the  world,  and  then  we  see  distinct  parti- 
cular reasons  for  miracles  :  to  afford  mankind  instruction 
additional  to  that  of  nature,  and  to  attest  the  truth  of  it. 
And  this  gives  a  real  credibility  to  the  supposition,  that  it 
might  be  part  of  the  original  plan  of  things,  that  there 
should  be  miraculous  interpositions. 

1  This  argument  appears  to  be  entangled  in  the  fallacious  idea 
propounded  in  §  n. 


§§ia-i6]        A    REVELATION    WITH  MIRACLE  181 

§  15.  (d)  They  are  to  be  compared  witli  the  cxtraordinaries 
of  nature. 

Then,  lastly,  Miracles  must  not  be  compared  to  common 
natural  events  ;  or  to  events  which,  though  uncommon,  are 
similar  to  what  we  daily  experience  :  but  to  the  extraordinary 
phenomena  of  nature.  And  then  the  comparison  will  be 
between  the  presumption  against  miracles,  and  the  presump- 
tion against  such  uncommon  appearances,  suppose,  as  comets, 
and  against  there  being  any  such  powers  in  nature  as  mag- 
netism and  electricity,  so  contrary  to  the  properties  of  other 
bodies  not  endued  with  these  powers  \  And  before  any  one 
can  determine,  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption 
against  miracles,  more  than  against  other  extraordinary 
things  ;  he  must  consider,  what,  upon  first  hearing,  would 
be  the  presumption  against  the  last-mentioned  appearances 
and  powers,  to  a  person  acquainted  only  with  the  daily, 
monthly,  and  annual  course  of  nature  respecting  this  earth, 
and  with  those  common  powers  of  matter  which  we  eveiy 
day  see. 

§  1 6.  Thus  they  appear  rather  to  have  a  degree  of  positive 
title  to  belief. 

Upon  all  this- 1  conclude  ;  That  there  certainly  is  no  such 
presumption  against  miracles,  as  to  render  them  in  any  wise 
incredible  :  that  on  the  contrary,  our  being  able  to  discern 
reasons  for  them,  gives  a  positive  credibility  to  the  history 
of  them,  in  cases  where  those  reasons  hold  :  and  that  it  is 
by  no  means  certain,  that  there  is  any  peculiar  presumption 
at  all,  from  analogy,  even  in  the  lowest  degree,  against 
miracles,  as  distinguished  from  other  extraordinary  phenc- 


1  The;e  powers  differ  from  the  them  and  other  laws,  which  were 

case  of  miracles  in  that  they  are  not    always   known,   prepare  us 

capable  of  systematic  verification;  to  anticipate  other  differences  of 

but  are  available  for  Butler's  pur-  great    breadth    and   strangeness, 

pose   in  that,  as  we  learn   new  Fitzgerald  observes,  that  miracles 

effects  and  characteristics  of  these  maybe  regarded  as  physical  events 

laws,  we  find  the  bounds  of  nature  having  moral  antecedents  :  which 

wider  than  we  had  supposed  ;  and  fall   under   Butler's  reference  to 

the    broad    differences    between  i  reasons.' 


182  THINGS    UNEXPECTED    OR  [ll.  HI. 

meua :  though  it  is  not  worth  while  to  perplex  the  reader 
with  inquiries  into  the  abstract  nature  of  evidence,  in  order 
to  determine  a  question,  which,  without  such  inquiries,  we 
see  e  is  of  no  importance. 


CHAPTER  III. 

OF  OUll  INCAPACITY  OF  JUDGING,  WHAT  WERE  TO  BE 
EXPECTED  IN  A  REVELATION;  AND  THE  CREDIBILITY, 
FROM  ANALOGY,  THAT  IT  MUST  CONTAIN  THINGS 
APPEARING  LIABLE  TO  OBJECTIONS. 

§  i.   Enumerates  dicers  objections  taken  to  the  Christian 
scheme. 

"OESIDES  the  objections  against  the  evidence  for  Chris- 
•*-*  tianity,  many  are  alleged  against  the  scheme  of  it ; 
against  the  whole  manner  in  which  it  is  put  and  left  with 
the  world  ;  as  well  as  against  several  particular  relations  in 
scripture  :  objections  drawn  from  the  deficiencies  of  revela- 
tion ;  from  things  in  it  appearing  to  men  foolishmss a ;  from 
its  containing  matters  of  offence,  which  have  led,  and  it 
must  have  been  foreseen  would  lead,  into  strange  enthusiasm 
and  superstition,  and  be  made  to  serve  the  purposes  of 
tyranny  and  wickedness ;  from  its  not  being  universal ; 
and,  which  is  a  thing  of  the  same  kind,  from  its  evidence 
not  being  so  convincing  and  satisfactory  as  it  might  have 
been  :  for  this  last  is  sometimes  turned  into  a  positive 
argument  against  its  truth b.  It  would  be  tedious,  indeed 
impossible,  to  enumerate  the  several  particulars  compre- 
hended under  the  objections  here  referred  to  ;  they  being 
so  various,  according  to  the  different  fancies  of  men.  There 
are  persons,  who  think  it  a  strong  objection  against  the 
authority  of  scripture,  that  it  is  not  composed  by  rules  of 


e  P.  169  [in  edition  of   1844.     But  the  reference  appears  to  be  to 
p.  210,  §  2.] 

a  i  Cor.  i.  23.  b  See  chap.  vi. 


§§  r-3]  LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS  183 

art,  agreed  upon  by  critics,  for  polite  and  correct  writing. 
And  the  scorn  is  inexpressible,  with  which  some  of  the 
prophetic  parts  of  scripture  are  treated  :  partly  through  the 
rashness  of  interpreters  ;  but  very  much  also,  on  account  of 
the  hieroglyphical  and  figurative  language,  in  which  they 
are  left  us.  Some  of  the  principal  things  of  this  sort  shall 
be  particularly  considered  in  following  chapters. 

§  2.   Mostly  frivolous ;  except  those  against  the  evidence. 

But  my  design  at  present  is  to  observe  in  general,  with 
respect  to  this  whole  way  of  arguing,  that,  upon  supposition 
of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  we  should 
be  incompetent  judges  of  it  to  a  great  degree  :  and  that  it 
would  contain  many  things  appearing  to  us  liable  to  great 
objections  ;  in  case  we  judge  of  it  otherwise,  than  by  the 
analogy  of  nature.  And  therefore,  though  objections  against 
the  evidence  of  Christianity  are  most  seriously  to  be  con- 
sidered ;  yet  objections  against  Christianity  itself  are,  in 
a  great  measure,  frivolous :  almost  all  objections  against  it, 
excepting  those  which  are  alleged  against  the  particular 
proofs  of  its  coming  from  God. 

§  3.  Cautious  not  to  vilify  reason,  ivhereby  we  judge  even  of 
revelation. 

I  express  myself  with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mistaken 
to  vilify  reason * ;  which  is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we  have 
wherewith  to  judge  concerning  any  thing,  even  revelation 
itself:  or  be  misunderstood  to  assert,  that  a  supposed 
revelation  cannot  be  proved  false,  from  internal  characters. 
For,  it  may  contain  clear  immoralities  or  contradictions  ; 
and  either  of  these  would  prove  it  false.  Nor  will  I  take 
upon  me  to  affirm,  that  nothing  else  can  possibly  render 
any  supposed  revelation  incredible.  Yet  still  the  observation 
above  is,  I  think,  true  beyond  doubt ;  that  objections  against 
Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its 
evidence,  are  frivolous.  To  make  out  this,  is  the  general 
design  of  the  present  chapter. 


1  See  inf.  ix.  7. 


184  THINGS    UNEXPECTED    OR  [II.  ill. 

§  4.  Dislike  of  consequences  no  relevant  pica. 

And  with  regard  to  the  whole  of  it,  I  cannot  but  par- 
ticularly wish,  that  the  proofs  might  be  attended  to ; 
rather  than  the  assertions  cavilled  at,  upon  account  of  any 
unacceptable  consequences,  whether  real  or  supposed,  which 
may  be  drawn  from  them.  For,  after  all,  that  which  is 
true,  must  be  admitted,  though  it  should  show  us  the 
shortness  of  our  faculties ;  and  that  we  are  in  no  wise 
judges  of  many  things,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think 
ourselves  very  competent  ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any 
objection  with  reasonable  men,  at  least  upon  second 
thought  it  will  not  be  any  objection  with  such,  against 
the  justness  of  the  following  observations. 

§  5.   Taking  objection  to  nature,  we  are  likely  to  object 
to  revelation. 

As  God  governs  the  world,  and  instructs  his  creatures, 
according  to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the  known  course  of 
nature,  known  by  reason  together  with  experience  :  so  the* 
scripture  informs  us  of  a  scheme  of  divine  Providence, 
additional  to  this.  It  relates,  that  God  has,  by  revelation, 
instructed  men  in  things  concerning  his  government,  which 
they  could  not  otherwise  have  known  ;  and  reminded  them 
of  things,  which  they  might  otherwise  know :  and  attested 
the  truth  of  the  whole  by  miracles.  Now  if  the  natural 
and  the  revealed  dispensation  of  things  are  both  from  God, 
if  they  coincide  with  each  other,  and  together  make  up  one 
scheme  of  Providence  ;  our  being  incompetent  judges  of 
one,  must  render  it  credible,  that  we  may  be  incompetent 
judges  also  of  the  other.  Since,  upon  experience,  the 
acknowledged  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is  found 
to  be  greatly  different  from  what,  before  experience,  would 
have  been  expected  ;  and  such  as,  men  fancy,  there  lie 
great  objections  against :  this  renders  it  beforehand  highly 
credible,  that  they  may  find  the  revealed  dispensation 
likewise,  if  they  judge  of  it  as  they  do  of  the  constitution 
of  nature,  very  different  from  expectations  formed  before, 
hand ;  and  liable,  in  appearance,  to  great  objections : 


§§  4-7]  LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS  185 

objections  against  the  scheme  itself,  and  against  the  degrees 
and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interpositions,  by  which  it 
was  attested  and  carried  on. 

§  6.   As  a  bad  judge  of  ordinary  temporal  government 

would  le  the  like  of  extraordinary. 

Thus  suppose  a  prince  to  govern  his  dominions  in  the 
wisest  manner  possible,  by  common  known  laws  ;  and  that 
upon  some  exigencies  he  should  suspend  these  laws  ;  and 
govern,  in  several  instances,  in  a  different  manner :  if  one 
of  his  subjects  were  not  a  competent  judge  beforehand,  by 
what  common  rules  the  government  should  or  would  be 
carried  on  ;  it  could  not  be  expected,  that  the  same  person 
would  be  a  competent  judge,  in  what  exigencies,  or  in 
what  manner,  or  to  what  degree,  those  laws  commonly 
observed  would  be  suspended  or  deviated  from.  If  he 
were  not  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the  ordinary  administra- 
tion, there  is  no  reason  to  think  he  would  be  a  judge  of 
the  wisdom  of  the  extraordinary.  If  he  thought  he  had 
objections  against  the  former ;  doubtless,  it  is  highly 
supposable,  he  might  think  also,  that  he  had  objections 
against  the  latter.  And  thus,  as  we  fall  into  infinite  follies 
and  mistakes,  whenever  we  pretend,  otherwise  than  from 
experience  and  analogy,  to  judge  of  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature ;  it  is  evidently  supposable  beforehand, 
that  we  should  fall  into  as  great,  in  pretending  to  judge, 
in  like  manner,  concerning  revelation.  Nor  is  there  any 
more  ground  to  expect  that  this  latter  should  appear  to 
us  clear  of  objections,  than  that  the  former  should. 

§  7.    What  inspiration,  or  revelation,  would  or  should 

le,  we  are  lad  judges. 

These  observations,  relating  to  the  whole  of  Christianity, 
are  applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular.  As  we  are  in 
no  sort  judges  beforehand,  by  what  laws  or  rules,  in  what 
degree,  or  by  what  means,  it  were  to  have  been  expected, 
that  God  would  naturally  instruct  us  :  so  upon  supposition 
of  his  affording  us  light  and  instruction  by  revelation, 
additional  to  what  he  has  afforded  us  by  reason  and 
experience,  we  are  in  no  sort  judges,  by  what  methods, 


III. 


186  THINGS    UNEXPECTED    OR  [n. 

and  in  what  proportion,  it  were  to  be  expected,  that  this 
supernatural  light  and  instruction  would  be  afforded  us. 
We  know  not  beforehand,  what  degree  or  kind  of  natural 
information,  it  were  to  be  expected  God  would  aiford  men. 
each  by  his  own  reason  and  experience:   nor  how  far  he 
would  enable  and  effectually  dispose  them  to  communicate 
it,  whatever  it  should  be,  to  each  other :  nor  whether  the 
evidence    of    it    would    be    certain,    highly    probable,     or 
doubtful:     nor    whether    it   would    be    given   with   equal 
clearness  and  conviction  to  all.     Nor  could  we  guess,  upon 
any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural  knowledge,  or 
even  the  faculty  itself,  by  which  we  are  capable  of  attaining 
it,   reason,  would  be  given  us  at  once,   or  gradually.     In 
like  manner,  we  are  wholly  ignorant,  what  degree  of  new 
knowledge,  it  were  to  be  expected,  God  would  give  mankind 
by  revelation,   upon  supposition  of  his   affording  one  :    or 
how  far,  or  in  what  way,  he  would  interpose  miraculously, 
to  qualify  them,  to  whom  he  should  originally  make  the 
revelation,  for  communicating  the  knowledge  given  by  it ; 
and  to  secure  their  doing  it  to  the  age  in  which  they  should 
live ;  and  to  secure  its  being  transmitted  to  posterity.     We 
are  equally  ignorant,  whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be 
certain,  or  highly  probable,  or  doubtful  c  :   Or  whether  all 
who  should  have  any  degree  of  instruction  from  it,  and 
any  degree  of  evidence  of  its  truth,  would  have  the  same  : 
or  whether   the    scheme   would    be   revealed    at   once,    or 
unfolded  gradually.     Nay  we  are  not  in  any  sort  able  to 
judge,  whether  it  were  to  have   been  expected,   that   the 
revelation   should    have    been    committed   to   writing;    or 
left   to  be  handed   down,  and  consequently  corrupted,  by 
verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  sunk  under  it,  if  mankind 
so  pleased,  and  during  such  time  as  they  are  permitted,  in 
the  degree  they  evidently  are,  to  act  as  they  will. 

§  8.   E.  g.  as  letiveen  written  and  oral  forms. 
But  it   may  be  said,   <  that  a  revelation  in  some  of  the 
>ove   mentioned   circumstances,   one,   for  instance,   which 

c  See  chap.  vi. 


§§8-io]  LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS  187 

was  not  committed  to  writing,  and  thus  secured  against 
danger  of  corruption,  would  not  have  answered  its  purpose.' 
I  ask,  what  purpose  ?  It  would  not  have  answered  all  the 
purposes,  which  it  has  now  answered,  and  in  the  same 
degree  :  but  it  would  have  answered  others,  or  the  same 
in  different  degrees.  And  which  of  these  were  the  purposes 
of  God,  and  best  fell  in  with  his  general  government,  we 
could  not  at  all  have  determined  beforehand. 

§  9.  27ms  ignorant  a  parte  ante,  lue  are  Incompetent 

a  parte  post. 

Now  since  it  has  been  shown,  that  we  have  no  principles 
of  reason,  upon  which  to  judge  beforehand,  how  it  were  to 
be  expected  revelation  should  have  been  left,  or  what  was 
most  suitable  to  the  divine  plan  of  government,  in  any  of 
the  forementioned  respects ;   it  must  be  quite  frivolous  to 
object  afterwards  as  to  any  of  them,  against  its  being  left 
in  one  way,  rather  th'an  another :  for  this  would  be  to  object 
against  things,  upon  account  of  their  being  different  from 
expectations,  which  have  been  shown  to  be  without  reason. 
And  thus  we  see,  that  the  only  question  concerning  the 
truth  of  Christianity  is,  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation  :  not 
whether  it  be  attended  with  every  circumstance  which  we 
should  have  looked  for  :    and  concerning  the  authority  of 
scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to  be  ;  not  whether 
it  be  a  book  of  such  sort,  and  so  promulged,  as  weak  men 
are  apt  to  fancy  a  book  containing  a  divine  revelation  should. 
And  therefore,  neither  obscurity,  nor  seeming  inaccuracy 
of  style,  nor  various  readings,  nor  early  disputes  about  the 
authors  of  particular  parts  ;    nor  any  other  things  of  the 
like  kind,  though  they  had  been  much  more  considerable 
in  degree  than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the  authority  of 
the  scripture :    unless  the  prophets,  apostles,  or  our  Lord, 
had  promised,  that  the  book  containing  the  divine  revelation 
should  be  secure  from  those  things. 

§  10.   Attack  feasible  only  on  (a)  proofs  of  miracle, 

(b)  prophecy. 

Nor  indeed  can  any  objections  overthrow  such  a  kind  of 
revelation  as  the  Christian  claims  to  be,  since  there  are  no 


188  THINGS    UNEXPECTED    OR  [II.  III. 

objections  against  the  morality  of  it  l\  but  such  as  can  show, 
that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought  originally  in 
attestation  of  it ;  no  appearance  of  any  thing  miraculous 
in  its  obtaining  in  the  world  ;  nor  any  of  prophecy,  that 
is,  of  events  foretold,  which  human  sagacity  could  not 
foresee. 

§  ii.  If  lut  partially  proven,  their  authority  will  abide. 

If  it  can  be  shown,  that  the  proof  alleged  for  all  these  is 
absolutely  none  at  all,  then  is  revelation  overturned  '.  But 
were  it  allowed,  that  the  proof  of  any  one  or  all  of  them 
is  lower  than  is  allowed  ;  yet,  whilst  any  proof  of  them 
remains,  revelation  will  stand  upon  much  the  'same  foot 
it  does  at  present,  as  to  all  the  purposes  of  life  and  practice, 
and  ought  to  have  the  like  influence  upon  our  behaviour. 

§  12.    Arguments  yood  for  ordinary  looks  ivill  not  always  hold 
in  the  case  of  scripture. 

From  the  foregoing  observations  too,  it  will  follow,  and 
those  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  revelation  will  find 
it  worth  remarking ;  that  there  are  several  ways  of  arguing, 
which,  though  just  with  regard  to  other  writings,  are  not 
applicable  to  scripture  :  at  least  not  to  the  prophetic  parts 
of  it.  We  cannot  argue,  for  instance,  that  this  cannot  be 
the  sense  or  intent  of  such  a  passage  of  scripture  ;  for,  if 
it  had,  it  would  have  been  expressed  more  plainly,  or  have 
been  represented  under  a  more  apt  figure  or  hieroglyphic  : 
yet  we  may  justly  argue  thus,  with  respect  to  common 
books.  And  the  reason  of  this  difference  is  very  evident ; 
that  in  scripture  we  are  not  competent  judges,  as  we 
are  in  common  books,  how  plainly  it  were  to  have  been 
expected,  what  is  the  true  sense  should  have  been  expressed, 


d  Inf.  §  26. 


1  I  suppose  we  may  fill  up  the  but  not  destroyed,  we  should  not, 

argument  thus.     The  disproof  in  under  the  rules  of  probability  and 

this  or  that  case  would  not  affect  good  sense,  be  discharged  from  all 

the  credit  generally  due.     If  the  duty  in  regard  to  them, 
general  proof  of  all  were  weakened 


§§  "- 


LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS 


189 


or  under  how  apt  an  image  figured.  The  only  question  is, 
what  appearance  there  is,  that  this  is  the  sense  ;  and  scarce 
at  all,  how  much  more  determinately  or  accurately  it  might 
have  been  expressed  or  figured. 

§  13.    Internal  improbabilities  (a)  hard  to  establish,  (b)  may 
be  set  aside  by  evidence, 

i  But  is  it  not  self-evident,  that  internal  improbabilities 
of  all  kinds  weaken  external  probable  proof  ?  '  Doubtless. 
But  to  what  practical  purpose  can  this  be  alleged  here,  when 
it  has  been  proved  before61,  that  real  internal  improbabilities 
which  rise  even  to  moral  certainty,  are  overcome  by  the 
most  ordinary  testimony  ;  and  when  it  now  has  been  made 
appear,  that  we  scarce  know  what  are  improbabilities,  as 
to  the  matter  we  are  here  considering :  as  it  will  further 
appear  from  what  follows. 

§  14.    Why  preconceived  notions  are  sure  to  mislead. 

For  though  from  the  observations  above  made  it  is 
manifest,  that  we  are  not  in  any  sort  competent  judges, 
what  supernatural  instruction  were  to  have  been  expected  ; 
and  though  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  objections  of  an 
incompetent  judgment  must  be  frivolous :  yet  it  may  be 
proper  to  go  one  step  further,  and  observe ;  that  if  men 
will  be  regardless  of  these  things,  and  pretend  to  judge  of 


0  Sup.  ii.  n,  12. 


1  Again  we  appear  to  be  en- 
tangled in  the  argument  of  §§  ir 
and  12,  ch.  ii.  Still,  the  state- 
ment there  does  not  go  beyond 
propounding  that  an  adverse  pre- 
sumption of  millions  to  one  may 
be  overcome  by  almost  any  proof. 
That  such  a  presumption,  as  But- 
ler there  has  in  view,  does  not 
'rise  to  moral  certainty'  is  plain 
at  once  from  the  fact  that  the 
things  referred  to  are  ('the  most 
common  facts')  such  as  do  actually 
happen.  These  are  not  'real 


internal  improbabilities,'  for  they 
do  not  grow  out  of  any  thing  in 
the  things  themselves,  but  are 
a  mere  conjecture  as  to  the  num- 
ber of  possibilities,  any  one  of 
which  might  have  become  fact, 
instead  of  that  which  did  become 
so.  This  discussion  must  turn 
not  upon  mere  adverse  chances, 
but  on  improbabilities  which  are 
intrinsic.  The  closing  lines  of 
the  section  stand  clear  of  this 
difficulty.  See  sup.  §  1 1  of  ch.  ii. 


I90  THINGS    UNEXPECTED    OR  [II.  III. 

the  scripture  by  preconceived  expectations  ;  the  analogy  of 
nature  shows  beforehand  not  only  that  it  is  highly  credible 
they  may,  but  also  probable  that  they  will,  imagine  they 
have  strong  objections  against  it,  however  really  unexcep- 
tionable :  for  so,  prior  to  experience,  they  would  think  they 
had,  against  the  circumstances  and  degrees  and  the  whole 
manner  of  that  instruction,  which  is  afforded  by  the  ordinary 
course  of  nature.  Were  the  instruction  which  God  affords 
to  brute  creatures  by  instincts  and  mere  propensions,  and  to 
mankind  by  these  together  with  reason,  matter  of  probable 
proof,  and  not  of  certain  observation  ;  it  would  be  rejected 
as  incredible,  in  many  instances  of  it,  only  upon  account 
of  the  means  by  which  this  instruction  is  given,  the  seeming 
disproportions,  the  limitations,  necessary  conditions,  and 
circumstances  of  it. 

§  15.   E.  g.  as  to  (a)  comparative  access  to  different  kinds 
of  knowledge,  (b)  invention,  (c)  language. 

For  instance :  Would  it  not  have  been  thought  highly 
improbable,  that  men  should  have  been  so  much  more 
capable  of  discovering,  even  to  certainty,  the  general  laws 
of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes,  paths,  and  revolutions  of 
the  heavenly  bodies ;  than  the  occasions  and  cures  of 
distempers,  and  many  other  things,  in  which  human  life 
seems  so  much  more  nearly  concerned,  than  in  astronomy  ? 
How  capricious  and  irregular  a  way  of  information,  would 
it  be  said,  is  that  of  invention,  by  means  of  wrhich  nature 
instructs  us  in  matters  of  science,  and  in  many  things, 
upon  which  the  affairs  of  the  world  greatly  depend  :  that 
a  man  should,  by  this  faculty,  be  made  acquainted  with 
a  thing  in  an  instant,  when  perhaps  he  is  thinking  of 
somewhat  else,  which  he  has  in  vain  been  searching  after, 
it  may  be,  for  years.  So  likewise  the  imperfections  attend- 
ing the  only  method,  by  which  nature  enables  and  directs 
us  to  communicate  our  thoughts  to  each  other,  are  in- 
numerable. Language  is,  in  its  very  nature,  inadequate, 
ambiguous,  liable  to  infinite  abuse,  even  from  negligence  ; 
and  so  liable  to  it  from  design,  that  every  man  can  deceive 
and  betray  by  it. 


§§  i5-i8]  LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS  191 

§  1 6.    Greater  certainty  of  brutes  in  their  mental 
operations. 

And,  to  mention  but  one  instance  more ;  that  brutes, 
without  reason,  should  act,  in  many  respects,  with  a  sagacity 
and  foresight  vastly  greater  than  what  men  have  in  those 
respects,  would  be  thought  impossible.  Yet  it  is  certain 
they  do  act  with  such  superior  foresight:  whether  it  be 
their  own  indeed,  is  another  question. 

§  17.  Case  would  probably  be  similar  in  any  (supposed) 
further  revelation. 

From  these  things,  it  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  that 
upon  supposition  God  should  afford  men  some  additional 
instruction  by  revelation,  it  would  be  with  circumstances, 
in  manners,  degrees,  and  respects,  which  we  should  be  apt 
to  fancy  we  had  great  objections  against  the  credibility  of. 
Nor  are  the  objections  against  the  scripture,  nor  against 
Christianity  in  general,  at  all  more  or  greater,  than  the 
analogy  of  nature  would  beforehand— not  perhaps  give 
ground  to  expect ;  for  this  analogy  may  not  be  sufficient, 
in  some  cases,  to  ground  an  expectation  upon  ;  but  no  more 
nor  greater,  than  analogy  would  show  it,  beforehand,  to  be 
supposable  and  credible,  that  there  might  seem  to  lie  against 
revelation. 

§  1 8.    Objection  from  the  disorderly  use  of  miraculous 
gifts  futile. 

By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  particular 
objection,  it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen,  how  they  are 
applicable  to  others  of  the  like  kind :  and  indeed  to  almost 
all  objections  against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from 
objections  against  its  evidence.  It  appears  from  scripture, 
that,  as  it  was  not  unusual  in  the  apostolic  age,  for  persons, 
upon  their  conversion  to  Christianity,  to  be  endued  with 
miraculous  gifts ;  so,  some  of  those  persons  exercised  these 
gifts  in  a  strangely  irregular  and  disorderly  manner;  and 
this  is  made  an  objection  against  theii  being  really 
miraculous,  Now  the  foregoing  observations  quite  remove 


192  THINGS    UNEXPECTED    OR  [II.  III. 

this  objection,  how  considerable  soever  it  may  appear  at 
first  sight.  For,  consider  a  person  endued  with  any  of 
these  gifts ;  for  instance,  that  of  tongues :  it  is  to  be 
supposed,  that  he  had  the  same  power  over  this  miraculous 
gift,  as  he  would  have  had  over  it,  had  it  been  the  effect 
of  habit,  of  study  and  use,  as  it  ordinarily  is  ;  or  the  same 
power  over  it,  as  he  had  over  any  other  natural  endowment '. 
Consequently,  he  would  use  it  in  the  same  manner  he  did 
any  other ;  either  regularly,  and  upon  proper  occasions 
only,  or  irregularly,  and  upon  improper  ones :  according 
to  his  sense  of  decency,  and  his  character  of  prudence. 
Where  then  is  the  objection?  Why,  if  this  miraculous 
power  was  indeed  given  to  the  world  to  propagate  Chris- 
tianity, and  attest  the  truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have 
expected,  that  other  sort  of  persons  should  have  been 
chosen  to  be  invested  with  it ;  or  that  these  should,  at  the 
same  time,  have  been  endued  with  prudence ;  or  that  they 
should  have  been  continually  restrained  and  directed  in 
the  exercise  of  it:  i.e.  that  God  should  have  miraculously 
interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a  different  manner,  or  higher  degree. 
But,  from  the  observations  made  above,  it  is  undeniably 
evident,  that  we  are  not  judges  in  what  degrees  and 
manners  it  were  to  have  been  expected  he  should  miracu- 
lously interpose  ;  upon  supposition  of  his  doing  it  in  some 
degree  and  manner. 

§  19.   Similar  risk  in  other  gifts. 

Nor,  in  the  natural  course  of  Providence,  are  superior 
gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and  other  talents 
of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on  persons  of  prudence 
and  decency,  or  such  as  are  disposed  to  make  the  properest 
use  of  them.  Nor  is  the  instruction  and  admonition 
naturally  afforded  us  for  the  conduct  of  life,  particularly 
in  our  education,  commonly  given  in  a  manner  the  most 
suited  to  recommend  it ;  but  often  with  circumstances  apt 
to  prejudice  us  against  such  instruction. 


1  This    seems   to   be   expressly       the  spirits  of  the  prophets  are 
declared  in  i  Cor.  xiv.  32,  <and       subject  to  the  prophets.' 


§§  i9-2i]  LIABLE   TO    OBJECTIONS  193 

§  20.    Analogy  of  nature  and  revelation  in  the  relations 
of  lower  to  higher  Jcnozvledge. 

One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  resemblance 
between  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revelation,  in  several 
other  respects.  Practical  Christianity,  or  that  faith  and 
behaviour  which  renders  a  man  a  Christian,  is  a  plain  and 
obvious  thing  :  like  the  common  rules  of  conduct,  with 
respect  to  our  ordinary  temporal  affairs.  The  more  distinct 
and  particular  knowledge  of  those  things,  the  study  of 
which  the  apostle  calls  going  on  unto  perfection f,  and  of  the 
prophetic  parts  of  revelation,  like  many  parts  of  natural 
and  even  civil  knowledge,  may  require  very  exact  thought, 
and  careful  consideration.  The  hindrances  too,  of  natural, 
and  of  supernatural  light  and  knowledge,  have  been  of  the 
same  kind. 

§  21.    So  it  is  as  to  the  further  opening  of  scripture. 

And  as  it  is  owned  the  whole  scheme  of  scripture  is  not 
yet  understood  ;  so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  understood, 
before  the  restitution  of  all  things  »,  and  without  miraculous 
interpositions ;  it  must  be  in  the  same  way  as  natural 
knowledge  is  come  at :  by  the  continuance  and  progress 
of  learning  and  of  liberty ;  and  by  particular,  persons 
attending  to,  comparing  and  pursuing,  intimations  scattered 
up  and  down  it,  which  are  overlooked  and  disregarded  by 
the  generality  of  the  world.  For  this  is  the  way,  in  which 
all  improvements  are  made ;  by  thoughtful  men's  tracing 
on  obscure  hints,  as  it  were,  dropped  us  by  nature 
accidentally,  or  which  seem  to  come  into  our  minds  by 
chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible,  that  a  book,  which  has 
been  so  long  in  the  possession  of  mankind,  should  contain 
many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered.  For,  all  the  same 
phenomena,  and  the  same  faculties  of  investigation,  from 
which  such  great  discoveries  in  natural  knowledge  have 
been  made  in  the  present  and  last  age,  were  equally  in 
the  possession  of  mankind,  several  thousand  years  before. 


f  Heb.  vi.  i.  f  Acts  iii.  ai. 

VOL.  I.  0 


194 


THINGS    UNEXPECTED    OR 


[II.  III. 


And  possibly  it  might  be  intended,  that  events,  as  they 
come  to  pass,  should  open  and  ascertain  the  meaning  of 
several  parts  of  scripture. 

§  22.   Natural  Icnoicledge  sometimes  of  high  stamp:   is  given 
not  as  tee  expect,  but  differently1. 

It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a  material 
respect :  for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of  little  or  no 
consequence.  But  I  have  been  speaking  of  the  general 
instruction  which  nature  does  or  does  not  afford  us.  And 
besides,  some  parts  of  natural  knowledge,  in  the  more 
common  restrained  sense  of  the  words,  are  of  the  greatest 
consequence  to  the  ease  and  convenience  of  life.  But 
suppose  the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail  in  this  respect ; 
yet  it  might  be  abundantly  supplied,  from  the  whole 
constitution  and  course  of  nature :  which  shows,  that  God 
does  not  dispense  his  gifts  according  to  our  notions  of  the 
advantage  and  consequence  they  would  be  of  to  us.  And 
this  in  general,  with  his  method  of  dispensing  knowledge 
in  particular,  would  together  make  out  an  analogy  full  to 
the  point  before  us. 

§  23.    That  the  supply  of  light  is  only  partial. 

But  it  may  be  objected  still  further  and  more  generally ; 
1  The  scripture  represents  the  world  as  in  a  state  of  ruin, 
and  Christianity  as  an  expedient  to  recover  it,  to  help  in 
these  respects  where  nature  fails :  in  particular,  to  supply 
the  deficiencies  of  natural  light.  Is  it  credible  then,  that 
so  many  ages  should  have  been  let  pass,  before  a  matter 
of  such  a  sort,  of  so  great  and  so  general  importance,  was 
made  known  to  mankind  ;  and  then  that  it  should  be  made 


1  Dr.  Angus  in  his  analysis  of 
the  chapter  brings  oat  the  numer- 
ous points  of  this  short  section  : 

(a',  Objection  is  taken  to  natural 
knowledge  as  unimportant. 

(6)  That  is,  irreleyant 

(c    Ako  untrue. 

(<T)  The  argument  is  that  God 


gives  not  as  we  expect,  but 
differently. 

(«)  Herein  a  full  analogy  be- 
tween nature  and  revelation 
is  exhibited. 

See    Butler's    Analogy,    edited    by 

Dr.  Angus,  p.  180. 


§§22-24]  LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS  195 

known  to  so  small  a  part  of  them  ?  Is  it  conceivable,  that 
this  supply  should  be  so  very  deficient,  should  have  the  like 
obscurity  and  doubtfulness,  be  liable  to  the  like  perversions, 
in  short,  lie  open  to  all  the  like  objections,  as  the  light  of 
nature  itself  h?' 

§  24.   In  ~both  schemes,  remedies  are  incomplete. 

Without  determining  how  far  this  in  fact  is  so,  I  answer  ; 
it  is  by  no  means  incredible,  that  it  might  be  so,  if  the  light 
of  nature  and  of  revelation  be  from  the  same  hand.  Men 
are  naturally  liable  to  diseases  :  for  which  God,  in  his  good 
providence,  has  provided  natural  remedies1.  But  remedies 
existing  in  nature  have  been  unknown  to  mankind  for  many 
ages  :  are  known  but  to  few  now  :  probably  many  valuable 
ones  are  not  known  yet.  Great  has  been  and  is  the 
obscurity  and  difficulty,  in  the  nature  and  application  of 
them.  Circumstances  seem  often  to  make  them  very  im- 
proper, where  they  are  absolutely  necessary.  It  is  after 
long  labour  and  study,  and  many  unsuccessful  endeavours, 
that  they  are  brought  to  be  as  useful  as  they  are ;  after 
high  contempt  and  absolute  rejection  of  the  most  useful 
we  have  ;  and  after  disputes  and  doubts,  which  have  seemed 
to  be  endless.  The  best  remedies  too,  when  unskilfully, 
much  more  if  dishonestly  applied,  may  produce  new  diseases : 
and  with  the  lightest  application  the  success  of  them  is  often 
doubtful.  In  many  cases  they  are  not  at  all  effectual : 
where  they  are,  it  is  often  very  slowly  :  and  the  application 
of  them,  and  the  necessary  regimen  accompanying  it,  is, 
not  uncommonly,  so  disagreeable,  that  some  will  not  submit 
to  them  ;  and  satisfy  themselves  with  the  excuse,  that,  if 
they  would,  it  is  not  certain  whether  it  would  be  successful. 
And  many  persons,  who  labour  under  diseases,  for  which 
there  are  known  natural  remedies,  are  not  so  happy  as  to 
be  always,  if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them.  In  a  word,  the 
remedies  which  nature  has  provided  for  diseases  are  neither 
certain,  perfect,  nor  universal. 


h  Chap.  vi.  i  See  chap,  v, 

O  2 


100  THINGS  UNEXPECTED   OR  [\\.\\\. 

§  25.   //  we  ask  perfect  remedies,  why  not  ask  banishment 
of  disease  ? 

And  indeed  the  same  principles  of  arguing,  which  would 
lend  us  to  conclude,  that  they  must  be  so,  would  lead  us 
likewise  to  conclude,  that  there  could  be  no  occasion  for 
them  ;  i.  e.  that  there  could  be  no  diseases  at  all.  And 
therefore  our  experience  that  there  are  diseases  shows, 
that  it  is  credible  beforehand,  upon  supposition  nature 
has  provided  remedies  for  them,  that  these  remedies  may 
be,  as  by  experience  we  find  they  are,  not  certain,  nor 
perfect,  nor  universal ;  because  it  shows,  that  the  principles 
upon  which  we  should  expect  the  contrary  are  fallacious. 

§  26.    //*  revelation,  reason  is  to  judge  (a)  the  meaning, 
(b)  the  morality,  (c)  the  evidence. 

And  now,  what  is  the  just  consequence  from  all  these 
things?  Not  that  reason  is  no  judge  of  what  is  offered  to 
us  as  being  of  divine  revelation.  For  this  would  be  to  infer, 
that  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  any  thing,  because  we  are 
unable  to  judge  of  all  things.  Reason  can,  and  it  ought  to 
judge,  not  only  of  the  meaning,  but  also  of  the  morality 
and  the  evidence,  of  revelation.  First,  It  is  the  province  of 
reason  to  judge  of  the  morality  of  the  scripture  ;  i.  e.  not 
whether  it  contains  things  different  from  what  we  should 
have  expected  from  a  wise,  just,  and  good  Being ;  for  objec- 
tions from  hence  have  been  now  obviated  :  but  whether  it 
contains  things  plainly  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or 
goodness ;  to  what  the  light  of  nature  teaches  us  of  God. 
And  I  know  nothing  of  this  sort  objected  against  scripture, 
excepting  such  objections  as  are  formed  upon  suppositions, 
which  would  equally  conclude,  that  the  constitution  of  nature 
is  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or  goodness;  which  most 
certainly  it  is  not. 

§  27.   Some  precepts,  not  contrary  to  immutable  morality, 
are  made  moral  only  by  command. 

Indeed  there  are  some  particular  precepts  in  scripture, 
given  to  particular  persons,  requiring  actions,  which  would 


$§25-s8]  LIABLE    TO    OBJECTIONS  197 

bo  immoral  and  vicious,  were  it  not  for  such  precepts.  But 
it  is  easy  to  see,  that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind,  as  that 
the  precept  changes  the  whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of 
the  action  ;  and  both  constitutes  and  shows  that  not  to 
be  unjust  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to  the  precept,  must 
have  appeared  and  really  have  been  so:  which  may  well 
be,  since  none  of  these  precepts  are  contrary  to  immutable 
morality.  If  it  were  commanded,  to  cultivate  the  principles 
mid  act  from  the  spirit  of  treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty  ; 
the  command  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the  case  or 
of  the  action,  in  any  of  these  instances.  But  it  is  quite 
otherwise  in  precepts,  which  require  only  the  doing  an 
external  action  :  for  instance,  taking  away  the  property  or 
life  of  any.  For  men  have  no  right  to  either  life  or  property, 
but  what  arises  solely  from  the  grant  of  God  :  when  this 
grant  is  revoked,  they  cease  to  have  any  right  at  all  in  either: 
and  when  this  revocation  is  made  known,  as  surely  it  is 
possible  it  may  be,  it  must  cease  to  be  unjust  to  deprive  them 
of  either.  And  though  a  course  of  external  acts,  which 
without  command  would  be  immoral,  must  make  an  im- 
moral habit ;  yet  a  few  detached  commands  have  no  such 
natural  tendency  \ 

§  28.    Objection  urged  against  these  lies  against  nature  at 
large,  and  trial  of  all  kinds. 

I  thought  proper  to  say  thus  much  of  the  few  scripture 
precepts,  which  require,  not  vicious  actions,  but  actions 
which  would  have  been  vicious  had  it  not  been  for  such 
precepts ;  because  they  are  sometimes  weakly  urged  as 
immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon  objections  drawn 
from  them.  But  to  me  there  seems  no  difficulty  at  all 
in  these  precepts,  but  what  arises  from  their  being  offences  : 
i.  e.  from  their  being  liable  to  be  perverted  '2,  as  indeed  they 

1  I  suppose  that  violence  offered  separate  essay  On  the  Censors  of 

by  order  of  law  may  help  to  illus-  Butler.    See  Coleridge's  account  of 

trate  Butler's  meaning:  especially  Executioners  in  Germany  :  tellers 

as  in  the  case  of  an  executioner.  1,1895),  vol.  i.  p.  294. 

I  deal  more  fully  with  this  subject  *  Perverted,  that  is,  seemingly, 

in  my  reply  to  Miss  Hennell  in  a  by  unwarranted  imitation.    We 


198  THINGS  UNEXPECTED,  ETC.     [n.  in.  §  29- 

are,  by  wicked  designing  men,  to  serve  the  most  horrid  pur- 
poses ;  and,  perhaps,  to  mislead  the  weak  and  enthusiastic. 
And  objections  from  this  head  are  not  objections  against 
revelation  ;  but  against  the  whole  notion  of  religion,  as 
a  trial ;  and  against  the  general  constitution  of  nature. 
Secondly1,  Reason  is  able  to  judge,  and  must,  of  the 
evidence  of  revelation,  and  of  the  objections  urged  against 
that  evidence:  which  shall  be  the  subject  of  a  following 
chapter  k. 


§  29.    Oilier  objections  being  frivolous,  let  us  try  those 
against  the  proofs. 

But  the  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observations  is,  that 
the  question  upon  which  the  truth  of  Christianity  depends 
is  scarce  at  all,  what  objections  there  are  against  its  scheme, 
since  there  are  none  against  the  morality  of  it ;  but  ivliat 
objections  there  are  against  its  evidence :  or,  ivhat  proof  there 
remains  of  it,  after  due  allowances  made  for  the  objections 
against  that  proof:  because  it  has  been  shown,  that  the 
objections  against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections 
against  its  evidence,  are  frivolous.  For  surely  veiy  little 
weight,  if  any  at  all,  is  to  be  laid  upon  a  way  of  arguing 
and  objecting,  which,  when  applied  to  the  general  consti- 
tution of  nature,  experience  shows  not  to  be  conclusive  : 
and  such,  I  think,  is  the  whole  way  of  objecting  treated  of 
throughout  this  chapter.  It  is  resolvable  into  principles, 
and  goes  upon  suppositions,  which  mislead  us  to  think,  that 
the  Author  of  nature  would  not  act,  as  we  experience  he 
does  ;  or  would  act,  in  such  and  such  cases,  as  we  experience 
he  does  not  in  like  cases.  But  the  unreasonableness  of  this 
way  of  objecting  will  appear  yet  more  evidently  from  hence, 


k  Chap.  vii. 


need  not  examine  the  precise  pro-  given  a  few  centuries  ago  to  some 

priety  of  the  word  offences,  since  of  the  Old  Testament  commands 

Butler  hasgiven  his  own  definition  may   perhaps    serve    here   as  an 

of  it   pro  hdc  vice,  as  acts  liable  illustration, 

to  be  perverted.     The  application  *  On  this  head  see  inf.,  ch.  vii. 


IV.  §  i]  CHRISTIANITY,    AS    A    SCHEME  199 

that  the  chief  things  thus  objected  against  are  justified,  as 
shall  be  further  shown1,  by  distinct,  particular,  and  full 
analogies,  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature. 

§  30.    We  can  judge  whether  a  revelation  (a)  tends  to 
virtue  and  (b)  is  due  to  mere  human  motive. 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that,  as  frivolous  as  objections 
of  the  foregoing  sort  against  revelation  are,  yet,  when  a 
supposed  revelation  is  more  consistent  with  itself,  and  has 
a  more  general  and  uniform  tendency  to  promote  virtue, 
than,  all  circumstances  considered,  could  have  been  expected 
from  enthusiasm  and  political  views  ;  this  is  a  presumptive 
proof  of  its  not  proceeding  from  them,  and  so  of  its  truth  : 
because  we  are  competent  judges,  what  might  have  been 
expected  from  enthusiasm  and  political  views. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF   CHRISTIANITY,   CONSIDERED   AS   A    SCHEME   OR 
CONSTITUTION,  IMPERFECTLY    COMPREHENDED. 

§  i.   Objections  against  nature  have  been  answered:  same 
answer  may  serve  for  Christianity  \ 

IT   hath   been  now  shown a,  that  the  analogy  of  nature 
renders  it  highly  credible   beforehand,   that  supposing 
a  revelation  to  be  made,  it  must  contain  many  things  very 
different  from  what  we  should  have  expected,  and  such  as 


1  Chap.  iv.  latter  part,  and  chaps,  v,  vi. 
a  In  the  foregoing  chapter. 


1  To  show  this  distinctly,  But-  threefold  argument  that  he  is  en- 
ler,  as  if  foreseeing  the  objection  titled  to  bar  the  objections  as  they 
of  those  who  now  hold  that  he  has  are  in  themselves,  and  not  only 
only  shifted  the  burden  to  the  by  showing  that  they  apply  else- 
shoulders  of  Nature,  expressly  de-  where. 

clines  in  this   section  to   expose  He  has  already  done  the  same 

that  line  of  defence  to  the  attack  :  for  Nature,  not  only  in  I.  vii.,  but 

and  holds   it  his   duty,   on   the  in  his  Introduction.  §  17. 
merits  of  the  case,  to  show  by  a 


200  CHRISTIANITY,    AS   A    SCHEME,  [II.  IV. 

appear  open  to  great  objections :  and  that  this  observation, 
in  good  measure,  takes  off  the  force  of  those  objections,  or 
rather  precludes  them.  But  it  may  be  alleged,  that  this  is 
a  veiy  partial  answer  to  such  objections,  or  a  very  unsatis- 
factory way  of  obviating  them  :  because  it  doth  not  show 
at  all,  that  the  things  objected  against  can  be  wTise,  just, 
and  good  ;  much  less,  that  it  is  credible  they  are  so.  It 
will  therefore  be  proper  to  show  this  distinctly  ;  by  applying 
to  these  objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness 
of  Christianity,  the  answer  above l)  given  to  the  like  objec- 
tions against  the  constitution  of  nature  :  before  we  consider 
the  particular  analogies  in  the  latter,  to  the  particular  things 
objected  against  in  the  former.  Now  that  which  affords  a 
sufficient  answer  to  objections  against  the  wisdom,  justice, 
and  goodness  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  is  its  being 
a  constitution,  a  system,  or  scheme,  imperfectly  compre- 
hended ;  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to 
accomplish  ends  ;  and  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
For  from  these  things  it  has  been  proved,  not  only  to  be 
possible,  but  also  to  be  credible,  that  those  things  which 
are  objected  against  may  be  consistent  with  wisdom,  justice, 
and  goodness  ;  nay,  may  be  instances  of  them  :  and  even 
that  the  constitution  and  government  of  nature  may  be 
perfect  in  the  highest  possible  degree.  If  Christianity  then 
be  a  scheme,  and  of  the  like  kind  ;  it  is  evident,  the  like 
objections  against  it  must  admit  of  the  like  answer.  And, 


§  2.   It  is  Imperfectly  comprehended ;   and  our  ignorance 
bars  our  objections. 

[I.]  Christianity  is  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  compre- 
hension. The  moral  government  of  God  is  exercised,  by 
gradually  conducting  things  so  in  the  course  of  his  pro- 
vidence, that  every  one,  at  length  and  upon  the  whole, 
shall  receive  according  to  his  deserts  ;  and  neither  fraud 
nor  violence,  but  truth  and  right,  shall  finally  prevail. 
Christianity  is  a  particular  scheme  under  this  general  plan 


b  Part  I.  ch.  vii.  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 


§a]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  2OI 

of  Providence,  and  a  part  of  it,  conducive  to  its  completion, 
with  regard  to  mankind :  consisting  itself  also  of  various 
parts,  and  a  mysterious  economy,  which  has  been  carrying 
011  from  the  time  the  world  came  into  its  present  wretched 
state,  and  is  still  carrying  on,  for  its  recovery,  by  a  divine 
person,  the  Messiah  ;  who  is  to  gather  together  in  one  the 
children  of  God  that  are  scattered  abroad c,  and  establish  an 
everlasting  kingdom,  'wherein  dwelleth  righteousness d.  .And  in 
order  to  it ;  after  various  manifestations  of  things,  relating 
to  this  great  and  general  scheme  of  Providence,  through 
a  succession  of  many  ages  :  (for  the  Spirit  of  Christ  which  was 
in  the  prophets,  testified  beforehand  his  sufferings,  and  the 
f/lort/  that  should  follow :  unto  whom  it  was  revealed,  that  not 
(into  themselves,  but  unto  ^ls  they  did  minister  the  things  which 
arc  now  reported  unto  us  by  them  that  have  preached  the  gospel ; 
which  things  the  angels  desire  to  look  into  e  :) — after  various 
dispensations,  looking  forward,  and  preparatory,  to  this 
Unal  salvation  :  in  the  fulness  of  time,  when  infinite  wisdom 

thought  fit ;  he,  being  in  the  form  of  God, made  himself  of 

no  reputation,  and  took  upon  him  the  form  of  a  servant,  and  was 
made  in  the  likeness  of  men :  and  being  found  in  fashion  as 
a  man,  he  humbled  himself,  and  became  obedient  to  death,  even 
the  death  of  the  cross :  wherefore  God  also  hath  highly  exalted 
him,  and  given  him  a  name,  which  is  above  evert/  name  :  that  at 
the  name  of  Jesus  every  knee  should  bow,  of  things  in  heaven,  and 
things  in  the  earth,  and  things  under  the  earth ;  and  that  every 
tongue  should  confess  that  Jesus  Christ  is  Lord,  to  the  glory  of 
God  the  Fat  her  f.  Parts  likewise  of  this  economy  are  the 
miraculous  mission  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  his  ordinary 
assistances  given  to  good  men  :  the  invisible  government, 
which  Christ  at  present  exercises  over  his  church  :  that 
which  he  himself  refers  to  in  these  words ;  In  my  Fathers 

house  are  many  mansions 1  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you  s  : 

and  his  future  return  to  judge  the  world  in  righteousness,  and 
completely  re-establish  the  kingdom  of  God.  For  the  Father 
judgeth  no  man,  but  hath  committed  all  judgment  unto  the  Son  : 


c  John  xi.  52.  d  2  Pet.  iii.  13.  e  i  Pet.  i.  n,  12. 

f   Phil.  ii.  6-n.  B  Johnxiv.  2. 


202  CHRISTIANITY,    AS   A    SCHEME,  [II.  IV. 

that  all  men  should  honour  the  Son,  even  as  they  honour  the 
Father^.  All  power  is  given  unto  him  in  heaven  and  in  earth*. 
And  he  must  reign,  till  he  hath  put  all  enemies  under  his  feet.  Then 
cometh  the  end,  ivlien  he  shall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to 
God,  even  the  Father ;  tvhen  he  shall  have  put  down  all  rule  and 
all  authority  and  power.  And  when  all  things  shall  he  subdued 
unto  him,  then  shall  the  Son  also  himself  l>e  subject  unto  Mm 
that  put  all  things  under  him,  that  God  may  be  all  in  all*. 
Now  little,  surely,  need  be  said  to  show,  that  this  system, 
or  scheme  of  things,  is  but  imperfectly  comprehended  by 
us.  The  scripture  expressly  asserts  it  to  be  so.  And  indeed 
one  cannot  read  a  passage  relating  to  this  great  mystery  of 
godliness^,  but  what  immediately  runs  up  into  something 
which  shows  us  our  ignorance  in  it ;  as  every  thing  in  nature 
shows  us  our  ignorance  in  the  constitution  of  nature.  And 
whoever  will  seriously  consider  that  part  of  the  Christian 
scheme,  which  is  revealed  in  scripture,  will  find  so  much 
more  unrevealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the 
purposes  of  judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it,  as 
of  the  constitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance,  therefore,  is  as 
much  an  answer  to  our  objections  against  the  perfection  of 
one,  as  against  the  perfection  of  the  other  ni. 


§  3.   Here,  as  in  nature,  means  to  attain  ends  are  used ; 
which  may  both  be  the  very  best. 

[II.]  It  is  obvious  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dispensation, 
as  much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things,  means  are  made 
use  of  to  accomplish  ends.  And  the  observation  of  this 
furnishes  us  with  the  same  answer,  to  objections  against  the 
perfection  of  Christianity,  as  to  objections  of  the  like  kind, 
against  the  constitution  of  nature.  It  shows  the  credibility, 
that  the  things  objected  against,  how  foolish n  soever  they 
appear  to  men,  may  be  the  very  best  means  of  accomplishing 
the  very  best  ends.  And  their  appearing  foolishness  is  no 


h  John  v.  22,  23.  i  Matt,  xxviii.  18.  k  i  Cor.  xv.  24-28. 

1  i  Tim.  iii.  16.  m  Sup.  I.  vii.  13  sqq.  n  i  Cor.  i. 


§§3-5]  IMPERFECTLY  COMPREHENDED  203 

presumption  against  this,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly  beyond 
our  comprehension  °. 

§  4.   Nature  operates  ly  general  laws,  hard  to  trace  out. 

[III.]  The  credibility,  that  the  Christian  dispensation 
may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general  laws  i',  no 
less  than  the  course  of  nature,  may  require  to  be  more 
distinctly  made  out.  Consider  then,  upon  what  ground  it 
is  we  say,  that  the  whole  common  course  of  nature  is  carried 
on  according  to  general  foreordained  laws.  We  know  indeed 
several  of  the  general  laws  of  matter  :  and  a  great  part  of  the 
natural  behaviour  of  living  agents  is  reducible  to  general 
laws.  But  we  know  in  a  manner  nothing,  by  what  laws, 
storms  and  tempests,  earthquakes,  famine,  pestilence,  become 
the  instruments  of  destruction  to  mankind.  And  the  laws, 
by  which  persons  born  into  the  world  at  such  a  time  and 
place  are  of  such  capacities,  geniuses,  tempers  ;  the  laws,  by 
which  thoughts  come  into  our  mind,  in  a  multitude  of 
cases ;  and  by  which  innumerable  things  happen,  of  the 
greatest  influence  upon  the  affairs  and  state  of  the  world  ; 
these  laws  are  so  wholly  unknown  to  us,  that  we  call  the 
events  which  come  to  pass  by  them,  accidental :  though  all 
reasonable  men  know  certainly,  that  there  cannot,  in  reality, 
be  any  such  thing  as  chance  ;  and  conclude,  that  the  things 
which  have  this  appearance  are  the  result  of  general  laws,  and 
may  be  reduced  into  them.  It  is  then  but  an  exceeding 
little  way,  and  in  but  a  very  few  respects,  that  we  can  trace 
up  the  natural  course  of  things  before  us,  to  general  laws. 
And  it  is  only  from  analogy,  that  we  conclude  the  whole 
of  it  to  be  capable  of  being  reduced  into  them  :  only  from 
our  seeing,  that  part  is  so.  It  is  from  our  finding,  that 
the  course  of  nature,  in  some  respects  and  so  far,  goes  on 
by  general  laws,  that  we  conclude  this  of  the  rest. 

§  5.    The  same  may  hold  as  to  revelation. 
And  if  that  be  a  just  ground  for  such  a  conclusion,  it 
is  a  just  ground  also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend, 


Sup.  I.  vii.  13  sqq.  P  Sup.  I.  vii.  18. 


204  CHRISTIANITY,    AS   A    SCHEME,  [II.  IV. 

to  render  it  supposable  and  credible,  which  is  sufficient  for 
answering  objections,  that  God's  miraculous  interpositions 
may  have  been,  all  along  in  like  manner,  by  general  laws 
of  wisdom.  Thus,  that  miraculous  powers  should  be 
exerted,  at  such  times,  upon  such  occasions,  in  such  degrees 
and  manners,  and  with  regard  to  such  persons,  rather  than 
others ;  that  the  affairs  of  the  world,  being  permitted  to 
go  on  in  their  natural  course  so  far,  should,  just  at  such 
a  point,  have  a  new  direction  given  them  by  miraculous 
interpositions  ;  that  these  interpositions  should  be  exactly 
in  such  degrees  and  respects  only  ;  all  this  may  have  been 
by  general  laws.  These  laws  are  unknown  indeed  to  us : 
but  no  more  unknown,  than  the  laws  from  whence  it  is, 
that  some  die  as  soon  as  they  are  born,  and  others  live  to 
extreme  old  age ;  that  one  man  is  so  superior  to  another 
in  understanding ;  with  innumerable  more  things,  which, 
as  was  before  observed,  we  cannot  reduce  to  any  laws  or 
rules  at  all,  though  it  is  taken  for  granted,  they  are  as 
much  reducible  to  general  ones,  as  gravitation.  Now,  if 
the  revealed  dispensations  of  Providence,  and  miraculous 
interpositions,  be  by  general  laws,  as  well  as  God's  ordinary 
government  in  the  course  of  nature,  made  known  by  reason 
and  experience  ;  there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect,  that 
every  exigence,  as  it  arises,  should  be  provided  for  by  these 
general  laws  of  miraculous  interpositions,  than  that  every 
exigence  in  nature  should,  by  the  general  laws  of  nature  : 
yet  there  might  be  wrise  and  good  reasons,  that  miraculous 
interpositions  should  be  by  general  laws  :  and  that  these 
laws  should  not  be  broken  in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by 
other  miracles. 

§  6.  As  to  apparent  (japs  and  anomalies,  the  tiro 
arc  parallel. 

Upon  the  whole  then  :  The  appearance  of  deficiencies 
and  irregularities  in  nature  is  owing  to  its  being  a  scheme 
but  in  part  made  known,  and  of  such  a  certain  particular 
kind  in  other  respects.  Now  we  see  110  more  reason  why 
the  frame  and  course  of  nature  should  be  such  a  scheme, 
than  why  Christianity  should.  And  that  the  former  is 


§§  6,  7]  IMPERFECTLY   COMPREHENDED  205 

such  a  scheme,  renders  it  credible,  that  the  latter,  upon 
supposition  of  its  truth,  may  be  so  too.  And  as  it  is 
manifest,  that  Christianity  is  a  scheme  revealed  but  in  part, 
and  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish 
ends,  like  to  that  of  nature :  so  the  credibility,  that  it  may 
have  been  all  along  carried  on  by  general  laws,  no  less  than 
the  course  of  nature,  has  been  distinctly  proved.  And  from 
all  this  it  is  beforehand  credible  that  there  might,  I  think 
probable  that  there  would,  be  the  like  appearance  of  defi- 
ciencies and  irregularities  in  Christianity,  as  in  nature  :  i.  e. 
that  Christianity  would  be  liable  to  the  like  objections,  as 
the  frame  of  nature.  And  these  objections  are  answered 
by  these  observations  concerning  Christianity ;  as  the  like 
objections  against  the  frame  of  nature  are  answered  by  the 
like  observations  concerning  the  frame  of  nature. 

§  7.    Obj.  Christianity  uses  means  that  are  cumbrous  and 
roundabout.      Ans.  We  arc  not  fit  judges ;  and  why. 

objections  against  Christianity,  considered  as 
a  matter  of  fact'i,  having,  in  general,  been  obviated 
in  the  preceding  chapter ;  and  the  same,  considered  as 
made  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  having  been 
obviated  in  this :  the  next  thing,  according  to  the  method 
proposed,  is  to  show,  that  the  principal  objections,  in 
particular,  against  Christianity,  may  be  answered,  by 
particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature.  And  as  one 
of  them  is  made  against  the  whole  scheme  of  it  together, 
as  just  now  described,  I  choose  to  consider  it  here,  rather 
than  in  a  distinct  chapter  by  itself.  The  thing  objected 
against  this  scheme  of  the  gospel  is,  'that  it  seems  to 
suppose  God  was  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  a  long  series 
of  intricate  means,  in  order  to  accomplish  his  ends,  the 
recovery  and  salvation  of  the  world  :  in  like  sort  as  men, 


*  [This  sign  of  reference  is  left  by  me  as  I  found  it,  except  that,  as 
elsewhere,  I  substitute  for  the  variable  paging  the  actual  place  in  the 
Treatise  as  fixed  in  this  Edition,  viz.  I.  vii.  i  sqq.  But  the  sign  ought, 
I  think,  to  be  attached  to  the  last  words  of  the  sentence,  '  analogies  in 
nature.' — ED.] 


206         CHRISTIANITY,    AS   A    SCHEME,    ETC.      [II.  IV.  §  8 

for  want  of  understanding  or  power,  not  being  able  to  come 
at  their  ends  directly,  are  forced  to  go  roundabout  ways, 
and  make  use  of  many  perplexed  contrivances  to  arrive 
at  them.'  Now  every  thing  which  we  see  shows  the  folly 
of  this,  considered  as  an  objection  against  the  truth  of 
Christianity.  For,  according  to  our  manner  of  conception, 
God  makes  use  of  variety  of  means,  what  we  often  think 
tedious  ones,  in  the  natural  course  of  providence,  for  the 
accomplishment  of  all  his  ends.  Indeed  it  is  certain  there  is 
somewhat  in  this  matter  quite  beyond  our  comprehension : 
but  the  mystery  is  as  great  in  nature  as  in  Christianity. 
We  know  what  we  ourselves  aim  at,  as  final  ends :  and 
what  courses  we  take,  merely  as  means  conducing  to  those 
ends.  But  we  are  greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are 
considered  by  the  Author  of  nature,  under  the  single  notion 
of  means  and  ends ;  so  as  that  it  may  be  said,  this  is  merely 
an  end,  and  that  merely  means,  in  his  regard.  And  whether 
there  be  not  some  peculiar  absurdity  in  our  very  manner  of 
conception,  concerning  this  matter,  somewhat  contradictory 
arising  from  our  extremely  imperfect  views  of  things,  it  is 
impossible  to  say. 

§  8.    Herein  it  plainly  corresponds  with  nature. 

However,  thus  much  is  manifest,  that  the  whole  natural 
world  and  government  of  it  is  a  scheme  or  system ;  not 
a  fixed,  but  a  progressive  one  :  a  scheme,  in  which  the 
operation  of  various  means  takes  up  a  great  length  of  time, 
before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can  be  attained.  The  change 
of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  the  fruits  of  the  earth,  the  very 
history  of  a  flower,  is  an  instance  of  this  :  and  so  is  human 
life.  Thus  vegetable  bodies,  and  those  of  animals,  though 
possibly  formed  at  once,  yet  grow  up  by  degrees  to  a  mature 
state.  And  thus  rational  agents,  who  animate  these  latter 
bodies,  are  naturally  directed  to  form  each  his  own  manners 
-and  character,  by  the  gradual  gaining  of  knowledge  and 
experience,  and  by  a  long  course  of  action.  Our  existence 
is  not  only  successive,  as  it  must  be  of  necessity ;  but  one 
state  of  our  life  and  being  is  appointed  by  God,  to  be 
a  preparation  for  another;  and  that,  to  be  the  means  of 


V.  §  i]  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  A    MEDIATOR  207 

attaining  to  another  succeeding  one :  infancy  to  child- 
hood ;  childhood  to  youth  ;  youth  to  mature  age.  Men  are 
impatient,  and  for  precipitating  things :  but  the  Author 
of  nature  appears  deliberate  throughout  his  operations  ; 
accomplishing  his  natural  ends  by  slow  successive  steps. 
And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand  laid  out,  which, 
from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  various  systems  of  means, 
as  well  as  length  of  time,  in  order  to  the  carrying  on  its 
several  parts  into  execution.  Thus,  in  the  daily  course  of 
natural  providence,  God  operates  in  the  very  same  manner, 
as  in  the  dispensation  of  Christianity :  making  one  thing 
subservient  to  another  :  this,  to  somewhat  further ;  and  so 
on,  through  a  progressive  series  of  means,  which  extend, 
both  backward  and  forward,  beyond  our  utmost  view.  Of 
this  manner  of  operation,  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course 
of  nature  is  as  much  an  instance,  as  any  part  of  the 
Christian  dispensation. 


CHAPTER   V. 

OF  THE  PARTICULAR  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIANITY;  THE 
APPOINTMENT  OF  A  MEDIATOR,  AND  THE  REDEMPTION 
OF  THE  WORLD  BY  HIM. 

§  i.   Mediation,  or  the  instrumentality  of  others,  met 
everywhere  in  nature. 

rpHERE  is  not,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  Christianity, 
-*-  which  has  been  more  objected  against,  than  the  media- 
tion of  Christ,  in  some  or  other  of  its  parts.  Yet,  upon 
thorough  consideration,  there  seems  nothing  less  justly 
liable  to  it.  For, 

[I.]  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  imagined 
presumption  against  the  general  notion  of  a  mediator  between 
God  and  man  a.  For  we  find  all  living  creatures  are  brought 
into  the  world,  and  their  life  in  infancy  is  preserved,  by  the 
instrumentality  of  others  :  and  every  satisfaction  of  it,  some 


»  i  Tim,  ii.  5. 


208  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  V. 

way  or  other,  is  bestowed  by  the  like  means.  So  that  the 
visible  government,  which  God  exercises  over  the  world, 
is  by  the  instrumentality  and  mediation  of  others.  And 
how  far  his  invisible  government  be  or  be  not  so,  it  is 
impossible  to  determine  at  all  by  reason.  And  the  supposi- 
tion, that  part  of  it  is  so,  appears,  to  say  the  least,  altogether 
as  credible  as  the  contrary.  There  is  then  no  sort  of  objec- 
tion, from  the  light  of  nature,  against  the  general  notion  of 
a  mediator  between  God  and  man,  considered  as  a  doctrine 
of  Christianity,  or  as  an  appointment  in  this  dispensation  : 
since  we  find  by  experience,  that  God  does  appoint  medi- 
ators, to  be  the  instruments  of  good  and  evil  to  us  ;  the 
instruments  of  his  justice  and  his  mercy.  And  the  objec- 
tion here  referred  to  is  urged,  not  against  mediation  in  that 
high,  eminent,  and  peculiar  sense,  in  which  Christ  is  our 
Mediator ;  but  absolutely  against  the  whole  notion  itself  of 
a  mediator  at  all. 


§  2.    Punishment  may  come  of  course,  i.e.  in  the 
way  of  natural  consequence. 

[II. ]  As  we  must  suppose,  that  the  world  is  under  the 
proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state  of  religion, 
before  we  can  enter  into  consideration  of  the  revealed 
doctrine,  concerning  the  redemption  of  it  by  Christ ;  so 
that  supposition  is  here  to  be  distinctly  taken  notice  of. 
Now  the  divine  moral  government  which  religion  teaches 
us,  implies,  that  the  consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery, 
in  some  future  state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of  God. 
That  such  consequent  punishment  shall  take  effect  by  his 
appointment,  is  necessarily  implied.  But,  as  it  is  not  in 
any  sort  to  be  supposed,  that  we  are  made  acquainted  with 
all  the  ends  or  reasons,  for  which  it  is  fit  future  punish- 
ments should  be  inflicted,  or  why  God  has  appointed  such 
and  such  consequent  misery  should  follow  vice ;  and  as  we 
are  altogether  in  the  dark,  how  or  in  what  manner  it  shall 
follow,  by  what  immediate  occasions,  or  by  the  instrumen- 
tality of  what  means  ;  there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  it 
may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to  that,  in  which  many 


§§2,  3]  A    MEDIATOR  209 

miseries  follow  such  and  such  courses  of  action  at  present ; 
poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  untimely  death  by  diseases,  death 
from  the  hands  of  civil  justice.  There  is  no  absurdity  in 
supposing  future  punishment  may  follow  wickedness  of 
course,  as  we  speak,  or  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence 
from  God's  original  constitution  of  the  world  ;  from  the 
nature  he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in  which 
he  places  us  :  or  in  a  like  manner,  as  a  person  rashly  trifling 
upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  falls 
down  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  breaks  his  limbs, 
suppose  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  of  this,  without 
help  perishes. 

§  3.   And  natural  consequence  is  the  act  of  God. 

Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  offended  with  hearing  it 
spoken  of  as  a  supposable  thing,  that  the  future  punishments 
of  wickedness  may  be  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  : 
as  if  this  were  taking  the  execution  of  justice  out  of  the 
hands  of  God,  and  giving  it  to  nature.  But  they  should 
remember,  that  when  things  come  to  pass  according  to  the 
course  of  nature,  this  does  not  hinder  them  from  being  his 
doing,  who  is  the  God  of  nature  :  and  that  the  scripture 
ascribes  those  punishments  to  divine  justice,  which  are 
known  to  be  natural ;  and  which  must  be  called  so,  when 
distinguished  from  such  as  are  miraculous.  But  after  all, 
this  supposition,  or  rather  this  way  of  speaking,  is  here 
made  use  of  only  by  way  of  illustration  of  the  subject  before 
us.  For  since  it  must  be  admitted,  that  the  future  punish- 
ment of  wickedness  is  not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  appointment, 
but  of  reason,  equity,  and  justice  ;  it  comes,  for  ought  I  see, 
to  the  same  thing,  whether  it  is  supposed  to  be  inflicted  in 
a  way  analogous  to  that,  in  which  the  temporal  punishments 
of  vice  and  folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  way.  And 
though  there  were  a  difference,  it  is  allowable,  in  the  present 
case,  to  make  this  supposition,  plainly  not  an  incredible  one  ; 
that  future  punishment  may  follow  wickedness  in  the  way 
of  natural  consequence,  or  according  to  some  general  laws 
of  government  already  established  in  the  universe. 

VOL.  i.  p 


210  OF  REDEMPTION   BY  [II.  V. 

§  4.   Partial  impunity  or  relief  in  familiar  to  us 
in  nature. 

[III.]  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it,  we 
may  observe  somewhat,  much  to  the  present  purpose,  in 
the  constitution  of  nature  or  appointments  of  Providence  : 
the  provision  which  is  made,  that  all  the  bad  natural  con- 
sequences of  men's  actions  should  not  always  actually  follow ; 
or  that  such  bad  consequences,  as,  according  to  the  settled 
course  of  things,  would  inevitably  have  followed,  if  not 
prevented,  should,  in  certain  degrees,  be  prevented.  We 
are  apt  presumptuously  to  imagine,  that  the  world  might 
have  been  so  constituted,  as  that  there  would  not  have  been 
any  such  thing  as  misery  or  evil.  On  the  contrary  we  find 
the  Author  of  nature  permits  it :  but  then  he  has  provided 
reliefs,  and  in  many  cases  perfect  remedies  for  it,  after  some 
pains  and  difficulties  :  reliefs  and  remedies  even  for  that  evil, 
which  is  the  fruit  of  our  own  misconduct ;  and  which,  in 
the  course  of  nature,  would  have  continued,  and  ended  in 
our  destruction,  but  for  such  remedies.  And  this  is  an  in- 
stance both  of  severity  and  of  indulgence,  in  the  constitution 
of  nature.  Thus  all  the  bad  consequences,  now  mentioned, 
of  a  man's  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  might  be  prevented. 
And  though  all  were  not,  yet  some  of  them  might,  by 
proper  interposition,  if  not  rejected  :  by  another's  coming 
to  the  rash  man's  relief,  with  his  own  laying  hold  on  that 
relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case  required.  Persons  may  do  a 
great  deal  themselves  towards  preventing  the  bad  conse- 
quences of  their  follies  :  and  more  may  be  done  by  them- 
selves, together  with  the  assistance  of  others  their  fellow- 
creatures;  which  assistance  nature  requires  and  prompts 
us  to.  This  is  the  general  constitution  of  the  world.  Now 
suppose  it  had  been  so  constituted,  that  after  such  actions 
were  done,  as  were  foreseen  naturally  to  draw  after  them 
misery  to  the  doer,  it  should  have  been  no  more  in  human 
power  to  have  prevented  that  naturally  consequent  misery, 
in  any  instance,  than  it  is,  in  all ;  no  one  can  say,  whether 
such  a  more  severe  constitution  of  things  might  not  yet 
have  been  really  good.  But,  that,  on  the  contrary,  pro- 


"§§4-6]  A    MEDIATOR  21 1 

vision  is  made  by  nature,  that  we  may  and  do.  to  so  great 
degree,  prevent  the  bad  natural  effects  of  our  follies  ;  this 
may  be  called  mercy  or  compassion  in  the  original  con- 
stitution of  the  world:  compassion,  as  distinguished  from 
goodness  in  general.  And,  the  whole  known  constitution 
and  course  of  things  affording  us  instances  of  such  com- 
passion, it  would  be  according  to  the  analogy  of  nature, 
to  hope,  that,  however  ruinous  the  natural  consequences 
of  vice  might  be,  from  the  general  laws  of  God's  govern- 
ment over  the  universe ;  yet  provision  might  be  made, 
possibly  might  have  been  originally  made,  for  preventing 
those  ruinous  consequences  from  inevitably  following :  at 
least  from  following  universally,  and  in  all  cases. 

§  5.    Total  impunity  Is  often  reckoned  on. 

Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  wonder  at  finding  this  made 
a  question,  or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree  doubtful.  The 
generality  of  mankind  are  so  far  from  having  that  awful 
sense  of  things,  which  the  present  state  of  vice  and  misery 
and  darkness  seems  to  make  but  reasonable,  that  they 
have  scarce  any  apprehension  or  thought  at  all  about  this 
matter,  any  way :  and  some  serious  persons  may  have 
spoken  unadvisedly  concerning  it '. 

§  6.    Yet  neglect  lias  grave  consequences;  sin,  probably, 
awful  ones. 

But  let  us  observe,  what  we  experience  to  be,  and  what, 
from  the  very  constitution  of  nature,  cannot  but  be,  the 
consequences  of  irregular  and  disorderly  behaviour ;  even 
of  such  rashness,  wilfulness,  neglects,  as  we  scarce  call 
vicious.  Now  it  is  natural  to  apprehend,  that  the  bad 
consequences  of  irregularity  will  be  greater,  in  proportion 
as  the  irregularity  is  so.  And  there  is  no  comparison 
between  these  irregularities,  and  the  greater  instances  of 
vice,  or  a  dissolute  profligate  disregard  to  all  religion  ;  if 
there  be  any  thing  at  all  in  religion.  For  consider  what 


1  Butler  seems  to  have  had  here       are  now  so  much  more  widely  pro- 
in  view  those  unhappy  devices  of      mulgated. 
what  is  called  Universalism,  that 

P  2 


212  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  V. 

it  is  for  creatures,  moral  agents,  presumptuously  to  intro- 
duce that  confusion  and  misery  into  the  kingdom  of  God, 
which  mankind  have  in  fact  introduced ;  to  blaspheme 
the  Sovereign  Lord  of  all  ;  to  contemn  his  authority ;  to 
be  injurious,  to  the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow- 
creatures,  the  creatures  of  God.  Add  that  the  effects 
of  vice  in  the  present  world  are  often  extreme  misery, 
irretrievable  ruin,  and  even  death.  And  upon  putting 
all  this  together,  it  will  appear,  that  as  no  one  can  say, 
in  what  degree  fatal  the  unprevented  consequences  of 
vice  may  be,  according  to  the  general  rule  of  divine 
government ;  so  it  is  by  no  means  intuitively  certain, 
how  far  these  consequences  could  possibly,  in  the  nature 
of  the  thing,  be  prevented,  consistently  with  the  eternal 
rule  of  right,  or  with  what  is,  in  fact,  the  moral  con- 
stitution of  nature.  However,  there  would  be  large  ground 
to  hope,  that  the  universal  government  was  not  so  severely 
strict,  but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  having 
those  penal  consequences  prevented.  Yet, 

§  7.    Nor  docs  subsequent  good  behaviour  cancel  the  past 
in  nature ; 

[IV.]  There  seems  no  probability,  that  any  thing  we 
could  do  would  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  them  :  prevent 
their  following,  or  being  inflicted.  But  one  would  think, 
at  least,  it  were  impossible  that  the  contraiy  should  be 
thought  certain.  For  we  are  not  acquainted  with  the 
whole  of  the  case.  We  are  not  informed  of  all  the  reasons, 
which  render  it  fit  that  future  punishments  should  be  in- 
flicted :  and  therefore  cannot  know,  whether  any  thing 
we  could  do  would  make  such  an  alteration,  as  to  render 
it  fit  that  they  should  be  remitted.  We  do  not  know  what 
the  whole  natural  or  appointed  consequences  of  vice  are  ; 
nor  in  what  way  they  would  follow,  if  not  prevented  :  and 
therefore  can  in  no  sort  say,  whether  we  could  do  any 
thing  which  would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  them.  Our 
ignorance  being  thus  manifest,  let  us  recollect  the  analogy 
of  nature  or  providence.  For,  though  this  may  be  but 
a  slight  ground  to  raise  a  positive  opinion  upon,  in  this 


§§  7-9]  A    MEDIA  TOR  213 

matter ;  yet  it  is  sufficient  to  answer  a  mere  arbitrary 
assertion,  without  any  kind  of  evidence,  urged  by  way 
of  objection  against  a  doctrine,  the  proof  of  which  is  not 
reason,  but  revelation.  Consider  then  :  people  ruin  their 
fortunes  by  extravagance ;  they  bring  diseases  upon  them- 
selves by  excess  ;  they  incur  the  penalties  of  civil  laws ; 
and  surely  civil  government  is  natural ;  will  sorrow  for 
these  follies  past,  and  behaving  well  for  the  future,  alone 
and  of  itself  prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  them? 
On  the  contrary,  men's  natural  abilities  of  helping  them- 
selves are  often  impaired  :  or  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced 
to  be  beholden  to  the  assistance  of  others,  upon  several 
accounts,  and  in  different  ways :  assistance  which  they 
would  have  had  no  occasion  for,  had  it  not  been  for 
their  misconduct  ;  but  which,  in  the  disadvantageous  con- 
dition they  have  reduced  themselves  to,  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  their  recovery,  and  retrieving  their  affairs. 

§  8.    And  probably  not  under  revelation. 

Now  since  this  is  our  case,  considering  ourselves  merely 
as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  and  as  having  a  temporal 
interest  here,  under  the  natural  government  of  God,  which 
however  has  a  great  deal  moral  in  it :  why  is  it  not  sup- 
posable  that  this  may  be  our  case  also,  in  our  more 
important  capacity,  as  under  his  perfect  moral  government, 
and  having  a  more  general  and  future  interest  depending  ? 
If  we  have  misbehaved  in  this  higher  capacity,  and 
rendered  ourselves  obnoxious  to  the  future  punishment, 
which  God  has  annexed  to  vice:  it  is  plainly  credible, 
that  behaving  well  for  the  time  to  come  may  be — not 
useless,  God  forbid — but  wholly  insufficient,  alone  and  of 
itself,  to  prevent  that  punishment ;  or  to  put  us  in  the 
condition,  which  we  should  have  been  in,  had  we  preserved 
our  innocence. 

§  9.    The  wide  early  prevalence  of  sacrifices  shoivs  hoiv 
repentance  ivas  held  insufficient. 

And  though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reverence,  when- 
ever we  reason  concerning  the  divine  conduct :  yet  it  may 


214  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  V. 

be  added,  that  it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all  our  notions  of 
government,  as  well  as  to  what  is,  in  fact,  the  general 
constitution  of  nature,  to  suppose  that  doing  well  for  the 
future  should,  in  all  cases,  prevent  all  the  judicial  bad 
consequences  of  having  done  evil,  or  all  the  punishment 
annexed  to  disobedience.  And  we  have  manifestly  nothing 
from  whence  to  determine,  in  what  degree,  and  in  what 
cases,  reformation  would  prevent  this  punishment,  even 
supposing  that  it  \vould  in  some.  And  though  the  efficacy 
of  repentance  itself  alone,  to  prevent  what  mankind  had 
rendered  themselves  obnoxious  to,  and  recover  what  they 
had  forfeited,  is  now  insisted  upon,  in  opposition  to  Chris- 
tianity :  yet,  by  the  general  prevalence  of  propitiatory 
sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  this  notion,  of  repentance 
alone  being  sufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  appears  to  be  contrary 
to  the  general  sense  of  mankind. 

§  10.    Punishment,  then,  ivas  to  be  expected. 

Upon  the  whole,  then :  Had  the  laws,  the  general  laws 
of  God's  government,  been  permitted  to  operate,  without 
any  interposition  in  our  behalf,  the  future  punishment, 
for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  or  have  any  reason 
to  think,  must  inevitably  have  followed,  notwithstanding 
any  thing  we  could  have  done  to  prevent  it.  Now, 

§  ii.   Mediation,  then,  ivas  (a)  appropriate,  (b)  requisite, 
(c)  effectual. 

[V.]  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call  it  which 
you  please,  revelation  comes  in  ;  confirms  every  doubting 
fear,  which  could  enter  into  the  heart  of  man,  concerning 
the  future  unprevented  consequence  of  wickedness  ;  supposes 
the  world  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin  ;  (a  supposition  which 
seems  the  very  ground  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and 
which,  if  not  provable  by  reason,  yet  is  in  no  wise 
contrary  to  it ;)  teaches  us  too,  that  the  rules  of  divine 
government  are  such,  as  not  to  admit  of  pardon  immedi- 
ately and  directly  upon  repentance,  or  by  the  sole  efficacy 
of  it :  but  then  teaches  at  the  same  time,  what  nature 
might  justly  have  hoped,  that  the  moral  government  of 


§§io,  n]  A    MEDIATOR  215 

the  universe  was  not  so  rigid,  but  that  there  was  room 
for  an  interposition,  to  avert  the  fatal  consequences  of 
vice ;  which  therefore,  by  this  means,  does  admit  of 
pardon.  Revelation  teaches  us,  that  the  unknown  laws 
of  God's  more  general  government,  no  less  than  the  par* 
ticular  laws  by  which  we  experience  he  governs  us  at 
present,  are  compassionate b,  as  well  as  good  in  the  more 
general  notion  of  goodness  :  and  that  he  hath  mercifully 
provided,  that  there  should  be  an  interposition  to  prevent 
the  destruction  of  human  kind  ;  whatever  that  destruction 
unprevented  would  have  been.  God  so  loved  the  world, 
that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth, 
not,  to  be  sure,  in  a  speculative,  but  in  a  practical  sense, 
that  whosoever  leliereth  in  him  should  not  perisli c :  gave 
his  Son  in  the  same  way  of  goodness  to  the  world,  as 
he  affords  particular  persons  the  friendly  assistance  of 
their  fellow- creatures ;  when,  without  it,  their  temporal 
ruin  would  be  the  certain  consequence  of  their  follies :  in 
the  same  way  of  goodness,  I  say  ;  though  in  a  transcen- 
dent and  infinitely  higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God 
loved  us  and  gave  himself  for  us,  with  a  love,  which  he 
himself  compares  to  that  of  human  friendship  :  though, 
in  this  case,  all  comparisons  must  fall  infinitely  short 
of  the  thing  intended  to  be  illustrated  by  them.  He 
interposed  in  such  a  manner  as  was  necessary  and  effectual 
to  prevent  that  execution  of  justice  upon  sinners,  which 
God  had  appointed  should  otherwise  have  been  executed 
upon  them :  or  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  prevent  that 
punishment  from  actually  following,  which,  according  to 
the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  must  have  fol- 
lowed the  sins  of  the  world,  had  it  not  been  for  such 
interposition  d. 

b  Sup.  §  4.  c  John  iii.  16. 

d  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cursory  reader, 
that   it   is,  in   any  sort,  affirmed   or  implied   in  any 
thing  said  in  this  chapter,  that  none  can  have  the  benefit        .   ^^e  ^UfSf. 
of  the  general  redemption,  but  such  as  have  the  ad-  aside 

vantage  of  being  made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present 
life.    But  it  may  be  needful  to  mention,  that  several  questions,  which 
have  been  brought  into  the  subject  before  us,  and  determined,  and  not  in 


2l6  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  v. 

§  12.    Our  sad  pliglit  lias  the  sin  m  Paradise  for 
its  occasion. 

If  any  thing  here  said  should  appear,  upon  first  thought, 
inconsistent  with  divine  goodness  ;  a  second,  I  am  persuaded, 
will  entirely  remove  that  appearance.  For  were  we  to  suppose 
the  constitution  of  things  to  be  such,  as  that  the  whole  creation 
must  have  perished,  had  it  not  been  for  somewhat,  which  God 
had  appointed  should  be,  in  order  to  prevent  that  ruin  :  even 
this  supposition  would  not  be  inconsistent,  in  any  degree,  with 
the  most  absolutely  perfect  goodness.  But  still  it  may  be 
thought,  that  this  whole  manner  of  treating  the  subject 
before  us  supposes  mankind  to  be  naturally  in  a  very  strange 
state.  And  truly  so  it  does.  But  it  is  not  Christianity, 
which  has  put  us  into  this  state.  Whoever  will  consider 
the  manifold  miseries,  and  the  extreme  wickedness  of  the 
world  :  that  the  best  have  great  wrongnesses  within  them- 
selves, which  they  complain  of,  and  endeavour  to  amend  ; 
but  that  the  generality  grow  more  profligate  and  corrupt 
with  age :  that  heathen  moralists  thought  the  present  state 
to  be  a  state  of  punishment :  and,  what  might  be  added,  that 
the  earth  our  habitation  has  the  appearances  of  being  a  ruin  : 
whoever,  I  say,  will  consider  all  these,  and  some  other 
obvious  things,  will  think  he  has  little  reason  to  object 
against  the  scripture  account,  that  mankind  is  in  a  state  of 
degradation ;  against  this  being  the  fact :  how  difficult 
soever  he  may  think  it  to  account  for,  or  even  to  form 

the  least  entered  into  here  :  questions  which  have  been,  I  fear,  rashly 
determined,  and  perhaps  with  equal  rashness  contrary  ways.  For  in- 
stance, whether  God  could  have  saved  the  world  by  other  means  than 
the  death  of  Christ,  consistently  with  the  general  laws  of  his  government. 
And  had  not  Christ  come  into  the  world,  what  would  have  been  the 
future  condition  of  the  better  sort  of  men  ;  those  just  persons  over  the 
face  of  the  earth,  for  whom,  Manasses  in  his  prayer  asserts,  repentance 
was  not  appointed.  The  meaning  of  the  first  of  these  questions  is 
greatly  ambiguous  :  and  neither  of  them  can  properly  be  answered, 
without  going  upon  that  infinitely  absurd  supposition,  that  we  know  the 
whole  of  the  case.  And  perhaps  the  very  inquiry,  What  would  have 
followed  if  God  had  not  clone  as  he  has  ?  may  have  in  it  some  very  great  im- 
propriety ;  and  ought  not  to  be  carried  on  any  further,  than  is  necessary 
to  help  our  partial  and  inadequate  conceptions  of  things. 


§§12,13]  A    MEDIATOR  217 

a  distinct  conception  of  the  occasions  and  circumstances 
of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was  the 
occasion  of  our  being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous 
condition,  is  a  thing  throughout  and  particularly  analogous 
to  what  we  see  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  Providence  ; 
as  the  recovery  of  the  world  by  the  interposition  of  Christ 
has  been  shown  to  be  so  in  general. 

H 

§  13.    The  mediation  is  by  a  forcshadoived  Priest-victim ; 

[VI.]  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  interposed 
in  the  redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office  as  Mediator,  in 
the  largest  sense,  between  God  and  man,  is  thus  represented  to 
us  in  the  scripture.  He  is  the  light  of  the  world  e ;  the  revealer 
of  the  will  of  God  in  the  most  eminent  sense.  He  is  a 
propitiatory  sacrifice  f  ;  the  Lamb  of  Gods  :  and,  as  he  volun- 
tarily offered  himself  up,  he  is  styled  our  High-Priest h. 
And,  which  seems  of  peculiar  weight,  he  is  described  before- 
hand in  the  Old  Testament,  under  the  same  characters  of 
a  priest,  and  an  expiatory  victim1'.  And  whereas  it  is 
objected,  that  all  this  is  merely  by  way  of  allusion  to  the 
sacrifices  of  the  Mosaic  law,  the  apostle  on  the  contrary 
affirms,  that  the  law  was  a  shadotv  of  good  things  to  come,  and 
not  the  very  image  of  the  thingsk  :  and  that  the  priests  that  offer 
gifts  according  to  the  law — serve  unto  the  example  and  shadow  of 
heavenly  things,  as  Moses  was  admonished  of  God  when  he  ivas 
about  to  make  the  tabernacle  :  for  See,  saith  he,  that  thou  make 
all  things  according  to  the  pattern  showed  to  thee  in  the  mount1 : 
i.  e.  the  Levitical  priesthood  was  a  shadow  of  the  priesthood 
of  Christ ;  in  like  manner  as  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses 
was  according  to  that  showed  him  in  the  mount.  The 
priesthood  of  Christ,  and  the  tabernacle  in  the  mount,  were 
the  originals  :  of  the  former  of  which  the  Levitical  priesthood 


e  John  i.  and  viii.  12. 

r  Rom.  iii.  25   and  v.   n  ;    i  Cor.  v.  7  ;  Eph.  v.  2 ;    i  John  ii.  2  ; 
Matt,  xx vi.  28. 

g  John  i.  29,  36  ;  and  throughout  the  Book  of  Revelation. 
h  Throughout  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 
5  Isa.  liii  ;  Dan.  ix.  24  ;  Ps.  ex.  4.  k  Heb.  x.  j, 

1  Heb,  viii.  4,  5. 


2l8  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  v. 

was  a  type  ;  and  of  the  latter  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses 
was  a  copy.  The  doctrine  of  this  Epistle  then  plainly  is, 
that  the  legal  sacrifices  were  allusions  to  the  great  and  final 
atonement  to  be  made  by  the  blood  of  Christ ;  and  not  that 
this  was  an  allusion  to  those.  Nor  can  any  thing  be  more 
express  and  determinate,  than  the  following  passage.  It  is 
not  possible  that  the  blood  of  lulls  and  of  goats  should  take  away 
s'm.  Wherefore  ivhen  he  cometh  into  the  world,  he  saith,  Sacrifice 
and  offering,  i.  e.  of  bulls  and  of  goats,  thou  wouldest  not,  but 

a  body  hast  thou  prepared  me Lo,  I  come  to  do  thy  will, 

0  God By  which  will  ice  arc  sanctified,  through  the  offering  of 

the  body  of  Jesus  Christ  once  for  all  n>.  And  to  add  one  passage 
more  of  the  like  kind  :  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear  the  sins 
of  many ;  and  unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the 
second  time,  without  sin ;  i.  e.  without  bearing  sin,  as  he  did 
at  his  first  coming,  by  being  an  offering  for  it ;  without 
having  our  iniquities  again  laid  upon  him,  without  being  any 
more  a  sin  offering : — unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall  he 
appear  the  second  time,  without  sin,  unto  salvation  n. 

§  14.    With  an  efficacy  transcending  that  of  example, 
instruction,  or  government. 

Nor  do  the  inspired  writers  at  all  confine  themselves  to 
this  manner  of  speaking  concerning  the  satisfaction  of 
Christ ;  but  declare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  suffered 
for  us,  additional  to  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  example, 
and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expression :  That  Jesus 
should  die  for  that  nation,  the  Jews  :  and  not  for  that  nation 
only,  but  that  also,  plainly  by  the  efficacy  of  his  death,  he 
should  gather  together  in  one  the  children  of  God  that  were 
scattered  abroad  ° :  that  he  suffered  for  sins,  the  just  for  the 
unjust  v  :  that  he  gave  his  life,  himself,  a  ransom^:  that  tve  are 
bought,  bought  with  a  price  r :  that  he  redeemed  us  with  his  blood ; 
redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being  made  a  curse  for 


m  Heb.  x.  4,  5,  7,  9,  10.  n  Heb.  ix.  28. 

0  John  xi.  51,  52.  i'  i  Pet.  iii.  18. 

1  Matt.  xx.  28  ;  Mark  x.  45  ;  i  Tim.  ii.  6. 
r  2  Pet.  ii.  i  ;  Rev.  xiv.  4  ;  i  Cor.  vi.  20. 


§§  14,  15]  A    MEDIATOR  219 

us  * :  that  he  is  our  advocate,  intercessor,  and  propitiation { : 
that  lie  was  made  perfect,  or  consummate,  through  sufferings : 
and  being  thus  made  perfect,  lie  became  the  author  of  salvation r: 
that  God  was  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  to  himself;  by  the 
death  of  his  Son,  by  the  cross ;  not  imputing  their  trespasses  unto 
them  x  :  and  lastly,  that  through  death  he  destroyed  him  that 
had  the  power  of  death  y.  Christ  then  having  thus  humbled 
himself,  and  become  obedient  to  death,  even  the  death  of  the 
cross ;  God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name, 
trhich  is  above  every  name  :  hath  given  all  things  into  his  hand  : 
hath  committed  all  judgment  unto  him  ;  that  all  men  should 
honour  the  Son,  even  as  they  honour  the  Father  z.  For.  Worthy  is 
the  Lamb  that  was  slain,  to  receive  power,  and  riches,  andivisdom, 
and  strength,  and  honour,  and  glory,  and  blessing.  And  every 
creature  which  is  in  heaven,  and  on  the  earth,  heard  I,  saying, 
Blessing,  and  honour,  and  glory,  and  power,  be  unto  him 
that  sittcth  upon  the  throne,  and  unto  the  Lamb  for  ever 
and  ever9-. 

§  15.    It  was  also  (a)  by  a  Prophet, 

These  passages  of  scripture  seem  to  comprehend  and 
express  the  chief  parts  of  Christ's  office,  as  Mediator  between 
God  and  man,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  the  nature  of  this  his 
office  is  revealed  ;  and  it  is  usually  treated  of  by  divines 
under  three  heads. 

First,  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  Prophet :  that 
Prophet  that  should  come  into  the  world l),  to  declare  the  divine 
will.  He  published  anew  the  law  of  nature,  which  men  had 
corrupted  ;  and  the  very  knowledge  of  which,  to  some  degree, 
was  lost  among  them.  He  taught  mankind,  taught  us 
authoritatively,  to  live  soberly,  righteously,  and  godly  in  this 
present  world,  in  expectation  of  the  future  judgment  of 


s  i  Pet.  i.  19 ;  Rev.  v.  9  ;  Gal.  iii.  13. 

*  Heb.  vii.  25  ;  i  John  ii.  i,  2.  "  Heb.  ii.  TO  and  v.  9. 

x  2  Cor.  v.  19;  Rom.  v.  10  ;  Eph.  ii.  16. 

y  Heb.   ii.   14.     See  also  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  Book  of  Job. 
xxxiii.  24. 

z  Phil.  ii.  8,  9  ;  John  iii.  35  and  v.  22,  23.  ft  Rev.  v.  12,  13. 

b  John  vi.  14. 


220  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  V. 

God.  He  confirmed  the  truth  of  this  moral  system  of 
nature,  and  gave  us  additional  evidence  of  it ;  the  evidence 
of  testimony  c.  He  distinctly  revealed  the  manner  in  which 
God  would  be  worshipped,  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  and 
the  rewards  and  punishments  of  a  future  life.  Thus  he  was 
a  prophet  in  a  sense  in  which  no  other  ever  was.  To  which 
is  to  be  added,  that  he  set  us  a  perfect  example,  that  ice  should 
follow  his  steps. 

§  1 6.    (b)  Who  had  a  Church  or  kingdom. 

Secondly,  He  has  a  kingdom  which  is  not  of  this  world  He 
founded  a  church,  to  be  to  mankind  a  standing  memorial  of 
religion,  and  invitation  to  it  ;  which  he  promised  to  be  with 
always  even  to  the  end.  He  exercises  an  invisible  govern- 
ment over  it,  himself,  and  by  his  Spirit :  over  that  part  of 
it,  which  is  militant  here  on  earth,  a  government  of  discipline, 
for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints,  for  the  edifying  his  body :  till  we  all 
come  in  the  unity  of  the  faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of 
God,  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the  stature  of  the 
fulness  of  Christ d.  Of  this  church,  all  persons  scattered  over 
the  world,  who  live  in  obedience  to  his  laws,  are  members. 
For  these  he  is  gone  to  prepare  a  place,  and  will  come  again  to 
receive  them  unto  himself,  that  where  he  is,  there  they  may  be  also ; 
and  reign  with  him  for  ever  and  ever e :  and  likewise  to  take 
vengeance  on  them  that  know  not  God,  and  obey  not  his  gospeV. 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office  I  find  no  objections, 
but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter. 

§  1 7.    (c)  By  an  expiation ; 

Lastly,  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sacrifice,  and 
made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  world  ;  which  is  men- 
tioned last,  in  regard  to  what  is  objected  against  it.  Sacrifices 
of  expiation  were  commanded  the  Jews,  and  obtained  amongst 
most  other  nations,  from  tradition,  whose  original  probably 
was  revelation.  And  they  were  continually  repeated,  both 


c  Sup.  II.  i.  4  sqq.  d  Eph.  iv.  12,  13. 

e  John  xiv.  2,  3  ;  Rev.  iii.  21  and  xi.  15.  '  2  Thess.  i.  8. 


§§  16-19]  A    MEDIATOR  221 

occasionally,  and  at  the  returns  of  stated  times  ;  and  made 
up  great  part  of  the  external  religion  of  mankind.  But  now 
once  in  the  end  of  the  icorld  Christ  appeared  to  put  aivay  sin  Ijy 
the  sacrifice  of  himself  %.  And  this  sacrifice  was,  in  the  highest 
degree  and  with  the  most  extensive  influence,  of  that  efficacy 
for  obtaining  pardon  of  sin,  which  the  heathens  may  be 
supposed  to  have  thought  their  sacrifices  to  have  been,  and 
which  the  Jewish  sacrifices  really  were  in  some  degree,  and 
with  regard  to  some  persons. 

§  1 8.    Whereof  the  mode  is  not  revealed  to  us. 

How  and  in  what  particular  way  it  had  this  efficacy, 
there  are  not  wanting  persons  who  have  endeavoured  to 
explain  :  but  I  do  not  find  that  the  scripture  has  explained 
it.  We  seem  to  be  very  much  in  the  dark  concerning  the 
manner  in  which  the  ancients  understood  atonement  to  be 
made,  i.  e.  pardon  to  be  obtained  by  sacrifices.  And  if  the 
scripture  has,  as  surely  it  has,  left  this  matter  of  the  satis- 
faction of  Christ,  mysterious,  left  somewhat  in  it  unrevealed, 
all  conjectures  about  it  must  be,  if  not  evidently  absurd,  yet 
at  least  uncertain.  Nor  has  any  one  reason  to  complain  for 
want  of  further  information,  unless  he  can  show  his  claim 
to  it. 

§  19.     Some  have  exaggerated  expiation,  others  reduce 
it  to  example. 

Some  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  efficacy  of  what 
Christ  has  done  and  suffered  for  us,  beyond  what  the 
scripture  has  authorized :  others,  probably  because  they 
could  not  explain  it,  have  been  for  taking  it  away,  and 
confining  his  office  as  Redeemer  of  the  world  to  his 
instruction,  example,  and  government  of  the  church. 
Whereas  the  doctrine  of  the  gospel  appears  to  be,  not  only 
that  he  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but  rendered  it 
of  the  efficacy  which  it  is,  by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for 
us :  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  benefit  of  having  our 


Heb.  ix.  26. 


222  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  V. 

repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  life :  not  only  that  he 
revealed  to  sinners,  that  they  were  in  a  capacity  of  salvation, 
and  how  they  might  obtain  it ;  but  moreover  that  he  put 
them  into  this  capacity  of  salvation,  by  what  he  did  and 
suffered  for  them  ;  put  us  into  a  capacity  of  escaping  future 
punishment,  and  obtaining  future  happiness.  And  it  is  our 
wisdom  thankfully  to  accept  the  benefit,  by  performing  the 
conditions,  upon  which  it  is  offered,  on  our  part,  without 
disputing  how  it  was  procured  on  his.  For, 

§  20.    Whether  (a)  means  other  than  mediation  could 
have  been  used,  tve  cannot  judge. 

[VII.]  Since  we  neither  know  by  what  means  punishment 
in  a  future  state  would  have  followed  wickedness  in  this ; 
nor  in  what  manner  it  would  have  been  inflicted,  had  it  not 
been  prevented ;  nor  all  the  reasons  why  its  infliction 
would  have  been  needful ;  nor  the  particular  nature  of  that 
state  of  happiness,  which  Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his 
disciples  :  and  since  we  are  ignorant  how  far  any  thing 
which  we  could  do,  would,  alone  and  of  itself,  have  been 
effectual  to  prevent  that  punishment,  to  which  we  were 
obnoxious,  and  recover  that  happiness,  which  we  had 
forfeited  ;  it  is  most  evident  we  are  not  judges,  antecedently 
to  revelation,  whether  a  mediator  was  or  was  not  necessary, 
to  obtain  those  ends :  to  prevent  that  future  punishment, 
and  bring  mankind  to  the  final  happiness  of  their  nature. 

§  21.    Nor  (b)  of  the  particulars  of  the  mediatorial  work. 

And  for  the  very  same  reasons,  upon  supposition  of  the 
necessity  of  a  mediator,  we  are  no  more  judges,  antecedently 
to  revelation,  of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office,  or  the  several 
parts  of  which  it  consists ;  of  what  was  fit  and  requisite  to 
be  assigned  him,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  ends  of  divine 
Providence  in  the  appointment.  And  from  hence  it  follows, 
that  to  object  against  the  expediency  or  usefulness  of 
particular  things,  revealed  to  have  been  done  or  suffered  by 
him,  because  we  do  not  see  how  they  were  conducive  to 


§§20-22]  A    MEDIATOR  223 

those  ends,  is  highly  absurd.  Yet  nothing  is  more  common 
to  be  met  with,  than  this  absurdity.  But  if  it  be  acknow- 
ledged beforehand,  that  we  are  not  judges  in  the  case,  it  is 
evident  that  no  objection  can,  with  any  shadow  of  reason, 
be  urged  against  any  particular  part  of  Christ's  mediatorial 
office  revealed  in  scripture,  till  it  can  be  shown  positively 
not  to  be  requisite  or  conducive  to  the  ends  proposed  to  be 
accomplished  ;  or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreasonable. 


§  22.    Vicarious  suffering  is  an  ordained  appointment  of 
everyday  experience ;  anterior  to  the  final  adjustment. 

And  there  is  one  objection  made  against  the  satisfaction 
of  Christ,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive  kind  :  that  the 
doctrine  of  his  being  appointed  to  suffer  for  the  sins  of  the 
world,  represents  God  as  being  indifferent  whether  he 
punished  the  innocent  or  the  guilty.  Now  from  the  fore- 
going observations  we  may  see  the  extreme  slightness  of  all 
such  objections  ;  and  (though  it  is  most  certain  all  who 
make  them  do  not  see  the  consequence)  that  they  conclude 
altogether  as  much  against  God's  whole  original  constitution 
of  nature,  and  the  whole  daily  course  of  divine  Providence 
in  the  government  of  the  world,  i.  e.  against  the  whole 
scheme  of  theism  and  the  whole  notion  of  religion,  as  against 
Christianity.  For  the  world  is  a  constitution  or  system, 
whose  parts  have  a  mutual  reference  to  each  other :  and 
there  is  a  scheme  of  things  gradually  carrying  on,  called 
the  course  of  nature,  to  the  carrying  on  of  which  God  has 
appointed  us,  in  various  ways,  to  contribute.  And  when, 
in  the  daily  course  of  natural  Providence,  it  is  appointed 
that  innocent  people  should  suffer  for  the  faults  of  the 
guilty,  this  is  liable  to  the  very  same  objection,  as  the 
instance  we  are  now  considering.  The  infinitely  greater 
importance  of  that  appointment  of  Christianity,  which  is 
objected  against,  does  not  hinder  but  it  may  be,  as  it  plainly 
is,  an  appointment  of  the  very  same  kind,  with  what  the 
world  affords  us  daily  examples  of.  Nay,  if  there  were 
any  force  at  all  in  the  objection,  it  would  be  stronger, 
in  one  respect,  against  natural  Providence,  than  against 


224  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  [II.  V. 

Christianity :  because  under  the  former  we  are  in  many 
cases  commanded,  and  even  necessitated  whether  we  will  or 
no,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others ;  whereas  the  sufferings 
of  Christ  were  voluntary.  The  world's  being  under  the 
righteous  government  of  God  does  indeed  imply,  that  finally 
and  upon  the  whole  every  one  shall  receive  according  to  his 
personal  deserts :  and  the  general  doctrine  of  the  whole 
scripture  is,  that  this  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  divine 
government.  But  during  the  progress,  and,  for  ought  we 
know,  even  in  order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral  scheme, 
vicarious  punishments  may  be  fit,  and  absolutely  necessary1. 
Men  by  their  follies  run  themselves  into  extreme  distress : 
into  difficulties  which  would  be  absolutely  fatal  to  them, 
were  it  not  for  the  interposition  and  assistance  of  others. 
God  commands  by  the  law  of  nature,  that  we  afford  them 
this  assistance,  in  many  cases  where  we  cannot  do  it 
without  very  great  pains,  and  labour,  and  sufferings  to 
ourselves.  And  we  see  in  what  variety  of  ways  one  person's 
sufferings  contribute  to  the  relief  of  another :  and  how,  or 
by  what  particular  means,  this  comes  to  pass,  or  follows, 
from  the  constitution  and  laws  of  nature,  which  come  under 
our  notice :  and,  being  familiarized  to  it,  men  are  not 
shocked  with  it.  So  that  the  reason  of  their  insisting  upon 
objections  of  the  foregoing  kind  against  the  satisfaction  of 
Christ  is,  either  that  they  do  not  consider  God's  settled  and 
uniform  appointments  as  his  appointments  at  all :  or  else 
they  forget  that  vicarious  punishment  is  a  providential 
appointment  of  every  day's  experience :  and  then,  from 
their  being  unacquainted  with  the  more  general  laws  of 
nature  or  divine  government  over  the  world,  and  not  seeing 
how  the  sufferings  of  Christ  could  contribute  to  the  redemp- 
tion of  it,  unless  by  arbitrary  and  tyrannical  will ;  they 
conclude  his  sufferings  could  not  contribute  to  it  any  other 
way. 


1  Punishments  materially  :  not  ideas,  (a)  that  there  has  been  sin 

punishments 'formally.'  I  take  it  in  the  case,  (&)  that  the  penalty 

for  granted   that  in  this  phrase  due  to  it  has   been   voluntarily 

Butler  only  means  to  superadd  to  undergone  by  another.     But  this 

the  idea  of  vicarious  suffering  these  may  be  disputed. 


§§  23-24]  A    MEDIA  TOR  225 

§  23.    Notice  its  tendency  to  vindicate  the  laws  of  God. 

And  yet,  what  has  been  often  alleged  in  justification  of 
this  doctrine,  even  from  the  apparent  natural  tendency  of 
this  method  of  our  redemption  ;  its  tendency  to  vindicate 
the  authority  of  God's  laws,  and  deter  his  creatures  from 
sin ;  this  has  never  yet  been  answered,  and  is,  I  think, 
plainly  unanswerable  :  though  I  am  far  from  thinking  it  an 
account  of  the  whole  of  the  case.  But  without  taking  this 
into  consideration,  it  abundantly  appears,  from  the  observa- 
tions above  made,  that  this  objection  is,  not  an  objection 
against  Christianity,  but  against  the  whole  general  constitu- 
tion of  nature.  And  if  it  were  to  be  considered  as  an 
objection  against  Christianity,  or  considering  it  as  it  is,  an 
objection  against  the  constitution  of  nature ;  it  amounts  to 
no  more  in  conclusion  than  this,  that  a  divine  appointment 
cannot  be  necessary  or  expedient,  because  the  objector  does 
not  discern  it  to  be  so  :  though  he  must  own  that  the  nature 
of  the  case  is  such,  as  renders  him  incapable  of  judging, 
whether  it  be  so  or  not  ;  or  of  seeing  it  to  be  necessary, 
though  it  were  so. 

§  24.    This  cavil,  i  We  see  not  why,  ergo  it  cannot  be,' 
almost  more  foolish  than  guilty. 

It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reasonable  men, 
to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner  :  objecting  against  the 
credibility  of  such  particular  things  revealed  in  scripture, 
that  they  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  expediency  of  them. 
For  though  it  is  highly  right,  and  the  most  pious  exercise 
of  our  understanding,  to  inquire  with  due  reverence  into 
the  ends  and  reasons  of  God's  dispensations  :  yet  when 
those  reasons  are  concealed,  to  argue  from  our  ignorance, 
that  such  dispensations  cannot  be  from  God,  is  infinitely 
absurd.  The  presumption  of  this  kind  of  objections  seems 
almost  lost  in  the  folly  of  them.  And  the  folly  of  them 
is  yet  greater,  when  they  are  urged,  as  usually  they  are, 
against  things  in  Christianity  analogous  or  like  to  thole 
natural  dispensations  of  Providence,  which  are  matter  of 
experience.  Let  reason  be  kept  to :  and  if  any  part  of  the 

VOL.  I. 


226  OF  REDEMPTION  BY  A    MEDIATOR       [II.  V.  §  25 

scripture  account  of  the  redemption  of  the  world  by  Christ 
can  be  shown  to  be  really  contrary  to  it,  let  the  scripture, 
in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up  :  but  let  not  such  poor 
creatures  as  we  go  on  objecting  against  an  infinite  scheme, 
that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  usefulness  of  all  its 
parts,  and  call  this  reasoning ;  and,  which  still  further 
heightens  the  absurdity  in  the  present  case,  parts  which 
we  are  not  actively  concerned  in.  For  it  may  be  worth 
mentioning. 

§  25.    We  cannot  expect  information  on  the  divine  conduct, 
as  large  as  on  our  own  duty. 

Lastly,  That  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but  the 
whole  analogy  of  nature,  should  teach  us,  not  to  expect  to 
have  the  like  information  concerning  the  divine  conduct,  as 
concerning  our  own  duty.  God  instructs  us  by  experience, 
(for  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience  which  instructs  us, )  what 
good  or  bad  consequences  will  follow  from  our  acting  in 
such  and  such  manners :  and  by  this  he  directs  us,  how  we 
are  to  behave  ourselves.  But,  though  we  are  sufficiently 
instructed  for  the  common  purposes  of  life  :  yet  it  is  but  an 
almost  infinitely  small  part  of  natural  providence,  which  we 
are  at  all  let  into.  The  case  is  the  same  with  regard  to 
revelation.  The  doctrine  of  a  mediator  between  God  and 
man,  against  which  it  is  objected,  that  the  expediency  of 
some  things  in  it  is  not  understood,  relates  only  to  what 
was  done  on  God's  part  in  the  appointment,  and  on  the 
mediator's  in  the  execution  of  it.  For  what  is  required  of 
us,  in  consequence  of  this  gracious  dispensation,  is  another 
subject,  in  which  none  can  complain  for  want  of  informa- 
tion. The  constitution  of  the  world,  and  God's  natural 
government  over  it,  is  all  mystery,  as  much  as  the  Christian 
dispensation.  Yet  under  the  first  he  has  given  men  all 
things  pertaining  to  life ;  and  under  the  other,  all  things 
pertaining  unto  godliness.  And  it  may  be  added,  that  there 
is  nothing  hard  to  be  accounted  for  in  any  of  the  common 
precepts  of  Christianity:  though  if  there  were,  surely  a 
divine  command  is  abundantly  sufficient  to  lay  us  under 
the  strongest  obligations  to  obedience.  But  the  fact  is,  that 


VI.  §§  r,  2]       WANT    OF    UNIVERSALITY,    ETC.  227 

the  reasons  of  all  the  Christian  precepts  are  evident.  Positive 
institutions  are  manifestly  necessary  to  keep  up  and  pro- 
pagate religion  amongst  mankind.  And  our  duty  to  Christ, 
the  internal  and  external  worship  of  him  ;  this  part  of 
the  religion  of  the  gospel,  manifestly  arises  out  of  what  he 
has  done  and  suffered,  his  authority  and  dominion,  and  the 
relation  which  he  is  revealed  to  stand  in  to  us  h. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

OF    THE   \VANT    OF    UNIVERSALITY    IN    REVELATION:     AND 
OF    THE    SUPPOSED   DEFICIENCY    IN    THE   PROOF   OF    IT. 

§  i.    These  two  objections  do  not  justify  rejection, 

IT  has  been  thought  by  some  persons,  that  if  the  evidence 
of  revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  itself  turns  into  a 
positive  argument  against  it :  because  it  cannot  be  supposed, 
that,  if  it  were  true,  it  would  be  left  to  subsist  upon 
doubtful  evidence.  And  the  objection  against  revelation 
from  its  not  being  universal  is  often  insisted  upon  as  of 
great  weight. 

Now  the  weakness  of  these  opinions  may  be  shown,  by 
observing  the  suppositions  on  which  they  are  founded : 
which  are  really  such  as  these  ;  that  it  cannot  be  thought 
God  would  have  bestowed  any  favour  at  all  upon  us, 
unless  in  the  degree,  which,  we  think,  he  might,  and 
which,  we  imagine,  would  be  most  to  our  particular  ad- 
vantage ;  and  also  that  it  cannot  be  thought  he  would 
bestow  a  favour  upon  any,  unless  he  bestowed  the  same 
upon  all :  suppositions  which  we  find  contradicted,  not 
by  a  few  instances  in  God's  natural  government  of  the 
world,  but  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature  together. 

§  2.   In  temporal  matters ;   nor,  therefore,  in  spiritual ; 
as  regards  (a)  imperfect  communication, 

Persons  who  speak  of  the  evidence  of  religion  as  doubtful, 
and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulness  as  a  positive  argument 


Sup.  II.  i.  16-18. 


228  WANT   OF   UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  VI. 

against  it,  should  be  put  upon  considering,  what  that  evi- 
dence indeed  is,  which  they  act  upon  with  regard  to  their 
temporal  interests.     For,  it  is  not  only  extremely  difficult, 
but  in  many  cases  absolutely  impossible,  to  balance  pleasure 
and  pain,  satisfaction  and  uneasiness,  so  as  to  be  able  to  say 
on  which  side  the  overplus  is.     There  are  the  like  difficulties 
and   impossibilities   in   making   the   due   allowances   for   a 
change  of  temper  and  taste,  for  satiety,  disgusts,  ill  health  : 
any  of  which  render  men  incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they 
have  obtained  what  they  most  eagerly  desired.     Numberless 
too  are  the  accidents,  besides  that  one  of  untimely  death, 
which  may  even  probably  disappoint   the   best   concerted 
schemes  :  and  strong  objections  are  often  seen  to  lie  against 
them,  not   to   be   removed    or  answered,  but  which   seem 
overbalanced  by  reasons  on  the  other  side  ;  so  as  that  the 
certain  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the  pursuit  are,  by  every 
one,   thought  justly  disregarded,  upon  account  of  the  ap- 
pearing greater  advantages  .in  case  of  success,  though  there 
be  but  little  probability  of  it.     Lastly,  every  one  observes 
our  liableness,  if  we  be  not  upon  our  guard,  to  be  deceived 
by  the  falsehood  of  men,  and  the  false  appearances  of  things: 
and  this  danger  must  be  greatly  increased,  if  there  be  a 
strong  bias  within,  suppose  from  indulged  passion,  to  favour 
the  deceit.     Hence  arises  that  great  uncertainty  and  doubt- 
fulness of  proof,  wherein  our  temporal  interest  really  consists ; 
what  are  the   most   probable  means  of  attaining  it;   and 
whether  those  means  will  eventually  be  successful.     And 
numberless  instances  there  are,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  in 
which  all  men  think  it  reasonable  to  engage  in  pursuits, 
though  the  probability  is  greatly  against  succeeding ;    and 
to  make  such  provision  for  themselves,   as  it  is  supposable 
they  may  have  occasion  for,  though  the  plain  acknowledged 
probability  is,  that  they  never  shall. 

§  3.    Or  (b)  want  of  universality  in  the  gift. 

Then  those  who  think  the  objection  against  revelation, 

from  its  light  not  being  universal,  to  be  of  weight,  should 

observe,  that  the  Author  of  nature,  in  numberless  instances, 

bestows  that  upon  some,  which  he  does  not  upon  others, 


SUPPOSED    SCANTINESS    OF  PROOF  229 

who  seem  equally  to  stand  in  need  of  it.  Indeed  he  appears 
to  bestow  all  his  gifts  with  the  most  promiscuous  variety 
among  creatures  of  the  same  species  :  health  and  strength, 
capacities  of  prudence  and  of  knowledge,  means  of  improve- 
ment, riches,  and  all  external  advantages.  And  as  there 
are  not  any  two  men  found,  of  exactly  like  shape  and 
features  :  so  it  is  probable  there  are  not  any  two,  of  an 
exactly  like  constitution,  temper  and  situation,  with  regard 
to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life.  Yet,  notwithstanding  these 
uncertainties  and  varieties,  God  does  exercise  a  natural 
government  over  the  world  :  and  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
a  prudent  and  imprudent  institution  of  life,  with  regard  to 
our  health  and  our  aifairs,  under  that  his  natural  govern- 
ment. 


§  4.    Diverse  degrees  of  evidence  have  here  been  combined 
with  diversity  of  time ; 

As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian  revelation  have 
been  universal ;  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a 
greater  or  less  part  of  the  world,  at  different  times  :  so 
likewise,  at  different  times,  both  revelations  have  had 
different  degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who  lived  during 
the  succession  of  prophets,  that  is,  from  Moses  till  after 
the  Captivity,  had  higher  evidence  of  the  truth  of  their 
religion,  than  those  had,  who  lived  in  the  interval  between 
the  last-mentioned  period,  and  the  coming  of  Christ.  And 
the  first  Christians  had  higher  evidence  of  the  miracles 
wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  than  what  we  have 
now.  They  had  also  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of  the 
truth  of  it,  perhaps  of  much  greater  force,  in  way  of  argu- 
ment, than  many  think,  of  which  we  have  very  little 
remaining  ;  I  mean  the  presumptive  proof  of  its  truth, 
from  the  influence  which  it  had  upon  the  lives  of  the 
generality  of  its  professors.  And  we,  or  future  ages, 
may  possibly  have  a  proof  of  it,  which  they  could  not 
have,  from  the  conformity  between  the  prophetic  history, 
and  the  state  of  the  world  and  of  Christianity. 


230  WANT  OF  UNIVERSALITY  AND         [n.  vi. 

§  5.  Also  of  persons,  places,  circumstances. 
And  further :  If  we  were  to  suppose  the  evidence,  which 
some  have  of  religion,  to  amount  to  little  more  than  seeing 
that  it  may  be  true  ;  but  that  they  remain  in  great  doubts 
and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence  and  its  nature, 
and  great  perplexities  concerning  the  rule  of  life  :  others 
to  have  a  full  conviction  of  the  truth  of  religion,  with 
a  distinct  knowledge  of  their  duty :  and  others  severally 
to  have  all  the  intermediate  degrees  of  religious  light 

and  evidence,  which  lie  between  these  two If  we  put 

the  case,  that  for  the  present,  it  was  intended,  revelation 
should  be  no  more  than  a  small  light,  in  the  midst  of 
a  world  greatly  overspread,  notwithstanding  it,  with 
ignorance  and  darkness :  that  certain  glimmerings  of 
this  light  should  extend,  and  be  directed,  to  remote 
distances,  in  such  a  manner  as  that  those  who  really 
partook  of  it  should  not  discern  from  whence  it  originally 
came  :  that  some  in  a  nearer  situation  to  it  should  have 
its  light  obscured,  and,  in  different  ways  and  degrees, 
intercepted  :  and  that  others  should  be  placed  within  its 
clearer  influence,  and  be  much  more  enlivened,  cheered, 
and  directed  by  it ;  but  yet  that  even  to  these  it  should  be 
no  more  than  a  light  shining  in  a  dark  place :  all  this 
would  be  perfectly  uniform,  and  of  a  piece  with  the 
conduct  of  Providence,  in  the  distribution  of  its  other 
blessings.  If  the  fact  of  the  case  really  were,  that  some 
have  received  no  light  at  all  from  the  scripture  ;  as  many 
ages  and  countries  in  the  heathen  world :  that  others, 
though  they  have,  by  means  of  it,  had  essential  or  natural 
religion  enforced  upon  their  consciences,  yet  have  never 
had  the  genuine  scripture-revelation,  with  its  real  evidence, 
proposed  to  their  consideration ;  and  the  ancient  Persians  * 
and  modern  Mahometans 2  may  possibly  be  instances  of 

1  The   author  probably  had  in  a  considerable  force  of  aggressive 

his  mind  the  comparative  purity  energy, 

of  Zoroastrian  doctrine.  (b)  That  its  proclamation  of  the 

*  There  are  three  things  here  to  divine  unity  is  a  fact  of  gigantic 

be  borne  in  mind  :  moment. 

(a)  That  Mahometanism,  among  (c)  That  the  worst  of  all  its  de- 

undeveloped  races,  still  manifests  velopments,  in  the  terrible  wicked- 


§§  5-7]         SUPPOSED   SCANTINESS    OF  PROOF  231 

people  in  a  situation  somewhat  like  to  this  :  that  others, 
though  they  have  had  the  scripture  laid  before  them  as 
of  divine  revelation,  yet  have  had  it  with  the  system  and 
evidence  of  Christianity  so  interpolated1,  the  system  so 
corrupted,  the  evidence  so  blended  with  false  miracles, 
as  to  leave  the  mind  in  the  utmost  doubtfulness  and 
uncertainty  about  the  whole ;  which  may  be  the  state 
of  some  thoughtful  men,  in  most  of  those  nations  who 
call  themselves  Christian :  and  lastly,  that  others  have 
had  Christianity  offered  to  them  in  its  genuine  simplicity, 
and  with  its  proper  evidence,  as  persons  in  countries  and 
churches  of  civil  and  of  Christian  liberty  ;  .but  however 
that  even  these  persons  are  left  in  great  ignorance  in  many 
respects,  and  have  by  110  means  light  afforded  them  enough 
to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  but  only  to  regulate  their  life,  to 
teach  them  their  duty,  and  encourage  them  in  the  careful 
discharge  of  it : 

§  6.    All  these  cases  have  parallels  in  nature. 

I  say,  if  we  were  to  suppose  this  somewhat  of  a  general 
true  account  of  the  degrees  of  moral  and  religious  light  and 
evidence,  which  were  intended  to  be  afforded  mankind,  and 
of  what  has  actually  been  and  is  their  situation,  in  their 
moral  and  religious  capacity  ;  there  would  be  nothing  in  all 
this  ignorance,  doubtfulness,  and  uncertainty,  in  all  these 
varieties,  and  supposed  disadvantages  of  some  in  comparison 
of  others,  respecting  religion,  but  may  be  paralleled  by 
manifest  analogies  in  the  natural  dispensations  of  Providence 
at  present,  and  considering  ourselves  merely  in  our  temporal 
capacity. 

§  7.    But  God's  plan  is  one  of  allowances,  and  so 
of  universal  equity. 

Nor  is  there  any  thing  shocking  in  all  this,  or  which 
would  seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  administration  in 


ness  of  the  government  of  Turkey,       portion    of  the    nineteenth    cen- 

has  only  been  exhibited   in  full       tury. 

to  the   world   during   the   latter  1  See  svp.  II.  i.  13. 


232  WANT   OF   UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  VI. 

nature,  if  we  would  really  keep  in  mind,  that  every  one 
shall  be  dealt  equitably  with  :  instead  of  forgetting  this, 
or  explaining  it  away,  after  it  is  acknowledged  in  words. 
All  shadow  of  injustice,  and  indeed  all  harsh  appearances,  in 
this  various  economy  of  Providence,  would  be  lost ;  if  we 
would  keep  in  mind,  that  every  merciful  allowance  shall  be 
made,  and  no  more  be  required  of  any  one,  than  what  might 
have  been  equitably  expected  of  him,  from  the  circumstances 
in  which  he  was  placed  ;  and  not  what  might  have  been 
expected,  had  he  been  placed  in  other  circumstances :  i.  e.  in 
scripture  language,  that  every  man  shall  be  accepted  according 
to  what  he  had,  not  according  to  tvhat  lie  had  not*.  This 
however  doth  not  by  any  means  imply,  that  all  persons' 
condition  here  is  equally  advantageous  with  respect  to 
futurity.  And  Providence's  designing  to  place  some  in 
greater  darkness  with  respect  to  religious  knowledge,  is  no 
more  a  reason  why  they  should  not  endeavour  to  get  out  of 
that  darkness,  and  others  to  bring  them  out  of  it ;  than  why 
ignorant  and  slow  people  in  matters  of  other  knowledge 
should  not  endeavour  to  learn,  or  should  not  be  instructed. 

§  8.    Unlikeness  of  creatures  makes  probable  unlikcness 
of  situations  for  like  creatures. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  same  wise  and 
good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  disposed  the  Author 
of  nature  to  make  different  kinds  and  orders  of  creatures, 
disposed  him  also  to  place  creatures  of  like  kinds  in  different 
situations1  :  and  that  the  same  principle  which  disposed 
him  to  make  creatures  of  different  moral  capacities,  dis- 
posed him  also  to  place  creatures  of  like  moral  capacities  in 
different  religious  situations ;  and  even  the  same  creatures, 


11  2  Cor.  viii.  12. 

1  *  Of  like  kinds '  may  mean,  I  clay,  to  confront  an  objector,  lie 

presume,  likeness  of  kind,  class,  does  not  proceed  to  any  assertion 

property,  or  quality,  short  of  like-  that  the  potter,  in  selecting  clay 

ness  in  every  particular  of  each  for  different  vessels,  has  no  regard 

property  or  quality.     It  is  observ-  to  the  suitableness  of  the  material 

able  that  when  St.  Paul  pleads  the  for  each   respectively.     Kom.   ix. 

dominion  of  the  potter  over  his  21-23. 


§§  8-io]        SUPPOSED    SCANTINESS    OF  PROOF  233 

in  different  periods  of  their  being.  And  the  account  or 
reason  of  this  is  also  most  probably  the  account  why  the 
constitution  of  things  is  such,  as  that  creatures  of  moral 
natures  or  capacities,  for  a  considerable  part  of  that  duration 
in  which  they  are  living  agents,  are  not  at  all  subjects  of 
morality  and  religion  ;  but  grow  up  to  be  so,  and  grow 
up  to  be  so  more  and  more,  gradually  from  childhood  to 
mature  age. 

§  9.    The  complexity  of  nature  infers  per  se 
great  varieties. 

What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reason  of  these 
things,  we  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were  it  only  that  we 
know  so  very  little  even  of  our  own  case.  Our  present  state 
may  possibly  be  the  consequence  of  somewhat  past,  which 
we  are  wholly  ignorant  of :  as  it  has  a  reference  to  somewhat 
to  come,  of  which  we  know  scarce  any  more  than  is  necessary 
for  practice.  A  system  or  constitution,  in  its  notion,  implies 
variety  ;  and  so  complicated  an  one  as  this  world,  very  great 
variety.  So  that  were  revelation  universal,  yet  from  men's 
different  capacities  of  understanding,  from  the  different 
lengths  of  their  lives,  their  different  educations  and  other 
external  circumstances,  and  from  their  difference  of  temper 
and  bodily  constitution  ;  their  religious  situations  would  be 
widely  different,  and  the  disadvantage  of  some  in  comparison 
of  others,  perhaps,  altogether  as  much  as  at  present.  And 
the  true  account,  whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or  such 
a  part  of  mankind,  are  placed  in  this  condition  of  ignorance, 
must  be  supposed  also  the  true  account  of  our  further  ignor- 
ance, in  not  knowing  the  reasons  why,  or  whence  it  is,  that 
they  are  placed  in  this  condition.  But  the  following  prac- 
tical reflections  may  deserve  the  serious  consideration  of  those 
persons,  who  think  the  circumstances  of  mankind  or  their 
own,  in  the  forementioned  respects,  a  ground  of  complaint. 

§  10.    (a)  Doubtfulness  of  evidence  may  constitute  a  part 
of  moral  probation. 

First,  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious, 
may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some  men's  trial  in  the 


234  WANT    Of   UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  VI. 

religious  sense :  as  it  gives  scope  for  a  virtuous  exercise,  or 
vicious  neglect  of  their  understanding,  in  examining  or  not 
examining  into  that  evidence.  There  seems  no  possible 
reason  to  be  given,  why  we  may  not  be  in  a  state  of  moral 
probation,  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  our  understanding 
upon  the  subject  of  religion,  as  we  are  with  regard  to  our 
behaviour  in  common  affairs.  The  former  is  as  much  a  thing 
within  our  power  and  choice  as  the  latter.  And  I  suppose 
it  is  to  be  laid  down  for  certain,  that  the  same  character,  the 
same  inward  principle,  which,  after  a  man  is  convinced 
of  the  truth  of  religion,  renders  him  obedient  to  the  precepts 
of  it,  would,  were  he  not  thus  convinced,  set  him  about  an 
examination  of  it,  upon  its  system  and  evidence  being  offered 
to  his  thoughts  :  and  that  in  the  latter  state  his  examination 
would  be  with  an  impartiality,  seriousness,  and  solicitude, 
proportionable  to  what  his  obedience  is  in  the  former. 

§  ii.  (b)  Neglect  of  evidence  is  a  form  of  depravity. 
And  as  inattention,  negligence,  want  of  all  serious  concern, 
about  a  matter  of  such  a  nature  and  such  importance,  when 
offered  to  men's  consideration,  is,  before  a  distinct  conviction 
of  its  truth,  as  real  immoral  depravity  and  dissoluteness  ;  as 
neglect  of  religious  practice  after  such  conviction  :  so  active 
solicitude  about  it,  and  fair  impartial  consideration  of  its 
evidence  before  such  conviction,  is  as  really  an  exercise 
of  a  morally  right  temper ;  as  is  religious  practice  after. 
Thus,  that  religion  is  not  intuitively  true,  but  a  matter  of 
deduction  and  inference  ;  that  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is  not 
forced  upon  every  one,  but  left  to  be,  by  some,  collected  with 
heedful  attention  t6  premises  ;  this  as  much  constitutes  reli- 
gious probation,  as  much  affords  sphere,  scope,  opportunity, 
for  right  and  wrong  behaviour,  as  any  thing  whatever  does. 
And  their  manner  of  treating  this  subject,  when  laid  before 
them,  shows  what  is  in  their  heart,  and  is  an  exertion  of  it. 

§  12.   (a)  In  this  subject,  that  matter  ( may  be  true '  obliges, 
as  well  as  if  it  '  is  true.' 

Secondly,  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident,  though  it  is 
not  so  much  attended  to,  that  if,  upon  consideration  of  reli- 


§§  ir,  is]      SUPPOSED   SCANTINESS    Of-  PROOF  235 

gion,  the  evidence  of  it  should  seem  to  any  persons  doubtful, 
in  the  highest  supposable  degree  ;  even  this  doubtful  evi- 
dence will,  however,  put  them  into  a  general  state  of  probation 
in  the  moral  and  religious  sense.  For,  suppose  a  man  to  be 
really  in  doubt,  whether  such  a  person  had  not  done  him 
the  greatest  favour  ;  or,  whether  his  \vhole  temporal  interest 
did  not  depend  upon  that  person  :  no  one,  who  had  any 
sense  of  gratitude  and  of  prudence,  could  possibly  consider 
himself  in  the  same  situation,  with  regard  to  such  person,  as 
if  he  had  no  such  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  just  to  say,  that 
certainty  and  doubt  are  the  same ;  as  to  say,  the  situations 
now  mentioned  would  leave  a  man  as  entirely  at  liberty 
in  point  of  gratitude  or  prudence,  as  he  would  be,  were 
he  certain  he  had  received  no  favour  from  such  person,  or 
that  he  no  way  depended  upon  him.  And  thus,  though  the 
evidence  of  religion  which  is  afforded  to  some  men  should 
be  little  more  than  that  they  are  given  to  see,  the  system  of 
Christianity,  or  religion  in  general,  to  be  supposable  and 
credible  ;  this  ought  in  all  reason  to  beget  a  serious  practical 
apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true !.  And  even  this  will 
afford  matter  of  exercise  for  religious  suspense  and  delibera- 
tion, for  moral  resolution  and  self-government ;  because  the 
apprehension  that  religion  may  be  true  does  as  really  lay 
men  under  obligations,  as  a  full  conviction  that  it  is  true. 
It  gives  occasion  and  motives  to  consider  further  the  impor- 
tant subject ;  to  preserve  attentively  upon  their  minds 
a  general  implicit  sense  that  they  may  be  under  divine 
moral  government,  an  awful  solicitude  about  religion, 
whether  natural  or  revealed.  Such  apprehension  ought  to 
turn  men's  eyes  to  every  degree  of  new  light  which  may  be 
had,  from  whatever  side  it  comes ;  and  induce  them  to 
refrain,  in  the  mean  time,  from  all  immoralities,  and  live 
in  the  conscientious  practice  of  every  common  virtue2. 


1  This    obligation    in    cases   of  occasion  to  deal  with  it. 

partial  proof  seems  to  extend  to  2  The  idea  of  the  author  seems 

all  matters  (a   bearing  upon  moral  to  be  that  conveyed  in  the  Psalms : 

conduct,  v&)  of  grave  interest ;  but  'I  will  wash  my  hands  in  inno- 

to  abstract  and  speculative  matter  cency,  0  Lord  ;  and  so  will  I  go  to 

only  if,  and  when,  we  have  special  thine  altar '  (xxvi.  6). 


236  WANT    OF   UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  VI. 

Especially  are  they  bound  to  keep  at  the  greatest  distance 
from  all  dissolute  profaneness  ;  for  this  the  very  nature  of 
the  case  forbids  ;  and  to  treat  with  highest  reverence 
a  matter,  upon  which  their  own  whole  interest  and  being, 
and  the  fate  of  nature,  depends. 

§  13.   (b)  Doubters  in  religion  are  bound  to  conform  to 
its  moral  laws. 

This  behaviour,  and  an  active  endeavour  to  maintain 
within  themselves  this  temper,  is  the  business,  the  duty, 
and  the  wisdom  of  those  persons,  who  complain  of  the 
doubtfulness  of  religion  :  is  what  they  are  under  the  most 
proper  obligations  to.  And  such  behaviour  is  an  exertion 
of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve  in  them,  that  character, 
which  the  practice  of  all  the  several  duties  of  religion,  from 
a  full  conviction  of  its  truth,  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has 
a  tendency  to  improve  in  others :  others,  I  say,  to  whom 
God  has  afforded  such  conviction.  Nay,  considering  the 
infinite  importance  of  religion,  revealed  as  well  as  natural, 
I  think  it  may  be  said  in  general,  that  whoever  will  weigh 
the  matter  thoroughly  may  see,  there  is  not  near  so  much 
difference,  as  is  commonly  imagined,  between  what  ought 
in  reason  to  be  the  rule  of  life,  to  those  persons  who  are 
fully  convinced  of  its  truth,  and  to  those  who  have  only 
a  serious  doubting  apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true.  Their 
hopes,  and  fears,  and  obligations,  will  be  in  various  degrees  : 
but,  as  the  subject-matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the 
same ;  so  the  subject-matter  of  their  obligations,  what  they 
are  bound  to  do  and  to  refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unlike. 

§  14.    (c)  The  obligation  is  enhanced  l>y  the  weight  attaching 
to  example. 

It  is  to  be  observed  further,  that,  from  a  character  of 
understanding,  or  a  situation  of  influence  in  the  world,  some 
persons  have  it  in  their  power  to  do  infinitely  more  harm 
or  good,  by  setting  an  example  of  profaneness  and  avowed 
disregard  to  all  religion,  or,  on  the  contrary,  of  a  serious, 
though  perhaps  doubting,  apprehension  of  its  truth,  and  of 


§§  i3-!5]      SUPPOSED   SCANTINESS    OF  PROOF  237 

a  reverend  regard  to  it  under  this  doubtfulness  ;  than  they 
can  do,  by  acting  well  or  ill  in  all  the  common  intercourses 
amongst  mankind.  And  consequently  they  are  most  highly 
accountable  for  a  behaviour,  which,  they  may  easily  foresee, 
is  of  such  importance,  and  in  which  there  is  most  plainly 
a  right  and  a  wrong  ;  even  admitting  the  evidence  of  religion 
to  be  as  doubtful  as  is  pretended. 

§  15.  (d)  Doubt  implies  the  existence  of  some  degree  of 
evidence  for  the  thing  doubted. 

The  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which  renders 
them  just  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  necessarily  implies 
some  degree  of  evidence  for  that,  of  which  we  doubt.  For 
no  person  would  be  in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  a 
number  of  facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  which  should 
accidentally  come  into  his  thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had 
no  evidence  at  all.  And  though  in  the  case  of  an  even 
chance,  and  where  consequently  we  were  in  doubt,  we  should 
in  common  language  say,  that  we  had  no  evidence  at  all  for 
either  side  ;  yet  that  situation  of  things,  which  renders  it  an 
even  chance  and  no  more,  that  such  an  event  will  happen, 
renders  this  case  equivalent  to  all  others,  where  there  is 
such  evidence  on  both  sides  of  a  question  b,  as  leaves  the 
mind  in  doubt  concerning  the  truth.  Indeed  in  all  these 
cases,  there  is  no  more  evidence  on  one  side  than  on  the 
other  ;  but  there  is  (what  is  equivalent  to)  much  more  for 
either,  than  for  the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  which  come 
into  one's  thoughts  at  random.  And  thus,  in  all  these 
cases,  doubt  as  much  presupposes  evidence,  lower  degrees  of 
evidence,  as  belief  presupposes  higher,  and  certainty  higher 
still.  Any  one,  who  will  a  little  attend  to  the  nature  of 
evidence,  will  easily  carry  this  observation  on,  and  see, 
that  between  no  evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree  of  it  which 
, affords  ground  of  doubt,  there  are  as. many  intermediate 
degrees,  as  there  are,  between  that  degree  which  is  the 
ground  of  doubt,  and  demonstration.  And  though  we 
have  not  faculties  to  distinguish  these  degrees  of  evidence 

b  Introduction,  §§  5,  6. 


238  WANT    OF   UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  vi. 

with  any  sort  of  exactness;  yet,  in  proportion  as  they  are 
discerned,  they  ought  to  influence  our  practice.  For  it  is 
as  real  an  imperfection  in  the  moral  character,  not  to  be 
influenced  in  practice  by  a  lower  degree  of  evidence  when 
discerned,  as  it  is  in  the  understanding,  not  to  discern  it. 

§  1 6.  (e)  Corruption  of  the  heart  operates  forcibly  where 
the  evidence  is  short  of  overbearing. 

And  as,  in  all  subjects  which  men  consider,  they  discern 
the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of  evidence,  proportion- 
ably  to  their  capacity  of  understanding :  so,  in  practical 
subjects,  they  are  influenced  in  practice,  by  the  lower  as 
well  as  higher  degrees  of  it,  proportionally  to  their  fairness 
and  honesty.  And  as,  in  proportion  to  defects  in  the 
understanding,  men  are  unapt  to  see  lower  degrees  of 
evidence,  are  in  danger  of  overlooking  evidence  when  it 
is  not  glaring,  and  are  easily  imposed  upon  in  such  cases  : 
so,  in  proportion  to  the  corruption  of  the  heart,  they  seem 
capable  of  satisfying  themselves  with  having  no  regard  in 
practice  to  evidence  acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not  over- 
bearing. From  these  things  it  must  follow,  that  doubting 
concerning  religion  implies  such  a  degree  of  evidence  for  it, 
as,  joined  with  the  consideration  of  its  importance,  unques- 
tionably lays  men  under  the  obligations  before  mentioned, 
to  have  a  dutiful  regard  to  it  in  all  their  behaviour. 

§  1 7.  (a)  The  duty  of  effort  is  en/tamed,  aft  by  doubt' 
fulness  in  rclif/ion,  so  by  temptations  in  conduct. 

Thirdly,  The  difficulties  in  which  the  qvidence  of  religion 
is  involved,  which  some  complain  of,  is  no  more  a  just  ground 
of  complaint,  than  the  external  circumstances  of  temptation, 
which  others  are  placed  in  ;  or  than  difficulties  in  the  practice 
of  it,  after  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth.  Temptations  render 
our  state  a  more  improving  state  of  discipline (;,  than  it  would 
be  otherwise  :  as  they  give  occasion  for  a  more  attentive 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  which  confirms  and 
strengthens  it  more,  than  an  easier  or  less  attentive  exercise 


Part  I.  chap.  v. 


or  r/toor 

of  it  could.  Now  speculative  diflicultios  are,  in  (his  respect, 
of  the  very  same  nature  with  these  external  temptations. 
For  the  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  obvious,  is  to 
some  persons  a  temptation  to  reject  it,  without  any  con- 
sideration at  all  :  and  therefore  requires  such  an  attentive 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  seriously  to  consider  that, 
evidence,  as  there  would  l>e  no  occasion  for,  hut  for  such 
temptation.  And  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence, 
after  it  has  been  in  some  sort  considered,  affords  opportunity 
to  an  unfair  mind  of  explaining  away,  and  deceitfully  hiding 
from  itself,  that  evidence  which  it  might  see  ;  and  also  for 
IIH-II'S  encouraging  themselves  in  vice,  from  hopes  of 
impunity,  though  they  do  clearly  see  thus  much  at  least, 
that  these  hopes  are  uncertain:  in  like  manner  as  the 

<• ion     temptation    to    many    instances    of    folly,    which 

end  in  temporal  infamy  and  ruin,  is  the  ground  for  hope 
of  not  being  detected,  and  of  escaping  with  impunity;  i.e. 
the  doubtfulness  of  the  proof  beforehand,  that  such  foolish 
behaviour  \\ill  thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruin.  On  the 
contrary,  supposed  doubtfulness  in  the  evidence  of  religion 
calls  for  a  more  ra.ireful  and  attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous 

principle,  in  fairly  yielding  themselves  up  to  the  proper 
influence  of  any  real  evidence,  though  doubtful  ;  and  in 
practising  conscientiously  all  virtue,  though  under  Homo 
uncertainty,  whether  the  government  in  the  universe  may 
not  possibly  be  such,  as  that  vice  may  escape  with  impunity. 
And  in  general,  temptation,  moaning  by  thin  word  the  lesser 
allurements  to  wrong  and  dilliculties  in  the  discharge  of  our 
duty,  as  well  as  the  greater  ones  ;  temptation,  I  say,  as  such 
and  of  every  kind  and  degree,  as  if  calls  forth  some  virtuous 
efforts,  additional  to  what  would  otherwise  have  been  wanting, 
cannot  but  be  an  additional  discipline  and  improvement  of 
virtue,  as  well  as  probation  of  it  in  the  other  senses  of  that 
won  I «'.  So  that  the  very  same  account  is  to  be  given,  why 
the  evidence  of  religion  should  be  left  in  such  a  manner, 
as  to  require,  in  some,  an  attentive,  solicitous,  perhaps 
painful  exercise  of  their  understanding  about  it ;  as  why 

ll  I'urt  I.  chap.  iv.  and  I.  v,  40. 


240  WANT   OF   UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  VI. 

others  should  be  placed  in  such  circumstances,  as  that  the 
practice  of  its  common  duties,  after  a  full  conviction  of  the 
truth  of  it,  should  require  attention,  solicitude,  and  pains  : 
or,  why  appearing  doubtfulness  should  be  permitted  to  afford 
matter  of  temptation  to  some  ;  as  why  external  difficulties 
and  allurements  should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of 
temptation  to  others.  The  same  account  also  is  to  be  given, 
why  some  should  be  exercised  with  temptations  of  both 
these  kinds  ;  as  why  others  should  be  exercised  with  the 
latter  in  such  very  high  degrees,  as  some  have  been,  par- 
ticularly as  the  primitive  Christians  were. 

§  18.  (b)  As  in  nature,  so  in  religion,  doubts  may  con- 
stitute for  some  the  capital  article  of  trial 

Nor  does  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that 
the  speculative  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  religion 
is  involved,  may  make  even  the  principal  part  of  some  per- 
sons' trial.  For,  as  the  chief  temptations  of  the  generality 
of  the  world  are,  the  ordinary  motives  to  injustice  or  un- 
restrained pleasure ;  or  to  live  in  the  neglect  of  religion 
from  that  frame  of  mind,  which  renders  many  persons 
almost  without  feeling  as  to  any  thing  distant,  or  which 
is  not  the  object  of  their  senses  :  so  there  are  other  persons 
without  this  shallowness  of  temper,  persons  of  a  deeper 
sense  as  to  what  is  invisible  and  future  ;  who  not  only  see, 
but  have  a  general  practical  feeling,  that  what  is  to  corne 
will  be  present,  and  that  things  are  not  less  real  for  their 
not  being  the  objects  of  sense  ;  and  who,  from  their  natural 
constitution  of  body  and  of  temper,  and  from  their  external 
condition,  may  have  small  temptations  to  behave  ill, 
small  difficulty  in  behaving  well,  in  the  common  course 
of  life.  Now  when  these  latter  persons  have  a  distinct  full 
conviction  of  the  truth  of  religion,  without  any  possible 
doubts  or  difficulties,  the  practice  of  it  is  to  them  unavoid- 
able, unless  they  will  do  a  constant  violence  to  their  own 
minds  ;  and  religion  is  scarce  any  more  a  discipline  to  them, 
than  it  is  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  perfection.  Yet  these 
persons  may  possibly  stand  in  need  of  moral  discipline  and 
exercise  in  a  higher  degree,  than  they  would  have  by  such 


§§  i8,  19]      SUPPOSED   SCANTINESS    OF  PROOF  24! 

an  easy  practice  of  religion.  Or  it  may  be  requisite,  for 
reasons  unknown  to  us,  that  they  should  give  some  further 
manifestation  e  what  is  their  moral  character,  to  the  creation 
of  God,  than  such  a  practice  of  it  would  be.  Thus  in  the 
great  variety  of  religious  situations  in  which  men  are  placed, 
what  constitutes,  what  chiefly  and  peculiarly  constitutes, 
the  probation,  in  all  senses,  of  some  persons,  may  be  the* 
difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  involved  : 
and  their  principal  and  distinguished  trial  may  be,  how  they 
will  behave  under  and  with  respect  to  these  difficulties. 
Circumstances  in  men's  situation  in  their  temporal  capacity, 
analogous  in  good  measure  to  this  respecting  religion,  are  to 
be  observed.  We  find  some  persons  are  placed  in  such  a 
situation  in  the  world,  as  that  their  chief  difficulty  with 
regard  to  conduct,  is  not  the  doing  what  is  prudent  when 
it  is  known ;  for  this,  in  numberless  cases,  is  as  easy  as  the 
contrary  :  but  to  some  the  principal  exercise  is,  recollection 
and  being  upon  their  guard  against  deceits,  the  deceits 
suppose  of  those  about  them  ;  against  false  appearances  of 
reason  and  prudence.  To  persons  in  some  situations,  the 
principal  exercise  with  respect  to  conduct  is,  attention  in 
order  to  inform  themselves  what  is  proper,  what  is  really 
the  reasonable  and  prudent  part  to  act. 

§  19.  Also  the  doubts  may  le  due  to  faults  in  the 
examinant. 

But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition,  that  men's 
dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion  is  not  owing  to 
their  neglects  or  prejudices  ;  it  must  be  added,  011  the  other 
hand,  in  all  common  reason,  and  as  what  the  truth  of  the 
case  plainly  requires  should  be  added,  that  such  dissatis- 
faction possibly  may  be  owing  to  those,  possibly  may  be 
men's  own  fault.  For, 

If  there  are  any  persons,  who  never  set  themselves  heartily 
and  in  earnest  to  be  informed  in  religion  :  if  there  are 
any,  who  secretly  wish  it  may  not  prove  true ;  and  are 
less  attentive  to  evidence  than  to  difficulties,  and  more  to 


e  Sup.  I.  v.  42. 
VOL.   1.  R 


242  WANT    OF    UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  VI. 

objections  than  to  what  is  said  in  answer  to  them  :  these 
persons  will  scarce  be  thought  in  a  likely  way  of  seeing  the 
evidence  of  religion,  though  it  were  most  certainly  true, 
and  capable  of  being  ever  so  fully  proved.  If  any  accustom 
themselves  to  consider  this  subject  usually  in  the  way  of 
mirth  and  sport :  if  they  attend  to  forms  and  representations, 
and  inadequate  manners  of  expression,  instead  of  the  real 
things  intended  by  them :  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more 
than  inadequately  expressive  of  the  things  signified :)  or  if 
they  substitute  human  errors  in  the  room  of  divine  truth  : 
why  may  not  all,  or  any  of  these  things,  hinder  some  men 
from  seeing  that  evidence,  which  really  is  seen  by  others  ; 
as  a  like  turn  of  mind,  with  respect  to  matters  of  common 
speculation  and  practice,  does,  we  find  by  experience,  hinder 
them  from  attaining  that  knowledge  and  right  understanding, 
in  matters  of  common  speculation  and  practice,  which  more 
fair  and  attentive  minds  attain  to  ?  And  the  effect  will  be 
the  same,  whether  their  neglect  of  seriously  considering  the 
evidence  of  religion,  and  their  indirect  behaviour  with  regard 
to  it,  proceed  from  mere  carelessness,  or  from  the  grosser 
vices  ;  or  whether  it  be  owing  to  this,  that  forms  and  figura- 
tive manners  of  expression,  as  well  as  errors,  administer 
occasions  of  ridicule,  when  the  things  intended,  and  the 
truth  itself,  would  not.  Men  may  indulge  a  ludicrous  turn 
so  far  as  to  lose  all  sense  of  conduct  and  prudence  in  worldly 
affairs,  and  even,  as  it  seems,  to  impair  their  faculty  of 
reason.  And  in  general,  levity,  carelessness,  passion,  and 
prejudice,  do  hinder  us  from  being  rightly  informed,  with 
respect  to  common  things :  and  they  may,  in  like  manner, 
and  perhaps  in  some  further  providential  manner,  with 
respect  to  moral  and  religious  subjects  :  may  hinder  evidence 
from  being  laid  before  us,  and  from  being  seen  when 
it  is.  The  scripture f  does  declare,  that  every  one  shall  not 


f  Dan.  xii.  10.    See  also  Is.  xxix.  13,  14  ;  Matth.  vi.  23,  and  xi.  25,  and 


Trxts  -     inrl  C'rotiv*     Xlii'  "'  I2  J  J°hn  iiL  *9  and  V>  44  > 

.t  CXto  .      Ct/frCl'    Or/  Oil  ttS  s*  *  m.  ...  i    ,  i       <        /M*       i  • 

on  the  purpose  of    2  Cor'  1V'  4»  *  Tira'  m-  J3  »  and  that  affectionate  as 


restricted  evidence.     we^  as   authoritative  admonition,  so   very  many 

times  inculcated,  He  that  hath  ears  to  hear,  let  him  hear. 

Grotius  saw  so  strongly  the  thing  intended  in  these  and  other  passages 


§  20]  SUPPOSED    SCANTINESS    OF  PROOF  243 

understand.  And  it  makes  no  difference,  by  what  provi- 
dential conduct  this  conies  to  pass  :  whether  the  evidence  of 
Christianity  was  originally  and  with  design,  put  and  left  so, 
as  that  those  who  are  desirous  of  evading  moral  obligations 
should  not  see  it  ;  and  that  honest-minded  persons  should  : 
or,  whether  it  comes  to  pass  by  any  other  means. 

§  20.  The  proof  of  religion,  in  both  kinds,  upon 
inquiry,  lies  level  to  common  men. 

Further :  The  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and  of 
Christianity  does,  I  think,  lie  level  to  common  men  ;  even 
those,  the  greatest  part  of  whose  time,  from  childhood  to  old 
age,  is  taken  up  with  providing  for  themselves  and  their 
families  the  common  conveniences,  perhaps  necessaries,  of 
life  :  those,  I  mean,  of  this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all 
of  asking  after  proof,  or  attending  to  it.  Common  men, 
were  they  as  much  in  earnest  about  religion,  as  about  their 
temporal  affairs,  are  capable  of  being  convinced  upon  real 
evidence,  that  there  is  a  God  who  governs  the  world  :  and 
they  feel  themselves  to  be  of  a  moral  nature,  and  account- 
able creatures.  And  as  Christianity  entirely  falls  in  with 
this  their  natural  sense  of  things,  so  they  are  capable,  not 
only  of  being  persuaded,  but  of  being  made  to  see,  that  there 
is  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  it,  and 
many  appearing  completions  of  prophecy.  But  though 
this  proof  is  real  and  conclusive,  yet  it  is  liable  to  objections, 
and  may  be  run  up  into  difficulties  ;  which,  however,  persons 
who  are  capable,  not  only  of  talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing, 
are  capable  also  of  seeing  through  :  i.  e.  not  of  clearing  up 
and  answering  them,  so  as  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  for 
of  such  knowledge  we  are  not  capable  with  respect  to  any 
one  thing  in  nature  ;  but  capable  of  seeing  that  the  proof 
is  noj:  lost  in  these  difficulties,  or  destroyed  by  these  objec- 
tions. But  then  a  thorough  examination  into  religion,  with 
regard  to  these  objections,  which  cannot  be  the  business 


of  scripture  of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say,  that  the  proof  given  us  of 
Christianity  was  less  than  it  might  have  been,  for  this  very  purpose  : 
Ut  ila  sermo  Evangeln  tanquam  lapis  esset  Lydius  ad  quern  ingenia  sanabilia 
explorarentur.  De  Ver.  R  C.  lib.  ii.  towards  the  end. 


K  2 


244  WANT    OF   UNIVERSALITY  AND  [II.  VI. 

of  eveiy  man,  is  a  matter  of  pretty  large  compass,  and,  from 
the  nature  of  it,  requires  some  knowledge,  as  well  as  time 
and  attention ;  to  see,  how  the  evidence  comes  out,  upon 
balancing  one  thing  with  another,  and  what,  upon  the  whole, 
is  the  amount  of  it.  Now  if  persons  who  have  picked  up 
these  objections  from  others,  and  take  for  granted  they  are 
of  weight,  upon  the  word  of  those  from  whom  they  received 
them,  or,  by  often  retailing  of  them,  come  to  see  or  fancy 
they  see  them  to  be  of  weight ;  will  not  prepare  themselves 
for  such  an  examination,  with  a  competent  degree  of  know- 
ledge ;  or  will  not  give  that  time  and  attention  to  the 
subject,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  is  necessary  for 
attaining  such  information  :  in  this  case,  they  must  remain 
in  doubtfulness,  ignorance,  or  error ;  in  the  same  way  as 
they  must,  with  regard  to  common  sciences,  and  matters 
of  common  life,  if  they  neglect  the  necessary  means  of  being 
informed  in  them. 

§  21.    Accrediting  an  ambassador  is  not  a  parallel  case,  as 
it  aims  only  at  a  formal  act. 

But  still  perhaps  it  will  be  objected,  that  if  a  prince  or 
common  master  were  to  send  directions  to  a  servant, 
he  would  take  care,  that  they  should  always  bear  the  certain 
marks,  who  they  came  from,  and  that  their  sense  should  be 
always  plain  :  so  as  that  there  should  be  no  possible  doubt, 
if  he  could  help  it,  concerning  the  authority  or  meaning  of 
them.  Now  the  proper  answer  to  all  this  kind  of  objections 
is,  that,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies,  it  is  even  certain  we  can- 
iiot  argue  thus  with  respect  to  him,  who  is  the  Governor  of 
the  world  :  and  particularly  that  he  does  not  afford  us  such 
information,  with  respect  to  our  temporal  affairs  and  interests, 
as  experience  abundantly  shows.  However,  there  is  a  full 
answer  to  this  objection,  from  the  very  nature  of  religion. 
For,  the  reason  why  a  prince  would  give  his  directions  in 
this  plain  manner  is,  that  he  absolutely  desires  such  an 
external  action  should  be  done,  without  concerning  himself 
with  the  motive  or  principle  upon  which  it  is  done:  i.  e.  he 
regards  only  the  external  event,  or  the  thing's  being  done  ; 
and  not  at  all,  properly  speaking,  the  doing  of  it,  or  the 


§§  21-23]      SUPPOSED   SCANTINESS    OF  PROOF  245 

action.  Whereas  the  whole  of  morality  and  religion  con- 
sisting merely  in  action  itself,  there  is  no  sort  of  parallel 
between  the  cases.  But  if  the  prince  be  supposed  to  regard 
only  the  action  ;  i.  e.  only  to  desire  to  exercise,  or  in  any 
sense  prove,  the  understanding  or  loyalty  of  a  servant ;  he 
would  not  always  give  his  orders  in  such  a  plain  manner. 

§  22.    Whether  God's  will  be  regarded,  herein,  as  absolute, 
or  as  conditional,  the  argument  remains. 

It  may  be  proper  to  add,  that  the  will  of  God,  respecting 
morality  and  religion,  may  be  considered  either  as  absolute, 
or  as  only  conditional.  If  it  be  absolute,  it  can  only  be  thus, 
that  we  should  act  virtuously  in  such  given  circumstances  ; 
not  that  we  should  be  brought  to  act  so,  by  his  changing  of 
our  circumstances.  And  if  God's  will  be  thus  absolute,  then 
it  is  in  our  power,  in  the  highest  and  strictest  sense,  to  do 
or  to  contradict  his  will  ;  which  is  a  most  weighty  considera- 
tion. Or  his  will  may  be  considered  only  as  conditional, 
that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall  be  rewarded  ;  if  otherwise, 
punished  :  of  which  conditional  will  of  the  Author  of  nature, 
the  whole  constitution  of  it  affords  most  certain  instances. 

§  23.    Sums  up  the  foregoing  Sections- 

Upon  the  whole  :  That  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion 
necessarily  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation  :  and 
the  credibility  of  our  being  at  all  in  such  a  state  being- 
admitted,  there  seems  no  peculiar  difficulty  in  supposing  our 
probation  to  be,  just  as  it  is,  in  those  respects  which  are 
above  objected  against.  There  seems  no  pretence,  from  the 
reason  of  the  thing,  to  say,  that  the  trial  cannot  equitably  be 
any  thing,  but  whether  persons  will  act  suitably  to  certain 
information,  or  such  as  admits  no  room  for  doubt  ;  so  as 
that  there  can  be  no  danger  of  miscarriage,  but  either  from 
their  not  attending  to  what  they  certainly  know,  or  from 
overbearing  passion  hurrying  them  on  to  act  contrary  to  it. 
For,  since  ignorance  and  doubt  afford  scope  for  probation  in 
all  senses,  as  really  as  intuitive  conviction  or  certainty  ;  and 
since  the  two  former  are  to  be  put  to  the  same  account 


246 


WANT   OF   UNIVERSALITY,    ETC.      [II.  VI.  §  24 


as  difficulties  in  practice  ;  men's  moral  probation  may  also 
be,  whether  they  will  take  due  care  to  inform  themselves 
by  impartial  consideration,  and  afterwards  whether  they  will 
act  as  the  case  requires,  upon  the  evidence  which  they  have, 
however  doubtful.  And  this,  we  find  by  experience,  is 
frequently  our  probation  s,  in  our  temporal  capacity.  For, 
the  information  which  we  want  with  regard  to  our  worldly 
interests  is  by  no  means  always  given  us  of  course,  without 
any  care  of  our  own.  And  we  are  greatly  liable  to  self-deceit 
from  inward  secret  prejudices,  and  also  to  the  deceits  of 
others.  So  that  to  be  able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part, 
often  requires  much  and  difficult  consideration.  Then  after 
we  have  judged  the  very  best  wre  can,  the  evidence  upon 
which  we  must  act,  if  we  will  live  and  act  at  all,  is 
perpetually  doubtful  to  a  veiy  high  degree.  And  the  con- 
stitution and  course  of  the  world  in  fact  is  such,  as  that 
want  of  impartial  consideration  what  we  have  to  do,  and 
venturing  upon  extravagant  courses  because  it  is  doubtful 
what  will  be  the  consequence,  are  often  naturally,  i.  e. 
providentially,  altogether  as  fatal,  as  misconduct  occasioned 
by  heedless  inattention  to  what  we  certainly  know,  or 
disregarding  it  from  overbearing  passion. 

§  24.  Invites  the  objector  to  consider  whether  the 
obstacle  lies  within  himself. 

Several  of  the  observations  here  made  may  well  seem 
strange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many  good  men.  But 
if  the  persons  for  whose  sake  they  are  made  think  so  ; 
persons  who  object  as  above,  and  throw  off  all  regard 
to  religion  under  pretence  of  want  of  evidence  ;  I  desire 
them  to  consider  again,  whether  their  thinking  so  be 
owing  to  any  thing  unintelligible  in  these  observations, 
or  to  their  own  not  having  such  a  sense  of  religion  and 
serious  solicitude  about  it,  as  even  their  state  of  scepticism 
does  in  all  reason  require  ?  It  ought  to  be  forced  upon 
the  reflection  of  these  persons,  that  our  nature  and  con- 
dition necessarily  require  us,  in  the  daily  course  of  life, 


g  I.  ii.  12,  and  sup.  {§  17-19. 


VII.  §§  i,  2]       EVIDENCE   FOR    CHRISTIANITY 


247 


to  act  upon  evidence  much  lower l  than  what  is  commonly 
called  probable  ;  to  guard,  not  only  against  what  we  fully 
believe  will,  but  also  against  what  we  think  it  supposable 
may,  happen  ;  and  to  engage  in  pursuits  when  the  probability 
is  greatly  against  success,  if  it  be  credible,  that  possibly  we 
may  succeed  in  them. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF   THE  PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE   FOR    CHRISTIANITY. 

§  i.   WiH  now  try  the  evidences  for  Christianity 
by  our  rules  of  temporal  action. 

rPHE  presumptions  against  revelation,  and  objections 
against  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  par- 
ticular things  relating  to  it,  being  removed  ;  there  remains 
to  be  considered,  what  positive  evidence  we  have  for  the 
truth  of  it :  chiefly  in  order  to  see,  what  the  analogy  of 
nature  suggests  with  regard  to  that  evidence,  and  the 
objections  against  it :  or  to  see  what  is,  and  is  allowed  to 
be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judgment  and  of  action,  in 
our  temporal  concerns,  in  cases  where  we  have  the  same 
kind  of  evidence,  and  the  same  kind  of  objections  against 
it,  that  we  have  in  the  case  before  us. 


§  2.  These  evidences  are  (a)  direct  and  particular, 
(b)  general  and  resulting. 

Now  in  the  evidence  of  Christianity  there  seem  to  be 
several  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the  head, 
either  of  miracles,  or  the  completion  of  prophecy,  in  the 
common  acceptation  of  the  words2.  But  these  two  are 


1  Comp.  Introd.  §§  3,  6. 

2  After  the  discussions  of  the 
hist  century  and   a   half,  Butler 
would    perhaps    have    somewhat 
altered  what  he  has  written  re- 
specting the  twin  office  of  miracle 
and  prophecy  as  evidences  of  re- 


vealed religion. 

As  regards  miracle,  we  may  do 
well  to  remember — 

1.  The   apostles  were  not  con- 
verted by  miracles  as  commonly 
understood. 

2.  The  miracles  of  our  Lord  were 


248 


OF   THE  PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE          [II.  VI I. 


its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs :  and  those  other  things, 
however  considerable  they  are,  yet  ought  never  to  be  urged 
apart  from  its  direct  proofs,  but  always  to  be  joined  with 
them.  Thus  the  evidence  of  Christianity  will  be  a  long 
series  of  things,  reaching,  as  it  seems,  from  the  beginning 
of  the  world  to  the  present  time,  of  great  variety  and 
compass,  taking  in  both  the  direct,  and  also  the  collateral, 
proofs  ;  and  making  up,  all  of  them  together,  one  argument : 
the  conviction  arising  from  which  kind  of  proof  may  be 
compared  to  what  they  call  the  effect  in  architecture  or 
other  works  of  art  ;  a  result  from  a  great  number  of  things 
so  and  so  disposed,  and  taken  into  one  view.  I  shall  there- 


of wide  local  notoriety,  but  we 
have  no  evidence  of  their  having 
led  to  extended  conversions.  They 
may  have  had  more  powerful  and 
extended  operation  through  the 
preaching  of  the  apostles. 

3.  The  great  miracle  of  Lazarus 
is  noted  for  the  specialty  of  its 
effect  (John  xi.  45'. 

4.  There    were  three  miracles 
which  may  be  denominated  as  of 
the  first  order  : — 

(a)  The     Incarnation      itself; 
which,  as  Butler  observes,  is 
not   available   as  proof,    but 
requires  to  be  proved. 
(ft)  The  miracle  of  the  Resur- 
rection ;  which,  after  it  had 
happened,  became  powerfully 
available,  and  may  be  taken 
us   sustaining    very   broadly 
this  declaration  of  Butler's. 
(<0  The  miracle    of  our  Lord's 
own  person   and   character ; 
which  was   too  spiritual  for 
the  mass,  but  operated  mar- 
vellously on  a  few. 
It  is  well   to  observe  that  the 
apostles  largely  converted  without 
miracle:   and,   in  his  address  to 
the   Athenians    (Acts   xvii.    31), 
St.  Paul   appeals  to   no   miracle 
except    the    Resurrection.      This 
appeal  brought   about  an   inter- 


ruption,   and    he    desisted    from 
further  speech. 

With  regard  to  prophecy — 

1.  It  seems  to  imply  the  action 
of  divine  power  operating  with 
large  combinations,  such  as  belong 
to  the  government  of  the  ages  as 
a  whole. 

2.  There  are  miracles  ascribed 
to  preternatural  agencies  of  evil, 
as  well  as  of  good.     But  we  have 
no   similar   recognition  in    Holy 
Writ  of  prophecy  as  being  placed 
at  the  command  of  any  evil  agent. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  evidential 
force  of  the  existence  of  the 
Church,  and  its  operation  on  the 
world  and  on  society,  has  grown 
progressively  with  the  lapse  of 
time,  and  the  development  of  the 
varying  conditions  of  life.  In 
Great  Britain,  especially,  it  was 
to  be  expected  that  this  idea 
should  become  more  prominent 
and  vivid  with  the  great  exten- 
sion and  increased  efficiency  of 
Christian  missions  during  the 
nineteenth  century.  Also  Chris- 
tianity and  the  Church  are  far 
larger  and  weightier  facts  than 
heretofore  in  comparison  with  the 
rest  of  the  world  :  nor  is  the 
great  increase  in  the  numerical 
proportion  of  Christians  wholly 
without  bearing  on  the  case. 


§3]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  249 

fore,  first,  make  some  observations  relating  to  miracles,  and 
the  appearing  completions  of  prophecy  ;  and  consider  what 
analogy  suggests,  in  answer  to  the  objections  brought  against 
this  evidence.  And,  secondly,  I  shall  endeavour  to  give 
some  account  of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned, 
consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  collateral  evidence,  con- 
sidered as  making  up  one  argument :  this  being  the  kind 
of  proof,  upon  which  wre  determine  most  questions  of 
difficulty,  concerning  common  facts,  alleged  to  have  hap- 
pened, or  seeming  likely  to  happen  ;  especially  questions 
relating  to  conduct. 

§  3.   On  the  direct.     (A)  The  miracles  are  told  in  narratives 
plain  and  unadorned; 

First,  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the  direct 
proof  of  Christianity  from  miracles  and  prophecy,  and  upon 
the  objections  alleged  against  it. 

[I.]  Now  the  following  observations  relating  to  the 
historical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of 
Christianity,  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 

f  i.]  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  historical 
evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the  prophets, 
as  of  the  common  civil  history  of  Moses  and  the  kings 
of  Israel ;  or,  as  of  the  affairs  of  the  Jewish  nation.  And 
the  Gospels  and  the  Acts  afford  us  the  same  historical 
evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  and  the  apostles,  as  of 
the  common  matters  related  in  them  \  This  indeed  could 
not  have  been  affirmed  by  any  reasonable  man,  if  the  authors 
of  these  books,  like  many  other  historians,  had  appeared 
to  make  an  entertaining  manner  of  writing  their  aim  ; 
though  they  had  interspersed  miracles  in  their  works,  at 
proper  distances  and  upon  proper  occasions.  These  might 


1  Fitzgerald  cites  Bolingbroke,  connected  with  all  the  civil  affaiis, 

Posthumous  Works,  iii.   279:    <  The  and  make  a  necessary  and  insepar- 

miracles  in  the  Bible  are  not  like  able  part.     The  whole  history  is 

those  in  Livy,  detached  pieces  that  founded  in  them  :    it  consists  of 

do  not  disturb  the  civil  history,  little  else  ;    and,  if  it    were  not 

which  goes  on  very  well  without  a   history  of  them,  it  would    be 

them.     But  the   miracles   of  the  a  history  of  nothing.' 
Jewish  historian   are  intimately 


250  OF   THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE         [II.  VII. 

have  animated  a  dull  relation,  amused  the  reader,  and 
engaged  his  attention.  And  the  same  account  would 
naturally  have  been  given  of  them,  as  of  the  speeches 
and  descriptions  of  such  authors :  the  same  account,  in 
a  manner,  as  is  to  be  given,  why  the  poets  make  use  of 
wonders  and  prodigies.  But  the  facts,  both  miraculous 
and  natural,  in  scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned 
narratives :  and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all  respects,  to 
stand  upon  the  same  foot  of  historical  evidence. 

§  4.  Sustained  by,  and  accounting  for,  great  knmcn 
consequent  events ; 

Further :  Some  parts  of  scripture,  containing  an  account 
of  miracles  fully  sufficient  to  prove  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
are  quoted  as  genuine,  from  the  age  in  which  they  are  said 
to  be  written,  down  to  the  present :  and  no  other  parts  of 
them,  material  in  the  present  question,  are  omitted  to  be 
quoted  in  such  manner,  as  to  afford  any  sort  of  proof  of 
their  not  being  genuine.  And,  as  common  history,  when 
called  in  question  in  any  instance,  may  often  be  greatly 
confirmed  by  contemporary  or  subsequent  events  more 
known  and  acknowledged  ;  and  as  the  common  scripture- 
history,  like  many  others,  is  thus  confirmed  :  so  likewise  is 
the  miraculous  history  of  it,  not  only  in  particular  instances, 
but  in  general.  For,  the  establishment  of  the  -Jewish  and 
Christian  religions,  which  were  events  contemporary  with 
the  miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  attestation  of  both,  or 
subsequent  to  them;  these  events  are  just  what  we  should 
have  expected,  upon  supposition  such  miracles  were  really 
wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  those  religions.  These 
miracles  are  a  satisfactory  account  of  those  events  :  of  which 
110  other  satisfactory  account  can  be  given  ;  nor  any  account 
at  all,  but  what  is  imaginary  merely  and  invented. 

§  5.  Hard  to  account  for,  except  by  supposing  them  true. 

It  is  to  be  added,  that  the  most  obvious,  the  most  easy 
and  direct  account  of  this  history,  how  it  came  to  be  written 
and  to  be  received  in  the  world,  as  a  true  history,  is,  that 


§§  4-7]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  251 

it  really  is  so  :  nor  can  any  other  account  of  it  be  easy  and 
direct.  Now,  though  an  account,  not  at  all  obvious,  but 
very  far-fetched  and  indirect,  may  indeed  be,  and  often  is, 
the  true  account  of  a  matter ;  yet  it  cannot  be  admitted  on 
the  authority  of  its  being  asserted.  Mere  guess,  supposition, 
and  possibility,  when  opposed  to  historical  evidence,  prove 
nothing,  but  that  historical  evidence  is  not  demonstrative. 

§  6.  Not  mere  objection,  but  disproof  is  here  required. 

Now  the  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  think,  is,  that 
the  scripture -history  in  general  is  to  be  admitted  as  an 
authentic  genuine  history,  till  somewhat  positive  be  alleged 
sufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But  no  man  will  deny  the  con- 
sequence to  be,  that  it  cannot  be  rejected,  or  thrown  by  as 
of  no  authority,  till  it  can  be  proved  to  be  of  none  ;  even 
though  the  evidence  now  mentioned  for  its  authority  wrere 
doubtful.  This  evidence  may  be  confronted  by  historical 
evidence  on  the  other  side,  if  there  be  any :  or  general 
incredibility  in  the  things  related,  or  inconsistence  in  the 
general  turn  of  the  history,  would  prove  it  to  be  of  no 
authority.  But  since,  upon  the  face  of  the  matter,  upon 
a  first  and  general  view,  the  appearance  is,  that  it  is  an 
•authentic  history ;  it  cannot  be  determined  to  be  fictitious 
without  some  proof  that  it  is  so.  And  the  following 
observations  in  support  of  these  and  coincident  with  them, 
will  greatly  confirm  the  historical  evidence  for  the  truth 
of  Christianity. 

§  7.  The  Epistles  of  St.  Paid  possess  distinct  verifying 

evidences. 

[2.]  The  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the  nature  of  epistolary 
writing,  and  moreover  from  several  of  them  being  written, 
not  to  particular  persons,  but  to  churches,  carry  in  them 
evidences  of  their  being  genuine,  beyond  what  can  be  in 
a  mere  historical  narrative,  left  to  the  world  at  large.  This 
evidence,  joined  with  that  which  they  have  in  common  with 
the  rest  of  the  New  Testament,  seems  not  to  leave  so  much 
as  any  particular  pretence  for  denying  their  genuineness 
considered,  as  an  ordinary  matter  of  fact,  or  of  criticism  : 


252  OF   THE  PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  VII. 

I  say  particular  pretence,  for  denying  it ;  because  any  single 
fact,  of  such  a  kind  and  such  antiquity,  may  have  general 
doubts  raised  concerning  it,  from  the  very  nature  of  human 
affairs  and  human  testimony.  There  is  also  to  be  mentioned 
a  distinct  and  particular  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  the 
Epistle  chiefly  referred  to  here,  the  First  to  the  Corinthians ; 
from  the  manner  in  which  it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Bomanus, 
in  an  epistle  of  his  own  to  that  church a.  Now  these  epistles 
afford  a  proof  of  Christianity,  detached  from  all  others,  which 
is,  I  think,  a  thing  of  weight ;  and  also  a  proof  of  a  nature 
and  kind  peculiar  to  itself.  For, 

In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  received  the  gospel 
in  general,  and  the  institution  of  the  communion  in  par- 
ticular, not  from  the  rest  of  the  apostles,  or  jointly  together 
with  them,  but  alone,  from  Christ  himself;  whom  he 
declares  likewise,  conformably  to  the  history  in  the  Acts, 
that  he  saw  after  his  ascension l).  So  that  the  testimony  of 
St.  Paul  is  to  be  considered,  as  detached  from  that  of  the 
rest  of  the  apostles. 

And  he  declares  further,  that  he  was  endued  with  a 
power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publicly  known  to 
those  very  people,  speaks  of  frequent  and  great  variety  of 
miraculous  gifts  as  then  subsisting  in  those  very  churches,  to 
which  he  was  writing  ;  which  he  was  reproving  for  several 
irregularities ;  and  where  he  had  personal  opposers :  he 
mentions  these  gifts  incidentally,  in  the  most  easy  manner 
and  without  effort ;  by  way  of  reproof  to  those  who  had 
them,  for  their  indecent  use  of  them  ;  and  by  way  of  depre- 
ciating them,  in  comparison  of  moral  virtues ;  in  short  he 
speaks  to  these  churches,  of  these  miraculous  powers,  in  the 
manner  any  one  would  speak  to  another  cf  a  thing,  which 
was  as  familiar  and  as  much  known  in  common  to  them 
both,  as  any  thing  in  the  World  c.  And  this,  as  hath  been 
observed  by  several  persons,  is  surely  a  very  considerable 
thing. 

a  Clem.  Rom.  Ep.  I.  c.  47. 
b  Gal.  i ;  i  Cor.  xi.  23,  &c ,  xv.  8. 

c  Rom.  xv.  19;  i  Cor.  xii.  8,  9,  10-28,  &c.  and  xiii.  i,  2,  8,  and  the 
whole  fourteenth  chapter ;  2  Cor.  xii,  12,  13  ;  Gal.  iii.  2,  5. 


§8]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  253 

§  8.   Christianity  and  Judaism  alone  allege  miracles 
publicly  wrought. 

[3.]  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact,  that  Chris- 
tianity offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demanded  to  be 
received,  upon  the  allegation,  i.  e.  as  unbelievers  would 
speak,  upon  the  pretence,  of  miracles,  publicly  wrought  to 
attest  the  truth  of  it,  in  such  an  age  ;  ancl  that  it  was 
actually  received  by  great  numbers  in  that  very  age,  and 
upon  the  professed  belief  of  the  reality  of  these  miracles. 
And  Christianity,  including  the  dispensation  of  the  Old 
Testament,  seems  distinguished  by  this  from  all  other 
religions.  I  mean,  that  this  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case 
with  regard  to  any  other :  for  surely  it  will  not  be  sup- 
posed to  lie  upon  any  person,  to  prove  by  positive  historical 
evidence,  that  it  was  not.  It  does  in  no  sort  appear  that 
Mahometanism  was  first  received  in  the  world  upon  the  foot 
of  supposed  miracles dl,  i.  e.  public  ones:  for,  as  revelation 
is  itself  miraculous,  all  pretence  to  it  must  necessarily  imply 
some  pretence  of  miracles.  And  it  is  a  known  fact,  that 
it  was  immediately,  at  the  very  first,  propagated  by  other 
means.  And  as  particular  institutions,  whether  in  paganism 
or  popeiy,  said  to  be  confirmed  by  miracles  after  those 
institutions  had  obtained,  are  not  to  the  purpose :  so,  were 
there  what  might  be  called  historical  proof,  that  any  of  them 
were  introduced  by  a  supposed  divine  command,  believed 
to  be  attested  by  miracles ;  these  would  not  be  in  any 
wise  parallel.  For  single  things  of  this  sort  are  easy  to  be 
accounted  for,  after  parties  are  formed,  and  have  power  in 
their  hands  ;  and  the  leaders  of  them  are  in  veneration 
with  the  multitude  ;  and  political  interests  are  blended  with 
religious  claims,  and  religious  distinctions.  But  before  any 
thing  of  this  kind,  for  a  few  persons,  and  those  of  the  lowest 
rank,  all  at  once,  to  bring  over  such  great  numbers  to  a 


d  See  the  Koran,  chap,  xiii  and  chap.  xvii. 


1  See   the   argument  hereupon       from  the  Arabic  by  Sir  W.  Muir. 
in  The  Beacon  of  Truth,  translated       chap.  i.  (1895). 


254  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  VII. 

new  religion,  and  get  it  to  be  received  upon  the  particular 
evidence  of  miracles ;  this  is  quite  another  thing.  And 
I  think  it  will  be  allowed  by  any  fair  adversary,  that  the 
fact  now  mentioned,  taking  in  all  the  circumstances  of  it,  is 
peculiar  to  the  Christian  religion.  However,  the  fact  itself 
is  allowed,  that  Christianity  obtained,  i.  e.  was  professed 
to  be  received  in  the  world,  upon  the  belief  of  miracles, 
immediately  in  the  age  in  which  it  is  said  those  miracles 
were  wrought :  or  that  this  is  what  its  first  converts  would 
have  alleged,  as  the  reason  for  their  embracing  it. 

§  9.  The  converts,  who  sacrificed  interest  and  pleasure, 
must  be  believed  sincere. 

Now  certainly  it  is  not  to  be  supposed,  that  such  numbers 
of  men,  in  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  world,  should 
forsake  the  religion  of  their  country,  in  which  they  had 
been  educated  ;  separate  themselves  from  their  friends,  par- 
ticularly in  their  festival  shows  and  solemnities,  to  which 
the  common  people  are  so  greatly  addicted,  and  which  were 
of  a  nature  to  engage  them  much  more,  than  any  thing  of 
that  sort  amongst  us ;  and  embrace  a  religion,  which  could 
not  but  expose  them  to  many  inconveniences,  and  indeed 
must  have  been  a  giving  up  the  world  in  a  great  degree, 
even  from  the  very  first,  and  before  the  empire  engaged 
in  form  against  them  :  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  such 
numbers  should  make  so  great,  and,  to  say  the  least,  so 
inconvenient  a  change  in  their  whole  institution  of  life, 
unless  they  were  really  convinced  of  the  truth  of  those 
miracles,  upon  the  knowledge  or  belief  of  which  they  pro- 
fessed to  make  it.  And  it  will,  I  suppose,  readily  be 
acknowledged,  that  the  generality  of  the  first  converts  to 
Christianity  must  have  believed  them :  that  as  by  becoming- 
Christians  they  declared  to  the  world,  they  were  satisfied  of 
the  truth  of  those  miracles  ;  so  this  declaration  was  to  be 
credited.  And  this  their  testimony  is  the  same  kind  of 
evidence  for  those  miracles,  as  if  they  had  put  it  in  writing, 
and  these  writings  had  come  down  to  us.  And  it  is  real 
evidence,  because  it  is  of  facts,  which  they  had  capacity  and 


§§  9,  io]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  255 

full  opportunity  to  inform  themselves  of.  It  is  also  distinct 
from  the  direct  or  express  historical  evidence,  though  it  is 
of  the  same  kind  :  and  it  would  be  allowed  to  be  distinct  in 
all  cases.  For  were  a  fact  expressly  related  by  one  or  more 
ancient  historians,  and  disputed  in  after  ages  ;  that  this  fact 
is  acknowledged  to  have  been  believed  by  great  numbers  of 
the  age  in  which  the  historian  says  it  was  done,  would  be 
allowed  an  additional  proof  of  such  fact,  quite  distinct  from 
the  express  testimony  of  the  historian.  The  credulity  of 
mankind  is  acknowledged  :  and  the  suspicions  of  mankind 
ought  to  be  acknowledged  too  ;  and  their  backwardness  even 
to  believe,  and  greater  still  to  practise,  what  makes  against 
their  interest.  And  it  must  particularly  be  remembered, 
that  education,  and  prejudice,  and  authority,  were  against 
Christianity,  in  the  age  I  am  speaking  of.  So  that  the 
immediate  conversion  of  such  numbers  is  a  real  presump- 
tion of  somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter :  I  say 
presumption,  for  it  is  not  alleged  as  a  proof  alone  and  by 
itself.  Nor  need  any  one  of  the  things  mentioned  in  this 
chapter  be  considered  as  a  proof  by  itself :  and  yet  all  of 
them  together  maybe  one  of  the  strongest6. 

§  io.  The  onus  probandi  lies  upon  the  objector. 

Upon  the  whole  :  As  there  is  large  historical  evidence, 
both  direct  and  circumstantial,  of  miracles  wrought  in 
attestation  of  Christianity,  collected  by  those  who  have  writ 
upon  the  subject ;  it  lies  upon  unbelievers  to  show,  why 
this  evidence  is  not  to  be  credited.  This  way  of  speaking 
is,  I  think,  just ;  and  what  persons  who  write  in  defence 
of  religion  naturally  fall  into.  Yet,  in  a  matter  of  such 
unspeakable  importance,  the  proper  question  is,  not  whom 
it  lies  upon,  according  to  the  rules  of  argument,  to  maintain 
or  confute  objections  :  but  whether  there  really  are  aiiy, 
against  this  evidence,  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  destroy  the 
credit  of  it.  However,  unbelievers  seem  to  take  upon  them 
the  part  of  showing  that  there  are. 


6  Inf.  §  60. 


256  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  VI 1. 

§  ii.  He  says  (a)  other  enthusiasts  liace  borne  erroneous 
witness.     Yes :  but  to  opinions,  not  facts. 

They  allege,  that  numberless  enthusiastic  people,  in 
different  ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves  to  the  same 
difficulties  which  the  primitive  Christians  did  ;  and  are  ready 
to  giye  up  their  lives  for  the  most  idle  follies  imaginable. 
But  it  is  not  very  clear,  to  what  purpose  this  objection  is 
brought.  For  every  one,  surely,  in  every  case,  must  dis- 
tinguish between  opinions  and  facts.  And  though  testimony 
is  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opinions,  or  of  any  opinions  at 
all ;  yet  it  is  allowed,  in  all  other  cases,  to  be  a  proof  of 
facts.  And  a  person's  laying  down  his  life  in  attestation 
of  facts  or  of  opinions,  is  the  strongest  proof  of  his  believing 
them.  And  if  the  apostles  and  their  contemporaries  did 
believe  the  facts,  in  attestation  of  which  they  exposed  them- 
selves to  sufferings  and  death  ;  this  their  belief,  or  rather 
knowledge,  must  be  a  proof  of  those  facts :  for  they  were 
such  as  came  under  the  observation  of  their  senses. 

§  12.  Martyrs  of  the  sub-apostolic  age. 

And  though  it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of  weight, 
that  the  martyrs  of  the  next  age,  notwithstanding  they  were 
not  eye-witnesses  of  those  facts,  as  were  the  apostles  and 
their  contemporaries,  had,  however,  full  opportunity  to 
inform  themselves,  whether  they  were  true  or  not,  and  gave 
equal  proof  of  their  believing  them  to  be  true. 

§  r3-  W  Enthusiasm  weakens  even  testimony  to  facts. 
But  were  these  tvitnesses  enthusiasts? 

But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the  evidence 
of  testimony  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relating  to  religion  : 
some  seem  to  think  it  totally  and  absolutely  destroys  the 
evidence  of  testimony  upon  this  subject.  And  indeed  the 
powers  of  enthusiasm,  and  of  diseases  too,  which  operate  in 
a  like  manner,  are  very  wonderful,  in  particular  instances. 
But  if  great  numbers  of  men,  not  appearing  in  any  peculiar 
degree  weak,  nor  under  any  peculiar  suspicion  of  negligence, 
affirm  that  they  saw  and  heard  such  things  plainly  with 


§§  11-15]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  257 

their  eyes  and  their  ears,  and  are  admitted  to  be  in  earnest  ; 
such  testimony  is  evidence  of  the  strongest  kind  we  can 
have,  for  any  matter  of  fact.  Yet  possibly  it  may  be  over- 
come, strong  as  it  is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things  thus 
attested,  or  by  contrary  testimony.  And  in  an  instance 
where  one  thought  it  was  so  overcome,  it  might  be  just  to 
consider,  how  far  such  evidence  could  be  accounted  for,  by 
enthusiasm  :  for  it  seems  as  if  no  other  imaginable  account 
were  to  be  given  of  it.  But  till  such  incredibility  be  shown, 
or  contrary  testimony  produced,  it  cannot  surely  be  expected, 
that  so  far-fetched,  so  indirect  and  wonderful  an  account  of 
such  testimony,  as  that  of  enthusiasm  must  be  ;  an  account 
so  strange,  that  the  generality  of  mankind  can  scarce  be 
made  to  understand  what  is  meant  by  it :  it  cannot,  I  say, 
be  expected,  that  such  account  will  be  admitted  of  such 
evidence ;  when  there  is  this  direct,  easy,  and  obvious 
account  of  it,  that  people  really  saw  and  heard  a  thing  not 
incredible,  which  they  affirm  sincerely  and  with  full  assurance, 
they  did  see  and  hear. 

§  14.  The  tilings  not  being  incredible,  the  charye  of 
enthusiasm  is  not  to  be  entertained. 

Granting  then  that  enthusiasm  is  not  (strictly  speaking) 
an  absurd,  but  a  possible  account  of  such  testimony  :'it  is 
manifest,  that  the  very  mention  of  it  goes  upon  the  previous 
supposition  that  the  things  so  attested  are  incredible  ;  and 
therefore  need  not  be  considered,  till  they  are  shown  to  be 
so.  Much  less  need  it  be  considered,  after  the  contrary  has 
been  proved.  And  I  think  it  has  been  proved,  to  full  satis- 
faction, that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  a  revelation,  in 
general ;  or  in  such  an  one  as  the  Christian,  in  particular. 

§  15.  Many  prejudices  operate  like  enthusiasm;  yet  testimony 

prevails. 

However ;  as  religion  is  supposed  peculiarly  liable  to 
enthusiasm,  it  may  just  be  observed,  that  prejudices  '  almost 


1  On   the    connection    between       Aristotle,  Eth.  Nic.  I.  iv.  6  ;  III.  iv. 
virtue  and  sound  judgment,  see       4  ;  X.  ix.  6. 


VOL.  I. 


258  OF   THE   PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  Vll. 

without  number  and  without  name,  romance,  affectation, 
humour,  a  desire  to  engage  attention  or  to  surprise,  the 
party-spirit,  custom,  little  competitions,  unaccountable 
likings  and  dislikings,  these  influence  men  strongly  in 
common  matters.  And  as  these  prejudices  are  often  scarce 
known'  or  reflected  upon  by  the  persons  themselves  who  are 
influenced  by  them,  they  are  to  be  considered  as  influences 
of  a  like  kind  to  enthusiasm.  Yet  human  testimony  in 
common  matters  is  naturally  and  justly  believed  notwith- 
standing. 

§  1 6.  So  it  will,  even  if  we  assume  partial  untruth, 
exaggeration,  or  reticence1. 

It  is  intimated  further,  in  a  more  refined  way  of  observa- 
tion, that  though  it  should  be  proved,  that  the  apostles  and 
first  Christians  could  not,  in  some  respects,  be  deceived 
themselves,  and,  in  other  respects,  cannot  be  thought  to 
have  intended  to  impose  upon  the  world  ;  yet  it  will  not 
follow,  that  their  general  testimony  is  to  be  believed,  though 
truly  handed  down  to  us :  because  they  might  still  in  part, 
i.  e.  in  other  respects,  be  deceived  themselves,  and  in  part 
also  designedly  impose  upon  others ;  which,  it  is  added,  is 
a  thing  very  credible,  from  that  mixture  of  real  enthusiasm, 
and  real  knavery,  to  be  met  with  in  the  same  characters. 
And,  I  must  confess,  I  think  the  matter  of  fact  contained 
in  this  observation  upon  mankind  is  not  to  be  denied  ;  and 
that  somewhat  very  much  akin  to  it  is  often  supposed  in 
scripture  as  a  very  common  case,  and  most  severely  reproved 2. 
But  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  that  persons  capable  of 
applying  this  observation  as  applied  in  the  objection,  might 
also  frequently  have  met  with  the  like  mixed  character,  in 


1  In    estimating    what    Butler  of  an  individual,  where  detection 

here  says  of  the  effect  of  partial  of   untruth    in    a    part    is    held 

untruth,  we  must  bear  in  mind  to  render  the  whole  unavailable 

that  we  are  dealing  with  the  case  for  carrying  penal    consequences 

of  statements  supposed  to  be  made  home. 

in  the  general  interests,  where  the  2  As  in  the  case  of  Balaam.    fSee 

subject  to  be  elucidated  is  truth  Serm.  vii,  on  Balaam,  and  Serm. 

at  large ;  and  not  with  evidence  x,  on  Self-Deceit, 
hostile  to  the  life  and  property 


§§  i6-i8]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  259 

instances  where  religion  was  quite  out  of  the  case.  The 
thing  plainly  is,  that  mankind  are  naturally  endued  with 
reason,  or  a  capacity  of  distinguishing  between  truth  and 
falsehood  ;  and  as  naturally  they  are  endued  with  veracity, 
or  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they  say :  but  from  many 
occasions  they  are  liable  to  be  prejudiced  and  biassed  and 
deceived  themselves,  and  capable  of  intending  to  deceive 
others,  in  eveiy  different  degree  :  insomuch  that,  as  we  are 
all  liable  to  be  deceived  by  prejudice,  so  likewise  it  seems  to 
be  not  an  uncommon  thing,  for  persons,  who,  from  their 
regard  to  truth,  would  not  invent  a  lie  entirely  without  any 
foundation  at  all,  to  propagate  it  with  heightening  circum- 
stances1, after  it  is  once  invented  and  set  a-going.  And 
others,  though  they  would  not  propagate  a  lie,  yet,  which  is 
a  lower  degree  of  falsehood,  will  let  it  pass  without  contra- 
diction. But,  notwithstanding  all  this,  human  testimony 
remains  still  a  natural  ground  of  assent ;  and  this  assent 
a  natural  principle  of  action. 

§  1 7.  No  proof  that  danyer  here  is  more  than  ordinary. 

It  is  objected  further,  that  however  it  has  happened,  the 
fact  is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different  ages,  been  strangely 
deluded  with  pretences  to  miracles  and  wonders.  But  it  is 
by  no  means  to  be  admitted,  that  they  have  been  oftener,  or 
are  at  all  more  liable  to  be  deceived  by  these  pretences,  than 
by  others. 

§  18.  Nor  does  failure  of  like  evidence  in  other  cases  prove 
this  evidence  fabulous.  . 

It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  veiy  considerable  degree  of 
historical  evidence  for  miracles,  which  are,  on  all  hands, 
acknowledged  to  be  fabulous.  But  suppose  there  were  even 
the  tike  historical  evidence  for  these,  to  what  there  is  for 
those  alleged  in  proof  of  Christianity,  which  yet  is  in  no 


1  Evidently    we    must    under-  falsify.    And,  again,  the  reticence 

.stand  this  to 'refer  to  incidental  glanced    at    can    only    apply    to 

exaggeration  :  not  to  what  is  sys-  secondary  matters,    or   it   might 

tematic,  which  would  go   far  to  totally  falsify* 

S   2 


260  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  VII. 

wise  allowed,  but  suppose  this  ;  the  consequence  would  not 
be,  that  the  evidence  of  the  latter  is  not  to  be  admitted. 
Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the  world,  who,  in  common  cases, 
would  conclude  thus.  For  what  would  such  a  conclusion 
really  amount  to  but  this,  that  evidence,  confuted  by  con- 
trary evidence,  or  any  way  overbalanced,  destroys  the 
credibility  of  other  evidence,  neither  confuted,  nor  over- 
balanced? To  argue,  that  because  there  is,  if  there  were, 
like  evidence  from  testimony,  for  miracles  acknowledged 
false,  as  for  those  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  therefore 
the  evidence  in  the  latter  case  is  not  to  be  credited  ;  this  is 
the  same  as  to  argue,  that  if  two  men  of  equally  good 
reputation  had  given  evidence  in  different  cases  110  way 
connected,  and  one  of  them  had  been  convicted  of  perjury, 
this  confuted  the  testimony  of  the  other. 

§  19.   Testimony  always  Halle  to  be  weakened  without  bciiuj 
destroyed. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  general  observation  that  human 
creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  from  enthusiasm  in 
religion,  and  principles  equivalent  to  enthusiasm  in  common 
matters,  and  in  both  from  negligence  ;  and  that  they  are  so 
capable  of  dishonestly  endeavouring  to  deceive  others ;  this 
does  indeed  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  all  cases, 
but  does  not  destroy  it  in  any.  And  these  things  will 
appear,  to  different  men,  to  weaken  tho  evidence  of  testi- 
mony, in  different  degrees  :  in  degrees  proportionable  to 
the  observations  they  have  made,  or  the  notions  they  have 
any  way  taken  up,  concerning  the  weakness  and  negligence 
and  dishonesty  of  mankind  ;  or  concerning  the  powers  of 
enthusiasm,  and  prejudices  equivalent  to  it.  But  it  seems 
to  me,  that  people  do  not  know  what  they  say,  who  affirm 
these  things  to  destroy  the  evidence  from  testimony,  which 
we  have  of  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Nothing  can  destroy 
the  evidence  of  testimony  in  any  case,  but  a  proof  or 
probability,  that  persons  are  not  competent  judges  of  the 
facts  to  which  they  give  testimony  ;  or  that  they  are  actually 
under  some  indirect  influence  in  giving  it,  in  such  particular 


§§  i9-2i]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  261 

case.  Till  this  be  made  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human 
actions  require,  that  testimony  be  admitted.  It  can  never 
be  sufficient  to  overthrow  direct  historical  evidence,  in- 
dolently to  say,  that  there  are  so  many  principles,  from 
whence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  themselves  and  dis- 
posed to  deceive  others,  especially  in  matters  of  religion,  that 
one  knows  not  what  to  believe.  And  it  is  surprising  persons 
can  help  reflecting,  that  this  very  manner  of  speaking  sup- 
poses they  are  not  satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
evidence,  of  which  they  speak  thus  ;  or  that  they  can  avoid 
observing,  if  they  do  make  this  reflection,  that  it  is,  on  such 
a  subject,  a  very  material  one  *'. 

§  20.    Liability  to  error,  how  reduced  in  the  Christian 

witnesses. 

And  over  against  all  these  objections  is  to  be  set  the 
importance  of  Christianity,  as  what  must  have  engaged  the 
attention  of  its  first  converts,  so  as  to  have  rendered  them 
less  liable  to  be  deceived  from  carelessness,  than  they  would 
in  common  matters  ;  and  likewise  the  strong  obligations  to 
veracity,  which  their  religion  laid  them  under  :  so  that  the 
first  and  most  obvious  presumption  is,  that  they  could  not 
be  deceived  themselves,  nor  would  deceive  others.  And 
this  presumption,  in  this  degree,  is  peculiar  to  the  testimony 
we  have  been  considering. 

§  21.   The  objector  is  bound  in  limine  to  abate  his 
objections. 

In  argument,  assertions  are  nothing  in  themselves,  and 
have  an  air  of  positiveness,  which  sometimes  is  not  very 
easy  :  yet  they  are  necessary,  and  necessary  to  be  repeated  ; 
in  order  to  connect  a  discourse,  and  distinctly  to  lay  before 
the  view  of  the  reader,  what  is  proposed  to  be  proved,  and 
what  is  left  as  proved.  Now  the  conclusion  from  the  fore- 
going observations  is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt,  this  :  that 
unbelievers  must  be  forced  to  admit  the  external  evidence 
for  Christianity,  i.  e.  the  proof  of  miracles  wrought  to  attest 

f  See  the  foregoing  chapter. 


262  OF   THE   PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  vn. 

it,  to  be  of  real  weight  and  very  considerable  ;  though  they 
cannot  allow  it  to  be  sufficient,  to  convince  them  of  the 
reality  of  those  miracles.  And  as  they  must,  in  all  reason, 
admit  this  ;  so  it  seems  to  me,  that  upon  consideration  they 
would,  in  fact,  admit  it  ;  those  of  them,  I  mean,  who  know 
any  thing  at  all  of  the  matter :  in  like  manner  as  persons, 
in  many  cases,  own  they  see  strong  evidence  from  testimony, 
for  the  truth  of  things,  which  yet  they  cannot  be  convinced 
are  true  :  cases,  suppose,  where  there  is  contrary  testimony : 
or  things  which  they  think,  whether  with  or  without  reason, 
to  be  incredible.  But  there  is  no  testimony  contrary  to 
that  which  we  have  been  considering  :  and  it  has  been  fully 
proved,  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  Christianity  in 
general,  or  in  any  part  of  it. 

§  22.  (B)  In  prophecy,  the  parts  understood  are  not 
Impaired  by  those  not  understood. 

[II.]  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  prophecy, 
I  shall  only  make  some  few  general  observations,  which  are 
suggested  by  the  analogy  of  nature  ;  i.  e.  by  the  acknow- 
ledged natural  rules  of  judging  in  common  matters,  concern- 
ing evidence  of  a  like  kind  to  this  from  prophecy. 

[i.]  The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  one  part  of  a 
prophecy  does  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the  proof  of 
foresight,  arising  from  the  appearing  completion  of  those 
other  parts  which  are  understood.  For  the  case  is  evidently 
the  same,  as  if  those  parts,  which  are  not  understood,  were 
lost,  or  not  written  at  all,  or  written  in  an  unknown  tongue. 
Whether  this  observation  be  commonly  attended  to  or  not, 
it  is  so  evident,  that  one  can  scarce  bring  oneself  to  set 
down  an  instance  in  common  matters,  to  exemplify  it. 
However,  suppose  a  writing,  partly  in  cypher,  and  partly  in 
plain  words  at  length  ;  and  that  in  the  part  one  understood, 
there  appeared  mention  of  several  known  facts  :  it  would 
never  come  into  any  man's  thoughts  to  imagine,  that  if  he 
understood  the  whole,  perhaps  he  might  find,  that  those 
facts  were  not  in  reality  known  by  the  writer.  Indeed,  both 
in  this  example  and  the  thing  intended  to  be  exemplified  by 


§§22-24]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  263 

it,  our  not  understanding  the  whole  (the  whole,  suppose,  of 
a  sentence  or  a  paragraph)  might  sometimes  occasion  a 
doubt,  whether  one  understood  the  literal  meaning  of  such 
a  part  :  but  this  comes  under  another  consideration. 


§  23.   Why  general  fulfilment,  short  of  absolute,  may 
suffice. 

For  the  same  reason,  though  a  man  should  be  incapable, 
for  want  of  learning,  or  opportunities  of  inquiry,  or  from 
not  having  turned  his  studies  this  way,  even  so  much  as  to 
judge,  whether  particular  prophecies  have  been  throughout 
completely  fulfilled  ;  yet  he  may  see,  in  general,  that  they 
have  been  fulfilled  to  such  a  degree,  as,  upon  very  good 
ground,  to  be  convinced  of  foresight  more  than  human  in 
such  prophecies,  and  of  such  events  being  intended  by  them, 
For  the  same  reason  also,  though,  by  means  of  the  deficien- 
cies in  civil  history,  and  the  different  accounts  of  historians, 
the  most  learned  should  not  be  able  to  make  out  to  satis- 
faction, that  such  parts  of  the  prophetic  history  have  been 
minutely  and  throughout  fulfilled  ;  yet  a  very  strong  proof 
of  foresight  may  arise,  from  that  general  completion  of 
them,  which  is  made  out :  as  much  proof  of  foresight, 
perhaps,  as  the  giver  of  prophecy  intended  should  ever  be 
afforded  by  such  parts  of  prophecy. 

§  24.  Applicability  is  to  be  presumed  intentional. 

[2.]  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to  such 
and  such  events,  is  itself  a  proof  that  it  was  intended  of 
them  :  as  the  rules,  by  which  we  naturally  judge  and  deter- 
mine, in  common  cases  parallel  to  this,  will  show.  This 
observation  I  make  in  answer  to  the  common  objection 
against  the  application  of  the  prophecies,  that,  considering 
each  of  them  distinctly  by  itself,  it  does  not  at  all  appear, 
that  they  were  intended  of  those  particular  events  to  which 
they  are  applied  by  Christians ;  and  therefore  it  is  to  be 
supposed,  that,  if  they  meant  any  thing,  they  were  intended 
of  other  events  unknown  to  us,  and  not  of  these  at  all, 


264  OF   THE   PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE          [II.  VII. 

§  25.  Is  taJien  as  proving  intention  in  writings, 
(a)  mythological,  (b)  satirical. 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing,  which  bear  a  great 
resemblance  to  prophecy,  with  respect  to  the  matter  before 
us :  the  mythological  *,  and  the  satirical,  where  the  satire  is, 
to  a  certain  degree,  concealed.  And  a  man  might  be  assured, 
that  he  understood  what  an  author  intended  by  a  fable  or 
parable,  related  without  any  application  or  moral,  merely 
from  seeing  it  to  be  easily  capable  of  such  application,  and 
that  such  a  moral  might  naturally  be  deduced  from  it.  And 
he  might  be  fully  assured,  that  such  persons  and  events 
were  intended  in  a  satirical  writing,  merely  from  its  being 
applicable  to  them.  And,  agreeably  to  the  last  observation, 
he  might  be  in  a  good  measure  satisfied  of  it,  though  he 
were  not  enough  informed  in  affairs,  or  in  the  stoiy  of  such 
persons,  to  understand  half  the  satire.  For,  his  satisfaction, 
that  he  understood  the  meaning,  the  intended  meaning,  of 
these  writings,  would  be  greater  or  less  in  proportion  as  he 
saw  the  general  turn  of  them  to  be  capable  of  such  applica- 
tion :  and  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  particular  things 
capable  of  it.  And  thus,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is 
applicable  to  the  present  state  of  the  church,  and  to  the 
political  situations  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  some 
thousand  years  after  these  prophecies  were  delivered,  and 
a  long  series  of  prophecy  delivered  before  the  coming  of 
Christ  is  applicable  to  him  ;  these  things  are  in  themselves 
a  proof,  that  the  prophetic  history  was  intended  of  him,  and 
of  those  events :  in  proportion  as  the  general  turn  of  it  is 
capable  of  such  application,  and  to  the  number  and  variety 
of  particular  prophecies  capable  of  it.  And  though,  in  all 
just  way  of  consideration,  the  appearing  completion  of  pro- 
phecies is  to  be  allowed  to  be  thus  explanatory  of,  and  to 
determine  their  meaning  ;  yet  it  is  to  be  remembered 
further,  that  the  ancient  Jews  applied  the  prophecies  to 
a  Messiah  before  his  coming,  in  much  the  s:ime  manner  as 

1  The  word  is  used  by  Butler  as  relating  not  to  mythology,  but  to 
fable. 


§§  25-27]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  265 

Christians  do  now:  and  that  the  primitive  Christians  inter- 
preted the  prophecies  respecting  the  state  of  the  church  and 
of  the  world  in  the  last  ages,  in  the  sense  which  the  event 
seems  to  confirm  and  verify.  And  from  these  things  it  may 
be  made  appear : 

§  26.  Intentional,  lint  not  necessarily  with  the  uttercr, 

[3.]  That  the  showing  even  to  a  high  probability,  if  that 
could  be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  some  other  events, 
in  such  and  such  predictions,  and  not  those  at  all  which 
Christians  allege  to  be  completions  of  those  predictions  ;  or 
that  such  and  such  prophecies  are  capable  of  being  applied 
to  other  events  than  those,  to  which  Christians  apply  them 
—that  this  would  not  confute  or  destroy  the  force  of  the 
argument  from  prophecy,  even  with  regard  to  those  very 
instances.  For,  observe  how  this  matter  really  is.  If  one 
knew  such  a  person  to  be  the  sole  author  of  such  a  book, 
and  was  certainly  assured,  or  satisfied  to  any  degree,  that 
one  knew  the  whole  of  what  he  intended  in  it  ;  one  should 
be  assured  or  satisfied  to  such  degree,  that  one  knew  the 
whole  meaning  of  that  book  :  for  the  meaning  of  a  book  is 
nothing  but  the  meaning  of  the  author.  But  if  one  knew 
a  person  to  have  compiled  a  book  out  of  memoirs,  which  he 
received  from  another,  of  vastly  superior  knowledge  in  the 
subject  of  it,  especially  if  it  were  a  book  full  of  great 
intricacies  and  difficulties  ;  it  would  in  no  wise  follow,  that 
one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  the  book,  from  knowing 
the  whole  meaning  of  the  compiler :  for  the  original  memoirs, 
i.  e.  the  author  of  them,  might  have,  and  there  would  be  no 
degree  of  presumption,  in  many  cases,  against  supposing  him 
to  have,  some  further  meaning  than  the  compiler  saw. 

§  27.    But  with  the  Inspirer. 

To  say  then,  that  the  scriptures  and  the  things  contained 
in  them  can  have  no  other  or  further  meaning  than  those 
persons  thought  or  had,  who  first  recited  or  wrote  them  ; 
is  evidently  saying,  that  those  persons  were  the  original, 
proper,  and  sole  authors  of  those  books,  i.  e.  that  they  are 


266  OF   THE   PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  VII. 

not  inspired  :  which  is  absurd,  whilst  the  authority  of  these 
books  is  under  examination  ;  i.  e.  till  you  have  determined 
they  are  of  no  divine  authority  at  all.  Till  this  be  deter- 
mined, it  must  in  all  reason  be  supposed,  not  indeed  that 
they  have,  for  this  is  taking  for  granted  that  they  are 
inspired,  but  that  they  may  have,  some  further  meaning 
than  what  the  compilers  saw  or  understood.  And  upon  this 
supposition,  it  is  supposable  also,  that  this  further  meaning 
may  be  fulfilled.  Now  events  corresponding  to  prophecies, 
interpreted  in  a  different  meaning  from  that,  in  which  the 
prophets  are  supposed  to  have  understood  them ;  this  affords, 
in  a  manner,  the  same  proof,  that  this  different  sense  was 
originally  intended,  as  it  would  have  afforded,  if  the  pro- 
phets had  not  understood  their  predictions  in  the  sense  it  is 
supposed  they  did  :  because  there  is  no  presumption  of  their 
sense  of  them  being  the  whole  sense  of  them.  And  it  has 
been  already  shown,  that  the  apparent  completions  of  pro- 
phecy must  be  allowed  to  be  explanatory  of  its  meaning. 
So  that  the  question  is,  whether  a  series  of  prophecy  has 
been  fulfilled,  in  a  natural  or  proper,  i.  e.  in  any  real,  sense 
of  the  words  of  it.  For  such  completion  is  equally  a  proof 
of  foresight  more  than  human,  whether  the  prophets  are,  or 
are  not,  supposed  to  have  understood  it  in  a  different  sense. 
I  say,  supposed  :  for,  though  I  think  it  clear,  that  the 
prophets  did  not  understand  the  full  meaning  of  their  pre- 
dictions ;  it  is  another  question,  how  far  they  thought  they 
did,  and  in  what  sense  they  understood  them. 

§  28.  Merely  proving  capability  of  some  oilier  interpretation 
is  wasted  labour. 

Hence  may  be  seen,  to  how  little  purpose  those  persons 
busy  themselves,  who  endeavour  to  prove,  that  the  pro- 
phetic history  is  applicable  to  events  of  the  age  in  which  it 
was  written,  or  of  ages  before  it.  Indeed  to  have  proved 
this  before  there  was  any  appearance  of  a  further  completion 
of  it,  might  have  answered  some  purpose  ;  for  it  might  have 
prevented  the  expectation  of  any  such  further  completion. 
Thus  could  Porphyry  have  shown,  that  some  principal  parts 


§28]  7^07?    CHRISTIANITY  267 

of  the  Book  of  Daniel,  for  instance,  the  seventh  verse  of  the 
seventh  chapter,  which  the  Christians  interpreted  of  the  latter 
ages,  was  applicable  to  events,  which  happened  before  or 
about  the  age  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes  ;  this  might  have 
prevented  them  from  expecting  any  further  completion  of 
it.  And,  unless  there  was  then,  as  I  think  there  must  have 
been,  external  evidence  concerning  that  book,  more  than  is 
come  down  to  us ;  such  a  discovery  might  have  been 
a  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of  Christianity  itself:  con- 
sidering the  authority  which  our  Saviour  has  given  to  the 
Book  of  Daniel1,  and  how  much  the  general  scheme  of 
Christianity  presupposes  the  truth  of  it.  But  even  this 
discovery,  had  there  been  any  such*,  would  be  of  very 
little  weight  with  reasonable  men  now ;  if  this  passage, 
thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of  Porphyry,  appears 
to  be  applicable  also  to  events,  which  succeeded  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Roman  empire.  I  mention  this,  not  at. all  as 
intending  to  insinuate,  that  the  division  of  this  empire  into 
ten  parts,  for  it  plainly  was  divided  into  about  that  number, 
were,  alone  and  by  itself,  of  any  moment  in  verifying  the 
prophetic  history :  but  only  as  an  example  of  the  thing 
I  am  speaking  of.  And  thus  upon  the  whole,  the  matter 
of  inquiry  evidently  must  be,  as  above  put,  Whether  the 
prophecies  are  applicable  to  Christ,  and  to  the  present  state 
of  the  world  and  of  the  church  ;  applicable  in  such  a  degree, 
as  to  imply  foresight :  not  whether  they  are  capable  of  any 


e  It  appears,  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  worth  mentioning  in  this 

way.     For  Jerome  on  the  place  says,  Duas  poster iores  bestias in  uno 

Macedonnm  regno  ponit.  And  as  to  the  ten  kings ;  Decem  reges  enumerat, 
qui  fuerunt  saevissimi :  ipsosque  reges  non  unius  ponit  regni,  verbi  gratia, 
Macedoniae,  Syrian,  Asiae,  et  Aegypti ;  seel  de  diversis  regnis  unum  efficit  reguni, 
ordinem.  And  in  this  way  of  interpretation,  any  thing  may  be  made 
of  any  thing. 

1  St.  Matt.  xxiv.  15  ;  St.  Mark  marked  with    a   rather  peculiar 

xiii.  14.     Two  reports  of  the  same  solemnity,  as  in  each  case  we  find 

incident:    'the    abomination    of  appended  to  it  the  words,  <who- 

desolation,  spoken   of  by  Daniel  so  readeth,  let  him  understand' 

the  prophet,  standing  in  the  holy  (Matt.);    'let   him   that   readeth 

place.'     Our   Lord's   reference    is  understand'  (Mark). 


268  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [IT.  VII. 

other  application  ;  though  I  know  no  pretence  for  saying  the 
general  turn  of  them  is  capable  of  any  other. 

§  29.  Men  shrink  from  laborious  inquiries  ivith  indeterminate 
result;  prefer  summary  rejection. 

These  observations  are,  I  think,  just ;  and  the  evidence 
referred  to  in  them  real :  though  there  may  be  people  who 
will  not  accept  of  such  imperfect  information  from  scripture. 
Some  too  have  not  integrity  and  regard  enough  to  truth,  to 
attend  to  evidence,  which  keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps 
perplexity,  arid  which  is  much  of  a  different  sort  from  what 
they  expected.  And  it  plainly  requires  a  degree  of  modesty 
and  fairness,  beyond  what  every  one  has,  for  a  man  to  say, 
not  to  the  world,  but  to  himself,  that  there  is  a  real  appear- 
ance of  somewhat  of  great  weight  in  this  matter,  though  he 
is  not  able  thoroughly  to  satisfy  himself  about  it ;  but  it 
shall  have  its  influence  upon  him,  in  proportion  to  its 
appearing  reality  and  weight.  It  is  much  more  easy,  and 
more  falls  in  with  the  negligence,  presumption,  and  wilful- 
ness  of  the  generality,  to  determine  at  once,  with  a  decisive 
air,  There  is  nothing  in  it.  The  prejudices  arising  from 
that  absolute  contempt  and  scorn,  with  which  this  evidence 
is  treated  in  the  world,  I  do  not  mention.  For  what  indeed 
can  be  said  to  persons,  who  are  weak  enough  in  their  under- 
standings to  think  this  any  presumption  against  it;  or,  if 
they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in  their  temper  to  be 
influenced  by  such  prejudices,  upon  such  a  subject? 

§  30.  The  evidence,  (a)  direct,  and  (b)  circumstantial  to  be 
iceighed  as  a  whole. 

I  shall  now,  secondly,  endeavour  to  give  some  account  of 
the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christianity,  consist- 
ing both  of  the  direct  and  circumstantial  evidence,  considered 
as  making  up  one  argument.  Indeed  to  state  and  examine 
this  argument  fully,  would  be  a  work  much  beyond  the 
compass  of  this  whole  Treatise  :  nor  is  so  much  as  a  proper 
abridgment  of  it  to  be  expected  here.  Yet  the  present 
subject  requires  to  have  some  brief  account  of  it  given. 


§§29-3']  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  269 

For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence,  upon  which  most  questions 
of  difficulty,  in  common  practice,  are  determined  :  evidence 
arising  from  various  coincidences,  which  support  and  confirm 
each  other,   and  in  this  manner  prove,  with  more  or  less 
certainty,  the  point  under  consideration.     And  I  choose  to 
do  it  also  :  first,   because   it   seems  to   be   of  the  greatest 
importance,  and  not  duly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the 
proof  of  revelation  is,  not  some  direct  and  express  things 
only,  but  a  great  variety  of  circumstantial  things  also  ;  and 
that  though  each  of  these  direct  and  circumstantial  things  is 
indeed  to  be  considered  separately,  yet  they  are  afterwards 
to   be   joined   together;    for   that  the  proper  force   of  the 
evidence  consists  in  the  result  of  those  several  things,  con- 
sidered in  their  respects  to  each  other,  and  united  into  one 
view :  and  in  the  next  place,  because  it  seems  to  me,  that 
the  matters  of  fact  here  set  down,  which  are  acknowledged 
by   unbelievers,   must   be   acknowledged   by  them   also   to 
contain  together  a  degree  of  evidence   of  great  weight,  if 
they  could  be  brought  to  lay  these  several  things   before 
themselves    distinctly,    and    then   with    attention    consider 
them  together  ;  instead  of  that  cursory  thought  of  them,  to 
which  we  are  familiarized.     For  being  familiarized  to  the 
cursory  thought  of  things  as  really  hinders  the  weight  of 
them  from  being  seen,  as  from  having  its  due  influence  upon 
practice. 

§  31.   Ocer  ami  above  our  reason  and  affections,   God  has 
given  its  (a)  natural  religion ;  and,  further, 

The  thing  asserted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to  be 
inquired  into,  is  this :  That  over  and  above  our  reason  and 
affections,  which  God  has  given  us  for  the  information  of  our 
judgment  and  the  conduct  of  our  lives,  he  has  also,  by 
external  revelation,  given  us  an  account  of  himself  and  his 
moral  government  over  the  world,  implying  a  future  state  of 
rewards  and  punishments  ;  i.e.  hath  revealed  the  system  of 
natural  religion:  for  natural  religion  may  be  externally11 

h  Sup.  II.  i.  5,  6  ;  also  ii.  10. 


270  OF   THE   PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  VII. 

revealed  by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may  be  taught  it  by  man- 
kind their  fellow-creatures : 


§  32.    (b)  A  revealed  dispensation  for  the  recovery  of 
mankind. 

That  God,  I  say,  has  given  us  the  evidence  of  revelation, 
as  well  as  the  evidence  of  reason,  to  ascertain  this  moral 
system  ;  together  with  an  account  of  a  particular  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence,  which  reason  could  no  way  have 
discovered,  and  a  particular  institution  of  religion  founded 
on  it,  for  the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  their  present 
wretched  condition,  and  raising  them  to  the  perfection  and 
final  happiness  of  their  nature. 

§  33.  This  revelation  atone  stands  upon  matters  of  fact, 
(a)  past,  or  (b)  alleged  in  the  future. 

This  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may  be  con* 
sidered  as  wholly  historical  *.  For  prophecy  is  nothing  but 
the  history  of  events  before  they  come  to  pass :  doctrines 
also  are  matters  of  fact :  and  precepts  come  under  the  same 
notion.  And  the  general  design  of  scripture,  which  contains 
in  it  this  revelation,  thus  considered  as  historical,  may  be 
said  to  be,  to  give  us  an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one 
single  view,  as  God's  world  :  by  which  it  appears  essentially 
distinguished  from  all  other  books,  so  far  as  I  have  found, 
except  such  as  are  copied  from  it.  It  begins  with  an  account 
of  God's  creation  of  the  world,  in  order  to  ascertain,  and 
distinguish  from  all  others,  who  is  the  object  of  our  worship, 
by  what  he  has  done :  in  order  to  ascertain,  who  he  is, 
concerning  whose  providence,  commands,  promises,  and 


1  The  connection  of  Christianity  of  the  common  experience  of  man-? 

with  fact  is  one  of  its  most  dis-  kind.     Thus  the    recorded   facts 

tinctive   characteristics.     In   one  become  a  guarantee  for  those  not 

sense  '  doctrines    are   matters   of  yet  recorded.  It  is  in  quite  another 

fact ' ;  but  the  great  bulk  of  essen-  sense  that,  e.  g.,  the  freedom  of  the 

tial    Christian    doctrine,    as    set  will,  or  the  Calvinian  doctrine  of 

forth  in  the  Apostles'  Creed,  rests  reprobation,  may  be  handled   as 

on  matters  of  fact  already  past,  matters  of  fact, 
and  subjected  to  the  testing  power 


§?  32,  33J  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  27! 

threatening^  this  sacred  book,  all  along,  treats  ;  the  Maker 
and  Proprietor  of  the  world,  he  whose  creatures  we  are,  the 
God  of  nature  :  in  order  likewise  to  distinguish  him  from 
the  idols  of  the  nations,  which  are  either  imaginary  beings, 
i.  e.  no  beings  at  all ;  or  else  part  of  that  creation,  the 
historical  relation  of  which  is  here  given  '.  And  St.  John, 
not  improbably,  with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaic  account  of  the 
creation,  begins  his  gospel  with  an  account  of  our  Saviour's 
pre-existence,  and  that  all  things  ivere  made  \)y  him ;  and 
without  him  was  not  any  thing  made  that  ivas  made  * :  agree- 
ably to  the  doctrine  of  St.  Paul,  that  God  created  all  things 
l)y  Jesus  Christ k.  This  being  premised,  the  scripture,  taken 
together,  seems  to  profess  to  contain  a  kind  of  an  abridgment 
of  the  history  of  the  world,  in  the  view  just  now  mentioned  : 
that  is,  a  general  account  of  the  condition  of  religion  and  its 
professors,  during  the  continuance  of  that  apostasy  from 
God,  and  state  of  wickedness,  which  it  every  where  supposes 
the  world  to  lie  in.  And  this  account  of  the  state  of  religion 
carries  with  it  some  brief  account  of  the  political  state  of 
things,  as  religion  is  aifected  by  it.  Revelation  indeed  con- 
siders the  common  affairs  of  this  world,  and  what  is  going 
on  in  it,  as  a  mere  scene  of  distraction ;  and  cannot  be 
supposed  to  concern  itself  with  foretelling  at  what  time 
Rome,  or  Babylon,  or  Greece,  or  any  particular  place,  should 
be  the  most  conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and  dissolute- 
ness, which  all  places  equally  aspire  to  be  ;  cannot,  I  say,  be 
supposed  to  give  any  account  of  this  wild  scene  for  its  own 
sake.  But  it  seems  to  contain  some  very  general  account 
of  the  chief  governments  of  the  world,  as  the  general  state  of 
religion  has  been,  is,  or  shall  be,  affected  by  them,  from  the 
first  transgression,  and  during  the  whole  interval  of  the 


1  John  i.  3.  k  Eph.  iii.  9. 


1  There  seems  now  to  be  little  Creator  and  Redeemer :  to  which 

room  for  doubt  that  the  greater  we  may  add  (a)  impersonations  of 

gods  of  the  ancient  religions  are  the  abstract  or  of  external  nature, 

to  a  large  extent  deteriorated  and  (6)  deifications   of  the   deceased, 

corrupted    reproductions    of    the  (c)  personified  conceptions  of  the 

original  divine  idea;  as  to  both  evil  agent  or  agents. 


272  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  Vll. 

world's  continuing  in  its  present  state,  to  a  certain  future 
period,  spoken  of  both  in  the  Old  and  New  Testament,  very 
distinctly,  and  in  great  variety  of  expression :  The  times  of 
the  restitution  of  all  things1  :  when  the  mystery  of  God  shall  be 
finished,  as  he  hath  declared  to  his  servants  the  prophets **  i 
when  the  God  of  heaven  shall  set  up  a  kingdom,  which  shall 
never  l>c  destroyed :  and  the  kingdom  shall  not  be  left  to  other 
people ",  as  it  is  represented  to  be  during  this  apostasy,  but 
judgment  shall  le  given  to  the  saints0,  and  they  shall  reign  v  : 
and  the  kingdom  and  dominion,  and  the  greatness  of  the  kingdom 
under  the  whole  heaven,  shall  be  given  to  the  people  of  the  saints 
of  the  Most  High^. 

§  34.  That  in  so  long  a  time  it  has  not  been  confuted, 
gives  a  presumption  that  it  cannot  be. 

Upon  this  general  view  of  the  scripture,  I  would  remark, 
how  great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  relation  takes  up,  near 
six  thousand  years 1  of  which  are  past :  and  how  great 
a  variety  of  things  it  treats  of;  the  natural  and  moral 
system  or  history  of  the  world,  including  the  time  when 
it  was  formed,  all  contained  in  the  veiy  first  book,  and 
evidently  written  in  a  rude  and  unlearned  age  ;  and  in 

1  Acts  iii.  21.  in  Kev.  x.  7.  "  Dan.  ii.  44. 

0  Dan.  vii.  22.  P  Rev.  xxii.  5.  «  Dan.  vii.  27. 

1  Obviously  to  be  taken  as  an  which  are  as  old  as,  or  older  than. 

obiter  dictum,  which  assumes  the  Christianity.  We  are  dealing 

popular  and  most  accepted  chrono-  here  with  presumption  only.  But 

•logy,  that  of  the  Hebrew  text,  but  even  as  to  presumption  the  case 

is  not  to  be  construed  as  an  is  by  no  means  parallel.  For  (i) 

authoritative  judgment  upon  the  Christianity  has  stimulated  the 

age  of  the  world  in  its  present  forces  and  faculties  of  human 

condition.  There  seems,  however,  nature  into  an  effective  vitality 

to  be  no  tendency  in  scientific  and  activity  quite  unknown  under 

opinion  to  any  wholesale  or  vast  other  now  current  religions.  (2) 

extension  of  the  term.  Butler's  It  has  been  the  only  religion 

argument  in  no  way  demands  an  which  has  constantly  practised 

exact  specification.  aggression,  and  this  as  a  rule  by 

From  another  point  of  view,  legitimate,  that  is  to  say  by  non- 

this  passage  is  open  to  the  remark  coercive,  means  :  and  has  thus 

that  the  favourable  presumption  delivered  a  perpetual  challenge 

applies  to  other  religions  also,  to  all  other  creeds. 


§§34~35]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  273 

subsequent  books,  the  various  common  and  prophetic  history, 
and  the  particular  dispensation  of  Christianity.  Now  all 
this  together  gives  the  largest  scope  for  criticism  ;  and  for 
confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being  confuted,  either  from 
reason,  or  from  common  history,  or  from  any  inconsistence 
in  its  several  parts.  And  it  is  a  thing  which  deserves, 
I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that  whereas  some  imagine  the 
supposed  doubtfulness  of  the  evidence  for  revelation  implies 
a  positive  argument  that  it  is  not  true  ;  it  appears,  on  the 
contrary,  to  imply  a  positive  argument  that  it  is  true.  For, 
could  any  common  relation,  of  such  antiquity,  extent,  and 
variety,  (for  in  these  things  the  stress  of  what  I  am  now 
observing  lies, )  be  proposed  to  the  examination  of  the  world  : 
that  it  could  not,  in  an  age  of  knowledge  and  liberty,  be 
confuted,  or  shown  to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  satisfaction 
of  reasonable  men  ;  this  would  be  thought  a  strong  pre- 
sumptive proof  of  its  truth.  And  indeed  it  must  be  a  proof 
of  it,  just  in  proportion  to  the  probability,  that  if  it  were 
false,  it  might  be  shown  to  be  so  :  and  this,  I  think,  is 
scarce  pretended  to  be  shown,  but  upon  principles  and  in 
ways  of  arguing,  which  have  been  clearly  obviated1".  Nor 
does  it  at  all  appear,  that  any  set  of  men  who  believe 
natural  religion,  are  of  the  opinion,  that  Christianity  has 
been  thus  confuted.  But  to  proceed  : 

§  35.  TJie  Old  Testament  gives  a  detailed  history  of 
God's  covenant  with  the  Jews; 

Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the  Old 
Testament  contains  a  chronological  account  of  the  beginning 
of  it,  and  from  thence,  an  unbroken  genealogy  of  mankind 
for  many  ages  before  common  history  begins ;  and  carried 
on  as  much  further  as  to  make  up  a  continued  thread  of 
history  of  the  length  of  between  three  and  four  thousand 
years.  It  contains  an  account  of  God's  making  a  covenant 
with  a  particular  nation,  that  they  should  be  his  people,  and 
he  would  be  their  God,  in  a  peculiar  sense ;  of  his  often 
interposing  miraculously  in  their  affairs ;  giving  them  the 


r  Chap,  ii,  iii,  &c. 
VOL.  I.  T 


274  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  VII. 

promise,  and,  long  after,  the  possession,  of  a  particular 
country ;  assuring  them  of  the  greatest  national  prosperity 
in  it,  if  they  would  worship  him,  in  opposition  to  the  idols 
which  the  rest  of  the  world  worshipped,  and  obey  his  com- 
mands ;  and  threatening  them  with  unexampled  punish- 
ments, if  they  disobeyed  him,  and  fell  into  the  general 
idolatry  ;  insomuch  that  this  one  nation  should  continue  to 
be  the  observation  and  the  wonder  of  all  the  world. 

§  36.  Threat  of  dispersion,  and  promise  of  restoration  ; 

It  declares  particularly,  that  God  would  scatter  them  among 
all  people,  from  one  end  of  the  earth  unto  the  other :  but  that 
when  they  should  return  unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  icould 
have  compassion  upon  them,  and  gather  them  from  all  the 
nations,  whither  he  had  scattered  them :  that  Israel  should  l)C 
saved  in  the  Lord,  with  an  everlasting  salvation ;  and  not  he 
ashamed  or  confounded  ivorld  without  end.  And  as  some  of 
these  promises  are  conditional,  others  are  as  absolute,  as  any 
thing  can  be  expressed  :  that  the  time  should  come,  when 
the  people  should  he  all  righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  for  ever  : 
that  though  God  ivould  make  a  full  end  of  all  nations  whither  he 
had  scattered  them,  yet  would  he  not  make  a  full  end  of  them : 
that  he  ivould  bring  again  the  captivity  of  his  people  Israel,  and 
plant  them  upon  their  land,  and  they  should  he  no  more  pulled 
up  out  of  their  land :  that  the  seed  of  Israel  should  not  cease 
from  being  a  nation  for  ever s. 

§  37.  It  predicts  a  Messiah  ; 

It  foretells,  that  God  would  raise  them  up  a  particular 
person,  in  whom  all  his  promises  should  finally  be  fulfilled  ; 
the  Messiah,  who  should  be,  in  an  high  and  eminent  sense, 
their  anointed  Prince  and  Saviour.  This  was  foretold  in 
such  a  manner,  as  raised  a  general  expectation  of  such 
a  person  in  the  nation,  as  appears  from  the  New  Testament, 
and  is  an  acknowledged  fact ;  an  expectation  of  his  coming 


s  Deut.  xxviii.  64,  xxx.   2,  3;    Isa.  xlv.   17,  Ix.   21;    Jer.  xxx.   u, 
xlvi.  28 ;  Amos  ix.  14,  15 ;  Jer.  xxxi.  36. 


§§  36-39] 


FOR    CHRISTIANITY 


275 


at  such  a  particular  time  before  any  one  appeared  claiming 
to  be  that  person,  and  when  there  was  no  ground  for  such 
an  expectation  but  from  the  prophecies  :  which  expectation, 
therefore,  must  in  all  reason  be  presumed  to  be  explanatory 
of  those  prophecies,  if  there  were  any  doubt  about  their 
meaning.  It  seems  moreover  to  foretell,  that  this  person 
should  be  rejected  by  that  nation,  to  whom  he  had  been 
so  long  promised,  and  though  he  was  so  much  desired  by 
them  t. 

§  38.   And  a  redemption  reaching  far  beyond  the 
Jeivish  race. 

And  it  expressly  foretells,  that  he  should  be  the  Saviour 
of  the  Gentiles  ;  and  even  that  the  completion  of  the 
scheme,  contained  in  this  book,  and  then  begun,  and  in  its 
progress,  should  be  somewhat  so  great,  that,  in  comparison 
with  it,  the  restoration  of  the  Jews  alone  would  be  but  of 
small  account.  It  is  a  light  thing  that  thou  shouldest  be  my 
servant  to  raise  up  the  tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to  restore  the 
preserved  of  Israel :  I  will  also  give  thee  for  a  light  to  the 
Gentiles,  that  thou  mayest  be  for  salvation  unto  the  end  of 
the  earth.  And,  In  the  last  days,  the  mountain  of  the  Lord's 
house  shall  be  established  in  the  top  of  the  mountains,  and  shall 

be  exalted  above  the  hills  ;  and  all  nations  shall  flow  into  it 

for  out  of  Zion  shall  go  forth  the  law,  and  the  word  of  the  Lord 

from  Jerusalem.     And  he  shall  judge  among  the  nations 

and  the  Lord  alone  shall  be  exalted  in  that  day,  and  the  idols  he 
shall  utterly  abolish  ". 

§  39.  Messiah  ivas  expected ;  came ;  and  fulfilled  his  mission. 

The  scripture  further  contains  an  account,  that  at  the 
time  the  Messiah  was  expected,  a  person  rose  up,  in  this 
nation,  claiming  to  be  that  Messiah,  to  be  the  person,  whom 

4  Isa.  viii.  14,  15,  xlix.  5,  ch.  liii ;  Mai.  i.  10,  n,  and  ch.  iii. 

"  Isa.  xlix.  6,  ch.  ii,  ch.  xi,  ch.  Ivi.  7;  Mai.  i.  n.  To  which  must 
be  added,  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,  Add     other     pro- 
several  in  the  New  Testament,  and  very  many  in  pheciesfrom  botk 
the  Old  ;  which  describe  what  shall  be  the  com-  Testaments. 
pletion  of  the  revealed  plan  of  Providence. 

T   2 


276  OF   THE   PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  VII. 

all  the  prophecies  referred  to,  and  in  whom  they  should 
centre  :  that  he  spent  some  years  in  a  continued  course  of 
miraculous  works ;  and  endued  his  immediate  disciples  and 
followers  with  a  power  of  doing  the  same,  as  a  proof  of  the 
truth  of  that  religion,  which  he  commissioned  them  to 
publish  :  that,  invested  with  this  authority  and  power,  they 
made  numerous  converts  in  the  remotest  countries,  and 
settled  and  established  his  religion-  in  the  world  ;  to  the  end 
of  which,  the  scripture  professes  to  give  a  prophetic  account 
of  the  state  of  this  religion  amongst  mankind. 

§  40.  Suppose  an  inquirer,  at  first  vieiv : 

Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  utterly  ignorant  of  history, 
to  have  all  this  related  to  him  out  of  the  scripture.  Or 
suppose  such  an  one,  having  the  scripture  put  into  his 
hands,  to  remark  these  things  in  it,  not  knowing  but  that 
the  whole,  even  its  civil  history,  as  well  as  the  other  parts 
of  it,  might  be,  from  beginning  to  end,  an  entire  invention  ; 
and  to  ask,  What  truth  was  in  it,  and  whether  the  revelation 
here  related  wras  real,  or  a  fiction  ?  And,  instead  of  a  direct 
answer,  suppose  him,  all  at  once,  to  be  told  the  following 

confessed  facts  ;  and  then  to  unite  them  into  one  view. 

i 

§  41.  Finds  (a)  lioiv  much  of  the  force  of  natural  religion 
is  clue  to  scripture  : 

Let  him  first  be  told,  in  how  great  a  degree  the  profession 
and  establishment  of  natural  religion,  the  belief  that  there  is 
one  God  to  be  worshipped,  that  virtue  is  his  law,  and  that 
mankind  shall  be  rewarded  and  punished  hereafter,  as  they 
obey  and  disobey  it  here  ;  in  how  very  great  a  degree,  I  say, 
the  profession  and  establishment  of  this  moral  system  in  the 
world  is  owing  to  the  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed, 
contained  in  this  book  :  the  establishment  of  this  moral 
system,  even  in  those  countries  which  do  not  acknowledge 
the  proper  authority  of  the  scripture  x. 


Sup,  II.  vi.  5. 


§§  40-44]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  277 

• 

§  42.  (b)  That  the  establishment  of  Christianity  is  the 
greatest  event  in  history. 

Let  him  be  told  also,  what  number  of  nations  do  acknow- 
ledge its  proper  authority.  Let  him  then  take  in  the 
consideration,  of  what  importance  religion  is  to  mankind. 
And  upon  these  things  he  might,  I  think,  truly  observe, 
that  this  supposed  revelation's  obtaining  and  being  received 
in  the  world,  with  all  the  circumstances  and  effects  of  it, 
considered  together  as  one  event,  is  the  most  conspicuous 
and  important  event  in  the  story  of  mankind  :  that  a  book 
of  this  nature,  and  thus  promulged  and  recommended  to  our 
consideration,  demands,  as  if  by  a  voice  from  heaven,  to 
have  its  claims  most  seriously  examined  into  :  and  that, 
before  such  examination,  to  treat  it  with  any  kind  of  scoffing 
and  ridicule,  is  an  offence  against  natural  piety. 


§  43.  (But  revelation  imports  no  disparagement  to  any  proof 
from  reason.) 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  how  much  soever  the 
establishment  of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  owing  to 
the  scripture-revelation,  this  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of 
religion  from  reason  ;  any  more  than  the  proof  of  Euclid's 
Elements  is  destroyed,  by  a  man's  knowing  or  thinking,  that 
he  should  never  have  seen  the  truth  of  the  several  proposi- 
tions contained  in  it,  nor  had  those  propositions  come  into 
his  thoughts,  but  for  that  mathematician. 


§44.  (c)  The  antiquity  of  scripture;  (d)  its  corroborations ; 

Let  such  a  person  as  we  are  speaking  of,  be,  in  the  next 
place,  informed  of  the  acknowledged  antiquity  of  the  first 
parts  of  this  book  :  and  that  its  chronology,  its  account  of 
the  time  when  the  earth,  and  the  several  parts  of  it,  were 
first  peopled  with  human  creatures,  is  no  way  contradicted, 
but  is  really  confirmed,  by  the  natural  and  civil  history  of 
the  world,  collected  from  common  historians,  from  the  state 


278  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  VII. 

of  the  earth,  and  from  the  late  invention  of  arts  and  sciences1. 
And  as  the  scripture  contains  an  unbroken  thread  of  common 
and  civil  history,  from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for 
between  three  and  four  thousand  years :  let  the  person  we 
are  speaking  of  be  told,  in  the  next  place,  that  this  general 
history,  as  it  is  not  contradicted,  but  is  confirmed  by  profane 
history  as  much  as  there  would  be  reason  to  expect,  upon 
supposition  of  its  truth ;  so  there  is  nothing  in  the  whole 
history  itself,  to  give  any  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion  of 
its  not  being,  in  the  general,  a  faithful  and  literally  true 
genealogy  of  men,  and  series  of  things. 

§45.  (e)  Its  selfaongruity. 

I  speak  here  only  of  the  common  scripture-history,  or  of 
the  course  of  ordinary  events  related  in  it ;  as  distinguished 
from  miracles,  and  from  the  prophetic  history.  In  all  the 
scripture-narrations  of  this  kind,  following  events  arise  out 
of  foregoing  ones,  as  in  all  other  histories.  There  appears 
nothing  related  as  done  in  any  age,  not  conformable  to  the 
manners  of  that  age  :  nothing  in  the  account  of  a  succeeding 
age,  which,  one  would  say,  could  not  be  true,  or  was  improb- 
able, from  the  account  of  things  in  the  preceding  one.  There 
is  nothing  in  the  characters,  which  would  raise  a  thought  of 
their  being  feigned  ;  but  all  the  internal  marks  imaginable 
of  their  being  real. 


1  This    confirmation   has   been  with  by  the  discovery  of  the  geo- 

immensely  enlarged  sines  Butler  logic  man  ;  for  there  seems  to  be 

wrote,  for  monuments  and  scieu-  no    reason    for    associating    him 

tific  results  are  histories.     How-  with  the  Adamic  race,  jind  much 

ever,  while  in  itse'.f  a  most  solid  reason,    perhaps   some  of  it  pos- 

and  weighty  fact,  it  is  not  exact  *ibly  derived  from   scripture,   to 

and  particular  on  behalf  of  the  assume    the    existence    of   other 

Hebrew  chronology,  or  of  any  of  races  of  men,  some  of  them  per- 

the  three  competing  chronologies  haps  less  perfect  or  less  capable 

of  the  Old  Testament :  but  it  con-  of  perfection. 

firms  the  Old  Testament  history  It  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  the 

in  its  basis,  from  which  we  learn  marked  concurrence  between  the 

that   the  history  of  the  Adamic  belief  now  generally  received  as 

race    is    confined    to   a   very  few  to  the  origin  of  our  solar  system, 

millennia  before  the  Advent.    This  and  the  general  framework  of  the 

proposition  is  in  no  way  interfered  first  chapter  of  Genesis. 


§§  45-48]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  279 

§  46.  (f)  Its  neutrality  as  to  ornament :  its  frank  encountering 

of  facts. 

It  is  to  be  added  also,  that  mere  genealogies,  bare  narra- 
tives of  the  number  of  years,  which  persons  called  by  such 
and  such  names  lived,  do  not  carry  the  face  of  fiction  ; 
perhaps  do  carry  some  presumption  of  veracity  :  and  all 
unadorned  narratives,  which  have  nothing  to  surprise,  may 
be  thought  to  carry  somewhat  of  the  like  presumption 
too.  And  the  domestic  and  the  political  history  is  plainly 
credible. 

§  47.  (It  has  strange  incidents ;  as  have  most  lives,  or  many ; 
but  nothing  to  destroy  credit.) 

There  may  be  incidents  in  scripture,  which,  taken  alone 
in  the  naked  way  they  are  told,  may  appear  strange ; 
especially  to  persons  of  other  manners,  temper,  education  : 
but  there  are  also  incidents  of  undoubted  truth,  in  many  or 
most  persons'  lives,  which,  in  the  same  circumstances,  would 
appear  to  the  full  as  strange.  There  may  be  mistakes  of 
transcribers,  there  may  be  other  real  or  seeming  mistakes, 
not  easy  to  be  particularly  accounted  for :  but  there  are 
certainly  no  more  things  of  this  kind  in  the  scripture,  than 
what  were  to  have  been  expected  in  books  of  such  antiquity ; 
and  nothing,  in  any  wise,  sufficient  to  discredit  the  general 
narrative. 

§  48.  (g)  Divers  points  :  and  hoiv.  in  scripture,  proof  of  the 
common  goes  to  support  the  miraculous. 

Now,  that  a  history,  claiming  to  commence  from  the 
creation,  and  extending  in  one  continued  series,  through  so 
great  a  length  of  time,  and  variety  of  events,  should  have 
such  appearances  of  reality  and  truth  in  its  whole  contexture, 
is  surely  a  very  remarkable  circumstance  in  its  favour.  And 
as  all  this  is  applicable  to  the  common  history  of  the  New 
Testament,  so  there  is  a  further  credibility,  and  a  very  high 
one,  given  to  it  by  profane  authors  :  many  of  these  writing 
of  the  same  times,  and  confirming  the  truth  of  customs  and 


280  OF   THE  PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  vil. 

events  which  are  incidentally  as  well  as  more  purposely 
mentioned  in  it1.  And  this  credibility  of  the  common 
scripture-history,  gives  some  credibility  to  its  miraculous 
history :  especially  as  this  is  interwoven  with  the  common, 
so  as  that  they  imply  each  other,  and  both  together  make  up 
one  relation. 

§  49.  (h)  Add  the  grand  sign,  viz.  the  Jews,  a  nationality 
dependent  on  belief. 

Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this  person, 
that  it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fact,  which  is  indeed 
implied  in  the  foregoing  observation,  that  there  was  such 
a  nation  as  the  Jews,  of  the  greatest  antiquity,  whose  govern- 
ment and  general  polity  was  founded  on  the  law,  here 
related  to  be  given  them  by  Moses  as  from  heaven  :  that 
natural  religion,  though  with  rites  additional  yet  no  way 
contrary  to  it,  was  their  established  religion,  which  cannot 
be  said  of  the  Gentile  world  :  and  that  their  very  being  as 
a  nation,  depended  upon  their  acknowledgment  of  one  God, 
the  God  of  the  universe.  For,  "suppose  in  their  captivity  in 
Babylon,  they  had  gone  over  to  the  religion  of  their  con- 
querors, there  would  have  remained  no  bond  of  union,  to 
keep  them  a  distinct  people.  And  whilst  they  were  under 
their  own  kings,  in  their  own  country,  a  total  apostasy  from 
God  would  have  been  the  dissolution  of  their  whole  govern- 
ment. They,  in  such  a  sense,  nationally  acknowledged  and 
worshipped  the  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth,  when  the  rest  of 
the  world  were  sunk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered  them,  in  fact, 
the  peculiar  people  of  God.  And  this  so  remarkable  an 
establishment  and  preservation  of  natural  religion  '2  amongst 
them,  seems  to  add  some  peculiar  credibility  to  the  historical 
evidence  for  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  the  prophets : 


1  This  appears  to  be  included  in  eludes  in   natural  religion.     But 
the  prior  allegation,  §  44.  with  this  deduction,  not  only  was 

2  The     expression    seems     not  the  Jewish  religion  a  manifesta- 
absolutely    correct,    because    the  tion  of  natural  religion  ;  but  it  is 
religion  of  the  Jews  in  no  way  the  only  one  known  to  history; 
rested  upon  future  rewards  and  which  is  rarely  borne  in  mind.  ' 
punishments,   which    Butler    in- 


§§49-51]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  281 

because  these  miracles  are  a  full  satisfactory  account  of 
this  event,  which  plainly  wants  to  be  accounted  for,  and 
cannot  otherwise. 

§  50.  (i)  Then  the  advent  of  the  Messiah  and  rapid 
rooting  of  his  religion  ; 

Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  history,  be 
acquainted  further,  that  one  claiming  to  be  the  Messiah,  of 
Jewish  extraction,  rose  up  at  the  time  when  this  nation, 
from  the  prophecies  above  mentioned,  expected  the  Messiah : 
that  he  was  rejected,  as  it  seemed  to  have  been  foretold  he 
should,  by  the  body  of  the  people,  under  the  direction  of 
their  rulers  :  that  in  the  course  of  a  very  few  years,  he  was 
believed  on  and  acknowledged  as  the  promised  Messiah,  by 
great  numbers  among  the  Gentiles,  agreeably  to  the  pro- 
phecies of  scripture,  yet  not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy, 
but  of  miracles  y,  of  which  miracles  we  also  have  strong 
historical  evidence  ;  (by  which  I  mean  here  no  more  than 
must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers  ;  for  let  pious  frauds 
and  follies  be  admitted  to  weaken,  it  is  absurd  to  say  they 
destroy,  our  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  proof  of 
Christianity55:)  that  this  religion  approving  itself  to  the 
reason  of  mankind,  and  carrying  its  own  evidence  with  it, 
so  far  as  reason  is  a  judge  of  its  system,  and  being  no  way 
contrary  to  reason,  in  those  parts  of  it  which  require  to  be 
believed  upon  the  mere  authority  of  its  Author ;  that  this 
religion,  I  say,  gradually  spread  and  supported  itself,  for 
some  hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  assistance  from 
temporal  power,  but  under  constant  discouragements,  and 
often  the  bitterest  persecutions  from  it  ;  and  then  became 
the  religion  of  the  world. 

§51.  (k)  With  the  dispersion  and  standing  isolation  of 
the  Jews ; 

That  in  the  mean  time,  the  Jewish  nation  and  government 
were  destroyed,  in  a  very  remarkable  manner,  and  the 
people  carried  away  captive  and  dispersed  through  the  most 


Sup.  §§  7,  8.  z  Sup.  §§  18  sqq. 


282  OF    THE   PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  VII. 

distant  countries ;  in  which  state  of  dispersion  they  have 
remained  fifteen  hundred  years  :  and  that  they  remain  a 
numerous  people,  united  amongst  themselves,  and  distin- 
guished from  the  rest  of  the  world,  as  they  were  in  the  days 
of  Moses,  by  the  profession  of  his  law  ;  and  eveiy  where 
looked  upon  in  a  manner,  which  one  scarce  knows  how 
distinctly  to  express,  but  in  the  words  of  the  prophetic 
account  of  it,  given  so  many  ages  before  it  came  to  pass  ; 
Thou  shalt  become  an  astonishment,  a  proverb,  and  a  byword, 
among  all  nations  tvhither  the  Lord  shall  lead  thce a. 

§  52.  Insufficiency  accounted  for  as  a  mere  fact,  by 
secondary  provisions. 

The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the  Jews  re- 
maining a  distinct  people  in  their  dispersion,  and  the 
confirmation  which  this  event  appears  to  give  to  the  truth 
of  revelation,  may  be  thought  to  be  answered,  by  their 
religion's  forbidding  them  intermarriages  with  those  of  any 
other,  and  prescribing  them  a  great  many  peculiarities  in 
their  food,  by  which  they  are  debarred  from  the  means  of 
incorporating  with  the  people  in  whose  countries  they  live 1. 
This  is  not,  I  think,  a  satisfactory  account  of  that  which  it 
pretends  to  account  for.  But  what  does  it  pretend  to  account 
for?  The  correspondence  between  this  event  and  the  pro- 
phecies ;  or  the  coincidence  of  both,  with  a  long  dispensation 
of  Providence,  of  a  peculiar  nature,  towards  that  people 
formerly  ?  No.  It  is  only  the  event  itself,  which  is  offered 
to  be  thus  accounted  for ;  which  single  event,  taken  alone, 
abstracted  from  all  such  correspondence  and  coincidence, 
perhaps  would  not  have  appeared  miraculous  :  but  that  cor- 
respondence and  coincidence  may  be  so,  though  the  event 
itself  be  supposed  not.  Thus  the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's 


Dent,  xxviii.  37. 


1  Now  let  us  suppose  that  these  from  the  original  divine  appoint- 

prohibitions    were    sufficient    to  ment,  so   that   the   entire    chain 

account    for   the    isolation.     The  of  phenomena   would    hang,  im- 

argument  perhaps  would  not  be  broken,  upon  that  appointment. 
weakened  ;    because  they    spring 


;  53] 


FOR    CHRISTIANITY 


283 


being  born  at  Bethlehem,  with  a  long  foregoing  series  of 
prophecy  and  other  coincidences,  is  doubtless  miraculous  ; 
the  series  of  prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  and  the 
event,  being  admitted  :  though  the  event  itself,  his  birth  at 
that  place,  appears  to  have  been  brought  about  in  a  natural 
way;  of  which,  however,  no  one  can  be  certain1. 

§  53.  The  part-fulfilment  of  historical  prophecy  seems 
to  foreshadow  the  entire, 

And  as  several  of  these  events  seem,  in  some  degree 
expressly,  to  have  verified  the  prophetic  history  already;  so 
likewise  they  may  be  considered  further,  as  having  a  peculiar 
aspect  towards  the  full  completion  of  it  ;  as  affording  some 
presumption  that  the  whole  of  it  shall,  one  time  or  other, 
be  fulfilled.  Thus,  that  the  Jews  have  been  so  wonder- 
fully preserved  in  their  long  and  wide  dispersion  ;  which  is 
indeed  the  direct  fulfilling  of  some  prophecies,  but  is  now 
mentioned  only  as  looking  forward  to  somewhat  yet  to 
come  :  that  natural  religion  came  forth  from  Juda3a,  and 
spread,  in  the  degree  it  has  done  over  the  world,  before  lost 
in  idolatry;  which,  together  with  some  other  things,  have 
distinguished  that  very  place,  in  like  manner  as  the  people 
of  it  are  distinguished  :  that  this  great  change  of  religion 
over  the  earth  was  brought  about  under  the  profession  and 
acknowledgment,  that  Jesus  was  the  promised  Messiah  : 
things  of  this  kind  naturally  turn  the  thoughts  of  serious 
men  towards  the  full  completion  of  the  prophetic  history, 
concerning  the  final  restoration  of  that  people  ;  concerning 
the  establishment  of  the  everlasting  kingdom  among  them, 
the  kingdom  of  the  Messiah  ;  and  the  future  state  of  the 
world,  under  this  sacred  government.  Such  circumstances 
and  events,  compared  with  these  prophecies,  though  no 
completions  of  them,  yet  would  not,  I  think,  be  spoken  of 
as  nothing  in  the  argument,  by  a  person  upon  his  first  being 


1  In  this  section,  the  word  mi- 
raculous appears  to  imply  marked 
adjustments  in  the  order  of  na- 
ture, but  not  any  variance  from 
it ;  differing  from  other  places 


where  miracle  does  imply  such, 
a  variance,  either  self-attested,  by 
the  evidence  of  the  human  senses ; 
or  i  as  in  the  Incarnation)  without 
that  kind  of  attestation 


284  OF   THE   PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE         [II.  VII. 

informed  of  them.  They  fall  in  with  the  prophetic  history 
of  things  still  future,  give  it  some  additional  credibility,  have 
the  appearance  of  being  somewhat  in  order  to  the  full  com- 
pletion of  it. 

§  54.  For  those  capable  of  handling  the  question. 

Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge,  and  great 
calmness  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to  judge,  thoroughly, 
of  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christianity,  from  that  part 
of  the  prophetic  history,  which  relates  to  the  situation  of 
the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  and  to  the  state  of  the  Church, 
from  the  establishment  of  Christianity  to  the  present  time. 
But  it  appears,  from  a  general  view  of  it,  to  be  very  material. 
And  those  persons  who  have  thoroughly  examined  it,  and 
some  of  them  were  men  of  the  coolest  tempers,  greatest 
capacities,  and  least  liable  to  imputations  of  prejudice,  insist 
upon  it  as  determinately  conclusive  \ 

§  55.  But  also  the  many,  large,  and  plain  coincidences 
ivill  weigh  much  with  any  impartial  mind: 

Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  history,  first  to 
recollect  the  passages  above  mentioned  out  of  scripture, 
without  knowing  but  that  the  whole  was  a  late  fiction,  then 
to  be  informed  of  the  correspondent  facts  now  mentioned, 
and  to  unite  them  all  into  one  view :  that  the  profession 
and  establishment  of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  greatly 
owing,  in  different  ways,  to  this  book,  and  the  supposed 
revelation  which  it  contains  ;  that  it  is  acknowledged  to  be 
of  the  earliest  antiquity ;  that  its  chronology  and  common 
history  are  entirely  credible  ;  that  this  ancient  nation,  the 
Jews,  of  whom  it  chiefly  treats,  appear  to  have  been,  in 
fact,  the  people  of  God,  in  a  distinguished  sense  ;  that,  as 
there  was  a  national  expectation  amongst  them,  raised  from 
the  prophecies,  of  a  Messiah  to  appear  at  such  a  time,  so  one 
at  this  time  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  Messiah  ;  that  he 


1   'Ho  had  probably  in  his  mind  Sir  Isaac  Newton  and  Dr.  Clarke.' — 
Fitzgerald. 


§§54-5?]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  285 

was  rejected  by  this  nation,  but  received  by  the  Gentiles, 
not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles  ;  that 
the  religion  he  taught  supported  itself  under  the  greatest 
difficulties,  gained  ground,  and  at  length  became  the  religion 
of  the  world  ;  that  in  the  mean  time  the  Jewish  polity  was 
utterly  destroyed,  and  the  nation  dispersed  over  the  face  of 
the  earth  ;  that  notwithstanding  this,  they  have  remained 
a  distinct  numerous  people  for  so  many  centuries,  even  to 
this  day  ;  which  not  only  appears  to  be  the  express  com- 
pletion of  several  prophecies  concerning  them,  but  also 
renders  it,  as  one  may  speak,  a  visible  and  easy  possibility, 
that  the  promises  made  to  them  as  a  nation,  may  yet  be 
fulfilled. 

§  56.  Extending  to  facts  beyond  Jewish  and  Christian 
history. 

And  to  these  acknowledged  truths,  let  the  person  we 
have  been  supposing  add,  as  I  think  he  ought,  whether 
every  one  will  allow  it  or  no,  the  obvious  appearances  which 
there  are,  of  the  state  of  the  world,  in  other  respects  besides 
what  relates  to  the  Jews,  and  of  the  Christian  Church, 
having  so  long  answered,  and  still  answering  to  the  pro- 
phetic history.  Suppose,  I  say,  these  facts  set  over  against 
the  things  before  mentioned  out  of  the  scripture,  and 
seriously  compared  with  them  ;  the  joint  view  of  both 
together  must,  I  think,  appear  of  very  great  weight  to 
a  considerate  reasonable  person  :  of  much  greater  indeed, 
upon  having  them  first  laid  before  him,  than  is  easy  for  us, 
who  are  so  familiarized  to  them,  to  conceive,  without  some 
particular  attention  for  that  purpose. 

§  57.  Even  this  rude  sketch  shoivs  something  more 
than  human; 

All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  contained 
under  them,  require  to  be  distinctly  and  most  thoroughly 
examined  into  ;  that  the  weight  of  each  may  be  judged  of, 
upon  such  examination,  and  such  conclusion  drawn  as 
results  from  their  united  force.  But  this  has  not  been 


286  OF    THE    PARTICULAR    EVIDENCE          [II.  VII. 

attempted  here.  I  have  gone  no  further  than  to  show,  that 
the  general  imperfect  view  of  them  now  given,  the  confessed 
historical  evidence  for  miracles,  and  the  many  obvious 
appearing  completions  of  prophecy,  together  with  the  col- 
lateral things  b  here  mentioned,  and  there  are  several  others 
of  the  like  sort ;  that  all  this  together,  which,  being  fact, 
must  be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  amounts  to  real 
evidence  of  somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter : 
evidence  much  more  important,  than  careless  men,  who 
have  been  accustomed  only  to  transient  and  partial  views 
of  it,  can  imagine  ;  and  indeed  abundantly  sufficient  to  act 
upon.  And  these  things,  I  apprehend,  must  be  acknow- 
ledged by  unbelievers. 

§  58.  And  with  claims  upon  unbelievers. 

For  though  they  may  say,  that  the  historical  evidence  of 
miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  is  not 
sufficient  to  convince  them  that  such  miracles  were  really 
wrought ;  they  cannot  deny,  that  there  is  such  historical 
evidence,  it  being  a  known  matter  of  fact  that  there  is. 
They  may  say,  the  conformity  between  the  prophecies  and 
events  is  by  accident :  but  there  are  many  instances  in 
which  such  conformity  itself  cannot  be  denied.  They  may 
say,  with  regard  to  such  kind  of  collateral  things  as  those 
above  mentioned,  that  any  odd  accidental  events,  without 
meaning,  will  have  a  meaning  found  in  them  by  fanciful 
people  :  and  that  such  as  are  fanciful  in  any  one  certain  way, 
will  make  out  a  thousand  coincidences,  which  seem  to  favour 
their  peculiar  follies. 

§  59.  To  competent  judges,  circumstantial  evidence  often  as 
strong  as  direct. 

Men,  I  say,  may  talk  thus :  but  no  one  who  is  serious, 
can  possibly  think  these  things  to  be  nothing,  if  he  considers 
the  importance  of  collateral  things,  and  even  of  lesser  cir- 

b  All  the  particular  things  mentioned  in  this  chapter,  not  reducible 
to  the  head  of  certain  miracles,  or  determinate  completions  of  pro- 
phecy. See  sup.  §§2  sqq. 


§§  58-6 1]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  287 

cumstances,  in  the  evidence  of  probability,  as  distinguished, 
in  nature,  from  the  evidence  of  demonstration.  In  many 
cases  indeed  it  seems  to  require  the  truest  judgment,  to 
determine  with  exactness  the  weight  of  circumstantial 
evidence 1 :  but  it  is  very  often  altogether  as  convincing,  as 
that  which  is  the  most  express  and  direct. 

§  60.  Serious  men,  taking  aggregate  account,  will  find  a  high 
probable  proof. 

This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Christianity,  con- 
sidered as  making  one  argument,  may  also  serve  to 
recommend  to  serious  persons,  to  set  down  every  thing 
which  they  think  may  be  of  any  real  weight  at  all  in  proof 
of  it,  and  particularly  the  many  seeming  completions  of 
prophecy :  and  they  will  find,  that,  judging  by  the  natural 
rules,  by  which  we  judge  of  probable  evidence  in  common 
matters,  they  amount  to  a  much  higher  degree  of  proof, 
upon  such  a  joint  review,  than  could  be  supposed  upon  con- 
sidering them  separately,  at  different  times ;  how  strong 
soever  the  proof  might  before  appear  to  them,  upon  such 
separate  views'  of  it.  For  probable  proofs,  by  being  added, 
not  only  increase  the  evidence,  but  multiply  it. 

§  6 1.  And  should  examine  which  is  the  safest  side. 

Nor  should  I  dissuade  any  one  from  setting  down,  what 
he  thought  made  for  the  contrary  side.  But  then  it  is  to 
be  remembered,  not  in  order  to  influence  his  judgment,  but 
his  practice,  that  a  mistake  on  one  side  may  be,  in  its  con- 
sequences, much  more  dangerous,  than  a  mistake  on  the 
other.  And  what  course  is  most  safe,  and  what  most 
dangerous,  is  a  consideration  thought  very  material,  when 
we  deliberate,  not  concerning  events,  but  concerning  conduct 
in  our  temporal  aifairs.  To  be  influenced  by  this  considera- 
tion in  our  judgment,  to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it,  is 


1  Meaning    in    this    place    not  according  to  the  etymology  of  the 

evidence  from  fact  as  opposed  to  word  ;  or  col  lateral  evidence,  which 

evidence  from  testimony  :  but  evi-  evidently  gives  scope  for  largeness 

dence  from  matter  circumjacent,  of  view  in  the  inquirer. 


288  OF   THE  PARTICULAR   EVIDENCE     [II.  VII.  §62- 

indeed  as  much  prejudice,  as  any  thing  whatever.  And,  like 
other  prejudices,  it  operates  contrary  ways,  in  different 
men  ;  for  some  are  inclined  to  believe  what  they  hope,  and 
others  what  they  fear.  And  it  is  manifest  unreasonableness 
to  apply  to  men's  passions  in  order  to  gain  their  assent. 
But  in  deliberations  concerning  conduct,  there  is  nothing 
which  reason  more  requires  to  be  taken  into  the  account, 
than  the  importance  of  it.  For,  suppose  it  doubtful,  what 
would  be  the  consequence  of  acting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary 
manner :  still,  that  taking  one  side  could  be  attended  with 
little  or  no  bad  consequence,  and  taking  the  other  might  be 
attended  with  the  greatest,  must  appear,  to  unprejudiced 
reason,  of  the  highest  moment  towards  determining,  how  we 
are  to  act. 

§  62.  The  stress  of  our  argument  lies  here :  this  cannot  as 
a  whole  (a)  be  accident,  or  (b)  be  otherwise  set  aside. 

But  the  truth  of  our  religion,  like  the  truth  of  common 
matters,  is  to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  evidence  taken 
together.  And  unless  the  whole  series  of  things  which  may 
be  alleged  in  this  argument,  and  every  particular  thing  in 
it,  can  reasonably  be  supposed  to  have  been  by  accident ; 
(for  here  the  stress  of  the  argument  for  Christianity  lies  ;) 
then  is  the  truth  of  it  proved  :  in  like  manner,  as  if  in  any 
common  case,  numerous  events  acknowledged,  were  to  be 
alleged  in  proof  of  any  other  event  disputed  ;  the  truth  of 
the  disputed  event  would  be  proved,  not  only  if  any  one 
of  the  acknowledged  ones  did  of  itself  clearly  imply  it,  but, 
though  no  one  of  them  singly  did  so,  if  the  whole  of  the 
acknowledged  events  taken  together  could  not  in  reason  be 
supposed  to  have  happened,  unless  the  disputed  one  were 
true. 

§  63.  Advantages  given  by  attack  in  detail 

It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage  the  nature  of  this 
evidence  gives  to  those  persons  who  attack  Christianity, 
especially  in  conversation.  For  it  is  easy  to  show,  in  a  short 
and  lively  manner,  that  such  and  such  things  are  liable  to 
objection,  that  this  and  another  thing  is  of  little  weight  in 


VIII.  §  i]  FOR    CHRISTIANITY  289 

itself;  but  impossible  to  show,  in  like  manner,  the  united 
force  of  the  whole  argument  in  one  view. 

§  64.  Summary  in  three  propositions. 

However,  lastly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear  *,  that  there 
is  no  presumption  against  a  revelation  as  miraculous ;  that 
the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  the  principal  parts  of 
it,  are  conformable  to  the  experienced  constitution  of  things, 
and  the  whole  perfectly  credible  :  so  the  account  now  given 
of  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  shows,  that  this  evidence  is 
such,  as,  from  the  nature  of  it,  cannot  be  destroyed,  though 
it  should  be  lessened. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

OF  THE  OBJECTIONS  WHICH  MAY  BE  MADE  AGAINST 
ARGUING  FROM  THE  ANALOGY  OF  NATURE,  TO 
RELIGION. 

§  i.  Chief  objections  of  thinking  and  unthinking  men ; 

TF  every  one  would  consider,  with  such  attention  as  they 
are  bound,  even  in  point  of  morality,  to  consider,  what 
they  judge  and  give  characters  of ;  the  occasion  of  this 
chapter  would  be,  in  some  good  measure  at  least,  super- 
seded. But  since  this  is  not  to  be  expected  ;  for  some  we 
find  do  not  concern  themselves  to  understand  even  what 
they  write  against :  since  this  Treatise,  in  common  with 
most  others,  lies  open  to  objections,  which  may  appear  very 
material  to  thoughtful  men  at  first  sight ;  and,  besides  that, 
seems  peculiarly  liable  to  the  objections  of  such  as  can  judge 
without  thinking,  and  of  such  as  can  censure  without  judging; 
it  may  not  be  amiss  to  set  down  the  chief  of  these  objections 
which  occur  to  me,  and  consider  them  to  their  hands.  And 
they  are  such  as  these  : 


1  Especially  in  chapters  ii,  iv,  v,  vii. 
VOL.  I.  U 


290  UPON   ARGUING   FROM    THE  [II.  VIII. 

§  2.  (a)  To  the  plan  of  meeting  difficulties  ~by  showing  the 
like  elsctvhere. 

1  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in  revelation, 
by  saying,  that  there  are  the  same  in  natural  religion  ;  when 
what  is  wanting  is  to  clear  both  of  them  of  these  their 
common,  as  well  as  other  their  respective,  difficulties  ;  but 
that  it  is  a  strange  way  indeed  of  convincing  men  of  the 
obligations  of  religion,  to  show  them,  that  they  have  as 
little  reason  for  their  worldly  pursuits :  and  a  strange  way 
of  vindicating  the  justice  and  goodness  of  the  Author  of 
nature,  and  of  removing  the  objections  against  both,  to 
which  the  system  of  religion  lies  open,  to  show,  that  the 
like  objections  lie  against  natural  providence ;  a  way  of 
answering  objections  against  religion,  without  so  much  as 
pretending  to  make  out,  that  the  system  of  it,  or  the  particular 

things  in  it  objected  against,  are  reasonable especially, 

perhaps  some  may  be  inattentive  enough  to  add,  must  this 
be  thought  strange,  when  it  is  confessed  that  analogy  is  no 
answer  to  such  objections  :  that  when  this  sort  of  reasoning 
is  carried  to  the  utmost  length  it  can  be  imagined  capable 
of,  it  will  yet  leave  the  mind  in  a  very  unsatisfied  state : 
and  that  it  must  be  unaccountable  ignorance  of  mankind,  to 
imagine  they  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  present 
interests  and  pleasures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon  doubtful 
evidence  V 

§  3.  Such  pleas  may  partially  affect  considerate  men. 

Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  appear,  that 
appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  measure  owing  to  half- 
views,  which  show  but  part  of  an  object,  yet  show  that 
indistinctly,  and  to  undeterminate  language.  By  these 
means  weak  men  are  often  deceived  by  others,  and  ludi- 


1  No  adversary  or  critic  within  himself  to  bring  that  argument 

my  knowledge    has   ever  stated  to  a  head  : 

the    objections    against    Butler's  i.  I  show  you,  on  the  basis  of 
argument  with  as  much  force  as  experience,  what  is  true  (§  6)  ; 
Butler  himself  has  given  them  2.  And,  in  the  way  of  induce- 
in  this  section.     Also,  he  exerts  ment,  what  is  useful  (§7). 


§§2-6]        ANALOGY  OF  NATURE    TO    RELIGION  291 

crous  men,  by  themselves.  And  even  those,  who  are 
serious  and  considerate,  cannot  always  readily  disentangle, 
and  at  once  clearly  see  through  the  perplexities,  in  which 
subjects  themselves  are  involved  ;  and  which  are  heightened 
by  the  deficiencies  and  the  abuse  of  words.  To  this  latter 
sort  of  persons,  the  following  reply  to  each  part  of  this 
objection  severally,  may  be  of  some  assistance  ;  as  it  may 
also  tend  a  little  to  stop  and  silence  others. 

§  4.  Removal  of  all  difficulties  would  mean  comprehension 
of  God's  entire  plan. 

First,  The  thing  wanted,  i.  e.  what  men  require,  is  to 
have  all  difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  or,  at  least  for 
any  thing  we  know  to  the  contraiy,  it  may  be,  the  same, 
as  requiring  to  comprehend  the  divine  nature,  and  the 
whole  plan  of  Providence  from  everlasting  to  everlasting. 

§  5.  The  method  is  one  of  regular  use  in  common  life. 

But  it  hath  always  been  allowed  to  argue,  from  what  is 
acknowledged,  to  what  is  disputed.  And  it  is  in  no  other 
sense  a  poor  thing,  to  argue  from  natural  religion  to  revealed, 
in  the  manner  found  fault  with,  than  it  is  to  argue  in 
numberless  other  ways  of  probable  deduction  and  inference, 
in  matters  of  conduct,  which  we  are  continually  reduced  to 
the  necessity  of  doing.  Indeed  the  epithet  poor  may  be 
applied,  I  fear,  as  properly  to  great  part  or  the  whole  of 
human  life,  as  it  is  to  the  things  mentioned  in  the  objec- 
tion. Is  it  not  a  poor  thing,  for  a  physician  to  have  so 
little  knowledge  in  the  cure  of  diseases,  as  even  the  most 
eminent  have  ?  to  act  upon  conjecture  and  guess,  where  the 
life  of  man  is  concerned  ?  Undoubtedly  it  is :  but  not  in 
comparison  of  having  no  skill  at  all  in  that  useful  art,  and 
being  obliged  to  act  wholly  in  the  dark. 

§6.  His  principal  recourse  is  to  the  course  of  providence 

experimentally  ascertained. 

Further :  since  it  is  as  unreasonable,  as  it  is  common, 
to  urge  objections  against  revelation,  which  are  of  equal 
weight  against  natural  religion  ;  and  those  who  do  this,  if 

u  2 


292  UPON   ARGUING   FROM    THE  [II.  VIII. 

they  are  not  confused  themselves,  deal  unfairly  with  others, 
in  making  it  seem,  that  they  are  arguing  only  against 
revelation,  or  ["particular  doctrines  of  it,  when  in  reality 
they  are  arguing  against  moral  providence  ;  it  is  a  thing 
of  consequence  to  show,  that  such  objections  are  as  much 
levelled  against  natural  religion  as  against  revealed.  And 
objections,  which  are  equally^applicable  to  both,  are  properly 
speaking  answered,  by  its  being  shown  that  they  are  so, 
provided  the  former  be  admitted  to  be  true.  And,  without 
taking  in  the  consideration  how  distinctly  this  is  admitted, 
it  is  plainly  very  material  to  observe,  that  as  the  things 
objected  against  in  natural  religion  are  of  the  same  kind 
with  what  is  certain  matter  of  experience  in  the  course  of 
providence,  and  in  the  information  which  God  affords  us 
concerning  our  temporal  interest  under  his  government  ; 
so  the  objections  against  the  system  of  Christianity,  and  the 
evidence  of  it,  are  of  the  very  same  kind  with  those  which 
are  made  against  the  system  and  evidence  of  natural 
religion.  However,  the  reader  upon  review  may  see,  that 
most  of  the  analogies  insisted  upon,  even  in  the  latter  part 
of  this  Treatise,  do  not  necessarily  require  to  have  more 
taken  for  granted  than  is  in  the  former  ;  that  there  is  an 
Author  of  nature,  or  natural  Governor  of  the  world :  and 
Christianity  is  vindicated,  not  from  its  analogy  to  natural 
religion,  but  chiefly  from  its  analogy  to  the  experienced 
constitution  of  nature. 


§  7.  Shows  also  that  our  interest  is  profoundly  involved 

Secondly,  Religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  consists  in 
such  a  determinate  course  of  life  ;  as  being  what,  there  is 
reason  to  think,  is  commanded  by. the  Author  of  nature, 
and  will,  upon  the  whole,  be  our  happiness  under  his 
government.  Now  if  men  can  be  convinced,  that  they  have 
the  like  reason  to  believe  this,  as  to  believe,  that  taking 
care  of  their  temporal  affairs  will  be  to  their  advantage ; 
such  conviction  cannot  but  be  an  argument  to  them  for  the 
practice  of  religion.  And  if  there  be  really  any  reason  for 
believing  one  of  these,  and  endeavouring  to  preserve  life, 


§§7-9]      ANALOGY   OF   NATURE    TO   RELIGION  293 

and  secure  ourselves  the  necessaries  and  conveniences  of 
it :  then  there  is  reason  also  for  believing  the  other,  and 
endeavouring  to  secure  the  interest  it  proposes  to  us.  And 
if  the  interest,  which  religion  proposes  to  us,  be  infinitely 
greater  than  our  whole  temporal  interest  ;  then  there  must 
be  proportionably  greater  reason  for  endeavouring  to  secure 
one,  than  the  other  :  since,  by  the  supposition,  the  prob- 
ability of  our  securing  one  is  equal  to  the  probability  of  our 
securing  the  other.  This  seems  plainly  unanswerable  ;  and 
has  a  tendency  to  influence  fair  minds,  who  consider  what 
our  condition  really  is,  or  upon  what  evidence  we  are 
naturally  appointed  to  act ;  and  who  are  disposed  to  ac- 
quiesce in  the  terms  upon  which  we  live,  and  attend  to 
and  follow  that  practical  instruction,  whatever  it  be,  which 
is  afforded  us. 

§  8.  The  main  objection  is :    i  the  evidence  is  doubt/til, 
therefore  the  claim  is  unfounded.' 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument  referred 
to  in  the  objection,  lies  in  another  place.  For,  it  is  said 
that  the  proof  of  religion  is  involved  in  such  inextricable 
difficulties,  as  to  render  it  doubtful  ;  and  that  it  cannot  be 
supposed,  that,  if  it  were  true,  it  would  be  left  upon  doubt- 
ful evidence.  Here  then,  over  and  above  the  force  of  each 
particular  difficulty  or  objection,  these  difficulties  and  objec- 
tions taken  together  are  turned  into  a  positive  argument 
against  the  truth  of  religion  ;  which  argument  would  stand 
thus.  If  religion  were  true,  it  would  not  be  left  doubtful, 
and  open  to  objections  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  :  there- 
fore that  it  is  thus  left,  not  only  renders  the  evidence  of  it 
weak,  and  lessens  its  force,  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of 
such  objections ;  but  also  shows  it  to  be  false,  or  is  a  general 
presumption  of  its  being  so. 

§  9.  Like  doubt  is  frequent  in  matters  of  high  temporal 

interest. 

Now  the  observation,  that,  from  the  natural  constitution 
and  course  of  things,  we  must  in  our  temporal  concerns, 


294  UPON  ARGUING   FROM   THE  [II.  VIII. 

almost  continually,  and  in  matters  of  great  consequence, 
act  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind  and  degree  to  the  evidence 
of  religion,  is  an  answer  to  this  argument :  because  it  shows, 
that  it  is  according  to  the  conduct  and  character  of  the 
Author  of  nature  to  appoint  we  should  act  upon  evidence 
like  to  that,  which  this  argument  presumes  he  cannot  be 
supposed  to  appoint  we  should  act  upon  :  it  is  an  instance, 
a  general  one  made  up  of  numerous  particular  ones,  of 
somewhat  in  his  dealing  with  us,  similar  to  what  is  said  to 
be  incredible.  And  as  the  force  of  this  answer  lies  merely 
in  the  parallel,  which  there  is  between  the  evidence  for 
religion  and  for  our  temporal  conduct ;  the  answer  is  equally 
just  and  conclusive,  whether  the  parallel  be  made  out,  by 
showing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to  be  higher,  or  the 
evidence  of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

§  10.  His  aim  is,  not  to  vindicate  God,  but  to  point  out 
our  duty  as  men. 

Thirdly,  The  design  of  this  Treatise  is  not  to  vindicate  the 
character  of  God,  but  to  show  the  obligations  of  men  :  it  is 
not  to  justify  his  providence,  but  to  show  what  belongs  to 
us  to  do.  These  are  two  subjects,  and  ought  not  to  be 
confounded.  And  though  they  may  at  length  run  up  into 
each  other,  yet  observations  may  immediately  tend  to  make 
out  the  latter,  which  do  not  appear,  by  any  immediate  con- 
nection, to  the  purpose  of  the  former  ;  which  is  less  our 
concern  than  many  seem  to  think.  For,  first,  it  is  not 
necessary  we  should  justify  the  dispensations  of  Providence 
against  objections,  any  further  than  to  show,  that  the  things 
objected  against  may,  for  ought  we  know,  be  consistent  with 
justice  and  goodness. 

§  ii.  Things,  unjust  if  taken  alone,  may  lc  vindiedble 
by  tilings  circumjacent. 

Suppose  then,  that  there  are  things  in  the  system  of  this 
world,  and  plan  of  Providence  relating  to  it,  which  taken 
alone  would  be  unjust  :  yet  it  has  been  shown  unanswer- 
ably, that  if  we  could  take  in  the  reference,  which  these 


§§io-i3]   ANALOGY   OF  NATURE    TO   RELIGION  295 

things  may  have,  to  other  things  present,  past,  and  to  come  ; 
to  the  whole  scheme,  which  the  things  objected  against  are 
parts  of ;  these  very  things  might,  for  ought  we  know,  be 
found  to  be,  not  only  consistent  with  justice,  but  instances 
of  it.  Indeed  it  has  been  shown,  by  the  analogy  of  what 
we  see,  not  only  possible  that  this  may  be  the  case,  but 
credible  that  it  is.  And  thus  objections,  drawn  from  such 
things,  are  answered,  and  Providence  is  vindicated,  as  far  as 
religion  makes  its  vindication  necessary. 

§  12.  He  leaves  none  but  inconclusive  objections  to  lie 
against  nature. 

Hence  it  appears,  secondly,  that  objections  against  the 
divine  justice  and  goodness  are  not  endeavoured  to  be 
removed,  by  showing  that  the  like  objections,  allowed  to 
be  really  conclusive,  lie  against  natural  Providence  :  but 
those  objections  being  supposed  and  shown  not  to  be  con- 
clusive, the  things  objected  against,  considered  as  matters 
of  fact,  are  further  shown  to  be  credible,  from  their  con- 
formity to  the  constitution  of  nature  ;  for  instance,  that 
God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions  here- 
after, from  the  observation,  that  he  does  reward  and  punish 
them  for  their  actions  here.  And  this,  I  apprehend,  is  of 
weight. 

§  13.  If  the  objections  remain  unanswered,  so  does  religion, 
ivitli  its  proofs. 

And  I  add,  thirdly,  it  would  be  of  weight,  even  though 
those  objections  were  not  answered.  For,  there  being  the 
proof  of  religion  above  set  down ;  and  religion  implying 
several  facts  ;  for  instance  again,  the  fact  last  mentioned, 
that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions 
hereafter  ;  the  observation,  that  his  present  method  of 
government  is  by  rewards  and  punishments,  shows  that 
future  fact  not  to  be  incredible  :  whatever  objections  men 
may  think  they  have  against  it,  as  unjust  or  unmerciful, 
according  to  their  notions  of  justice  and  mercy;  or  as 
improbable  from  their  belief  of  necessity.  I  say,  as 


296  UPON  ARGUING   FROM   THE  [II.  VIII. 

improbable  :  for  it  is  evident  no  objection  against  it,  as 
unjust,  can  be  urged  from  necessity;  since  this  notion  as 
much  destroys  injustice,  as  it  does  justice. 

§  14.  The  credibility  of  a  religion  based  on  fact  may  be 
proved  apart  from  its  reasonableness. 

Then,  fourthly,  Though  objections  against  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  system  of  religion  cannot  indeed  be  answered 
without  entering  into  consideration  of  its  reasonableness ; 
yet  objections  against  the  credibility  or  truth  of  it  may. 
Because  the  system  of  it  is  reducible  into  what  is  properly 
matter  of  fact  :  and  the  truth,  the  probable  truth,  of  facts, 
may  be  shown  without  consideration  of  their  reasonableness. 
Nor  is  it  necessary,  though,  in  some  cases  and  respects,  it  is 
highly  useful  and  proper,  yet  it  is  not  necessary,  to  give 
a  proof  of  the  reasonableness  of  eveiy  precept  enjoined  us, 
and  of  every  particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  which 
comes  into  the  system  of  religion. 

§  15.   Unless  relief  ion  lias  been  disproved,  the  practice  of 
it  is  reasonable. 

Indeed  the  more  throughly  a  person  of  a  right  disposition 
is  convinced  of  the  perfection  of  the  divine  nature  and  con- 
duct, the  further  he  will  advance  towards  that  perfection  of 
religion,  which  St.  John  speaks  of a.  But  the  general  obli- 
gations of  religion  are  fully  made  out,  by  proving  the 
reasonableness  of  the  practice  of  it.  And  that  the  practice 
of  religion  is  reasonable,  may  be  shown,  though  no  more 
could  be  proved,  than  that  the  system  of  it  may  be  so,  for 
ought  we  knowr  to  the  contrary :  and  even  without  entering 
into  the  distinct  consideration  of  this. 

§  1 6.  Repeats  §  14. 

And  from  hence,  fifthly,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  though  the 
analogy  of  nature  is  not  an  immediate  answer  to  objections 
against  the  wisdom,  the  justice,  or  goodness,  of  any  doctrine 


i  John  iv.  1 8. 


§§  14-17]     ANALOGY  OF  NATURE    TO    RELIGION          297 

or  precept  of  religion  :  yet  it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate 
and  direct  answer  to  what  is  really  intended  by  such  objec- 
tions ;  which  is,  to  show  that  the  things  objected  against 
are  incredible. 


§  17.  Proof  in  religion  does  not  reach  to  satisfaction ;  nor 
in  temporal  affairs ;   c.  g.  as  to  health  *. 

Fourthly,  It  is  most  readily  acknowledged,  that  the  fore- 
going Treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory  ;  very  far  indeed 
from  it :  but  so  would  any  natural  institution  of  life  appear, 
if  reduced  into  a  system,  together  with  its  evidence.  Leaving 
religion  out  of  the  case,  men  are  divided  in  their  opinions, 
whether  our  pleasures  overbalance  our  pains  :  and  whether 
it  be,  or  be  not,  eligible  to  live  in  this  world.  And  were 
all  such  controversies  settled,  which  perhaps,  in  speculation, 
would  be  found  involved  in  great  difficulties ;  and  were  it 
determined  upon  the  evidence  of  reason,  as  nature  has 
determined  it  to  our  hands,  that  life  is  to  be  preserved  :  yet 
still,  the  rules  which  God  has  been  pleased  to  afford  us,  for 
escaping  the  miseries  of  it,  and  obtaining  its  satisfactions, 
the  rules,  for  instance,  of  preserving  health,  and  recovering 
it  when  lost,  are  not  only  fallible  and  precarious,  but  very 
far  from  being  exact.  Nor  are  we  informed  by  nature,  in 
future  contingencies  and  accidents,  so  as  to  render  it  at  all 
certain,  what  is  the  best  method  of  managing  our  affairs. 
What  will  be  the  success  of  our  temporal  pursuits,  in  the 
common  sense  of  the  word  success,  is  highly  doubtful.  And 
what  will  be  the  success  of  them,  in  the^ proper  sense  of  the 
word  ;  i.  e.  what  happiness  or  enjoyment  we  shall  obtain 


1  Butler  seems  to  use  the  word  with    regard    to     sufficiency    of 

satisfaction,  or  its  adjective  satisfac-  evidence. 
tory,  in  the  following  senses  : —  He  supplies  in  the  next  section 

(a)  In  a  popular  manner,  as  the  a    subjective    definition    of    the 

equivalent  of  comfort  or  enjoy-  words  '  satisfactory  evidence,'  viz. 

ment.  what,  we  wish  it.     In  itself  it  seems 

(6)  With  regard  to  our  Saviour's  to  be  the  equivalent  of  the  Greek 
sacrifice,  as  the  equivalent  of  avTafKrjs,  that  is  to  say,  self- 
atonement.  See  sup.  II.  vi.  17,  sufficing  or  ideally  complete,  not 
!8,  22.  requiring  aid  or  supplement  from 

(c)  In   a  more   scientific  way,  without, 


298  UPON  ARGUING   FROM    THE  [II.  VIII, 

by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a  much  higher  degree.  Indeed  the 
unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  evidence,  with  which  we  are 
obliged  to  take  up,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  is  scarce  to  be 
expressed.  Yet  men  do  not  throw  away  life,  or  disregard 
the  interests  of  it,  upon  account  of  this  doubtfulness. 

§  18.  The  demand  is  to  change  '  the  very  condition 
of  our  'being,' 

The  evidence  of  religion  then  being  admitted  real,  those 
who  object  against  it,  as  not  satisfactory,  i.  e.  as  not  being 
what  they  wish  it,  plainly  forget  the  very  condition  of  our 
being  :  for  satisfaction,  in  this  sense,  does  not  belong  to 
such  a  creature  as  man.  And,  which  is  more  material,  they 
forget  also  the  very  nature  of  religion. 

§  19.  And  the  probative  poiver  of  religious  evidences. 

For,  religion  presupposes,  in  all  those  who  will  embrace 
it,  a  certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honesty ;  which  it  was 
intended  to  try  whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  exercise  in 
such  as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement.  Religion  pre- 
supposes this  as  much,  and  in  the  same  sense,  as  speaking 
to  a  man  presupposes  he  understands  the  language  in  which 
you  speak  ;  or  as  warning  a  man  of  any  danger  presupposes 
that  he  hath  such  a  regard  to  himself,  as  that  he  will 
endeavour  to  avoid  it.  And  therefore  the  question  is  not 
at  all,  Whether  the  evidence  of  religion  be  satisfactory :  but 
Whether  it  be,  in  reason,  sufficient  to  prove  and  discipline 
that  virtue,  which  it  presupposes.  Now  the  evidence  of  it 
is  fully  sufficient  for  all  those  purposes  of  probation  ;  how 
far  soever  it  is  from  being  satisfactory,  as  to  the  purposes  of 
curiosity,  or  any  other  :  and  indeed  it  answers  the  purposes 
of  the  former  in  several  respects,  which  it  would  not  do,  if 
it  were  as  overbearing  as  is  required. 

§  20.  Ask,  not,  does  it  satisfy  ?  but,  does  it  bind 
to  action  ? 

One  might  add  farther  ;  that  whether  the  motives  or  the 
evidence  for  any  course  of  action  be  satisfactory,  meaning 
here,  by  that  word,  what  satisfies  a  man,  that  such  a  course 


§§  i8-22]     ANALOGY   OF  NATURE    TO    RELIGION          299 

of  action  will  in  event  be  for  his  good  ;  this  need  never  be, 
and  I  think,  strictly  speaking,  never  is,  the  practical  ques- 
tion in  common  matters.  But  the  practical  question  in  all 
cases  is,  Whether  the  evidence  for  a  course  of  action  be 
such,  as,  taking  in  all  circumstances,  makes  the  faculty 
within  us,  which  is  the  guide  and  judge  of  conduct13,  deter- 
mine that  course  of  action  to  be  prudent.  Indeed,  satisfac- 
tion that  it  will  be  for  our  interest  or  happiness,  abundantly 
determines  an  action  to  be  prudent  :  but  evidence  almost 
infinitely  lower  than  this,  determines  actions  to  be  so  too  ; 
even  in  the  conduct  of  every  day. 

§  21.  His  object  is  to  show  how  men  ought  in  reason 
to  behave; 

Fifthly,  As  to  the  objection  concerning  the  influence 
which  this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may,  or  may  not,  be 
expected  to  have  upon  men  ;  I  observe,  as  above,  that 
religion  being  intended  for  a  trial  and  exercise  of  the 
morality  of  every  person's  character,  who  is  a  subject  of  it ; 
and  there  being,  as  I  have  shown,  such  evidence  for  it,  as  is 
sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence  men  to  embrace  it  :  to 
object,  that  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  mankind  will  be  in- 
fluenced by  such  evidence,  is  nothing  to  the  purpose  of  the 
foregoing  Treatise.  For  the  purpose  of  it  is  not  to  inquire, 
what  sort  of  creatures  mankind  are  ;  but  what  the  light  and 
knowledge,  which  is  afforded  them,  requires  they  should 
be  :  to  show  how,  in  reason,  they  ought  to  behave  ;  not 
how,  in  fact,  they  will  behave.  This  depends  upon  them- 
selves, and  is  their  own  concern  ;  the  personal  concern  of 
each  man  in  particular. 

§  22.  And  so  to  put  them  into  probation ;   with  some 
he  may  succeed. 

And  how  little  regard  the  generality  have  to  it,  experience 
indeed  does  too  fully  show.  But  religion,  considered  as 
a  probation,  has  had  its  end  upon  all  persons,  to  whom  it 


b  See  Dissert.  II.  §  8. 


300  UPON  ARGUING   FROM    THE  [II.  VIII. 

has  been  proposed  with  evidence  sufficient  in  reason  to 
influence  their  practice  :  for  by  this  means  they  have  been 
put  into  a  state  of  probation  ;  let  them  behave  as  they  will 
in  it.  And  thus,  not  only  revelation,  but  reason  also, 
teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence  of  religion  being  laid 
before  men,  the  designs  of  Providence  are  carrying  on,  not 
only  with  regard  to  those  who  will,  but  likewise  with 
regard  to  those  who  will  not,  be  influenced  by  it.  How- 
ever, lastly,  the  objection  here  referred  to,  allows  the  things 
insisted  upon  in  this  Treatise  to  be  of  some  weight  :  and  if 
so,  it  may  be  hoped  it  will  have  some  influence.  And  if 
there  be  a  probability  that  it  will  have  any  at  all,  there  is 
the  same  reason  in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it 
before  men,  as  there  would  be,  if  it  were  likely  to  have 
a  greater  influence. 

§  23.  Has  all  along  worked  from  points  of  departure  not 
chosen  ~by  him. 

And  further,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with  respect 
to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that  in  this 
Treatise  I  have  argued  upon  the  principles  of  others  n,  not 
my  own  :  and  have  omitted  what  I  think  true,  and  of  the 
utmost  importance,  because  by  others  thought  unintelligible, 
or  not  true.  Thus  I  have  argued  upon  the  principles  of  the 
Fatalists,  which  I  do  not  believe  : 

§  24.  Has  waived  the  two  great  principles,  (a)  of  moral 
fitness,  (b)  of  liberty ; 

And  have  omitted  a  thing  of  the  utmost  importance  which 
I  do  believe,  the  moral  fitness  and  unntness  of  actions,  prior 
to  all  will  whatever  ;  which  I  apprehend  as  certainly  to 
determine  the  divine  conduct,  as  speculative  truth  and  false- 
hood necessarily  determine  the  divine  judgment.  Indeed 
the  principle  of  liberty,  and  that  of  moral  fitness,  so  force 

c  By  arguing  upon  the  principles  of  others,  the  reader  will  observe  is 
meant ;  not  proving  any  thing  from  those  principles,  but  notwithstanding 
them.  Thus  religion  is  proved,  not  from  the  opinion  of  necessity ; 
which  is  absurd :  but,  notwithstanding  or  even  though  that  opinion  were 
admitted  to  be  true. 


§§23-25]   ANALOGY   OF  NATURE    TO   RELIGION  301 

themselves  upon  the  mind,  that  moralists,  the  ancients  as 
well  as  moderns,  have  formed  their  language  upon  it.  And 
probably  it  may  appear  in  mine  :  though  I  have  endeavoured 
to  avoid  it ;  and,  in  order  to  avoid  it,  have  sometimes  been 
obliged  to  express  myself  in  a  manner,  which  will  appear 
strange  to  such  as  do  not  observe  the  reason  for  it :  but  the 
general  argument  here  pursued  does  not  at  all  suppose  or 
proceed  upon  these  principles. 

§  25.  And  has  treated  religion  only  as  matter  of  fact. 

Now,  these  two  abstract  principles  of  liberty  and  moral 
fitness  being  omitted,  religion  can  be  considered  in  no  other 
view,  than  merely  as  a  question  of  fact :  and  in  this  view 
it  is  here  considered.  It  is  obvious,  that  Christianity,  and 
the  proof  of  it,  are  both  historical.  And  even  natural 
religion  is,  properly,  a  matter  of  fact.  For,  that  there  is 
a  righteous  Governor  of  the  world,  is  so  :  and  this  proposi- 
tion contains  the  general  system  of  natural  religion.  But 
then,  several  abstract  truths,  and  in  particular  those  two 
principles,  are  usually  taken  into  consideration  in  the  proof 
of  it  :  whereas  it  is  here  treated  of  only  as  a  matter  of  fact. 
To  explain  this  :  that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal 
to  two  right  ones,  is  an  abstract  truth  :  but  that  they  appear 
so  to  our  mind,  is  only  a  matter  of  fact.  And  this  last  must 
have  been  admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient 
sceptics,  who  would  not  have  admitted,  the  former ;  but 
pretended  to  doubt,  Whether  there  were  any  such  thing  as 
truth,  or  Whether  we  could  certainly  depend  upon  our 
faculties  of  understanding  for  the  knowledge  of  it  in  any 
case.  So  likewise,  that  there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  an 
original  standard  of  right  and  wrong  in  actions,  independent 
upon  all  will,  but  which  unalterably  determines  the  will  of 
God,  to  exercise  that  moral  government  over  the  world, 
which  religion  teaches,  i.  e.  finally  and  upon  the  whole  to 
reward  and  punish  men  respectively  as  they  act  right  or 
wrong  1  ;  this  assertion  contains  an  abstract  truth,  as  well 
as  matter  of  fact.  But  suppose,  in  the  present  state,  every 


1  Comp.  sup.  I.  vi.  16  n. 


302  UPON  ARGUING,    ETC.  [II.  VIII.  26- 

nian,  without  exception,  was  rewarded  and  punished,  in  exact 
proportion  as  he  followed  or  transgressed  that  sense  of  right 
and  wrong,  which  God  has  implanted  in  the  nature  of  every 
man  :  this  would  not  be  at  all  an  abstract  truth,  but  only 
a  matter  of  fact.  And  though  this  fact  were  acknowledged 
by  every  one  ;  yet  the  very  same  difficulties  might  be  raised, 
as  are  now,  concerning  the  abstract  questions  of  liberty  and 
moral  fitness  :  and  we  should  have  a  proof,  even  the  certain 
one  of  experience,  that  the  government  of  the  world  was 
perfectly  moral,  without  taking  in  the  consideration  of  those 
questions  :  and  this  proof  would  remain,  in  what  way  soever 
they  were  determined. 

§  26.    Has  thus  lost  much  in  the  proof  of  final  reward  and 
2)unishment. 

And  thus,  God  having  given  mankind  a  moral  faculty, 
the  object  of  which  is  actions,  and  which  naturally  approves 
some  actions  as  right,  and  of  good  desert,  and  condemns 
others  as  wrong,  and  of  ill  desert ;  that  he  will,  finally  and 
upon  the  whole,  reward  the  former  and  punish  the  latter,  is 
not  an  assertion  of  an  abstract  truth,  but  of  what  is  as  mere 
a  fact,  as  his  doing  so  at  present  would  be.  This  future  fact 
I  have  not  indeed  proved  with  the  force  with  which  it  might 
be  proved,  from  the  principles  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness  ; 
but  without  them  have  given  a  really  conclusive  practical 
proof  of  it,  which  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the  general 
analogy  of  nature :  a  proof  easily  cavilled  at,  easily  shown 
not  to  be  demonstrative,  for  it  is  not  offered  as  such ;  but 
impossible,  I  think,  to  be  evaded,  or  answered.  And  thus 
the  obligations  of  religion  are  made  out,  exclusively  of  the 
questions  concerning  liberty  and  moral  fitness  ;  which  have 
been  perplexed  with  difficulties  and  abstruse  reasonings,  as 
every  thing  may. 

§  27.  Has  shotvn  it  absurd  to  denounce  Christianity  as  false : 
also  that  it  is  credible :  and  more. 

Hence  therefore  may  be  observed  distinctly,  what  is  the 
force  of  this  Treatise.  It  will  be,  to  such  as  are  convinced 
of  religion  upon  the  proof  arising  out  of  the  two  last- 


IX.  i]  CONCLUSION  303 

mentioned  principles,  an  additional  proof  and  a  confirmation 
of  it :  to  such  as  do  not  admit  those  principles,  an  original 
proof  of  it d,  and  a  confirmation  of  that  proof,  Those  who 
believe,  will  here  find  the  scheme  of  Christianity  cleared  of 
objections,  and  the  evidence  of  it  in  a  peculiar  manner 
strengthened  :  those  who  do  not  believe,  will  at  least  be 
shown  the  absurdity  of  all  attempts  to  prove  Christianity 
false,  the  plain  undoubted  credibility  of  it ;  and,  I  hope, 
a  good  deal  more. 

§  28.    Analogy  lias  a  firm  basis,  and  special  claims  on  those 
ivlio  prefer  facts  to  abstractions. 

And  thus,  though  some  perhaps  may  seriously  think,  that 
analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great  stress  laid  upon  it ;  and 
ridicule,  unanswerable  ridicule,  may  be  applied,  to  show  the 
argument  from  it  in  a  disadvantageous  light :  yet  there  can 
be  no  question,  but  that  it  is  a  real  one.  For  religion,  both 
natural  and  revealed,  implying  in  it  numerous  facts ; 
analogy,  being  a  confirmation  of  all  facts  to  which  it  can 
be  applied,  as  it  is  the  only  proof  of  most,  cannot  but 
be  admitted  by  every  one  to  be  a  material  thing,  and  truly 
of  weight  on  the  side  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed  : 
and  it  ought  to  be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  pro- 
fess to  follow  nature,  and  to  be  less  satisfied  with  abstract 
reasonings. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

CONCLUSION. 

§  i.   Upon  the  Moiun  facts,  disregard  of  religion  would  be 
incredible  but  for  experience. 

TTTHATEVER  account  may  be  given  of  the  strange  in- 

*  '       attention  and  disregard,  in  some  ages  and  countries, 

to  a  matter  of  such  importance  as  religion  ;  it  would,  before 

experience,   be  incredible,   that   there   should   be   the  like 


d  Sup.  I.  vi.  12-14. 


304  CONCLUSION  [II.  IX. 

disregard  in  those,  who  have  had  the  moral  system  of  the 
world  laid  before  them,  as  it  is  by  Christianity,  and  often 
inculcated  upon  them  :  because  this  moral  system  carries  in 
it  a  good  degree  of  evidence  for  its  truth,  upon  its  being 
barely  proposed  to  our  thoughts. 

§  2.  A  simple  matter  is  obscured  by  intricacies  of 
speculation. 

There  is  no  need  of  abstruse  reasonings  and  distinctions, 
to  convince  an  unprejudiced  understanding,  that  there  is 
a  God  who  made  and  governs  the  world,  and  will  judge  it 
in  righteousness  ;  though  they  may  be  necessary  to  answer 
abstruse  difficulties,  when  once  such  are  raised :  when  the 
very  meaning  of  those  words,  which  express  most  intelli- 
gibly the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  is  pretended  to  be 
uncertain ;  and  the  clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is  obscured 
by  the  intricacies  of  speculation.  But  to  an  unprejudiced 
mind,  ten  thousand  thousand  instances  of  design  cannot 
but  prove  a  designer.  And  it  is  intuitively  manifest,  that 
creatures  ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful  sense  of  their  Maker  ; 
and  that  justice  and  charity  must  be  his  laws,  to  creatures 
whom  he  has  made  social,  and  placed  in  society. 

§  3.  Revelation  requires  proofs ;  offers  them  :  to  refuse  inquiry 
is  immoral; 

Indeed  the  truth  of  revealed  religion,  peculiarly  so  called, 
is  not  self-evident,  but  requires  external  proof,  in  order  to 
its  being  received.  Yet  inattention,  among  us,  to  revealed 
religion,  will  be  found  to  imply  the  same  dissolute  immoral 
temper  of  mind,  as  inattention  to  natural  religion  :  because, 
when  both  are  laid  before  us,  in  the  manner  they  are  in 
Christian  countries  of  liberty,  our  obligations  to  inquire  into 
both,  and  to  embrace  both  upon  supposition  of  their  truth, 
are  obligations  of  the  same  nature.  For,  revelation  claims 
to  be  the  voice  of  God  :  and  our  obligation  to  attend  to  his 
voice  is  surely  moral  in  all  cases.  And  as  it  is  insisted,  that 
its  evidence  is  conclusive,  upon  thorough  consideration  of 
it ;  so  it  offers  itself  to  us  with  manifest  obvious  appear- 


§§2-5]  CONCLUSION  305 

ances  of  having  something  more  than  human  in  it,  and 
therefore  in  all  reason  requires  to  have  its  claims  most 
seriously  examined  into. 


§  4.  Especially  in  view  of  its  claim  as  miraculous. 

It  is  to  be  added,  that  though  light  and  knowledge,  in 
what  manner  soever  afforded  us,  is  equally  from  God  ;  yet 
a  miraculous  revelation  has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the 
first  principles  of  our  nature,  to  awaken  mankind,  and 
inspire  them  with  reverence  and  awe  :  and  this  is  a  peculiar 
obligation,  to  attend  to  what  claims  to  be  so  with  such 
appearances  of  truth.  It  is  therefore  most  certain,  that  our 
obligations  to  inquire  seriously  into  the  evidence  of  Chris- 
tianity, and,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  to  embrace  it,  are 
of  the  utmost  importance,  and  moral  in  the  highest  and 
most  proper  sense. 


§  5.    Negation  is  apt  to  pass  into  virulent  hostility. 

Let  us  then  suppose,  that  the  evidence  of  religion  in 
general,  and  of  Christianity,  has  been  seriously  inquired 
into,  by  all  reasonable  men  among  us.  Yet  we  find  many 
professedly  to  reject  both,  upon  speculative  principles  of 
infidelity.  And  all  of  them  do  not  content  themselves  with 
a  bare  neglect  of  religion,  and  enjoying  their  imaginary 
freedom  from  its  restraints.  Some  go  much  beyond  this. 
They  deride  God's  moral  government  over  the  world.  They 
renounce  his  protection,  and  defy  his  justice.  They  ridicule 
and  vilify  Christianity,  and  blaspheme  the  Author  of  it ; 
and  take  all  occasions  to  manifest  a  scorn  and  contempt  of 
revelation.  This  amounts  to  an  active  setting  themselves 
against  religion ;  to  what  may  be  considered  as  a  positive 
principle  of  irreligion  :  which  they  cultivate  within  them- 
selves, and,  whether  they  intend  this  effect  or  not,  render 
habitual,  as  a  good  man  does  the  contrary  principle.  And 
others,  who  are  not  chargeable  with  all  this  profligateness, 
yet  are  in  avowed  opposition  to  religion,  as  if  discovered  to 
be  groundless. 

VOL.  i.  x 


306  CONCLUSION  [II.  IX. 

§  6.  His  opponents  proceed  on  (a)  prejudice  against  revelation ; 
(b)  strange  things  in  Scripture;  (c) pleas  as  sup.  cli.  vi.  ; 
(d)  that  doubt  warrants  denial. 

Now  admitting,  which  is  the  supposition  we  go  upon,  that 
these  persons  act  upon  what  they  think  principles  of  reason, 
and  otherwise  they  are  not  to  be  argued  with ;  it  is  really 
inconceivable,  that  they  should  imagine  they  clearly  see  the 
whole  evidence  of  it,  considered  in  itself,  to  be  nothing  at  all : 
nor  do  they  pretend  this.  They  are  far  indeed  from  having 
a  just  notion  of  its  evidence  :  but  they  would  not  say  its 
evidence  was  nothing,  if  they  thought  the  system  of  it,  with 
all  its  circumstances,  were  credible,  like  other  matters  of 
science  or  history.  So  that  their  manner  of  treating  it  must 
proceed,  either  from  such  kind  of  objections  against  all 
religion,  as  have  been  answered  or  obviated  in  the  former 
part  of  this  Treatise  ;  or  else  from  objections,  and  difficulties, 
supposed  more  peculiar  to  Christianity.  Thus,  they  enter- 
tain prejudices  against  the  whole  notion  of  a  revelation,  and 
miraculous  interpositions.  They  find  things  in  scripture, 
whether  in  incidental  passages,  or  in  the  general  scheme 
of  it,  which  appear  to  them  unreasonable.  They  take  for 
granted,  that  if  Christianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it  must 
have  been  more  general,  and  the  evidence  of  it  more  satis- 
factory,  or  rather  overbearing :  that  it  must  and  would  have 
been,  in  some  way,  otherwise  put  and  left,  than  it  is.  Now 
this  is  not  imagining  they  see  the  evidence  itself  to  be 
nothing,  or  inconsiderable  ;  but  quite  another  thing.  It  is 
being  fortified  against  the  evidence,  in  some  degree  acknow- 
ledged, by  thinking  they  see  the  system  of  Christianity,  or 
somewhat  which  appears  to  them  necessarily  connected  with 
it,  to  be  incredible  or  false  :  fortified  against  that  evidence, 
which  might,  otherwise,  make  great  impression  upon  them. 
Or,  lastly,  if  any  of  these  persons  are,  upon  the  whole,  in 
doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity  ;  their  behaviour 
seems  owing  to  their  taking  for  granted,  through  strange 
inattention,  that  such  doubting  is,  in  a  manner,  the  same 
thing,  as  being  certain  against  it. 


§§  6-8]  CONCLUSION  307 

§  7.  Tliis  treatise  meets  them  by  (a)  establishing  a  moral 
government ;  (b)  removing  presumptions  against  Chris- 
tianity as  fact  ; 

To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion  concerning 
religion,  the  foregoing  Treatise  is  adapted.  For,  all  the 
general  objections  against  the  moral  system  of  nature  having 
been  obviated,  it  is  shown,  that  there  is  not  any  peculiar 
presumption  at  all  against  Christianity,  either  considered  as 
not  discoverable  by  reason,  or  as  unlike  to  what  is  so  dis- 
covered ;  nor  any  worth  mentioning  against  it  as  miraculous, 
if  any  at  all ;  none,  certainly,  which  can  render  it  in  the 
least  incredible.  It  is  shown,  that,  upon  supposition  of 
a  divine  revelation,  the  analogy  of  nature  renders  it  before- 
hand highly  credible,  I  think  probable,  that  many  things  in 
it  must  appear  liable  to  great  objections  ;  and  that  wre  must 
be  incompetent  judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree.  This  obser- 
vation is,  I  think,  unquestionably  true,  and  of  the  very 
utmost  importance  :  but  it  is  urged,  as  I  hope  it  will  be 
understood,  with  great  caution  of  not  vilifying  the  faculty 
of  reason 1,  which  is  the  candle  of  the  Lord  within  us  a  ;  though 
it  can  afford  no  light,  where  it  does  not  shine  ;  nor  judge, 
where  it  has  no  principles  to  judge  upon. 

§  8.  (c)  As  against  its  goodness,  by  shoicing  their  failure 
as  against  nature. 

The  objections  here  spoken  of,  being  first  answered  in  the 
view  of  objections  against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
are  in  the  next  place  considered  as  urged  more  immediately 
against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  the  Christian 
dispensation.  And  it  is  fully  made  out,  that  they  admit  of 
exactly  the  like  answer,  in  every  respect,  to  what  the  like 
objections  against  the  constitution  of  nature  admit  of  :  that, 
as  partial  views  give  the  appearance  of  wrong  to  things, 
which,  upon  further  consideration  and  knowledge  of  their 


a  Prov.  xx.  27. 


1  Sup.  II.  iii.  3. 
.   X  2 


308  CONCLUSION  [II.  ix. 

relations  to  other  things,  are  found  just  and  good  ;  so  it 
is  perfectly  credible,  that  the  things  objected  against  the 
wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  may  be 
rendered  instances  of  wisdom  and  goodness,  by  their  refer- 
ence to  other  things  beyond  our  view :  because  Christianity 
is  a  scheme  as  much  above  our  comprehension,  as  that  of 
nature ;  and  like  that,  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made 
use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  and  which,  as  is  most  credible, 
may  be  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  it  ought  to  be 
attended  to,  that  this  is  not  an  answer  taken  merely  or 
chiefly  from  our  ignorance ;  but  from  somewhat  positive, 
which  our  observation  shows  us.  For,  to  like  objections, 
the  like  answer  is  experienced  to  be  just,  in  numberless 
parallel  cases. 

§  9.    Particular  objections  are  next  met :  c.  g.  that  the 
remedy  was  not  summary. 

The  objections  against  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  the 
method  by  which  it  is  carried  on,  having  been  thus  obviated, 
in  general  and  together ;  the  chief  of  them  are  considered 
distinctly,  and  the  particular  things  objected  to  are  shown 
credible,  by  their  perfect  analogy,  each  apart,  to  the  consti- 
tution of  nature.  Thus,  if  man  be  fallen  from  his  primitive 
state,  and  to  be  restored,  and  infinite  wisdom  and  power 
engages  in  accomplishing  our  recoveiy :  it  were  to  have 
been  expected,  it  is  said,  that  this  should  have  been  effected 
at  once  ;  and  not  by  such  a  long  series  of  means,  and  such 
a  vaiious  economy  of  persons  and  things  ;  one  dispensation 
preparatory  to  another,  this  to  a  further  one,  and  so  on 
through  an  indefinite  number  of  ages,  before  the  end  of  the 
scheme  proposed  can  be  completely  accomplished  :  a  scheme 
conducted  by  infinite  wisdom,  and  executed  by  almighty 
power.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  our  finding  that  every 
thing  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is  thus  carried 
on,  shows  such  expectations  concerning  revelation  to  be 
highly  unreasonable ;  and  is  a  satisfactoiy  answer  to  them, 
when  urged  as  objections  against  the  credibility,  that  the 
great  scheme  of  Providence  in  the  redemption  of  the  world 


§§  9-13]  CONCLUSION  309 

may   be    of   this   kind,    and   to   be   accomplished   in    this 
manner. 

§  10.  As  to  operating  through  a  mediator. 

As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  redemption,  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  mediator  between  God  and  man :  this  has 
been  shown  to  be  most  obviously  analogous  to  the  general 
conduct  of  nature,  i.e.  the  God  of  nature,  in  appointing 
others  to  be  the  instruments  of  his  mercy,  as  we  experience 
in  the  daily  course  of  Providence. 

§  ii.   Heathen  recognition  of  our  fallen  state. 

The  condition  of  this  world,  which  the  doctrine  of  our 
redemption  by  Christ  presupposes,  so  much  falls  in  with 
natural  appearances,  that  heathen  moralists  inferred  it  from 
those  appearances  :  inferred,  that  human  nature  was  fallen 
from  its  original  rectitude,  and,  in  consequence  of  this, 
degraded  from  its  primitive  happiness.  Or,  however  this 
opinion  came  into  the  world,  these  appearances  must  have 
kept  up  the  tradition,  and  confirmed  the  belief  of  it. 

§  12.    As  to  the  insufficiency  of  repentance ; 

And  as  it  was  the  general  opinion  under  the  light  of 
nature,  that  repentance  and  reformation,  alone  and  by  itself, 
was  not  sufficient  to  do  away  sin,  and  procure  a  full  remis- 
sion of  the  penalties  annexed  to  it ;  and  as  the  reason  of  the 
thing  does  not  at  all  lead  to  any  such  conclusion  :  so  every 
day's  experience  shows  us,  that  reformation  is  not,  in  any 
sort,  sufficient  to  prevent  the  present  disadvantages  and 
miseries,  which,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  God  has 
annexed  to  folly  and  extravagance. 

§  13.    And  the  further  provision  made  ; 

Yet  there  may  be  ground  to  think,  that  the  punishments, 
which,  by  the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  are  an- 
nexed to  vice,  may  be  prevented  :  that  provision  may  have 
been,  even  originally,  made,  that  they  should  be  prevented 


310  CONCLUSION  [II.  IX. 

by  some  means  or  other,  though  they  could  not  by  reforma- 
tion alone.  For  we  have  daily  instances  of  such  mercy,  in 
the  general  conduct  of  nature  :  compassion  provided  for 
misery'1,  medicines  for  diseases,  friends  against  enemies. 
There  is  provision  made,  in  the  original  constitution  of  the 
world,  that  much  of  the  natural  bad  consequences  of  our 
follies,  which  persons  themselves  alone  cannot  prevent,  may 
be  prevented  by  the  assistance  of  others  ;  assistance,  which 
nature  enables,  and  disposes,  and  appoints  them  to  afford. 
By  a  method  of  goodness  analogous  to  this,  when  the  world 
lay  in  wickedness,  and  consequently  in  ruin,  God  so  loved 
the  ivorld,  that  lie  gave  his  only  begotten  Son  to  save  it :  and  he 
bting  made  perfect  by  suffering,  became  the  Author  of  eternal 
salvation  to  all  them  that  obey  him  c. 

§  14.  Beyond  comprehension  in  its  mode,  but  efficacious, 
agreeably  to  experience. 

Indeed  neither  reason  nor  analogy  would  lead  us  to 
think,  in  particular,  that  the  interposition  of  Christ,  in  the 
manner  in  which  he  did  interpose,  would  be  of  that  efficacy 
for  recovery  of  the  world,  which  the  scripture  teaches  us  it 
was  :  but  neither  would  reason  nor  analogy  lead  us  to  think, 
that  other  particular  means  would  be  of  the  efficacy,  which 
experience  shows  they  are,  in  numberless  instances.  And 
therefore,  as  the  case  before  us  does  not  admit  of  experience  ; 
so,  that  neither  reason  nor  analogy  can  show  how,  or  in 
what  particular  way,  the  interposition  of  Christ,  as  revealed 
in  scripture,  is  of  that  efficacy,  which  it  is  there  represented 
to  be  ;  this  is  no  kind  nor  degree  of  presumption  against  its 
being  really  of  that  efficacy. 

§  15.  As  to  partial  propagation,  and  imperfect  evidence. 

Further :  the  objections  against  Christianity,  from  the 
light  of  it  not  being  universal,  nor  its  evidence  so  strong  as 
might  possibly  be  given  us,  have  been  answered  by  the 


b  Sermons  V,  VI,  at  the  Rolls.  c  John  iii.  16;  Heb.  v.  9. 


§§  1 4-i 8]  CONCLUSION  311 

general  analogy  of  nature.  That  God  has  made  such  variety 
of  creatures,  is  indeed  an  answer  to  the  former  :  but  that  he 
dispenses  his  gifts  in  such  variety,  both  of  degrees  and  kinds, 
amongst  creatures  of  the  same  species,  and  even  to  the  same 
individuals  at  different  times ;  is  a  more  obvious  and  full 
answer  to  it.  And  it  is  so  far  from  being  the  method  of 
Providence  in  other  cases,  to  afford  us  such  overbearing 
evidence,  as  some  require  in  proof  of  Christianity ;  that,  on 
the  contrary,  the  evidence  upon  which  we  are  naturally 
appointed  to  act  in  common  matters,  throughout  a  very 
great  part  of  life,  is  doubtful  in  a  high  degree.  And 
admitting  the  fact,  that  God  has  afforded  to  some  no  more 
than  doubtful  evidence  of  religion :  the  same  account  may 
be  given  of  it,  as  of  difficulties  and  temptations  with  regard 
to  practice. 

§  1 6.  The  doubtfulness  may  be  due  to  ourselves; 

But  as  it  is  not  impossible d,  surely,  that  this  alleged  doubt- 
fulness may  be  men's  own  fault  ;  it  deserves  their  most 
serious  consideration,  whether  it  be  not  so. 

§  17.  And  doubtful  evidence  binds. 

However,  it  is  certain,  that  doubting  implies  a  degree  of 
evidence  for  that  of  which  we  doubt :  and  that  this  degree 
of  evidence,  as  really  lays  us  under  obligations,  as  demon- 
strative evidence. 

§  1 8.  Religion  varies  from  nature  not  more  than  nature 
from  herself. 

The  whole  then  of  religion  is  throughout  credible  :  nor  is 
there,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  the  revealed  dispensa- 
tion of  things,  more  different  from  the  experienced  constitu- 
tion and  course  of  nature,  than  some  parts  of  the  constitution 
of  nature  are  from  other  parts  of  it. 


d  Sup.  II.  vi.  19. 


312  CONCLUSION  [II.  IX. 

§  19.  Reason  almost  intuitively  approves  of  natural  religion, 
taken  up  by  the  gospel:  so  the  guilt  of  immorality  is 
aggravated. 

And  if  so,  the  only  question  which  remains  is,  What 
positive  evidence  can  be  alleged  for  the  truth  of  Christianity? 
This  too  in  general  has  been  considered,  and  the  objections 
against  it  estimated.  Deduct,  therefore,  what  is  to  be 
deducted  from  that  evidence,  upon  account  of  any  weight 
which  may  be  thought  to  remain  in  these  objections,  after 
what  the  analogy  of  nature  has  suggested  in  answer  to 
them :  and  then  consider,  what  are  the  practical  con- 
sequences from  all  this,  upon  the  most  sceptical  principles 
one  can  argue  upon  :  (for  I  am  writing  to  persons  who 
entertain  these  principles  :)  and  upon  such  consideration  it 
will  be  obvious,  that  immorality,  as  little  excuse  as  it  admits 
of  in  itself,  is  greatly  aggravated,  in  persons  who  have  been 
made  acquainted  with  Christianity,  whether  they  believe 
it  or  not :  because  the  moral  system  of  nature,  or  natural 
religion,  which  Christianity  lays  before  us,  approves  itself, 
almost  intuitively,  to  a  reasonable  mind,  upon  seeing  it 
proposed. 

§  20.  The  sceptic  must  own  that  Christianity  may  be  true ; 
by  this  he  is  bound. 

In  the  next  place,  with  regard  to  Christianity,  it  will  be 
observed  ;  that  there  is  a  middle  between  a  full  satisfaction 
of  the  truth  of  it,  and  a  satisfaction  of  the  contrary.  The 
middle  state  of  mind  between  these  two  consists  in  a  serious 
apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true ;  joined  with  doubt 
whether  it  be  so.  And  this,  upon  the  best  judgment  I  am 
able  to  make,  is  as  far  towards  speculative  infidelity,  as  any 
sceptic  can  at  all  be  supposed  to  go,  who  has  had  true 
Christianity,  with  the  proper  evidence  of  it,  laid  before 
him,  and  has  in  any  tolerable  measure  considered  them. 
For  I  would  not  be  mistaken  to  comprehend  all  who  have 
ever  heard  of  it :  because  it  seems  evident,  that  in  many 
countries  called  Christian,  neither  Christianity,  nor  its 
evidence,  are  fairly  laid  before  men.  And  in  places  where 


§§  i9-22]  CONCLUSION  313 

both  are,  there  appear  to  be  some,  who  have  very  little 
attended  to  either,  and  who  reject  Christianity  with  a  scorn 
proportionate  to  their  inattention  ;  and  yet  are  by  no  means 
without  understanding  in  other  matters.  Now  it  has  been 
shown,  that  a  serious  apprehension  that  Christianity  may  be 
true,  lays  persons  under  the  strictest  obligations  of  a  serious 
regard  to  it,  throughout  the  whole  of  their  life :  a  regard 
not  the  same  exactly,  but  in  many  respects  nearly  the 
same,  with  what  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth  wrould  lay 
them  under. 

§  21.  Blasphemy  is  without  excuse. 

Lastly,  it  will  appear,  that  blasphemy  and  profaneness, 
I  mean  with  regard  to  Christianity,  are  absolutely  without 
excuse.  For  there  is  no  temptation  to  it,  but  from  the 
wantonness  of  vanity  or  mirth  :  and  these,  considering  the 
infinite  importance  of  the  subject,  are  no  such  temptations 
as  to  afford  any  excuse  for  it. 

§  22.  For  it,  and  for  disregard,  even  demonstration  might 
fail  as  remedy1. 

If  this  be  a  just  account  of  things,  and  yet  men  can  go  on 
to  vilify  or  disregard  Christianity,  which  is  to  talk  and  act 
as  if  they  had  a  demonstration  of  its  falsehood  ;  there  is 
no  reason  to  think  they  would  alter  their  behaviour  to 
any  purpose,  though  there  were  a  demonstration  of  its 
truth. 

1  If  we  project  the  following  will  range  from  (2)  down  to  (4). 
classification:  (The  distinction  between  (2),  (3), 

1.  Things  demonstrated  ;  (4),  is  taken  by  Maurice,  Mor.  and 

2.  of  moral  certainty;          Met.  Phil.  ch.  viii.  §  31.)     Butler's 
likely;  complaint   is  that  men   so   irra- 


not  unlikely ;  tional  as   to  place   it  in  (7)  are 

neutral ;  such  offenders  against  reason,  that 

improbable ;  they  would  probably  defy   even 

7.        ,,       demonstrated  false ;  a    demonstration    on    behalf    of 

Butler's    arguments    for  religion  religion. 


THE  END  OF  THE  SECOND  PABT 


TWO    BRIEF   DISSERTATIONS 

i. 

OF  PERSONAL   IDENTITY 

II. 
OF  THE  NATURE   OF   VIRTUE 


ADVERTISEMENT 

IN  the  first  copy  of  these  Papers,  I  had  inserted  the  two 
following  Dissertations  into  the  chapters,  Of  a  Future  Life, 
and,  Of  tlip  Moral  Government  of  God ;  with  which  they  are 
closely  connected.  But  as  they  do  not  directly  fall  under 
the  title  of  the  foregoing  Treatise,  and  would  have  kept  the 
subject  of  it  too  long  out  of  sight  ;  it  seemed  more  proper  to 
place  them  by  themselves. 


DISSERTATION  I 

OF  PERSONAL    IDENTITY 

§  i .  There  are  misleading  subtleties  on  personal  identity ; 

"1T7HETHEE  we  are  to  live  in  a  future  state,  as  it  is  the 
*  *  most  important  question  which  can  possibly  be  asked, 
so  it  is  the  most  intelligible  one  which  can  be  expressed  in 
language.  Yet  strange  perplexities  have  been  raised  about 
the  meaning  of  that  identity  or  sameness  of  person,  which 
is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  living  now  and  hereafter,  or 
in  any  two  successive  moments.  And  the  solution  of  these 
difficulties  hath  been  stranger  than  the  difficulties  them- 
selves. For,  personal  identity  has  been  explained  so  by 
some,  as  to  render  the  inquiry  concerning  a  future  life  of  no 
consequence  at  all  to  us  the  persons  who  are  making  it. 
And  though  few  men  can  be  misled  by  such  subtleties ;  yet 
it  may  be  proper  a  little  to  consider  them. 

§  2.  An  idea,  which  definition  can  only  perplex : 

Now  when  it  is  asked,  wherein  personal  identity  consists, 
the  answer  should  be  the  same,  as  if  it  were  asked,  wherein 
consists  similitude,  or  equality  ;  that  all  attempts  to  define 
would  but  perplex  it.  Yet  there  is  no  difficulty  at  all  in 
ascertaining  the  idea.  For  as,  upon  two  triangles  being 
compared  or  viewed  together,  there  arises  to  the  mind  the 
idea  of  similitude  ;  or  upon  twice  two  and  four,  the  idea  of 
equality  :  so  likewise,  upon  comparing  the  consciousnesses 
of  one's  self,  or  one's  own  existence,  in  any  two  moments, 
there  as  immediately  arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  personal 
identity.  And  as  the  two  former  comparisons  not  only 


OF  PERSONAL    IDENTITY 


[Diss.  I. 


give  us  the  ideas  of  similitude  and  equality  ;  but  also  show 
us,  that  two  triangles  are  alike,  and  twice  two  and  four  are 
equal :  so  the  latter  comparison  not  only  gives  us  the  idea 
of  personal  identity,  but  also  showrs  us  the  identity  of  our- 
selves in  those  two  moments  ;  the  present,  suppose,  and 
that  immediately  past ;  or  the  present,  and  that  a  month, 
a  year,  or  twenty  years  past.  Or  in  other  words,  by  reflect- 
ing upon  that,  which  is  my  self  now,  and  that,  which  was 
my  self  twenty  years  ago,  I  discern  they  are  not  two,  but 
one  and  the  same  self  \ 


§  3.  Not  constituted  by,  but  presupposed  in,  recollection  (or 
consciousness  of  the  past). 

But  though  consciousness  of  what  is  past  does  thus 
ascertain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet  to  say,  that 
it  makes  personal  identity,  or  is  necessary  to  our  being  the 
same  persons,  is  to  say,  that  a  person  has  not  existed  a  single 
moment,  nor  done  one  action,  but  what  he  can  remember  ; 
indeed  none  but  what  he  reflects  upon.  And  one  should 
really  think  it  self-evident,  that  consciousness  of  personal 
identity  presupposes,  and  therefore  cannot  constitute,  per- 
sonal identity  ;  any  more  than  knowledge,  in  any  other  case, 
can  constitute  truth,  which  it  presupposes. 

This  wonderful  mistake  may  possibly  have  arisen  from 
hence ;  that  to  be  endued  with  consciousness  is  inseparable 
from  the  idea  of  a  person,  or  intelligent  being.  For,  this 
might  be  expressed  inaccurately  thus,  that  consciousness 
makes  personality :  and  from  hence  it  might  be  concluded 
to  make  personal  identity 2.  But  though  present  conscious- 


1  Reflection  on  the  past,  or  re- 
collection, is  for  us,  consciousness 
of   the   past.     But    brutes    have 
memory,  perhaps  not  recollection, 
without  consciousness  proper. 

2  This  is  a  bold  description  of 
personality.     But  can  a  better  be 
supplied  ?      As    to    dictionaries, 
Johnson  gives,  '  The  existence  or 
individuality  of  any  one.'  Latham 
and  Webster  withdraw  the  first 


phrase.  Locke  says,  *  Person  be- 
longs only  to  intelligent  agents, 
capable  of  a  law,  and  happiness 
and  misery.'  This  definition,  or 
account,  seems  to  go  beyond  the 
personality  of  God.  For  a  law  is 
something  extrinsic  ;  and  capa- 
bility of  misery  is  surely  here  a 
thing  utterly  beyond  our  power 
to  predicate.  What  is  conscious- 
ness? It  is  a  developed  intelli 


§§  3,  4]  OF  PERSONAL    IDENTITY  319 

ness  of  what  we  at  present  do  and  feel  is  necessary  to  our 
being  the  persons  we  now  are ;  yet  present  consciousness 
of  past  actions  or  feelings  is  not  necessary  to  our  being 
the  same  persons  who  performed  those  actions,  or  had  those 
feelings. 

§  4.  Differs  from  sameness  in  vegetables ;  where  all  the 
parts  may  be  different : 

The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same  in  the  com- 
mon acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  appear  to  have  any 
relation  to  this  of  personal  identity :  because,  the  word  same, 
when  applied  to  them  and  to  person,  is  not  only  applied 
to  different  subjects,  but  it  is  also  used  in  different  senses. 
For  when  a  man  swears  to  the  same  tree,  as  having  stood 
fifty  years  in  the  same  place,  he  means  only  the  same  as  to 
all  the  purposes  of  property  and  uses  of  common  life,  and 
not  that  the  tree  has  been  all  that  time  the  same  in  the 
strict  philosophical  sense  of  the  word.  For  he  does  not 
know,  whether  any  one  particle  of  the  present  tree  be  the 
same  with  any  one  particle  of  the  tree  which  stood  in  the 
same  place  fifty  years  ago1.  And  if  they  have  not  one 
common  particle  of  matter,  they  cannot  be  the  same  tree 
in  the  proper  philosophic  sense  of  the  word  same :  it  being 
evidently  a  contradiction  in  terms,  to  say  they  are,  when 


gence,  in  act  or  habit ;  it  is  a  1  May  there  not,  however,  re- 
doubled mental  function  :  it  pre-  .  main  behind,  and  untouched  by 
sents  to  us  an  active  and  a  passive  this  argument,  the  question,  What 
function,  or  perhaps  a  reciproca-  is  it  that  constitutes  life  in  a  veget- 
tion  of  activities  implying  dual-  able,  and  wherein  and  whereby 
ism.  Not  two  intelligences,  but  is  it  transmitted  ?  If  we  look  to 
one,  gifted  with  the  power  of  parts  alone,  how  does  a  vegetable 
turning  back  upon  itself.  The  differ  from  any  mineral,  subject 
personality  of  brutes  is  defective  ;  only  to  mechanical  or  chemical 
is  not  this  because  their  con-  action  ?  But  the  total  absence  of 
sciousness  is  defective?  Do  we  consciousness  seems  of  itself  to 
gain  anything  by  adding  to  But-  supply  the  immeasurable  separa- 
ler's  succinct  phrase  ?  Conscious-  tion,  which  Butler's  argument  re- 
ness  is,  at  the  least,  personality  quires.  He  uses  below  the  phrase 
in  action,  and  is  the  basis  and  'same  life':  but  this  life  cannot 
distinctive  mark  of  all  that  be  regarded  as  exchangeable, 
belongs  to  personality. 


320  OF  PERSONAL   IDENTITY  [DlSS.  I. 

no  part  of  their  substance,  and  no  one  of  their  properties 
is  the  same  :  no  part  of  their  substance,  by  the  sup- 
position: no  one  of  their  properties,  because  it  is  allowed, 
that  the  same  property  cannot  be  transferred  from  one 
substance  to  another.  And  therefore,  when  we  say  the 
identity  or  sameness  of  a  plant  consists  in  a  continuation  of 
the  same  life,  communicated  under  the  same  organization, 
to  a  number  of  particles  of  matter,  whether  the  same  or 
not  ;  the  word  same,  when  applied  to  life  and  to  organiza- 
tion, cannot  possibly  be  understood  to  signify,  what  it 
signifies  in  this  very  sentence,  when  applied  to  matter.  In 
a  loose  and  popular  sense  then,  the  life  and  the  organization 
and  the  plant  are  justly  said  to  be  the  same,  notwithstand- 
ing the  perpetual  change  of  the  parts.  But  in  a  strict  and 
philosophical  manner  of  speech,  no  man,  no  being,  no  mode 
of  being,  no  anything,  can  be  the  same  with  that,  with 
which  it  hath  indeed  nothing  the  same.  Now  sameness  is 
used  in  this  latter  sense,  when  applied  to  persons.  The 
identity  of  these,  therefore,  cannot  subsist  with  diversity  of 
substance. 


§  5.  And  consciousness,  if  at  different  times,  is  different. 

The  thing  here  considered,  and  demonstratively,  as  I  think, 
determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr.  Locke  in  these  words, 
Whether  it,  i.  e.  the  same  self  or  person,  be  the  same  identical 
substance  ?  And  he  has  suggested  \vhat  is  a  much  better 
answer  to  the  question,  than  that  which  he  gives  it  in  form. 
For  he  defines  Person,  a  thinking  intelligent  being^  &c.,  and 
personal  identity,  the  sameness  of  a  rational  being*.  The 
question  then  is,  whether  the  same  rational  being  is  the 
same  substance  :  which  needs  no  answer,  because  Being  and 
Substance,  in  this  place,  stand  for  the  same  idea.  The 
ground  of  the  doubt,  whether  the  same  person  be  the  same 
substance,  is  said  to  be  this  ;  that  the  consciousness  of  our 
own  existence,  in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any  two  joint 


a  Locke's  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  146. 


§§  5;  6]  OF  PERSONAL   IDENTITY  321 

successive  moments,  is  not l  the  same  individual  action  ]),  i.  e. 
not  the  same  consciousness,  but  different  successive  con- 
sciousnesses2.  Now  it  is  strange  that  this  should  have 
occasioned  such  perplexities.  For  it  is  surely  conceivable, 
that  a  person  may  have  a  capacity  of  knowing  some  object 
or  other  to  be  the  same  now,  which  it  was  when  he  contem- 
plated it  formerly :  yet  in  this  case,  where,  by  the  supposi- 
tion, the  object  is  perceived  to  be  the  same,  the  perception 
of  it  in  any  two  moments  cannot  be  one  and  the  same 
perception.  And  thus  though  the  successive  conscious- 
nesses, which  we  have  of  our  own  existence,  are  not  the 
same,  yet  are  they  consciousnesses  of  one  and  the  same 
thing  or  object ;  of  the  same  person,  self,  or  living  agent. 
The  person,  of  whose  existence  the  consciousness  is  felt 
now,  and  was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year  ago,  is  discerned  to  be, 
not  two  persons,  but  one  and  the  same  person  ;  and  there- 
fore is  one  and  the  same. 


§  6.  Locke's  hasty  ideas  pushed  by  others  to  confusion. 

Mr.  Locke's  observations  upon  this  subject  appear  hasty : 
and  he  seems  to  profess  himself  dissatisfied  with  supposi- 
tions, which  he  has  made  relating  to  it c.  But  some  of  those 
hasty  observations  have  been  carried  to  a  strange  length  by 
others,  whose  notion,  when  traced  and  examined  to  the 
bottom,  amounts,  I  think,  to  thisd:  'That  personality  is 
not  a  permanent,  but  a  transient  thing  :  that  it  lives  and 
dies,  begins  and  ends  continually :  that  no  one  can  any 
more  remain  one  and  the  same  person  two  moments 
together,  than  two  successive  moments  can  be  one  and  the 
same  moment :  that  our  substance  is  indeed  continually 


b  Locke,  pp.  146,  147.  c  Locke,  p.  152. 

d  See  an  Answer  to  Dr.  Clarke's  Third  Defence  of  his  Letter  to  Mr.  Dodwell, 
and  edit.  pp.  44,  56,  &c. 


1  See  Anal.  I.  i.  i.  B  this  year,  it  should  be  argued 

'2  The    argument    ascribed    to       that   the   faculty  or  affection  of 

Locke  is  frivolous  :  as  if,  because       love  is  in  rne  not  the  same. 

I  saw  and  loved  A  last  year  and 
VOL.  I.  Y 


322  OF  PERSONAL   IDENTITY  [Diss.  I. 

changing  ;    but  whether   this   be   so   or  not,  is,   it   seems, 
nothing   to   the   purpose  ;    since   it   is   not   substance,    but 
consciousness  alone,  which  constitutes  personality ;   which 
consciousness,  being  successive,  cannot  be  the  same  in  any 
two  moments,  nor  consequently  the  personality  constituted 
by  it.'     And  from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  it  is  a  fallacy 
upon  ourselves,  to  charge  our  present  selves  with  any  thing 
we  did,  or  to  imagine  our  present  selves  interested  in  any 
thing  which  befell  us  yesterday  ;    or  that  our  present  self 
will  be  interested  in  what  will  befall  us  to-morrow  :   since 
our  present  self  is  not,  in  reality,  the  same  with  the  self  of 
yesterday,   but  another  like  self  or  person  coming  in  its 
room,   and  mistaken   for   it  ;    to  which   another   self  will 
succeed  to-morrow.     This,  I  say,  must  follow :    for  if  the 
self  or  person  of  to-day,  and  that  of  to-morrow,  are  not  the 
same,  but  only  like  persons  ;    the  person  of  to-day  is  really 
no    more   interested    in   what   will    befall    the    person    of 
to-morrow,  than  in  what  will  befall  any  other  person.     It 
may  be  thought,  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  just  represen- 
tation of  the  opinion  we  are  speaking  of :  because  those  who 
maintain  it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the  same  as  far  back  as 
his  remembrance   reaches.     And    indeed  they  do   use  the 
words,  identity  and  same  person.     Nor  will  language  permit 
these  words  to  be  laid  aside  ;  since  if  they  were,  there  must 
be  I  know  not  what  ridiculous  periphrasis  substituted  in  the 
room  of  them.     But  they  cannot,  consistently  with  ihem- 
selves,  mean,  that  the  person  is  really  the  same.     For  it  is 
self-evident,  that  the  personality  cannot  be  really  the  same, 
if,  as  they  expressly  assert,  that  in  which  it  consists  is  not 
the  same.  And  as,  consistently  with  themselves,  they  cannot, 
so,  I  think  it  appears,  they  do  not,  mean,  that  the  person  is 
really  the  same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a  fictitious  sense  : 
in  such  a  sense  only  as  they  assert,  for  this  they  do  assert, 
that  any  number  of  persons  whatever   may  be   the  same 
person.     The  bare  unfolding  this  notion,  and  laying  it  thus 
naked  and  open,  seems  the  best  confutation  of  it.    However, 
since  great  stress  is  said  to  be  put  upon  it,  I  add  the  follow- 
ing things. 


§§  7-9]  OF  PERSONAL   IDENTITY  323 

§  7.  It  is  imagination  against  conviction  ; 

First,  This  notion  is  absolutely  contradictory  to  that 
certain  conviction,  which  necessarily  and  every  moment 
rises  within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts  upon  ourselves, 
when  we  reflect  upon  what  is  past,  and  look  forward  upon 
what  is  to  come.  All  imagination  of  a  daily  change  of  that 
living  agent  which  each  man  calls  himself,  for  another,  or 
of  any  such  change  throughout  our  whole  present  life,  is 
entirely  borne  down  by  our  natural  sense  of  things.  Nor  is 
it  possible  for  a  person  in  his  wits  to  alter  his  conduct,  with 
regard  to  his  health  or  affairs,  from  a  suspicion,  that,  though 
he  should  live  to-morrow,  he  should  not,  however,  be  the 
same  person  he  is  to-day.  And  yet,  if  it  be  reasonable  to 
act,  with  respect  to  a  future  life,  upon  this  notion,  that 
personality  is  transient  ;  it  is  reasonable  to  act  upon  it,  with 
respect  to  the  present. 

§  8.  As  all  perceive  in  temporal  concerns. 

Here  then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable  to  religion  and 
to  our  temporal  concerns  ;  and  every  one  sees  and  feels  the 
inexpressible  absurdity  of  it  in  the  latter  case.  If,  therefore, 
any  can  take  up  with  it  in  the  former,  this  cannot  proceed 
from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but  must  be  owing  to  an 
inward  unfairness,  and  secret  corruption  of  heart. 

§  9.  The  experiences  of  a  being  supply  a  lond  independent 
of  memory. 

Secondly,  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or  quality, 
but  a  being  only,  which  is  capable  of  life  and  action,  of 
happiness  and  misery.  Now  all  beings  confessedly  continue 
the  same,  during  the  whole  time  of  their  existence.  Con- 
sider then  a  living  being  now  existing,  and  which  has 
existed  for  any  time  alive  :  this  living  being  must  have 
done  and  suffered  and  enjoyed,  what  it  has  done  and 
suffered  and  enjoyed  formerly,  (this  living  being,  I  say, 
and  not  another,)  as  really  as  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys, 
what  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys  this  instant.  All  these 

Y  2 


324  OF  PERSONAL    IDENTITY  [Diss.  I. 

successive  actions,  enjoyments,  and  sufferings,  are  actions, 
enjoyments,  and  sufferings,  of  the  same  living  being.  And 
they  are  so,  prior  to  all  consideration  of  its  remembering  or 
forgetting :  since  remembering  or  forgetting  can  make  no 
alteration  in  the  truth  of  past  matter  of  fact.  And  suppose 
this  being  endued  with  limited  powers  of  knowledge  and 
memory,  there  is  no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving  it  to  have 
a  power  of  knowing  itself  to  be  the  same  living  being  which 
it  was  some  time  ago,  of  remembering  some  of  its  actions, 
sufferings,  and  enjoyments,  and  forgetting  others,  than  in 
conceiving  it  to  know  or  remember  or  forget  any  thing  else. 

§  10.    Whether  the  self  be  property  or  substance,  consciousness 
declares  its  identity; 

Thirdly,  Every  person  is  conscious,  that  he  is  now  the 
same  person  or  self  he  was  as  far  back  as  his  remembrance 
reaches :  since  when  any  one  reflects  upon  a  past  action  of 
his  own,  he  is  just  as  certain  of  the  person  who  did  that 
action,  namely,  himself,  the  person  who  now  reflects  upon 
it,  as  he  is  certain  that  the  action  was  at  all  done.  Nay, 
veiy  often  a  person's  assurance  of  an  action  having  been 
done,  of  which  he  is  absolutely  assured,  arises  wholly  from 
the  consciousness  that  he  himself  did  it.  And  this  he, 
person,  or  self,  must  either  be  a  substance,  or  the  property 
of  some  substance.  If  he,  if  person,  be  a  substance  ;  then 
consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  person  is  consciousness 
that  he  is  the  same  substance.  If  the  person,  or  he,  be 
the  property  of  a  substance,  still  consciousness  that  he  is 
the  same  property  is  as  certain  a  proof  that  his  substance 
remains  the  same,  as  consciousness  that  he  remains  the 
same  substance  would  be  :  since  the  same  property  cannot 
be  transferred  from  one  substance  to  another. 

§  ii.    And  is  deed  cable  in  all,  if  in  this. 

But  though  we  are  thus  certain,  that  we  are  the  same 
agents,  living  beings,  or  substances,  now,  which  we  were 
as  far  back  as  our  remembrance  reaches  ;  yet  it  is  asked, 
whether  we  may  not  possibly  be  deceived  in  it  ?  And  this 


§§  io,  n]  OF  PERSONAL    IDENTITY  325 

question  may  be  asked  at  the  end  of  any  demonstration 
whatever  :  because  it  is  a  question  concerning  the  truth 
of  perception  by  memory.  And  he  who  can  doubt,  whether 
perception  by  memory  can  in  this  case  be  depended  upon, 
may  doubt  also,  whether  perception  by  deduction  and  reason- 
ing, which  also  include  memory,  or  indeed  whether  intuitive 
perception  can.  Here  then  we  can  go  no  further.  For  it  is 
ridiculous  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  those  perceptions, 
whose  truth  we  can  no  otherwise  prove,  than  by  other  per- 
ceptions of  exactly  the  same  kind  with  them,  and  which 
there  is  just  the  same  ground  to  suspect  ;  or  to  attempt  to 
prove  the  truth  of  our  faculties,  which  can  no  otherwise 
be  proved,  than  by  the  use  or  means  of  those  very  sus- 
pected faculties  themselves. 


DISSEETATION  II 


OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE 


§  i.   We  have  powers  of  reflection  and  approval,  and  ly  this 
become  capable  of  moral  government  \ 

THAT  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  government, 
is  their  having  a  moral  nature,  and  moral  faculties  of 
perception  and  of  action.  Brute  creatures  are  impressed 
and  actuated  by  various  instincts  and  propensions :  so  also 
are  we.  But  additional  to  this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  reflect- 
ing upon  actions  and  characters,  and  making  them  an  object 
to  our  thought :  and  on  doing  this,  we  naturally  and  un- 
avoidably approve  some  actions,  under  the  peculiar  view  of 


1  I  extract  from  Dr.  Angus  (in 
Zoc.)  portions  of  his  concise  ac- 
count of  the  tacit  references  of 
Butler  in  this  Dissertation  to 
the  doctrines  of  immediately  pre- 
ceding writers  : 

'  Within  a  hundred  years, 
Hobbes  had  published  his  Theory 
of  Human  Nature,  in  which  he 
taught  that  personal  gratification 
was  the  sole  end  of  every  act, 
that  every  exercise  of  passion  or 
faculty  was  equally  authorita- 
tive, and  that  man  has  no  moral 
faculties  of  perception  or  action. 
.  .  .  The  first  and  last  part  of 
Hobbes's  theory  Butler  here  re- 
futes ;  the  second  he  notices  in 


his  Sermons.  .  .  . 

'  By  denying  that  prudence  is 
the  whole  of  virtue,  he  meets  the 
abuse  which  Hobbes  committed, 
and  which  some  modern  writers 
have    revived.      Benevolence    he 
reckons  a  most  important  virtue 
and  yet  denies,  against  Leibnitz, 
that  all  virtue  is  resolvable  int< 
it.     In  his   doctrine  of  a  moral 
sense,  he  agrees  substantially  witl 
Hutcheson,  his  contemporary,  an< 
in  the  importance  he  attaches 
the  distinction  between  mere  act 
and  the  dispositions  or  principle 
from     which     they     spring,     h< 
condemns  Hobbes  and  sanctioi 
Malebranche.' 


Diss.  II.  §§  i,  2]       OF   THE   NATURE    OF   VIRTUE  327 

their  being  virtuous  and  of  good  desert  ;  and  disapprove 
others,  as  vicious  and  of  ill  desert.  That  we  have  this 
moral  approving  and  disapproving  a  faculty,  is  certain  from 
our  experiencing  it  in  ourselves,  and  recognizing  it  in  each 
other. 


§  2.   Shown  ~by  our  common  language,  judgments,  behaviour; 
and  by  moral  systems. 

It  appears  from  our  exercising  it  unavoidably,  in  the 
approbation  and  disapprobation  even  of  feigned  characters  : 
from  the  words,  right  and  wrong,  odious  and  amiable,  base 
and  worthy,  with  many  others  of  like  signification  in  all 
languages,  applied  to  actions  and  characters  l  :  from  the 
many  written  systems  of  morals  which  suppose  it ;  since 
it  cannot  be  imagined,  that  all  these  authors,  throughout 
all  these  treatises,  had  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to  their 
words,  or  a  meaning  merely  chimerical  :  from  our  natural 
sense  of  gratitude,  which  implies  a  distinction  between 
merely  being  the  instrument  of  good,  and  intending  it  : 
from  the  like  distinction,  every  one  makes,  between  injury 
and  mere  harm,  which,  Hobbes  says,  is  peculiar  to  man- 


ft  This  way  of  speaking  is  taken  from  Epictetus  *,  and  is  made  use 


Phrase  of  Epictetus, 
why  employed. 


of  as  seeming  the   most  full,  and  least  liable  to 
cavil.     And  the  moral  faculty  may  be  understood 


to  have  these  two  epithets,  8otti]j.aoTiKr)  and  diroSo- 
],  upon  a  double  account  :  because,  upon  a  survey  of  actions, 
whether  before  or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines  them  to  be  good 
or  evil ;  and  also  because  it  determines  itself  to  be  the  guide  of  action 
and  of  life,  in  contradistinction  from  all  other  faculties,  or  natural 
principles  of  action  :  in  the  very  same  manner  as  speculative  reason 
directly  and  naturally  judges  of  speculative  truth  and  falsehood  ;  and  at 
the  same  time  is  attended  with  a  consciousness  upon  reflection,  that  the 
natural  right  to  judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 

*  Arr.  Epict.  lib.  i.  cap.  i. 


1  We  may  add  the  cacuvos  and  upon  a  basis  merely  subjective,  and 
^0705  of  Aristotle  ;  but  it  is  char-  to  look  rather  for  tests  founded  in 
acteristic  of  Butler  not  to  rest  the  nature  of  the  thing  itself. 


328  OF    THE  NATURE    OF   VIRTUE  [DiSF.  II. 

kind 1  ;  and  between  injury  and  just  punishment,  a  distinc- 
tion plainly  natural,  prior  to  the  consideration  of  human 
laws 2.  It  is  manifest  great  part  of  common  language,  and 
of  common  behaviour  over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  suppo- 
sition of  such  a  moral  faculty 3 ;  whether  called  conscience, 
moral  reason,  moral  sense,  or  divine  reason  ;  whether  con- 
sidered as  a  sentiment  of  the  understanding,  or  as  a  percep- 
tion of  the  heart 4 ;  or,  which  seems  the  truth,  as  including 
both.  ' 


§  3.  It  lias  an  aclmoidcdycd  standard;  and  conclusive  tests. 

Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in  the  general,  what  course  of 
action  this  faculty,  or  practical  discerning  power  within  us, 
approves,  and  what  it  disapproves.  For,  as  much  as  it  has 
been  disputed  wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever  ground 
for  doubt  there  may  be  about  particulars ;  yet,  in  general, 
there  is  in  reality  an  universally  acknowledged  standard  of 
it.  It  is  that,  which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have  made 
profession  of  in  public  :  it  is  that,  which  every  man  you 
meet  puts  on  the  show  of :  it  is  that,  which  the  primary 
and  fundamental  laws  of  all  civil  constitutions  over  the  face 
of  the  earth  make  it  their  business  and  endeavour  to  enforce 
the  practice  of  upon  mankind  :  namely,  justice,  veracity, 
and  regard  to  common  good.  It  being  manifest  then,  in 
general,  that  we  have  such  a  faculty  or  discernment  as  this, 
it  may  be  of  use  to  remark  some  things  more  distinctly 
concerning  it. 


1  Evidently  Butler's  intention  of  first  instance,  we  discern  good 

is    rather    to    record    as    against  rnd  evil.     When  the  perception 

Hobbes    generally   this  valuable  thus  acquired  has  passed  under 

admission,    than    to    imply  that  the  view,  and  received  the  judicial 

the    opposite    opinion    was    one  sanction,  of  the  conscience,  it  has 

anywhere  held.  passed  under  the  view  of  the  court 

a  On  the  distinction  see  Serm.  cf  appeal, 

viii.  6,  8.  This  sentence  is  one  in  which 

3  Comp.  Serm.  xii.  6.  Butler  allows  himself  more  elasti- 

4  Is  this  not  an  exercise  of  the  city  in  the  use  of  terms  than  is 
faculty  by  which,  as  in  a  court  quite  usual  with  him. 


§§  3-5]  OF    THE   NATURE    OF    VIRTUE  329 

§  4.   Has  action  for  its  object,  apart  from  (a)  mere  truth, 
(b)  con-sequences. 

First,  It  ought  to  be  observed,  that  the  object  of  this 
faculty  is  actions b,  comprehending  under  that  name  active 
or  practical  principles  :  those  principles  from  which  men 
would  act,  if  occasions  and  circumstances  gave  them  power  ; 
and  which,  when  fixed  and  habitual  in  any  person,  we  call 
his  character.  It  does  not  appear,  that  brutes  have  the  least 
reflex  sense  of  actions,  as  distinguished  from  events  :  or  that 
will  and  design,  which  constitute  the  very  nature  of  actions 
as  such,  are  at  all  an  object  to  their  perception.  But  to 
ours  they  are  :  and  they  are  the  object,  and  the  only  one, 
of  the  approving  and  disapproving  faculty.  Acting,  conduct, 
behaviour,  abstracted  from  all  regard  to  what  is,  in  fact  and 
event,  the  consequence  of  it,  is  itself  the  natural  object  of 
the  moral  discernment ;  as  speculative  truth  and  falsehood 
is  of  speculative  reason.  Intention  of  such  and  such  conse- 
quences, indeed,  is  always  included  ;  for  it  is  part  of  the 
action  itself :  but  though  the  intended  good  or  bad  conse- 
quences do  not  follow,  we  have  exactly  the  same  sense  of 
the  action  as  if  they  did.  In  like  manner  we  think  well 
or  ill  of  characters,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the 
good  or  the  evil,  which  persons  of  such  characters  have  it 
actually  in  their  power  to  do.  We  never1,  in  the  moral  way, 
applaud  or  blame  either  ourselves  or  others,  for  what  we 
enjoy  or  what  we  suffer,  or  for  having  impressions  made 
upon  us  which  we  consider  as  altogether  out  of  our  power  : 
but  only  for  what  we  do,  or  would  have  done  had  it  been  in 
our  power ;  or  for  what  we  leave  undone  which  we  might 
have  done,  or  would  have  left  undone  though  we  could  have 
done  it. 

§  5.  By  nature,  we  link  vice  with  misery  for  ill  desert. 

Secondly,  Our  sense  or  discernment  of  actions  as  morally 
good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  discernment  of  them  as 


b  Oube  fj  aptTi)  real  fcanla  .  .  .  .  €»/  wttfftl,  uAAd  fvepyfiq.  M.  Anton, 
lib.  ix.  16.  Virtutis  laus  omnis  in  actione  consistit.  Cio.  Off.  lib.  i. 
cap.  6. 


330  OF   THE  NATURE    OF   VIRTUE  [Diss.  II. 

of  good  or  ill  desert.  It  may  be  difficult  to  explain  this 
perception,  so  as  to  answer  all  the  questions  which  may  be 
asked  concerning  it :  but  every  one  speaks  of  such  and  such 
actions  as  deserving  punishment ;  and  it  is  not,  I  suppose, 
pretended  that  they  have  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to 
the  expression.  Now  the  meaning  plainly  is  not,  that  we 
conceive  it  for  the  good  of  society,  that  the  doer  of  such 
actions  should  be  made  to  suffer.  For  if  unhappily  it  were 
resolved,  that  a  man,  who,  by  some  innocent  action,  was 
infected  with  the  plague,  should  be  left  to  perish,  lest,  by 
other  people's  coming  near  him,  the  infection  should  spread  ; 
no  one  would  say  he  deserved  this  treatment.  Innocence 
and  ill  desert  are  inconsistent  ideas.  Ill  desert  always 
supposes  guilt :  and  if  one  be  no  part  of  the  other,  yet  they 
are  evidently  and  naturally  connected  in  our  mind.  The 
sight  of  a  man  in  misery  raises  our  compassion  towards  him  ; 
and,  if  this  misery  be  inflicted  on  him  by  another,  our 
indignation  against  the  author  of  it.  But  when  we  are 
informed,  that  the  sufferer  is  a  villain,  and  is  punished 
only  for  his  treachery  or  cruelty ;  our  compassion  exceed- 
ingly lessens,  and  in  many  instances  our  indignation  wholly 
subsides.  Now  what  produces  this  effect  is  the  conception 
of  that  in  the  sufferer,  which  we  call  ill-desert.  Upon  con- 
sidering then,  or  viewing  together,  our  notion  of  vice  and 
that  of  misery,  there  results  a  third,  that  of  ill-desert.  And 
thus  there  is  in  human  creatures  an  association  of  the  two 
ideas,  natural  and  moral  evil,  wickedness  and  punishment. 
If  this  association  were  merely  artificial  or  accidental,  it  were 
nothing :  but  being  most  unquestionably  natural,  it  greatly 
concerns  us  to  attend  to  it,  instead  of  endeavouring  to  explain 
it  away. 

§  6.  Desert  is  higher  or  lower  according  to  circumstances. 

It  may  be  observed  farther,  concerning  our  perception  of 
good  and  of  ill  desert,  that  the  former  is  very  weak  with 
respect  to  common  instances  of  virtue.  One  reason  of  which 
may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear  to  a  spectator,  how  far  such 
instances  of  virtue  proceed  from  a  virtuous  principle,  or  in 


§§6,  7]  OF   THE   NATURE   OF   VIRTUE  331 

what  degree  this  principle  is  prevalent :  since  a  very  weak 
regard  to  virtue  may  be  sufficient  to  make  men  act  well  in 
many  common  instances.  And  on  the  other  hand,  our  per- 
ception of  ill  desert  in  vicious  actions  lessens,  in  proportion 
to  the  temptations  men  are  thought  to  have  had  to  such 
vices.  For,  vice  in  human  creatures  consisting  chiefly  in 
the  absence  or  want  of  the  virtuous  principle  ;  though  a  man 
be  overcome,  suppose,  by  tortures,  it  does  not  from  thence 
appear  to  what  degree  the  virtuous  principle  was  wanting. 
All  that  appears  is,  that  he  had  it  not  in  such  a  degree,  as 
to  prevail  over  the  temptation  :  but  possibly  he  had  it  in 
a  degree,  which'  would  have  rendered  him  proof  against 
common  temptations. 

§  7.  Judgment  on  acts  must  measure  them  by  the  agent1. 

Thirdly,  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  desert  arises  from, 
and  is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  actions  with  the  nature 
and  capacities  of  the  agent.  For  the  mere  neglect  of  doing 
what  we  ought  to  do  would,  in  many  cases,  be  determined 
by  all  men  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  vicious.  And  this 
determination  must  arise  from  such  comparison,  and  be  the 
result  of  it ;  because  such  neglect  would  not  be  vicious  in 
creatures  of  other  natures  and  capacities,  as  brutes.  And  it 
is  the  same  also  with  respect  to  positive  vices,  or  such  as 
consist  in  doing  what  we  ought  not.  For,  every  one  has 
a  different  sense  of  harm  done  by  an  idiot,  madman,  or 
child,  and  b^  one  of  mature  and  common  understanding ; 
though  the  action  of  both,  including  the  intention,  which  is 
part  of  the  action,  be  the  same :  as  it  may  be,  since  idiots 
and  madmen,  as  well  as  children,  are  capable  not  only  of 
doing  mischief,  but  also  of  intending  it.  Now  this  difference 
must  arise  from  somewhat  discerned  in  the  nature  or 
capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the  action  vicious  ;  and 
the  want  of  which,  in  the  other,  renders  the  same  action 
innocent  or  less  vicious :  and  this  plainly  supposes  a  com- 
parison, whether  reflected  upon  or  not,  between  the  action 


1  Comp.  Serm.  ii.  15,  iii.  13. 


332  OF   THE   NATURE-   OF   VIRTUE  [Diss.  II. 

and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previous  to  our  determining  an 
action  to  be  vicious.  And  hence  arises  a  proper  application 
of  the  epithets,  incongruous,  unsuitable,  disproportionate, 
unfit,  to  actions  which  our  moral  faculty  determines  to 
be  vicious. 


§  8.  Prudence,  or  a  due  regard  to  our  otvn  welfare,  is  a  part 

of  virtue. 

Fourthly,  It  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether  men  are 
more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make  themselves 
miserable  without  reason,  than  to  make  other  people  so  :  or 
dissolutely  to  neglect  their  own  greater  good,  for  the  sake 
of  a  present  lesser  gratification,  than  they  are  to  neglect  the 
good  of  others,  whom  nature  has  committed  to  their  care. 
It  should  seem,  that  a  due  concern  about  our  own  interest 
or  happiness,  and  a  reasonable  endeavour  to  secure  and 
promote  it,  which  is,  I  think,  very  much  the  meaning  of 
the  word  prudence,  in  our  language ;  it  should  seem,  that 
this  is  virtue,  and  the  contrary  behaviour  faulty  and  blam- 
able  :  since,  in  the  calmest  way  of  reflection,  we  approve 
of  the  first,  and  condemn  the  other  conduct,  both  in  our- 
selves and  others '.  This  approbation  and  disapprobation 
are  altogether  different  from  mere  desire  of  our  own,  or  of 
their  happiness,  and  from  sorrow  upon  missing  it.  For  the 
object  or  occasion  of  this  last  kind  of  perception  is  satisfaction 


1  I  suppose  it  indisputable  that  not  of  B,  but  of  A  ?    So  that  But- 

the  study  and  prosecution  of  good  ler's  contention  appears  perfectly 

with  a  practical  aim  is  virtuous.  just.     It  undergoes  perhaps  some 

Let  us   suppose   then   that   it  is  disadvantage  from  the  fact  that 

done  for  the  benefit  of  a-.      If  x  prudence,  as  the  wise   choice  of 

mean  another  person  than  our-  means  for  an  end,  extends  to  all 

selves,  this   is   benevolence,   and  common  matters  lying  beyond  the 

benevolence  is  a  virtue.     But  let  territory  of  vice  and  virtue, 

a-  mean  a  man's  own  self.     The  This   may  well   be   considered 

act   is    still   the    same,    done    to  the    classical   passage    of  Butler 

one  person  instead  of  another  ;  it  on  prudence.     Compare  Aristotle 

continues   to    be   the    study  and  (Eth.  Nic.  VI.  v.  4)  on  typovrjais : 

prosecution  of  good  with  a  prac-  AenrfTcu     apa    avrty    dvai    t(iv 

tical  aim  :  how  can  the  act  have  d\r}6fj  utra  \6yov  irpaKnn^v  TTC/M  TO. 

changed  its  own  essential  nature,  avOpwitw  d-yafld  /cat  KOLKCL. 
because  it  is  now  for  the  benefit, 


§§  8-io]  OF    THE    NATURE    OF    VIRTUE  333 

or  uneasiness  :  whereas  the  object  of  the  first  is  active  be- 
haviour. In  one  case,  what  our  thoughts  fix  upoii  is  our 
condition  :  in  the  other,  our  conduct. 

§  9.   Why  not  fortified  so  strongly,  as  other  parts,  with 
disapproval  of  the  contrary. 

It  is  true  indeed,  that  nature  has  not  given  us  so  sensible 
a  disapprobation  of  imprudence  and  folly,  either  in  ourselves 
or  others,  as  of  falsehood,  injustice,  and  cruelty  :  I  suppose, 
because  that  constant  habitual  sense  of  private  interest  and 
good,  which  we  always  carry  about  with  us,  renders  such 
sensible  disapprobation  less  necessary,  less  wanting,  to  keep 
us  from  imprudently  neglecting  our  own  happiness,  and 
foolishly  injuring  ourselves,  than  it  is  necessary  and  want- 
ing to  keep  us  from  injuring  others,  to  whose  good  we 
cannot  have  so  strong  and  constant  a  regard  :  and  also 
because  imprudence  and  folly,  appearing  to  bring  its  own 
punishment  more  immediately  and  constantly  than  injurious 
behaviour,  it  less  needs  the  additional  punishment,  which 
would  be  inflicted  upon  it  by  others,  had  they  the  same 
sensible  indignation  against  it,  as  against  injustice,  and 
fraud,  and  cruelty.  Besides,  unhappiness  being  in  itself 
the  natural  object  of  compassion  ;  the  unhappiness  which 
people  bring  upon  themselves,  though  it  be  wilfully,  excites 
in  us  some  pity  for  them :  and  this  of  course  lessens  our 
displeasure  against  them. 

§  10.  Still  disapproval  is  strong  in  grave  cases. 

But  still  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  formed  so 
as  to  reflect  very  severely  upon  the  greater  instances  of 
imprudent  neglects  and  foolish  rashness,  both  in  ourselves 
and  others.  In  instances  of  this  kind,  men  often  say  of 
themselves  with  remorse,  and  of  others  with  some  indigna- 
tion, that  they  deserved  to  suffer  such  calamities,  because 
they  brought  them  upon  themselves,  and  would  not  take 
warning.  Particularly  when  persons  come  to  poverty  and 
distress  by  a  long  course  of  extravagance,  and  after  frequent 
admonitions,  though  without  falsehood  or  injustice ;  we 


334  OF   THE  NATURE    OF   VIRTUE  [Diss.  II. 

plainly  do  not  regard  such  people  as  alike  objects  of  com- 
passion with  those,  who  are  brought  into  the  same  condition 
by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  these  things  it  appears, 
that  prudence  is  a  species  of  virtue,  and  folly  of  vice : 
meaning  by  folly,  somewhat  quite  different  from  mere  in- 
capacity ;  a  thoughtless  want  of  that  regard  and  attention 
to  our  own  happiness,  which  we  had  capacity  for.  And 
this  the  word  properly  includes ;  and,  as  it  seems,  in 
its  usual  acceptation ;  for  we  scarce  apply  it  to  brute 
creatures. 

§  ii.   We  may  dispense  tvith  vice  and  virtue  as  predicates. 

However,  if  any  person  be  disposed  to  dispute  the  matter, 
I  shall  veiy  willingly  give  him  up  the  words  virtue  and 
vice,  as  not  applicable  to  prudence  and  folly  ;  but  must  beg 
leave  to  insist,  that  the  faculty  within  us,  which  is  the  judge 
of  actions,  approves  of  prudent  actions,  and  disapproves 
imprudent  ones  ;  I  say  prudent  and  imprudent  actions  as 
such,  and  considered  distinctly  from  the  happiness  or  misery 
which  they  occasion.  And,  by  the  way,  this  observation 
may  help  to  determine  what  justness  there  is  in  that 
objection  against  religion,  that  it  teaches  us  to  be  interested 
and  selfish. 

§  12.  Benevolence,  and  its  op2>osite,  are  only  parts  of 
virtue  and  vice ; 

Fifthly,  Without  inquiring  how  far,  and  in  what  sense, 
virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice  into  the  want 
of  it ;  it  may  be  proper  to  observe,  that  benevolence,  and 
the  want  of  it,  singly  considered,  are  in  no  sort  the  whole 
of  virtue  and  vice  l.  For  if  this  were  the  case,  in  the  review 
of  one's  own  character,  or  that  of  others,  our  moral  under- 
standing and  moral  sense  would  be  indifferent  to  every 
thing,  but  the  degrees  in  which  benevolence  prevailed,  and 
the  degrees  in  which  it  was  wanting.  That  is,  we  should 


1  On  benevolence  see  Anal.  I.  iii.       from   a  different  point   of  view, 
3.     Also  compare  the  statement       Serm.  xii.  18,  19,  22. 


§§n-i3]  OF   THE  NATURE   OF   VIRTUE  335 

neither  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  persons  rather  than 
to  others,  nor  disapprove  injustice  and  falsehood  upon  any 
other  account,  than  merely  as  an  overbalance  of  happiness 
was  foreseen  likely  to  be  produced  by  the  first,  and  of 
misery  by  the  second.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  suppose 
two  men  competitors  for  any  thing  whatever,  which  would 
be  of  equal  advantage  to  each  of  them  :  though  nothing 
indeed  would  be  more  impertinent,  than  for  a  stranger  to 
busy  himself  to  get  one  of  them  preferred  to  the  other  ;  yet 
such  endeavour  would  be  virtue,  in  behalf  of  a  friend  or 
benefactor,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  distant  con- 
sequences :  as  that  examples  of  gratitude,  and  the  cultivation 
of  friendship,  would  be  of  general  good  to  the  world.  Again, 
suppose  one  man  should,  by  fraud  or  violence,  take  from 
another  the  frnit  of  his  labour,  'with  intent  to  give  it  to 
a  third,  who  he  thought  would  have  as  much  pleasure  from 
it  as  would  balance  the  pleasure  which  the  first  possessor- 
would  have  had  in  the  enjoyment,  and  his  vexation  in  the 
loss  of  it  ;  suppose  also  that  no  bad  consequences  wrould 
follow  :  yet  such  an  action  would  surely  be  vicious.  Nay 
farther,  were  treachery,  violence  and  injustice,  no  otherwise 
vicious,  than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of 
misery  to  society ;  then,  if  in  any  case  a  man  could  procure 
to  himself  as  great  advantage  by  an  act  of  injustice,  as  the 
whole  foreseen  inconvenience,  likely  to  be  brought  upon 
others  by  it,  would  amount  to  ;  such  a  piece  of  injustice 
would  not  *be  faulty  or  vicious  at  all :  because  it  would  be 
no  more  than,  in  any  other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own 
satisfaction  to  another's  in  equal  degrees. 

§  13.   Which  include  matter  other  than  the  overbalance 
of  enjoyment  or  suffering. 

The  fact  then  appears  to  be,  that  we  are  constituted  so  as 
to  condemn  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  injustice,  and 
to  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  preferably  to  others, 
abstracted  from  all  consideration,  which  conduct  is  like- 
liest to  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery. 
And  therefore,  were  the  Author  of  nature  to  propose  nothing 


336  OF   THE   NATURE    OF    VIRTUE  [Diss.  II. 

to  himself  as  an  end  but  the  production  of  happiness,  were 
his  moral  character  merely  that  of  benevolence  ;  yet  ours  is 
not  so.  Upon  that  supposition  indeed  the  only  reason  of 
his  giving  us  the  above-mentioned  approbation  of  benevo- 
lence to  some  persons  rather  than  others,  and  disapprobation 
of  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  and  injustice,  must  be, 
that  he  foresaw  this  constitution  of  our  nature  would  pro- 
duce more  happiness,  than  forming  us  with  a  temper  of 
mere  general  benevolence.  But  still,  since  this  is  our  con- 
stitution ;  falsehood,  violence,  injustice,  must  be  vice  in  us, 
and  benevolence  to  some,  preferably  to  others,  virtue  ; 
abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  overbalance  of  evil 
or  good,  which  they  may  appear  likely  to  produce. 

§  14.  Moral  government  makes  awards  by  a  moral  ndc. 

Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a  moral 
nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a  moral  faculty, 
the  natural  object  of  which  is  actions ;  moral  government 
must  consist  in  rendering  them  happy  and  unhappy,  in 
rewarding  and  punishing  them,  as  they  follow,  neglect,  or 
depart  from,  the  moral  rule  of  action  interwoven  in  their 
nature,  or  suggested  and  enforced  by  this  moral  faculty  c  ; 
in  rewarding  and  punishing  them  upon  account  of  their  so 
doing. 

§  15.  Some  authors  are  open  to  misapprehension  on 
benevolence. 

I  am  not  sensible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  observation, 
contradicted  what  any  author  designed  to  assert.  But  some 
of  great  and  distinguished  merit  have,  I  think,  expressed 
themselves  in  a  manner,  which  may  occasion  some  danger, 
to  careless  readers,  of  imagining  the  whole  of  virtue  to 
consist  in  singly  aiming,  according  to  the  best  of  their 
judgment,  at  promoting  the  happiness  of  mankind  in  the 


c  Page  121.     [So  stands  the  reference  in  the  edition  of  1844. 
reference  seems  really  to  be  to  I.  iii.  2,  3. — ED.] 


§§  i4-i6]  OF   THE   NATURE    OF   VIRTUE  337 

present  state 1 ;  and  the  whole  of  vice,  in  doing  what  they 
foresee,  or  might  foresee,  is  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance 
of  unhappiness  in  it :  than  which  mistakes,  none  can  be 
conceived  more  terrible.  For  it  is  certain,  that  some  of  the 
most  shocking  instances  of  injustice,  adultery,  murder,  per- 
jury, and  even  of  persecution,  may,  in  many  supposable 
cases,  not  have  the  appearance  of  being  likely  to  produce 
an  overbalance  of  misery  in  the  present  state  :  perhaps 
sometimes  may  have  the  contrary  appearance.  For  this 
reflection  might  easily  be  carried  on,  but  I  forbear. 

§  1 6.   We  are  to  promote  happiness,  not  simpliciter,  but 
within  bounds,  and  according  to  likelihoods. 

The  happiness  of  the  world  is  the  concern  of  him,  who  is 
the  Lord  and  the  Proprietor  of  it :  nor  do  we  know  what 
we  are  about,  when  we  endeavour  to  promote  the  good  of 
mankind  in  any  ways,  but  those  which  he  has  directed  ; 
that  is  indeed  in  all  ways  not  contrary  to  veracity  and 
justice.  I  speak  thus  upon  supposition  of  persons  really 
endeavouring,  in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without  regard  to 
these.  But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such  supposed 
endeavours  proceed,  almost  always,  from  ambition,  the 
spirit  of  party,  or  some  indirect  principle,  concealed  perhaps 
in  great  measure  from  persons  themselves.  And  though  it 
is  our  business  and  our  duty  to  endeavour,  within  the 
bounds  of  veracity  and  justice,  to  contribute  to  the  ease, 
convenience,  and  even  cheerfulness  and  diversion  of  our 
fellow-creatures :  yet,  from  our  short  views,  it  is  greatly 
uncertain,  whether  this  endeavour  will,  in  particular  in- 
stances, produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness  upon  the 
whole  ;  since  so  many  and  distant  things  must  come  into 
the  account.  And  that  which  makes  it  our  duty  is,  that 
there  is  some  appearance  that  it  will,  and  no  positive  appear- 
ance sufficient  to  balance  this,  on  the  contrary  side  ;  and 
also,  that  such  benevolent  endeavour  is  a  cultivation  of  that 


1  Is  the  allusion  to  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson  ?   See  Leslie  Stephen, 
English  Thought,  ix.  60. 

VOL.  I.  Z 


338  OF   THE   NATURE    OF   VIRTUE      [Diss.  II.  §  17 

most  excellent  of  all  virtuous  principles,  the  active  principle 
of  benevolence. 

§  17.   Veracity  is  part  of  tlie  rule  of  life,  but  not  easy 
in  application. 

However,  though  veracity,  as  well  as  justice,  is  to  be  our 
rule  of  life  ;  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a  snare  will  be 
laid  in  the  way  of  some  .plain  men,  that  the  use  of  common 
forms  of  speech,  generally  understood,  cannot  be  falsehood  ; 
and,  in  general,  that  there  can  be  no  designed  falsehood 
without  designing  to  deceive.  It  must  likewise  be  observed, 
that  in  numberless  cases,  a  man  may  be  under  the  strictest 
obligations  to  what  he  foresees  will  deceive,  without  his 
intending  it.  For  it  is  impossible  not  to  foresee,  that  the 
words  and  actions  of  men,  in  different  ranks  and  employ- 
ments, and  of  different  educations,  will  perpetually  be 
mistaken  by  each  other :  and  it  cannot  but  be  so,  whilst 
they  will  judge  with  the  utmost  carelessness,  as  they  daily 
do,  of  what  they  are  not,  perhaps,  enough  informed  to  be 
competent  judges  of,  even  though  they  considered  it  with 
great  attention. 


CORRESPONDENCE 


BETWEEN 


DR.  BUTLER   AND   DR.  CLARKE 


[The  Letters  are  numbered  consecutively,  and  the  references  in  the  Index 
are  to  Corr.  I.,  Corr.  II.,  and  so  forth.] 


I. 

THE   FIRST  LETTER. 

(A.) 

Butler,  apparently  admitting  place  to  be  a  condition  or  incident  of  divine  exist- 
ence,  conceives  that  Clarke  has  offered,  as  proving  the  divine  omnipresence,  this : 
that  if  absent  somewhere,  He  might  be  absent  everywhere ;  which  contradicts  His 
self- existence  being  non-existence.  No,  says  Butler :  partial  absence  might  le 
possible,  yet  universal  impossible. 

Further,  to  prove  the  unity  of  the  self-existent,  Clarke  says,  were  there  two, 
each  might  be  supposed  existing  alone,  so  that  the  other  might  be  conceived  not  to 
exist.  Butler  denies  this  consequence :  whether  we  take  alone  as  independent, 
or  as  solitary. 

REVEREND  SIR, 

T  SUPPOSE  you  will  wonder  at  the  present  trouble  from  one  who  is 
-*-  a  perfect  stranger  to  you,  though  you  are  not  so  to  him  ;  but 
I  hope  the  occasion  will  excuse  my  boldness.  I  have  made  it,  sir, 
my  business,  ever  since  I  thought  myself  capable  of  such  sort  of 
reasoning,  to  prove  to  myself  the  being  and  attributes  of  God.  And 
being  sensible  that  it  is  a  matter  of  the  last  consequence,  I  endeavoured 
after  a"Tte«ionstrative  proof;  not  only  more  fully  to  satisfy  my  own 
mind,  but  also  in  order  to  defend  the  great  truths  of  natural  religion, 
and  those  of  the  Christian  revelation  which  follow  from  them,  against 
all  opposers ;  but  must  own  with  concern,  that  hitherto  I  have  been 
unsuccessful ;  and  though  I  have  got  very  probable  arguments,  yet 

Z  2 


340  CORRESPONDENCE   BETWEEN  [CoRR. 

I  can  go  but  a  very  little  way  with  demonstration  in  the  proof  of  those 
things.  When  first  your  book  on  those  subjects  (which  by  all,  whom 
I  have  discoursed  with,  is  so  justly  esteemed)  was  recommended  to 
me,  I  was  in  great  hopes  of  having  all  my  inquiries  answered.  But 
since  in  some  places,  either  through  my  not  understanding  your  mean- 
ing, or  what  else  I  know  not,  even  that  has  failed  me,  I  almost 
despair  of  ever  arriving  to  such  a  satisfaction  as  I  aim  at,  unless  by  the 
method  I  now  use.  You  cannot  but  know,  sir,  that  of  two  different 
expressions  of  the  same  thing,  though  equally  clear  to  some  persons, 
yet  to  others  one  of  them  is  sometimes  very  obscure,  though  the  other 
be  perfectly  intelligible.  Perhaps  this  may  be  my  case  here  ;  and 
could  I  see  those  of  your  arguments,  of  which  I  doubt,  differently 
proposed,  possibly  I  might  yield  a  ready  assent  to  them.  This,  sir, 
I  cannot  but  think  a  sufficient  excuse  for  the  present  trouble  ;  it 
being  such  an  one  as  I  hope  may  prevail  for  an  answer,  with  one  who 
seems  to  aim  at  nothing  more  than  that  good  work  of  instructing 
others. 

In  your  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  Prop.  VI. a 
[edit,  and,  pp.  69,  70]  you  propose  to  prove  the  infinity  of  omnipres- 
ence of  the  self-existent  Being.  The  former  part  of  the  proof  seems 
highly  probable ;  but  the  latter  part,  which  seems  to  aim  at  demon- 
stration,  is  not  to  me  convincing.  The  latter  part  of  the  paragraph  is, 
if  I  mistake  not,  an  entire  argument  of  itself,  which  runs  thus :  '  To 
suppose  a  finite  being  to  be  self-existent,  is  to  say  that  it  is  a  contradic- 
tion for  that  being  not  to  exist,  the  absence  of  which  may  yet  be  con- 
ceived without  a  contradiction  ;  which  is  the  greatest  absurdity  in  the 
world.'  The  sense  of  these  words  ['  the  absence  of  which ']  seems 
plainly  to  be  determined  by  the  following  sentence,  to  mean  its 
absence  from  any  particular  place.  Which  sentence  is  to  prove  it 
to  be  an  absurdity  ;  and  is  this  :  i  For  if  a  being  can,  without  a  contra- 
diction, be  absent  from  one  place,  it  may,  without  a  contradiction,  be 
absent  from  another  place,  and  from  all  places.'  Now  supposing  this 
to  be  a  consequence,  all  that  it  proves  is,  that  if  a  being  can,  without 
a  contradiction,  be  absent  from  one  place  at  one  time,  it  may,  without 
a  contradiction,  be  absent  from  another  place,  and  so  from  all  places,  at 
different  times ;  (for  I  cannot  see,  that  if  a  being  can  be  absent  from 
one  place  at  one  time,  therefore  it  may,  without  a  contradiction,  be 
absent  from  all  places  at  the  same  time,  i.e.  may  cease  to  exist.)  Now, 
if  it  proves  no  more  than  this,  I  cannot  see  that  it  reduces  the  supposi- 
tion to  any  absurdity.  Suppose  I  could  demonstrate,  that  any  par- 
ticular man  should  live  a  thousand  years ;  this  man  might,  without 
a  contradiction,  be  absent  from  one  and  from  all  places  at  different 
times  ;  but  it  would  not  from  thence  follow,  that  he  might  be  absent 

fl  P.  45,  edit.  4  ;  p.  4r,  edit.  6 ;  p.  43,  edit.  7 ;  p.  44,  edit,  8. 


I]  DR.    BUTLER   AND   DR.    CLARKE  34! 

from  all  places  at  the  same  time,  i.e.  that  he  might  cease  to  exist. 
No  ;  this  would  be  a  contradiction,  because  I  am  supposed  to  have 
demonstrated  that  he  should  live  a  thousand  years.  It  would  be 
exactly  the  same,  if,  instead  of  a  thousand  years,  I  should  say,  for 
ever  ;  and  the  proof  seems  the  same,  whether  it  be  applied  to  a  self- 
existent  or  a  dependent  being. 

What  else  I  have  to  offer  is  in  relation  to  your  proof,  that  the  self- 
existent  being  must  of  necessity  be  but  one.  Which  proof  is  as  follows, 
in  Prop.  VII.  b  [edit,  snd,  p.  74].  '  To  suppose  two  or  more  different 
natures  existing  of  themselves,  necessarily,  and  independent  from  each 
other,  implies  this  plain  contradiction  ;  that,  each  of  them  being  inde- 
pendent from  the  other,  they  may  either  of  them  be  supposed  to  exist 
alone  ;  so  that  it  will  be  no  contradiction  to  imagine  the  other  not  to 
exist,  and  consequently  neither  of  them  will  be  necessarily  existing.' 
The  supposition  indeed  implies,  that  since  each  of  these  beings  is 
independent  from  the  other,  they  may  either  of  them  exist  alone, 
i.  e.  without  any  relation  to,  or  dependence  on,  the  other  :  but  where 
is  the  third  idea,  to  connect  this  proposition  and  the  following  one, 
viz.  'so  that  it  will  be  no  contradiction  to  imagine  the  other  not  to 
exist  '  ?  Were  this  a  consequence  of  the  former  proposition,  I  allow 
it  would  be  demonstration,  by  the  first  corollary  of  Prop.  III.  c  [2nd 
edit.  p.  26]  but  since  these  two  propositions,  ['they  may  cither  of 
them  be  supposed  to  exist  alone,']  and,  ['  so  that  it  will  be  no  contra- 
diction to  imagine  the  other  not  to  exist/]  are  very  widely  different  ; 
since  likewise  it  is  no  immediate  consequence,  that  because  either  may 
be  supposed  to  exist  independent  from  the  other,  therefore  the  other 
may  be  supposed  not  to  exist  at  all  ;  how  is  what  was  proposed,  proved? 
That  the  propositions  are  different,  I  think  is  plain  ;  and  whether 
there  be  an  immediate  connection,  every  body  that  reads  your  book 
must  judge  for  themselves.  I  must  say,  for  my  own  part,  the  absurdity 
does  not  appear  at  first  sight,  any  more  than  the  absurdity  of  saying 
that  the  angles  below  the  base  in  an  isosceles  triangle  are  unequal  ; 
which  though  it  is  absolutely  false,  yet  I  suppose  no  one  will  lay  down 
the  contrary  for  an  axiom  ;  because,  though  it  is  true,  yet  there  is 
need  of  a  proof  to  make  it  appear  so. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  answered,  that  I  have  not  rightly  explained  the 
words,  '  to  exist  alone  ;  '  and  that  they  do  not  mean  only,  to  exist  inde- 
pendent from  the  other  ;  but  that  'existing  alone'  means  that  nothing 
exists  with  it.  Whether  this  or  the  other  was  meant,  I  cannot  deter- 
mine :  but,  whichever  it  was,  what  I  have  said  will  hold.  For  if  this 
last  be  the  sense  of  those  words,  ['they  either  of  them  may  be  sup- 
posed to  exist  alone  ;  ']  it  indeed  implies  that  it  will  be  no  contra  dic- 


b  P.  48,  edit.  4  ;  p.  44,  edit.  6  ;  p.  46,  edit.  7  ;  p.  47,  edit.  8. 
c  Pp.  1  6,  17,  edit.  4,  6,  7,  and  8. 


342 


CORRESPONDENCE   BETWEEN 


[CoRR. 


tion  to  suppose  the  other  not  to  exist  :  but  then  I  ask,  how  come 
these  two  propositions  to  be  connected ;  that  to  suppose  two  different 
natures  existing,  of  themselves,  necessarily  and  independent  from 
each  other,  implies  that  each  of  them  may  be  supposed  to  exist  alone 
in  this  sense  ?  Which  is  exactly  the  same  as  I  said  before,  only 
applied  to  different  sentences.  So  that  if  '  existing  alone '  be  under- 
stood as  I  first  took  it,  I  allow  it  is  implied  in  the  supposition  ;  but 
cannot  see  that  the  consequence  is,  that  it  will  be  no  contradiction  to 
suppose  the  other  not  to  exist.  But  if  the  words,  l  existing  alone,'  are 
meant  in  the  latter  sense,  I  grant,  that  if  either  of  them  may  be  sup- 
posed thus  to  exist  alone,  it  will  be  no  contradiction  to  suppose  the 
other  not  to  exist  :  but  then  I  cannot  see,  that  to  suppose  two  different 
natures  existing,  of  themselves,  necessarily  and  independent  from 
each  other,  implies  that  either  of  them  may  be  supposed  to  exist  alone 
in  this  sense  of  the  words  ;  but  only,  that  either  of  them  may  be  sup- 
posed to  exist  without  having  any  relation  to  the  other,  and  that  there 
will  be  no  need  of  the  existence  of  the  one  in  order  to  the  existence  of 
the  other.  But  though  upon  this  account,  were  there  no  other  prin- 
ciple of  its  existence,  it  might  cease  to  exist  ;  yet  on  the  account  of  the 
necessity  of  its  own  nature,  which  is  quite  distinct  from  the  other,  it 
is  an  absolute  absurdity  to  suppose  it  not  to  exist. 

Thus,  sir,  I  have  proposed  my  doubts,  with  the  reasons  of  them. 
In  which  if  I  have  wrested  your  words  to  another  sense  than  you 
designed  them,  or  in  any  respect  argued  unfairly,  I  assure  you  it  was 
without  design.  So  I  hope  you  will  impute  it  to  mistake.  And,  if  it 
will  not  be  too  great  a  trouble,  let  me  once  more  beg  the  favour 
of  a  line  from  you,  by  which  you  will  lay  me  under  a  particular 
obligation  to  be,  what,  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  I  now  am, 

Reverend  Sir, 

Nov.  4,  1/13.  Your  most  obliged  servant,  &c. 

II. 

THE  ANSWER. 
(B.) 

1.  C'arkc  contends  in  reply  that  if  necessary  self-existing  presence  can  be  dis- 
pensed icith  anywhere,  it  can  be  dispensed  icith  everywhere.     If  so,  his  argument 
holds. 

2.  Also  independent  self-existence  may  imply  solitary  self -existence  :  and  here, 
too,  he  holds  his  ground. 

SIB, 

~I~\ID  men  who  publish  controversial  papers  accustom  themselves  to 
J-'  write  with  that  candour  and  ingenuity,  with  which  you  propose 
your  difficulties,  I  am  persuaded  almost  all  disputes  might  be  very 


II]  DR.    BUTLER   AND   DR.    CLARKE  343 

amicably  terminated,  either  by  men's  coming  at  last  to  agree  in 
opinion,  or  at  least  finding  reason  to  suffer  each  other  friendly  to 
differ. 

Your  two  objections  are  very  ingenious,  and  urged  with  great 
strength  and  acuteness.  Yet  I  am  not  without  hopes  of  being  able 
to  give  you  satisfaction  in  both  of  them.  To  your  first,  therefore, 
I  answer  :  Whatever  may,  without  a  contradiction,  be  absent  from 
any  one  place,  at  any  one  time,  may  also,  without  a  contradiction,  be 
absent  from  all  places  at  all  times.  For,  whatever  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary at  all,  is  absolutely  necessary  in  every  part  of  space,  and  in  every 
point  of  duration.  Whatever  can  at  any  time  be  conceived  possible 
to  be  absent  from  any  one  part  of  space,  may  for  the  same  reason 
[viz.  the  implying  no  contradiction  in  the  nature  of  things]  be  con- 
ceived possible  to  be  absent  from  every  other  part  of  space  at  the  same 
time  ;  either  by  ceasing  to  be,  or  by  supposing  it  never  to  have  begun 
to  be.  Your  instance  about  demonstrating  a  man  to  live  a  thousand 
years,  is  what,  I  think,  led  you  into  the  mistake  ;  and  is  a  good 
instance  to  lead  you  out  of  it  again.  You  may  suppose  a  man  shall 
live  a  thousand  years,  or  God  may  reveal  and  promise  he- shall  live 
a  thousand  years ;  and  upon  that  supposition,  it  shall  not  to  possible 
for  the  man  to  be  absent  from  all  places  in  any  part  of  that  time. 
Very  true  :  but  why  shall  it  not  be  possible?  only  because  it  is  con- 
trary to  the  supposition,  or  to  the  promise  of  God  ;  but  not  contrary  to 
the  absolute  nature  of  things  ;  which  would  be  the  case,  if  the  man 
existed  necessarily,  as  every  part  of  space  does.  In  supposing  you 
could  demonstrate,  a  man  should  live  a  thousand  years,  or  one  year  ; 
you  make  an  impossible  and  contradictory  supposition.  For  though 
you  may  know  certainly  (by  revelation  suppose)  that  he  will  live  so 
long  ;  yet  this  is  only  the  certainty  of  a  thing  true  in  fact,  not  in 
itself  necessary  :  and  demonstration  is  applicable  to  nothing  but  what 
is  necessary  in  itself,  necessary  in  all  places  and  at  all  times  equally. 

To  your  second  difficulty,  I  answer :  What  exists  necessarily,  not  only 
must  so  exist  alone,  as  to  be  independent  of  any  thing  else  ;  but  (being 
self-sufficient)  may  also  so  exist  alone,  as  that  every  thing  else  may  pos- 
sibly (or  without  any  contradiction  in  the  nature  of  things)  be  supposed 
not  to  exist  at  all :  and  consequently,  (since  that  which  may  possibly 
be  supposed  not  to  exist  at  all,  is  not  necessarily  existent,)  no  other 
thing  can  be  necessarily  existent.  Whatever  is  necessarily  existing, 
there  is  need  of  its  existence  in  order  to  the  supposal  of  the  existence 
of  any  other  thing;  so  that  nothing  can  possibly  be  supposed  to  exist, 
without  presupposing  and  including  antecedently  the  existence  of  that 
which  is  necessary.  For  instance ;  the  supposal  of  the  existence  of  any 
thing  whatever  includes  necessarily  a  presupposition  of  the  existence 
of  space  and  time  ;  and  if  any  thing  could  exist  without  space  or  time, 
it  would  follow  that  space  and  time  were  not  necessarily  existing. 


344  CORRESPONDENCE   BETWEEN  [CoRR. 

Therefore,  the  supposing  any  thing  possibly  to  exist  alone,  so  as  not 
necessarily  to  include  the  presupposal  of  some  other  thing,  proves 
demonstrably  that  that  other  thing  is  not  necessarily  existing  ;  because, 
whatever  has  necessity  of  existence  cannot  possibly,  in  any  conception 
whatsoever,  be  supposed  away.  There  cannot  possibly  be  any  notion 
of  the  existence  of  any  thing,  there  cannot  possibly  be  any  notion  of 
existence  at  all,  but  what  shall  necessarily  preinclude  the  notion  of  that 
which  has  necessary  existence.  And  consequently  the  two  propo- 
sitions, which  you  judged  independent,  are  really  necessarily  con- 
nected. These  sorts  of  things  are  indeed  very  difficult  to  express,  and 
not  easy  to  be  conceived  but  by  very  attentive  minds :  but  to  such 
as  can  and  will  attend,  nothing,  I  think,  is  more  demonstrably 
convictive. 

If  any  thing  still  sticks  with  you  in  this  or  any  other  part  of  my 
books,  I  shall  be  very  willing  to  be  informed  of  it  ;  who  am, 

Sir, 
Your  assured  friend  and  servant, 

S.  C. 
Kov.  10,  1713. 

PS.  Many  readers,  I  observe,  have  misunderstood  my  second  general 
proposition  ;  as  if  the  words  ['  some  one  unchangeable  and  independent 
being,']  meant  [one  only— being  ;]  whereas  the  true  meaning,  and  all 
that  the  argument  there  requires,  is,  [some  one  at  least.]  That  there 
can  be  but  one,  is  the  thing  proved  afterwards  in  the  seventh  propo- 
sition. 


III. 
THE   SECOND   LETTER. 

(C.) 

Bailer  aryues  in  reply  that  ubiquity  and  self -existence  are  separable ;  and  We 
necessity  of  ubiquity  Jias  to  be  proved. 

On  the  second  head,  demands  1he  title  for  asserting  that  the  necessary  bcinj  is 
required  in  order  to  the  existence  of  any  other  being. 

REVEREND  SIR, 

T  HAVE  often  thought  that  the  chief  occasions  of  men's  differing  so 
-*-  much  in  their  opinions,  were,  either  their  not  understanding  each 
other  ;  or  else,  that,  instead  of  ingenuously  searching  after  truth,  they 
have  made  it  their  business  to  find  out  arguments  for  the  proof  of 


Ill]  DR.    BUTLER   AND   DR.    CLARKE  345 

what  they  have  once  asserted.  However,  it  is  certain  there  may  be 
other  reasons  for  persons  not  agreeing  in  their  opinions  :  and  where  it 
is  so,  I  cannot  but  think  with  you,  that  they  will  find  reason  to  suffer 
each  other  to  differ  friendly  ;  every  man  having  a  way  of  thinking, 
in  some  respects,  peculiarly  his  own. 

I  am  sorry  I  must  tell  you,  your  answers  to  my  objections  are  not 
satisfactory.  The  reasons  why  I  think  them  not  so  are  as  follow  : 

You  say,  'Whatever  is  absolutely  necessary  at  all  is  absolutely 
necessary  in  every  part  of  space,  and  in  every  point  of  duration.' 
Were  this  evident,  it  would  certainly  prove  what  you  bring  it  for  ;  viz. 
that  'Whatever  may,  without  a  contradiction,  be  absent  from  one 
place  at  one  time,  may  also  be  absent  from  all  places  at  all  times.'  But 
I  do  not  conceive,  that  the  idea  of  ubiquity  is  contained  in  the  idea  of 
self-existence,  or  directly  follows  from  it ;  any  otherwise  than  as, 
whatever  exists  must  exist  somewhere.  You  add,  '  Whatever  can  at 
any  time  be  conceived  possible  to  be  absent  from  any  one  part  of 
space,  may  for  the  same  reason  [viz.  the  implying  no  contradiction  in 
the  nature  of  things]  be  conceived  possible  to  be  absent  from  every 
other  part  of  space,  at  the  same  time.'  Now  I  cannot  see,  that  I  can 
make  these  two  suppositions  for  the  same  reason,  or  upon  the  same 
account.  The  reason  why  I  conceive  this  being  may  be  absent  from 
one  place,  is  because  it  doth  not  contradict  the  former  proof,  [drawn 
from  the  nature  of  things,]  in  which  I  proved  only  that  it  must  neces- 
sarily exist.  But  the  other  supposition,  viz.  that  I  can  conceive  it 
possible  to  be  absent  from  every  part  of  space  at  one  and  at  the  same 
time,  directly  contradicts  the  proof  that  it  must  exist  somewhere  ;  and 
so  is  an  express  contradiction.  Unless  it  be  said,  that  as,  when  we 
have  proved  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  equal  to  two  right  ones, 
that  relation  of  the  equality  of  its  angles  to  two  right  ones  will  be 
wherever  a  triangle  exists  ;  so,  when  we  have  proved  the  necessary 
existence  of  a  being,  this  being  must  exist  everywhere.  But  there  is 
a  great  difference  between  these  two  things  :  the  one  being  the  proof 
of  a  certain  relation,  upon  supposition  of  such  a  being's  existence  witli 
such  particular  properties ;  and  consequently,  wherever  this  being 
and  these  properties  exist,  this  relation  must  exist  too :  but  from  the 
proof  of  the  necessary  existence  of  a  being,  it  is  no  evident  consequence 
that  it  exists  everywhere.  My  using  the  word  demonstration,  instead  of 
proof  which  leaves  no  room  for  doubt,  was  through  negligence,  for  I  never 
heard  of  strict  demonstration  of  matter  of  fact. 

In  your  answer  to  my  second  difficulty,  you  say,  '  Whatsoever  is 
necessarily  existing,  there  is  need  of  its  existence,  in  order  to  the 
supposal  of  the  existence  of  any  other  thing.'  All  the  consequences 
you  draw  from  this  proposition,  I  see  proved  dernonstrably  ;  and  con- 
sequently, that  the  two  propositions  I  thought  independent  are  closely 
connected.  But  how,  or  upon  what  account,  is  there  need  of  the 


346  CORRESPONDENCE   BETWEEN  [CoRR. 

existence  of  whatever  is  necessarily  existing,  in  order  to  the  existence 
cf  any  other  thing?  Is  it  as  there  is  need  of  space  and  duration, 
in  order  to  the  existence  of  any  thing ;  or  is  it  needful  only  as  the 
cause  of  the  existence  of  all  other  things?  If  the  former  he  said, 
as  your  instance  seems  to  intimate  :  I  answer  ;  space  and  duration  are 
very  abstruse  in  their  natures,  and.  I  think,  cannot  properly  be  called 
things,  but  are  considered  rather  as  affections  which  belong,  and  in 
the  order  of  our  thoughts  are  antecedently  necessary,  to  the  existence 
of  a'l  things.  And  I  can  no  more  conceive  how  a  necessarily  existent 
being  can,  en  the  same  account,  or  in  the  same  manner  as  space  and 
duration  are,  be  needful  in  order  to  the  existence  of  any  other  being, 
than  I  can  conceive  extension  attributed  to  a  thought  ;  that  idea  110 
more  belonging  to  a  thing  existing,  than  extension  belongs  to  thought. 
But  if  the  latter  be  said,  that  there  is  need  of  the  existence  of  whatever 
is  a  necessary  being,  in  order  to  the  existence  of  any  other  thing ;  only 
as  this  necessary  being  must  be  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  all  other 
things :  I  think  this  is  plainly  begging  the  question  ;  for  it  supposes 
that  there  is  no  other  being  exists,  but  what  is  casual,  and  so  not 
necessary.  And  on  what  other  account,  or  in  what  other  manner  than 
one  of  these  two,  there  can  be  need  of  the  existence  of  a  necessary 
being  in  order  to  the  existence  of  any  thing  else,  I  cannot  conceive. 

Thus,  sir,  you  see  I  entirely  agree  with  you  in  all  the  consequences 
you  have  drawn  from  your  suppositions,  but  cannot  see  the  truth  of 
the  suppositions  themselves. 

I  have  aimed  at  nothing  in  my  style,  but  only  to  be  intelligible  ; 
being  sensible  that  it  is  very  difficult  (as  you  observe)  to  express  one's 
self  on  these  sorts  of  subjects,  especially  for  one  who  is  altogether 
unaccustomed  to  write  upon  them. 

I  have  nothing  at  present  more  to  add,  but  my  sincerest  thanks  for 
your  trouble  in  answering  my  letter,  and  for  your  professed  readiness 
to  be  acquainted  with  any  other  difficulty  that  I  may  meet  with  in  any 
of  your  writings.  I  am  willing  to  interpret  this,  as  somewhat  like 
a  promise  of  an  answer  to  what  I  have  now  written,  if  there  be  any 
thing  in  it  which  deserves  one. 

I  am, 

Reverend  Sir, 

Your  most  obliged  humble  servant. 
Nov.  23,  1713. 


IV]  DR.    BUTLER   AND   DR.    CLARKE  347 

IV. 

THE   ANSWER, 

(D.) 

Clarke  holds  in  reply  that  necessity  of  existence  is  original,  absolute,  and 
antecedent  to  all  besides ;  so  that  the  necessary,  if  anywhere,  must  for  the  same 
reason  be  everywhere. 

Declares  Butler  assumes  a  finite  necessary  being. 

On  No.  2  :  a  necessary  being  is  a  sine  qua  non  to  the  existence  of  any 
(  =  every}  other  being. 

SIR, 
TT  seems  to  me,  that  the  reason  why  you  do  not  apprehend  ubiquity 

to  be  necessarily  connected  with  self-existence,  is  because,  in  the 
order  of  your  ideas,  you  first  conceive  a  being,  (a  finite  being,  suppose,) 
and  then  conceive  self-existence  to  be  a  property  of  that  being  ;  as  the 
angles  are  properties  of  a  triangle,  when  a  triangle  exists  :  whereas,  on 
the  contrary,  necessity  of  existence,  not  being  a  property  consequent 
upon  the  supposition  of  the  things  existing,  but  antecedently  the  cau.-.e 
or  ground  of  that  existence  ;  it  is  evident  this  necessity,  being  not 
limited  to  any  antecedent  subject,  as  angles  are  to  a  triangle  ;  but 
being  itself  original,  absolute,  and  (in  order  of  nature)  antecedent  to 
all  existence  ;  cannot  but  be  everywhere,  for  the  same  reason  that  it  is 
anywhere.  By  applying  this  reasoning  to  the  instance  of  space,  you 
will  find,  that  by  consequence  it  belongs  truly  to  that  substance, 
whereof  space  is  a  property  d,  as  duration  also  is.  What  you  say  about 
a  necessary  being  existing  somewhere,  supposes  it  to  fce  finite  ;  and 
being  finite,  supposes  some  cause  which  determined  that  such  a  certain 
quantity  of  that  being  should  exist,  neither  more  nor  less  :  and  that 
cause  must  either  be  a  voluntary  cause ;  or  else  such  a  necessary  cause, 
the  quantity  of  whose  power  must  be  determined  and  limited  by  some 
other  cause.  But  in  original  absolute  necessity,  antecedent  (in  order 
of  nature)  to  the  existence  of  any  thing,  nothing  of  all  this  can  have 
place  ;  but  the  necessity  is  necessarily  everywhere  alike. 

Concerning  the  second  difficulty,  I  answer :  That  which  exists  neces- 
sarily, is  needful  to  the  existence  of  any  other  thing  ;  not  considered 
now  as  a  cause,  (for  that  indeed  is  begging  the  question,)  but  as  a  sine 
qua  ncn  ;  in  the  sense  as  space  is  necessary  to  every  thing,  and  nothing 
can  possibly  be  conceived  to  exist,  without  thereby  presupposing  space  : 
which  therefore  I  apprehend  to  be  a  property  or  mode  of  the  self- 


d  Or,  mode  of  existence. 


348  CORRESPONDENCE   BETWEEN  [CouR. 

existent  substance  ;  and  that,  by  being  evidently  necessary  itself,  it 
proves  that  the  substance,  of  which  it  is  a  property,  must  also  be 
necessary  ;  necessary  both  in  itself,  and  needful  to  the  existence  of  any 
thing  else  whatsoever.  Extension  indeed  does  not  belong  to  thought, 
because  thought  is  not  a  being  ;  but  there  is  need  of  extension  to  the 
existence  of  every  being,  to  a  being  which  has  or  has  not  thought,  or 
any  other  quality  whatsoever. 

I  am,  Sir, 

Your  real  friend  and